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CHAPTER I. 
Introduction 
Future historians of philosophy may well consider the 
most outstanding metaphysician, the revitalizer of metaphysics, 
of the first half of the twentieth century to be Alfred North 
Whitehead . In a century ushered in by the decline in its first 
decades of the traditional metaphysical schools of nineteenth 
century absolute idealism and mechanistic materialism, by the 
rise of strongly anti-intellectualistic movements, by the per-
sistent insistence of many worshippers at the shrine of 
science that metaphysics in any form is "non-sense," that 
knowledge of anything beyond convenient formulas for descrip-
tion and prediction of uniform sequences of sensations is im-
possible,l Whitehead stands as one of the most outstanding and 
certainly one of the most influential proponents of the empiri-
cal and rational right of man to satisfy his metaphysical 
intellectual curiosity. A new metaphysical synthesis, if not 
necessary, was at least highly desirable --a synthesis fully 
cognizant of and growing out of scientific advances and yet not 
arbltrarily restricted to the data of the physical and biolog-
ical sciences alone, a synthesis which would involve the 
reformulation of the presuppositions of the sciences themselves 
in order to make these presuppositions more adequate to the 
advancing superstructure of the particular sciences, a syn-
1. Of. Perry, PRP, Part IV, for a concise statement of the 
major philosophic trends at the turn of the century. 
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thesis wh ich would take into account the axiological factors 
motivating science and action in all fields . 
Whitehead was particularly qualified to attempt such a 
synthesis. Approaching metaphysi cs, as he did , throughmathe-
mati cs, phy sics, and philo~ophy of science, he could not be 
charged with not having an adequate background and understand-
ing of science. His already outstanding reputation in these 
fields co®nanded the respect and attention if not the agreement 
of a far wider audience than just technical philosophers. 
Accordingly, when Whitehead called into question the pre-
supposed methodolo gi cal materialism of nineteenth and early 
twentieth century science--"an assumption I shall chalenge as 
being utterly unsuited to the scientific situation at which we 
1 have now arrived" --his words carried the authority of a 
scientist as well as a philosopher. 
The nature of the metaphysical synthesis that Whitehead 
spent the later part of his life developing was intimated as 
early as 1919 in his investigation of philosophy of science 
itself. "The values of nature are perhaps the key to the 
2 
metaphysical synthesis of existence." As his metaphysical 
investigations advanced, Whitehead attempted to replace the 
Wfixed ••• , senseless, valueless, purposeless "3 materialistic 
1. s:rvm, 25-26. Unless otherwise noted all references will be 
to works by Whitehead, abbreviations to which are explained 
in the bib liog raphy. 
2. CON, 5. 
· 3. SM.Vv, 25. 
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hypothesis with that of a thoroughly dynamic, teleolo gical, 
axiocentric concept of the nature of reality and the universe 
as a whole. •neality ••• is activity emerg ing into individu-
alized value."1 N 1 Value 1 is the word I use for t h e intrinsic 
reality of an event.n 2 ~Self-realization is the ultimate fact 
of facts ••• Whatever is self-realizing is an actuality.n3 
While we are too close to Whitehead to judge what the 
lasting effect of his thought will be on the history of 
~ 
philosophy, his contemporary relevance can hardly be denied. 
Already the literature about Whitehead has passed the five-
foot bookshelf stage. No contemporary philosopher can very 
well aff ord to overlook his thought. · Particularly at the 
presen t time of unrest, when the search for meaning and value 
in existence has become a major preoccupation of men every -
where, Whitehead's attempt at a metaphysical value s ynthesis 
of existence is worthy of the closest consideration. The 
meeting of science and axiology may well be the major hope of 
avoiding cultural, racial, and species suicide. 
A. Problem and scope of this study. 
If value is the key to Whitehead's metaphysical synthesis 
of existence, then the question as to what the term value means 
for Whitehead, what the basic conditions of value are, and how 
the concept of valu e functions as a key to the metaphysical 
1. SMW, 287. 
2. SMW, 129-.30. 
3. PR, 340. 
synthesis of existence, would seem to be central to an under-
standing .of Whitehead's thought. Further, since Whitehead's 
metaphysical investigation followed a period of a search for 
a philosophy of science and then extended over a period of at 
least sixteen years 1 during which Whitehead continued to 
develop and elaborate his point of view, the nature of this 
development and change in relation to his value theory would 
seem to be integral to an understanding of that theory of 
value. According ly, the pro b lem of this d issertation is that 
of an investigation of the development of White head 1 s con-
ception of the nature of value and its basic categories and 
4 
the function of value as an integrating factor for his general 
metaphysical position. 
The problem of value is made complex by a number of fac-
tors. First, Whitehead does not in any one work or in any one 
place systematically develop his theory of value. The possib le 
ex ception to this statement mi ght be the two late articles 
" Mathematics and the Good '" and 11 Immortality•, 2 but it will be 
our content ion that these articles do not represent the major 
emphasis in Whitehead's theory of value, although the basis 
but not the body of this later view is present in earlier 
works. 
Second, Whitehead !s conception of the nature of value is 
1. From the public~tion of SMW in 1925 through Art. (1941) 1 
and Art. ( 1941) • . 
2. In Schilpp, PANW, 666-700, and Whitehead, ESP, 60-86. 
itself fluid, undergoing constant modification. While the 
line of development is relatively clear, the fact of develop-
ment has often been overlooked. 1 It is our contention that 
unless this developmental factor is kept well in mind, White-
head's theory of value approaches unintelligibility. 
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Third, although Whitehead develops a highly technical vo-
cabulary in order to "supply a closer approach to fully ex-
pressed propositions,n2 as a result of the developmental nature 
of b~s thought his use of terms is neither constant ncir always 
consistent. 3 The objectors to Whitehead's vocabulary have 
been numerous. 4 Unless it is realized that the vocabulary it-
self is fluid, it can easily become a major stumbling block to 
an understanding of Whitehead. The attempt to force on White-
head an exact consistency in the use of terms is pe r haps to 
distort his intent. Reality is not to be pigeon-holed by 
vocabulary. Whitehead points out: 
The position of metaphysics in the develop-
ment of a culture cannot be understood with-
out remembering that no verbal statement is 
the adequate expression of' a proposition. 
An old established metaphysical position gains 
a false air of adequate precision from the 
fact tbat its words and phrases have passed 
into current literature.5 
1. See below, sec. C, and note in particular the failure to 
recognize any difference between the position in PR and 
in Art.(l941)1 and Art.(l941)~ by such writers as Goheen, 
Art.(l941), 437-439, and Hudson, AOW, 114. 
2. PR, 18. 
3. E.g., note the difference between the meaning of the term 
"event" in P.NK (63), CON (166), SMW (174), and in PR (113). 
4. Of. Carr, Art.(l930), 157-163; Tennant, Art.(l927), 221-
228; Stebbing, Art.(l926)2, 380-385; Urban, Art.(l938), 
624-630. 
5. PR, 20. 
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The scope of this investigation will not involve a re-
iteration or even interpretation of all the phases and problems 
of Whitehead's metaphysics but rather it does involve concen-
tration on the problem of value itself and its role as a uni-
fying or synthetic factor in Whitehead's metaphysics. Our 
primary interest will center in the period of Whitehead's 
metaphysical investigations as such, extending from 1925 until 
his death in 1947. The major works of this period which we 
shall consider more or less in detail as related to the problem 
of value include ~ci~ ~nd the Mode~ World (1925), Religion 
in the Maki~ ( 1926), Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect 
(1927), Process and Reali~ (1929), Th~ Function of Reason 
(1929), !dv~ture of _!de~ (1933), Modes of ~hought (1938 ) 
which includes Nature ~~Life (1934), and the two articles in 
the Schilpp volume, The Philosopbl of Alfred Nort~ Whitehead 
(1941) in the "Library of Living Philosophersa series, 11 Mathe-
l 
matics and the Good 111 and 11 Immortality."' Besides the major 
works, we shall also consider, in so far as they are relevant 
to the problem at hand, the other articles written during this 
period, most of which are collected in .the volume Essa~ !!! 
Science and Philosophy (1947). 
Since our study is developmental we shall also be concerned 
with those factors in Whitehead's investigation of philosophy 
of the natural sciences which are most clearly antecedent to 
1. See bibliography for complete data. 
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the value concepts of his metaphysical investigations. Thus 
we shall first turn our attention to the major formulations 
of the natural science period which bear upon our pro blem in 
An Enquiry Con~rni~ the Principles of Natural Knowledge 
(1919), :Ehe Concep~ of Natur~ (1920), ~he Principle of Rela-
tivity (1922} , and articles from the period appearing in Aims 
of Education(l929) and various issues of the Proceeding~ of 
the Aristotelean Soci~. Excluded from our investi gation of 
this period will be any and all of Whitehead's considerations 
of mathematical and scientific doctrines as such. 1 
Further, since we are primarily concerned with Whitehead's 
metaphysical investigations as they bear on the problem of 
value, the primarily mathematical and logical works of· the 
period prior to 1919 will necessarily be eliminated. Thus the 
scope of this investigation makes necessary the exclusion of 
the followin g works by Whitehead: A Treatise on Universal 
Algebra (1898), The Axioms ~f Projective Geometry (1906), The 
Axioms of Descriptive Qeometry (1907), Principia Mathematica 
(1910-1913), and An Introduction to Mathematics (1911). 
B. Method of investi gation. 
The method of this investigation will be primarily develop-
mental, that is, an attempt will be made to point out the inter-
1. Thus, for example, we shall exclude from our investigation 
Whitehead's discussions of extensive abstraction and the 
technical sides of relativity appearing in PNK, CON, and 
POR, as being too technically scientific and irrelevant 
to t he immediate pro blem at hand. 
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nal factors in Vfuitehead's thought which gave rise to his con-
siderations of value and then follow the development of his 
thou ght a b out value throug h its various chronolo gical phases 1 
indicating additions, changes, and tendencies as they arise. 
While a general s y stematic exposition and criticism of the pre-
dominant value theory mi ght seem preferable for some writers, 
in the case of Whitehead such a procedure is all but impossible 
and would tend to lead to an oversimplification and distortion 
of Whitehead's developing point of view. Whitehead has not 
written one definitive work on value in light of whichtls other 
statements can b e interpreted. His own position is never 
static. His thought contains a constant yeasting factor as a 
result of which part of its contribution may ve r y well lie in 
the very ricb~ess of suggestion it contains as opposed to 
systematic completeness. To assume be f orehand that Whitehead's 
statements about value in Science and t he Modern World1 can be 
exactly equated with his statements about value in the article 
• L~ortality~2 is not only to overlook the intervention of six-
teen years of active thought on the subject but to ne gate 
Whitehead's own emphas i s on process, change, creativity, and 
development. 
A warning must be issued a gainst t he assumption prior to 
investigation that the last phases of Whitehead's thoug ht are 
1. 1925. 2 
2. Art.(l941). 
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necessarily the most adequate. Either the warrant for or t he 
negation of such an assertion can come only after our investi-
gation . Re gar d les s of whi ch phase or comb ination of phase s of 
his thought will a ppea r the most adequate, that whi ch must be 
guarded against in an investigation is a ri g idity of method-
olo gy which (l) would predetermine the results of our investi-
gation , or (2) would be unfair to the variety and richness or 
lack of it of Whitehead's thought, or (3) would force upon 
Whitehead criteria of adequacy he himself would not reco gnize. 
A developmental approach would seem to be least subject to 
such dangers. 
The further j ust ifica t ion of a developmental approach lies 
in our aim at sympathetic understanding and e xp osi t ion. It 
would see~ to u s tl~t before a pos i tion can be intelligently 
criticized internally or externally , positive ly or ne gatively, 
it must be sympathetically understood in its own pe rspective. 
It is our contention that such a perspective understanding can 
best be attained by followin g t h e line of its development. 
Thi s is not to say , however, that systema tic exposition, re-
construction, and ela boration will not be necessary for the 
establ ishment of such a perspe ctive development. The very lack 
of such formal exposition on Whitehead's part makes it all t he 
more necessary on ou r part in order to draw into focus White-
head's theory of value and its implications. In order to 
facilitate such an exposition our procedure will in general be 
as follows: After we have indicated t he factors in Whitehead's 
10 
formulation of a philosophy of the natural sciences pointing 
towards an axio-centric metaphysics, we shall consider in each 
of t he phases of h i s meta physical developmen t (1) the cond itions 
of valu e, (2) the nature of valu e and its implicat i ons, and (3) 
the role of value in the unity of the universe. An exception 
to thi s procedure will be found in Chapter V, ltAdventures in 
Value," where the last and major portion of the chapter will 
be devoted to a reconstruction of Whitehead's table of values. 
Since t he ai m of t h is study involves not only sympatn etic 
understanding but critical exposition as well, the problem of 
the adequacy of Whitehead's position and/or positions must also 
be considered. Presupposed as a basis for criticism, both 
po s itive and ne ga ti ve, will be the criterion which Whitehead 
himself proposes, i.e., coherence-- 11 the great preservative of 
rational sanity. • 1 With Whitehead, we shall be 6oncerned as 
to whether his v i ew is "coherent, lo g ical, and, in respect to 
its interpretation, a pplicable and adequate." 2 Whitehead 
elaborates t he conditions of coherence in The Function of Rea-
son as follows: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
( v) 
1. PR, 9. 
2. PR, 4. 
Conformity to i ntuitive experience: 
Clarity in propositional content: 
Internal lo g ical consistency: 
Exte r nal lo gical consistency: 
Status of a log ical scheme with, 
(a) widespread conformity to experience, 
(b) no dis c ordance with experi ence, 
(c) coherence among its categoreal notions, 
(d) methodolo gical consequences.l 
The most general positive and ne gative criticisms wi ll be re-
served for the final ch apt e r. However, specific criticisms 
will be ma de throu ghout our investigation at the points of 
their specific rel e vance. Critical comment by other investi-
gators will be considered in terms of the adequacy of such 
con~ents as they are specifically relevant to the points at 
issue. 
A separate g eneral historical orien tation has not been 
ll 
included. Rather the al t ernative has been taken of indicating 
major historical roots and similarities to contempora r y views 
either in the body of the text or in footnotes at t h e points 
of their greatest specific relevancy. This alternative has 
been ch osen (1) in order to stress the developmental features 
of White head's thought and (2) in order to avoid unnecessary 
repeti t ion. 
c. Work of previous investi gators. 
In spite of what will appear the centrality of Whitehead's 
theory of value to h i s entire metaphysical position, the amount 
1. FOR, 53. Cf. Bri ghtman, POR, 128 : "According to the cri-
terion of coherence, a proposition is to be treated as 
true if (1) it is self-consistent, (2) it is consistent 
with all the known facts of experience, (3) it is con-
sistent with other propositions held as true by the mind 
that is applying the criterion, (4) it establishes ex-
planatory and interpretative relations between the var-
ious parts of experience, (5) these relations include 
ali known aspects of experience and all known pro blems 
about experience in its details and as a whole." 
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of literature devoted to an exposition of and criticisms of his 
value theory is surprizingly small. While much of the White-
headean literature necessarily does contain reference to his 
value theory, in most cases the problem of value is not the 
central problem 1mder consideration and in many cases it re-
ceives only incidental mention. 
Two articles must be mentioned in particular as dealing 
directly with the problem of value: The first, by G. Morgan,l 
appeared under the title 11 Whitehead 1 s Theory of Value" in the 
International Journal of Ethics in 1937. 2 The second is an 
------------- ------- -- -----
article, "Whitehead's Theory of Value,~' by John Goheen in the 
Schilpp volQme, !he Philosop~ of !lfred !ortg Whitehead, 
1941, which volume also included Whitehead's articles "Mathe-
matics and the Goodu and ·"Im."'lortality." Of the two, Morgan's 
article, though without advantage of Mode~ of Thought and the 
late Whitehead articles, seems to us to approach more closely 
the essence of Whitehead's dominant position. 
While Morgan does not insist that theory of value is 
central to Whitehead's metaphysics, he does recognize that it 
is an integral part of Vfuitehead's general metaphysical po-
sition. "His philosophy includes values from the start and 
does not have to bring t h em in later as an apologetic after 
1. Morgan's first name is not given. 
2. G. Morgan, Art.(l937). 
thoug ht. 111 It is, Morgan points out, in Whitehead's concept 
of an actual entity as a 11 process of self-enjoyment" that 
Whitehead g ives ~his answer to the divorce between fact and 
2 
value." Morgan recognizes the affective, purposive, and 
factual nature of value for Whitehead. Yet at the same time, 
on the basis of a passage from !dventures of ~~3which, we 
shall claim, represents a secondary line of thoug ht pointing 
towards the article nnrumortality,* Morgan maintains that 
value for Whitehead is undefinable. He says, 
What does Whitehead mean by value? He in-
clines provisionally at least and without 
extended discussion to accept the adjective 
1good 1 in its most general sense as an 
ultimate notion 'not to ~e analyzed in terms 
of anything more final.' 
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Morgan points out that Whitehead d oes have a scale of 
values"5 ; however, he draws no distinction between the criteria 
of degrees of value of Scie~~ and th~ Modern ~orld and Pro-
~~ and Real~ on the one hand and the discussion of types 
of value in Adventures of Ideas on the other. 6 In spite of 
his contention that value for Whitehead is undefinable, Mor-
gan does insist that Whitehead's view of value is "essentially 
concrete" and that, as a result, 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
G. 
G. 
Whitehead 1s view would, therefore, convict 
several stock theories--hedonism or platon-
ism, for example--of the fallacy of 'mis-
placed concreteness. 1 The one deifies ab-
Morgan, Art .(l937), 308 . 6. Of. Go Morgan, Art. 
Morgan, Art. ( 1937) , 310. (1937), 311, 314-315. 
AOI, 190. Of. below, Chap. III, 
G. Morgan, Art.( l937), 309. sec. B, 2: Chap. IV_. 
G. Morgan, Art. (1937), 314 . sec.B; Chap.v. sec. 0. 
stractions, the other abstracts fro~ full-
bodied flavor of individual values. 
14 
John Goheen has the added advantage over G. Morgan of hav-
ing availab le at the time of the writing of his article 2 all 
of Wh i tehead's works with the possi ble exception of w·Imrnorta l -
ity.n3 Yet he fails to recognize that Whitehead's theory has 
underg one any significant change. ~s a result he attempts to 
encompass as part of the same theory the statement from 
Scien~ an<! the Modern World, '' 'Value 1 is the word I use f'or 
the intrinsic reality of an event, ~4 and such a statement from 
• Mathematics and t h e Good• as "Thus the infusion of pattern 
into natural occurrences, and the stabili tl of such pattern, 
and t he mod ification of such patterns, is the necessary con-
dition for the realization of the Good. '"'5 It is not surprizing , 
in li ght of this, that Goheen shou ld find a basic internal 
weakness in Whitehead's theory of value. It has, Goheen in-
sists, 11 t wo distinct parts, i.e., (1) t he doctrine of pattern 
or form (the general formula of the Good, 'finitude, 1 1unity 1 ), 
6 
and (2) the doctrine of feelin g ." Ri ghtly, it seems to us 
Goheen objects that t h ese t wo parts are not brought together. 
1. G. Morgan, Art.(l937), 3 12 . 
2. Goheen, Art.(l941), 437-459. 
3. Goheen acknowledges his indebtedness to Whitehe ad for per-
mission to consult the article "Mathematics and the Good• 
in manuscript form. (Goheen, Art./!9417, 437 fn.) He does 
not, however, me n tion "Immortalityn- nor does he refer to it 
in the text of his article. 
4. Goheen, Art.(l941), 439. SMW , 136. 
5. Goheen, Arf.(l941), 439. Underlining Goheen's. Whitehead, 
Art.(l941) , 677-678. 
6. Goheen, Art.(l941), 458. 
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Whitehead ha~ not supplied the 'middle principles.••1 The 
possibility Goheen does not consider is that he is not talking 
about two parts of one value theory but two distinct theories 
of value. This possibility at least should be examined. In 
relation to the "theory of feeling " Goheen does say, 
The theory of feeling which is developed 
by Whitehead as a description of the nature 
of events, ma,y find its most important ap-
plication in interpretation of value.2 
With this statement in relation to what we shall call White-
head's dominant theory of value we would be in substantial 
agreement , but it mi ght be added, Whitehead himself goes a 
long way towards developing that application. 
Contained in the Schilpp volume along with the article 
by Goheen are a series of articles bearing on phases of the 
problem of value as it presents itself in the various axio-
log ical disciplines and in relation to the concept of God. 
Mention must be made of the following: Bertram Morris, "The 
Art-process and Aesthetic Fact in Whitehead's Philosophy, 113 
Julius Seelye Bixler, "Whitehead 1 s Philosophy of Religion, n 4 
Charles Hartshorne, "Whitehead 1 s Idea of God, tt 5 and Paul 
Schilpp, 111Whitehead 1 s Moral Philosophy • .!f 6 Attention will be 
called to these at their points of relevance in our exposition. 
In regard to the concept of importance and its relation 
to value, attentlon must be called to an article by Dorothy 
1. Goheen, Art.(l94l), 
2. Goheen, Art.(l94l), 
3. Morris, Art.(l941), 
4. Bixler, Art.(l94l), 
458. 
459. 
461-468. 
487-511. 
5. Hartshorne, Art.(l941), 
513-559. 
6. Schilpp, Art.(l941), 561-
618. 
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Emmet, nOn the Idea of Importance, 111 appearing in Philosoph;y:_ 
in 1946. Miss Emmet suggests the use of importance as • the 
generic term for value 112 in Whi tehead. She adds, however, 
that for Whitehead "importance itself is an intr:tnsic value."3 
Bo th of these su ggestions will be considered when we come to 
the conce pt of importance, first, in the period of Science and 
the Modern World and Religion 1~ !he ~aking, 4 and, second, when 
we come to Whitehead's more extended treatment of Importance 
in Modes o t· Thought. 5 
Two dissertations have been written from the poin t of view 
of a co mparison of Whitehead's t heory of value with that of 
othe r contemporary philosophers. First, Edmund Thompson in 
1935 completed a dissertation at the University of Chicag o e n -
titled An Analysis of th~ Thought of !lfre~ North Whi teh~~ and 
6 Willia~ Ernest Hocki~ Concerning Q£Od and ~vil. Second, Ro ger 
Hazelton in 1937 completed a dissertation for Yale University 
entitled The Relation Between Value and Existence in t he 
------- ----- --- -- ---
Philosophies of ~icolai gartmann and Alfred North Wh.!_teb~~. 7 
Thompson tends to emphasize the pattern feat ure of Whitehead's 
theory of value, 8 whereas Hazelton tends to emphasize the 
atomic nature of· value for Whitehead. 9 Perhaps the most t ypi-
1. Emmet, Art.(l946 ), 234-244. Miss Emmet's book, WPO, is of 
value as a gene ral expos i tion and commentary bn Whitehead's · 
metaphysical posit i on up through PR. 
2. Emmet, Art.(l946), 234. 6. Thompson, ATWH . 
3. Emmet, Art.(l946), 236 . · 7. Hazelton, VEHW. 
4. Chap. II I , sec. B, 2. 8 . Thompson, ATWH , 103. 
5. Chap. V, sec. A, 2. 9. Hazelton, VEWN, 263-264. 
cal summary of statement of Thompson is the followin g : 
Good and Evil are descriptive adjectives 
which are to be applied to processes in 
accordance as those processes support or 
obstruct the actualization of progressively 
more comprehensive systems of patterns.l 
Hazelton, on the other hand, contends that 
t he fact that Whitehead restricts 'value' 
to the atomic world of actual entities 
warrants the charge that his theory of 
values is contradicted by h i s whole meta-
physics. The principles to which his 
metaphysics have directed us--those of 
continuity, relatedness, and participation 
--prohibit that value alone among all the 
topics of metaphysics should claim ex-
ception from them.2 
It would hardly seem possible that Thompson and Hazelton are 
writing about the same person. 
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Not only does Hazelton contend that Whitehead's theory of 
value and metaphysics contradict each other, he also insists 
that Whitehead makes no distinction between extrinsic or in-
strumental value and intrinsic value. 3 The contention of this 
investi gation to the contrary will be that Whitehead's doc-
trine of the relation of intrinsic and instrumental value to 
each other is one of the most striking and significant features 
of his value theory. Hazelton's view that Whitehead's meta-
physics and theory of value are contradictory seems to us to 
involve a basic misunderstanding either of Whitehead's meta-
physics or of his theory of value or of both. Neither Thomp-
son nor Hazelton take into account the developmental nature 
1. Thompson, ATWH, 103. 
2. Hazelton, WEKW, 264. 
3. Hazelton, VEIDV, 239-240. 
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of Whitehead 1 s thought. Since, however, both were writing 
prior to Modes £f Thought, the changing character of Whitehead's 
later thought was by no means so obvious as it later became. 
Of particular interest in relation to the problem of value 
among sources not primarily devoted to White head's theory of 
value is . the excellent study of William P. McEwen, Whitehead's 
Metaphysical Interpretation £f the Meani£g and Qrowt£ of ~ 
Hum~ Individual. 1 McEwen stresses the teleological or self-
causative c hara cter of value expe rience as a salient featu re 
of personal experience.2 However, at the same time he con-
tends that •both sensa and value-experiences are g iven for 
the concrete growth of human personality .ft3 While there is a 
sen se in whi ch t h is can be maintained, yet as an achievement, 
as attained purpose, it would hardly seem that 11 g iven 11 is an 
accurate descr i pti on of value itself. Perhaps a more accurate 
statement would seem to be that possibilities or potentiali-
ties for value are g iven whereas the value itself' is attained 
experience. 
One further dissertation should be mentioned as relevant 
to the problem of value, that of James Hudson, The Doctr ine 
of Actual Occasio~ 1£ Whitehead, submitted at Boston Univer-
sity in 1947. Hudson devotes a chapter to Whitehead's theory 
of value in its relations to actual occas i ons. 4 He takes into 
1. McEwen, WMI, Cf. also McEwen, Art.(l943). 
2. McEwen, WMI, 109, 129-131. 
3. McEwen, WMI, 194. 
4. Hudson, AOW , 114-138. 
account the whole of Whitehead's metaphysical writings out he 
does not point out any change in Whitehead's point of view. 
As a resul t , he attempt s to harmonize the early and late 
writing s wi th some difficulty. Interpreting the word "event ' 
in terr~ of its use in Process and Reali!l, 1 Hudson says, 
Value and fact always have relevance for 
each other. The relevance is mutual. 
The notion of relevance is made into id-
entity by Whitehead in the remark: 'Value 
is the word I use for the intrinsic reali-
ty of an event. 1 An event is a nexus of 
occasions. Actual occasions thus belong 
to the intrinsic reality of an event. It 
follows that value and actual occasions 
r efer to each other. In fact values are 
in actual occasions as such. This is 
explicit~y Whitehead's position as is shown 
by the statement: 1For the actuality is the 
event.' 2 
Yet having established the identity of occasions and value in 
spite of the !~ de force of interpreting Science ~nd t he 
Modern World in terms of the vocabulary of Pro~ and 
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Reality, Hudson proceeds to identify values a nd universals on 
the basis of the article "Immortality. ~3 Just how values could 
be universals and yet be identical with actual occas ions Hud-
son never makes clear. Further, Hudso n cont e nds, it is in his 
account o f value tba t one sees 11 the e mergen ce of Vlhi tehead 1 s 
realism. n4 It will be our contention to the contrary t ha t it 
is by the virtue of his insistence on the identity of actual 
1. PR, 113. 
2. Hudson, AOW, 114-115. Q.uotations .from SlVfW, 13 1 and 149. 
3. Hudson, AO, 116: nvalues ••• may be called universals.~ 
In support of this he quotes Whitehead, Art.(1941)2, 684. 
4. Hudson, AOW, 115. 
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occasions and value, in li ght of his definition of value, that 
Whitehead most clearly places himself within the camp of ideal-
ism. Hudson, on the other hand, holds to the position that 
by positing value as the intrinsic real-
ity of an event Whitehead , in contrast to 
Brightman, g ives evidence of a tendency 
towards impersonalism in his interpreta-
tion of value because actual occasions, 
the scene of value events, are far less 
than persons .1 
It must be recalled that Brightman distinguishes between per-
sons and selves of a minimum nature 2 and nowhere restricts 
values just to persons . 
The most significant developmental study of Whi t ehead to 
date is the excellent article, "Whitehead's Philos ophical 
Development," by Victor Lowe in the Schilpp volume on White-
head mentioned a bove. 3 Lowe traces the development of White-
head's t h ought from the Universal Algebra (1 89 8 ) up to 1941, 
or from Whitehead's primary interest in mathematics throug h 
mathematical lo g ic, then the philos o phy of science, and finally 
through metaphysics. While Lowe's task is much broader in 
scope than the development of Whitehead 's theory of value, 
the fruitfulness of his investigation for a general understand-
ing of Whitehead 's philosophical positi on and its genesis 
would seem to indicate t h e pos s i b ility of an equally fruitful 
result fror:1 a developmental investi gation of Whitehead 's theory 
of value. It is to this task that t h is study shall be devoted. 
1. Hudson , AOW, 115. 
2. Bri g htman, POR, 351 . 
3 . Lowe, Art.(l941), 15-124. 
CHA PTER II. 
The Preparation in Natural Science. 
Whitehead's life work may conveniently be divided into 
three parts of phases as long as it is kept clearly in mind 
that these periods are not to be considered as unrelated or 
completely new departures. Rather Whitehead's development 
follows a natural critical progression from more restricted 
to more inclusive fields impelled in each case by the grasp 
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of basic problems within the narrower field which could only 
be solved for him as seen and struggled with in wider con-
texts. His was the Faustian and pioneer spirit which refuses 
to rest satisfied with the accomplishments of the specialist 
in narrower areas as long as new problems open out, further 
presuppositional paths are still open for investigation, or 
the widest horizons of understanding have not at least been 
tackled. 
The first and longest period of Whitehead's work , extend-
ing from the publication of! Treatise ~ Univers a l Algebra in 
1898 up to t he publication of An Enquiry Concerning !he Prin-
cipl~ of Natural Knowledge in 1919, was devoted primarily to 
theoretical mathematics and logic. The greatest achievement 
of this period was undoubtedly Principia ~athematica (1910-
1913) written in collaboration with Bertrand Russell. The 
second and shortest period extends from The Organisation of 
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1 Thought in 1917 up to Sci~ce and the Modern World published 
in 1925 and is characterized by the attempt to formulate a 
philosophy of the natural sciences and their presuppositions. 
The third or metaphysical period beginning with Science and 
the Modern ~orld and continuing, as far as publication is con-
cerned, through the article 11 Immortality11 pu-blished in 1941 
was his greatest productive period with its high point the 
publication of Process ~~ ~ealit~ in 1927. 
It is with the last period that we shall be most vitally 
concerned for, as is to be expected, Whitehead's concept of 
the axio-centric universe is a product of his deepest meta-
physical considerations. We shall exclude the mathematical 
and logical considerations of the first period as beyond the 
scope of our investigation as also the purely scientific and 
mathematical aspects of the natural science period. Yet in 
retrospect the natural science period can well be considered 
a transition phase from mathematics to metaphysics. Because 
of this it is only natural that many of the later conceptions 
so vi tal to Whitehead 1 s theory of value either have their 
direct origin or their germinal predecessors in the natural 
2 
science period. Our immediate task likes in making explicit 
1. There is an overlapping of two years, 1917-1919, which can 
be considered as belonging to both the natural science and 
mathematical periods. 
2. For an excellent discussion of the development of Whitehead's 
general philosophic position and the emergence of problems 
in the mathematical period see Lowe, Art.(l941), particularly 
24-25 and 33. 
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the factors in Whitehead's philosophy of science directly 
antecedent to his later value considerations. 
1. Knowledge of Nature. 
It is a matter of basic importance from the standpoint of 
our investigation to discover what task Whitehead set for him-
self in the natural science period, for it is on the basis of 
his work in this period that he has most often been classified 
as an epistemological and metaphysical realist. 1 By selective 
reading it would be possible to construe some of Whitehead's 
statements of this period as anti-metaphysical and positivis-
tic.2 To those who had identified Whitehead's thought too 
closely with its seeming positivistic and realistic strands 
Science and the Modern World came as a shock and about face on 
Whitehead's part.3 Our contention to the contrary is that 
:Science and the Modern World is a natural outgrowth of hi_s 
previous investigations. That there are realistic tendencies 
present in this period would be hard to deny. But to contend 
that Whitehead was thoroughly committed to realism, or that he 
~ anti-metaphysica~ or that he was opposed to value considera-
tion, or that he was an epistemological monist of the nee-
realistic variety would seem to us to be contrary to his major 
contentions. In order to indicate Whitehead's major direction 
during this period and to show that the passages most often set 
1. Cf. Bowman, ASU, 88; Lowe, 
599; Perry, PRP, 219. 
2. Cf. Whitehead, CON, 3. 
3. Stabbing, Art.(l928), 116. 
Art.(l941),79-82; Metz, HYPB, 
forth in support of the above contentions are capable of 
quite different interpretation in light of Whitehead's avowed 
purpose, we shall briefly examine what Whitehead considered 
the nature and task of science to be, what he considered the 
task of ~philosophy of the sciences 111 to be, and what he meant 
by the "nature" in such a context. 
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In accordance with the English empirical tradition of 
which he was a part, Whitehead insists that the field of science 
is the field of experience. "Its task is the dis co very of the 
relations which exist within that flux of perceptions, sensa-
tions, and emotions which forms our experience of life." 1 As 
early as 1911 Whitehead indicated that the aim of science in 
the discovery of such relat i ons is ~to see what is general in 
what is particular and what is permanent in what is transi-
tory." 2 The experience with which science starts is essen-
tially chaotic and unorganized. 
The most obvious aspect of this field of 
experience is its disorderly character. 
It is for each person a continuum, frag-
mentary, and with elements not-c!early 
differentiated ••• ! insist on the radi-
cally untidy, ill-adjusted character of 
the fields of agtual experience from which 
science starts. 
1. AOE, 157. Unless otherwise noted all references will be to 
works by Whitehead, abbreviations to which are explained in 
the bibliography. 
2. ITM, 4. 
3. AOE, 157 . Note also the following: "My point in this res:p3 ct 
is that Jragmentary individual experiences are all that we 
know, and that all speculation must start from these disjecta 
membra as its sole datum. It is not true that we are directly 
aware of a smooth running world, which in our speculations we 
are to conceive as given. In my view the creation of bhe 
world is the first unconscious act of speculative thought; 
and the first task of a self-conscious philosophy is to ex-
plain how it has been done." Art.(l916), 122. 
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The starting point of science, then, is the given content of 
consciousness in all its diversity. Science is what Whi t ehea.d 
calls "the thought organisation of experience." 1 Organiza-
tion he defines as "the adjustment of diverse elements so that 
their mutual relations may exhibit some predetermined quality."2 
But not all organization of experience is science. Science in-
volves abstraction. While it is concrete in the sense of re-
lational, it is abstract in the sense that as science it deals 
purely with matters-of-fact abstracted from value considera-
tions. 
The characteristic of physical science is, 
that it ignores all judgments of value: for 
example, aesthetic or moral judgments. It 
is purely matter-of-fact, and this is the 
sense in which we must interpret the sonorous 
phrase, "Man the servant and the minister of 
Nature. " 3 
The exclusion of value considerations from scientific in-
vestigation does not, however, mean that value is irrelevant 
to scientific endeavor. The aim of science, as Whitehead re-
states it in 1917, is that of "harmonising our reflective and 
derivative thoughts involved in immediate apprehension of sense-
presentation114 which in turn involved "(1) the production of 
theory which agrees with experience; and {2) the explanation 
of commonsense concepts of nature, at least in their main out-
1. AOE, 157. 
2. AOE, 153. 
3. AOE, 180. This concept of 
the abstract nature of science 
carries over to and explains 
Whitehead's later statement 
that nature is also an ab-
straction from something 
more concrete. POR, 63. 
See below on nature. 
4. AOE, 185. 
lines.•1 The scientist attempts to construct a unified con-
ception of nature which unites, harmonizes, and makes sig-
nificant the chaotic world of sense-presentation. His search 
is for "permanence; uniformity, and simplicity of logical re-
lation."2 But this aim itself rests back upon and must be 
judged in terms of value and concrete concepts of existence. 
Accordingly, Whitehead insists that metaphysical "inquiry is 
a necessary critique of the worth of science to tell us what 
it all comes to.~3 Value considerations form the motivation 
to and basis for science, and without these there could be no 
science. Whitehead sums up the relation of scientific en-
deavor and value by saying, 
Judgments of worth are no part of the texture 
of physical science, but they are part of the 
motive of its production. Mankind have raised 
the edifice of science, because they have 
judged it worthwhile. In other words, the 
motives involve innumerable judgments of 
value. Again, there has been conscious selec-
tion of the parts of the scientific field to 
be cultivated, and this conscious selection 
involved judgments of value. These values may 
be aesthetic, or moral, or utilitarian ••• 
But whatever the motive, without4 judgments of value there would be no science. 
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The result of scientific investigation is a world of hypo-
thetical thought constructs. Present experienced facts of 
science are not complex objects external to us but the present 
content of consciousness. This content includes a stream of 
sense-presentations but more than this. "We find ourselves 
1. AOE, 186. 3. AOE, 180 
2. AOE, 228. 4. AOE, 228-229. 
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with emotions, volitions, imaginations, conceptions, and 
judgments. No factor which enters into consciousness is by 
itself, or can even exist in insolation.ft 1 The world of nature 
of science and of common sense on which science is based and 
to which it must return2 is a conceptual hypothetical world. 
The material universe is largely a concept of 
the imagination which rests upon a slender 
basis of direct sense-presentation. But none 
the less it is a fact; for it is a fact that 
we actually imagine it. Thus it is actual in 
our consciousness just as sense-presentation 
is actual there. 
The refined world of science is a world of more or less per-
fectly defined concepts4 and these concepts in turn become 
facts for science. Even the simplest percept ion involves 
judgment. Thus Whitehead says, 
So far as physical a cience is concerned, the 
facts are thoughts, and thoughts are facts. 
Namely, the facts of sense-presentation as they 
affect science are those elements in the im-
mediate apprehension which are thoughts. Also, 
actual thought expressions, primary and second-
ary, are the material facts which science 
interprets.5 
It becomes evident at once that at lea~t at the opening 
of his natural science investigations Whitehead was far from 
asserting a realistic metaphysics in the usual sense of the 
term realism. His posit :!. on is far more Kantian than has 
often been recognized. But neither is he asserting epiate-
mological idealism. The epistemolo gical dualism first appear-
1. AOE, 196. 
2. AOE, 159. 
3. AOE, 199. Cf. B. Russell, 
"'Matter' is a convenient 
formula for describing what 
happens where it isn't.• 
OOP, 152-153. 
4. AOE, 158. 
5. AOE, 184. 
ing in An Introduction to Mathematics 1 is reasserted. 
There is also the relation of a perceiving 
consciousness to an entity which does not 
exist in virtue of being part of the content 
of that consciousness. Such a relation, so 
far as it is known to the perceiving con-
sciousness, must be an inferred relation, 
the inference being derived from an analysis 2 
of the content of the perceiving consciousness. 
3 Further, the doctrine of significance tends to carry this 
4 dualism throughout the natural science period. For the time 
being at least Whitehead is making no claim as to the nature 
1. ITM, 5. • we ascr ibe the origin of these sensat i omto re-
lations between things which form the -external world. • 
2. AOE, 230. Note also the following statement made to the 
Aristotelean Society in 1916: "We mus t not slip into the 
fallacy of assuming that we are comparing a given world 
wi tb. given perceptions of it. The physical world is in 
s orne general sense of the term a deduced concept. 11 · Art. 
( 191.6 ) 1 12 9 • 
3. See below, sec~ c. 
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4. Whitehead's account of scientific construction can be com-
pared with tba t of Eina tein. Einstein says, 11 Phys leal con-
cepts are free constructions of the human mind, and are not, 
however it may seem, uniquely determined by the external 
world.* (Einstein and Infeld, EOP, 33.) Whitehead seems to 
be drawing a distinctionsimilar to that of Brightman be-
tween the Situation-Experience~ and the Situation Believed-
in (Brightman, POR, 347-348.) 
A.O.Lovejoy spends some effort trying to prove that while 
Whitehead thinks himself to be a realistic epistemological 
monist he really is a dualist. He concludes by saying, '"Thus 
we see the 'bifurcation of nature' roundly denounced in the 
preamble a nd plainly affirmed in the conclusion." (Lovejoy, 
RAD, 1"88}. It is our contention that Whitehead did not con-
aider himself as Lovejoy would have us think. The bifurca-
tion to which Whitehead objected in the second chapter of 
The Concept of Nature most often quoted by Lovejoy is that 
or-primary ana aeconaary qualities, of "psychic additions• 
(CON, 29) as necessary to a concept of nature. He is object-
ing to the view that electrons should be considered real on 
the one hand while color, sound, and taste are considered 
merely "the by-play of the mind... (CON, 30.) The concept 
of nature must include both as real and integrally related. 
Whitehead proceeds to warn the reader against taking his 
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of the reality to which the contents of consciousness refer. 
If the sciencrerelate and interpret sense-presentation 
in terms of harmonious thought the next question which arises 
is that of the nature o.f' the task of philosophy of science. 
With this question we move into the major works of the natural 
science period. In the earlier The ~rganisation of Thought 
(1917), after pointing out the conceptual nature of the 
scientific world view, Whitehead phrased what he considered 
the fundamental question of philosophy of science to be as 
follows: 
My contention is, that this world is a world 
of ideas, and that its internal relations are 
relations between abstract concepts, and that 
the elucidation of the precise connection 
between this world and the feelings of actual 
experience is the fund~mental question of 
scientific philosophy. 
However Whitehead's clearest statements appear in the opening 
paragra phs of The Concept £! Nat~. The aim or ideal of 
philosophy in the widest sense "is the attainment of some 
unifying concept which will set in assigned relationships 
within itself all that there is for knowledge, for feeling, and 
statements in the sense Lovejoy does. •we are merely en-
deavouring to exhibit the type of relations which hold be-
tween the entities which we in fact perceive as nature. We 
are not called on to make any pronouncement as to the 
psychological relation of subject to objects or as to the 
status of either in the realm of reality." (CON, 46) He 
adds, "it is difficult for a philosopher to realise that 
anyone really is confining his discussion within the limits 
which I have set before you.• (CON, 4 8.) It would seem 
that Lovejoy has not realized it. 
1. AOE, 158. 
1 for emotion." The aim of philosophy of science as of phil-
osophy in general is unity but a more specific unity. 
The philosophy of science is the endeavour 
to express explicitly those unifying charac-
teristics which produce that complex of 
thoughts and make it to be a science. The 
philosophy of the sciences--conceived of as 
one subject--is the endeavour to exhibit a.ll 
sciences as one science, or--in case of d~~ 
feat--the disproof of such a possibility. 
Whitehead proceeds then to limit his discussion to the search 
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for the unifying concepts or philosophy of the natural 
sciences, "the sciences whose subject matter is nature."3 The 
job of philosophy of science is one of integration, of putting 
together the loose ends, of unifying, of forming the total con-
cept of nature as conceived by the sciences and on the basis 
of ordinary perception. But as a correlate, philosophy of' 
science investigates the presuppositions of the sciences as 
well. 
Thus the philosophy of science only differs 
from any of the special sciences by the fact 
that it is nat~~al science at the stage before 
it is convenient to split it up into its 
various branches. This philosophy exists 
because there is something to be said befor~ 
we commence the process of differentiation. 
Or again, in the same passage he states, "The philosophy of 
science is the endeavour to formulate the most general 
characteristics of the things observed. 115 That which is ob-
served, according to Whitehead, is nature. 
1. CON, 2. 4. POR, 5. 
2. CON, 2. 5. POR, 5. 
3. CON, 2. 
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If, then, the natural sciences are to be defined in terms 
of their suoject-matter, i.e., nature, and the unity of the 
subject-matter is the condition of the unity of the sciences 
and thus of the philosophy of the sciences, a definition of 
nature would seem in order. The definition which Whitehead 
gives is the major basis for the contention that Whitehead is 
a realist as well as one of the major sources of conflict 
among his reviewers and commentators. Whitehead's definition 
is: 
Nature is that which we observe in perception 
through the senses. In this sense-perception 
we are aware of something which is not thought 
and which is self-contained for thought. This 
property of being self-contained for thought 
lies at the basis of natural science. It means 
that nature can be thought of as a closed system 
whose mutual relations do not require the ex- 1 pression of the fact that they are thought about. 
Not only is nature "self-contained for thought," it is also 
"self-contained as against sense-awareness."2 We no more have 
to think about the process of sense-awareness to think about 
nature than we have to think about thought to think about 
nature. In An En~uiry Conc~in~ the Principles of Natural 
Knowledge Whitehead states, "We are concerned only with nat~ 
that is, with the object of perceptual knowledge, and not with 
the synthesis of the knower and the known." 3 Accordingly, 
Whitehead concludes, I will also express this self-containedness 
4 
of nature by saying that nature is closed to mind." 
1. CON, 3. 3. PNK, vii. 
2. CON, 4. 4. CON, 4. 
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The claim that nature is closed to mind considered with 
the claim that nature is the terminus of sense-perception and 
the immediately following attack on •bifurca tion1t aroused con-
siderable controversy and objection. Rudolph Metz, for example, 
suggests, 
One might be attempted to accuse Whitehead 
of a bifurcation such as he has reproached 
other thinkers with. This is the thesis 
that has become famous, that nature is closed 
to mind; or, as Whitehead puts it, nature 
is completely self-contained and self-
sufficient. But the question how it is possi-
ble that natural philosophy should break off 
all relations with mind, though all knowledge 
is conditioned by the percipient subject, re-
ceives no satisfactory answer from him.l 
Susan Stebbing, while very much in favor of the exclusion of 
epistemology from the field of nature, 2 is yet bothered by 
somewhat the same seeming dichotomy and seeming contradiction 
as Metz, for she asks, "But is it possible to assign without 
reference to mind any meaning to the 'immediacy'?" 3 
Aside from the contention that Whitehead has divided the 
undividable, the argument is also advanced that by his con-
ception of nature Whitehead has committed hi!TISelf to realism, 
nee-realism, and/or naturalism. Again Metz says, 11 Whitehead's 
standpoint as natural philosopher ••• is outspokenly realistic 
and naturalistic," though he adds, "although ••• nothing is 
4 prejudiced against the future metaphysician." Bowman insists 
1. Metz, HYBP, 600. 
2. "This contention seems to me unquestionably sound." Art. 
( 1924) , 290. 
3. Stebbing, Art.(l924), 290. 
4. Metz, HYBP, 599. 
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that as a result of the closure of nature to mind "it is 
necessary that the sensa should be taken over into the flux of 
natural events and exhibited as ingredients in the latter, 
rather than as terms in a subject-object relation,n the results 
being "a system of nature defined in terms of thorough going 
realism."l While Victor Lowe clearly points out the non-
metaphysical nature of Whitehead's philosophy of nature, yet 
he also insists that Whitehead has defined nature "in nee-
realistic terms. • 2 
In light of Whitehead's analysis of the nature of science 
and of the task of philosophy of science, it would seem that 
if these commentators are correct, particularly in the con-
tention of naturalism and realism, Whitehead completely re-
versed his position between 19173 and 19194 - 19205 , and yet 
such a contention, while conceivable, hardly seems probable 
when it is kept in mind that with the exception of the first 
statement, the major statements of the task of philosophy of 
science, e.g., "the endeavour to express explicitly those uni-
fying characteristics which pervade that complex of thoughts" 
/Underlining mine7, occur in The Concept of Nature just prior 
- - ----
to the much discussed phrase, "Nature is closed to mind. 116 If 
such a reversal in position has not occurred, then two other 
possibilities are open. Eitber Whitehead is openly contradict-
ing himself in the same work on successive pages by holding 
1. Bowman, ASU, 88. 
2. Lowe, Art.(l94l), 82. 
4. PNK. 
5. CON. 
3. OOT. 6. CON, 2 and 4. 
both a dualistic, non-metaphysical position and a realistic, 
epistemologically monistic, and naturalistic position at the 
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same time, or the statements "nature closed to mind" and nature 
of which we are immediately aware "which is not thought and 
which is self-contained for thought 11 are methodological princi-
ples. As such they would be invoked in order to deal with a 
certain type of subject-matter for the purpose of discovering 
certain types of relations in that subject-matter and thus 
would be neither ultimate epistemological statements · of the re-
lation of thought to that to which it refers nor metaphysical 
statements of the actual status of nature as metaphysically 
real. 
There would seem to be ample evidence that the second al-
ternative is a description of what Whitehead is really doing. 
What he is searching for is the unifying principles of the 
kno~m, not as it is metaphysically, but as it is as known by 
the various sciences and through the sense-perceptions which 
form the original data of the sciences. He is not directly 
asking how that knowledge comes about nor what difference the 
fact that it is our knowledge makes but merely what concept 
of' nature we can formulate which will unlfy the various types 
of knowledge of the various sciences and the deliverances of 
perception. It is significant that the titles of two of the 
three books of this period are An Enquiry Concernins th~ Prin-
~iple~ of Natural Knowledge and Th~ Concept of Nature and not 
just Nature or The Acqmirement £! Nat£Eal Knowled~. In An 
Enqui~ Concerning th~ Principles of Natural Knowledge White-
head states, 1111 0ur theme is the coherence of the known.n 1 
Again, in !he Concept ££ Nat~ he says, 
Science is not discussing the causes of 
knowledge but the coherence of knowledge. 
The understanding which is sought by science 
is an understanding of the relations within 
nature.2 · 
Whitehead proceeds to specify in exactly what sense he 
means the statements in question to be taken and to warn 
against jumping to metaphysical conclusions. 
Thus in a sense nature is independent of 
thougnt.-By tnis statement no metaphysical 
pronouncement is intended. What I mean 
is that we can think about nature without 
thinking about thought. I shall say that 
we are thinking "homogeneously" about 
nature.3 
Part of the very working concept of nature held by scientists 
and the rest of us except when critically engaged in thought 
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about how thought about nature is possible is the postulate of 
objective reference of our knowledge about nature. We assume 
that we are aware of something more than just our own thought. 
Whitehead's point is that this postulate is not now under in-
vestigation but rather that it is a fact that the postulate of 
objective reference is present and necessarily presupposed 
by common sense and scientific formulation. 4 Further, he in-
1. PNK, ii. 
2. CON, 4. 
3. CON, 3., Underlining mine. 
4. Compare AOE, 199, cited above. t' The material universe is 
largely a concept of the imagination ••• But none the less it 
is a fact; for it is a fact that we actually imagine it. 
Thus it is actual in our consciousness. 11 
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sists, for the task at hand, i.e., discovering the coherence 
of the known, the question wou ld only be confused and compli-
cated by bringing in the further metaphysical and epistemolo-
gical question. Metz to the contrary, Whitehead does not say 
that nature is "completely self-contained and self-sufficient"l 
but something quite different, i.e., nature is self-contained 
"for thought. 112 Thus thought itself posits the self-contained-
ness of nature and closes it to mind. In other words, the mind 
does not ordinarily assume that it makes nature. Tinmediately 
following the statement of the closure of nature to mind White-
head a gain warns us, 
This closure of nature does not carry with 
it any metaphysical doctrine of the dis-
junction of nature and mind. It means that 
in sense -percept ion nature is dis closed as 
a complex of entities whose mutual relations 
are expressible in thought without reference 
to mind, that is, without referenge either 
to sense-awareness or to thought. 
Victor Lowe points out, 
The point is that the aim of the whole in-
quiry is not to state everying that is 
true about nature, but to express the unity 
of the initial subJ ect-matter of the natural 
sciences in a single concept. It is a fact, 
acknowledged by everyone, that the factors in 
this unity are the assumption (made in every 
observation of nature) of the externality of 
nature to mind, a~d the concentration on 
what is external. 
1. Metz, HYPB, 600. 
2. CON, 3. 
3. CON, 4-5. 
4. Lowe, Art.(l941), 82. Hock i n g, quoting POR, points out, 
nHe was defining physical nature as 'an assemblage of 
factors within fact' so far mutually interreferring as to 
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The fact tbat Whitehead limits his task to begin with to 
the non-metaphysical one of the synthesis of knowledge of 
nature and a search for the basfc categories of that knowledge 
and thus of nature so conceived does not mean that this task 
will not have implications for metaphysics nor that the more 
basic metaphysical questions of the synthesis of natural 
knowledge and the rest of experience including value experience 
in a concept of reality will not need to follow. Our conten-
tion is that Whitehead in his analysis of the concept of nature 
in ter-ms of the basic categories of events, objects, and sig-
nificance found it increasing~Jnecessary to go beyond the 
narrower methodolo gical limits of his investigation towards a 
metaphysical synthesis in which value was to be a key factor. 
We have indicated Whitehead's recognition of value factors as 
the motivation to scientific e ndeavor. 1 Wh i le at present his 
investigation demands the exclusion of value factors as such, 
yet he states t hat they are not to be ·considered irrelevant to 
more inclusive thought ab out nature. 
I also take the homogeneity of thought about 
nature as excluding any reference to moral 
or aesthetic values whose appreciation is 
vivid in proportion to self-conscious activity. 
The values of nature are perhaps the key to 
the metaphysical synthesis of existence. But 
such a syntgesis is exactly what I am not 
attempting . 
constitute a system complete in itself. It is, in a mathe-
matical sense, a closed group." Hocking, .art.(l941), 393. 
1. See above and AOE, 228-229. 
2. CON, 5. 
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As his investigation proceeded the importance of extending the 
synthetic task by means of this value key became more and more 
evident to him with the result that in Science and the Modern 
World he actually undertakes such a synthesis. 
We as percipient events are part of the complex whole 1 
which makes up the concept of nature. The content of the 
specious present 11 is an ultimate datum for science.ilf2 Con-
sciousness so considered, Whitehead points out, "is a factor 
within facttt which 11 exhibi ts its significance of factors of 
fact beyond itself. 113 Accordingly, he states, "Nature is 
thus a totality including individual experiences."4 When we 
think of experience or consciousness in such a light we are 
not thinking about ourselves in value terms but as natural 
events among natural events as described by science. As such, 
consciousness or mind become part of the closed system of 
nature in that it can be thought about without thinking of the 
thought about it. nrn this way we are treating nature as a 
closed system, and this I believe is the standpoint of natural 
science in the strict sense of the word."5 However, again 
Whitehead points out that nature so conceived, even when con-
sciousness in the form of the percipient event is brought in 
as a factor, is an abstraction, "an abstraction from something 
1. PNK, 69-70. 
2. PNK, 8. 
3. Art.(l923), 11-12. This 
again would tend to indicate 
epistemological dualism as 
does even · the statement 
quoted by Lowe as a nee-
realistic concept of nature. 
CON, 4. 
4. POR, 62. 
5. POR, 21-22. 
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more concrete than itself which must also include imagination, 
t hought, and emotion.•1 For a fuller understanding of na t ure 
on a metaphysical level these factors abstracted must be 
brought back into the picture since the abstract concept of 
nat ure keeps pointing beyond itself. 11 The factors of nature 
are also significant of factors which are not included in 
nature. 112 We cannot stop with t he unity of the natural 
sciences and the unity of the perceptual manifold considered 
objectively. It is both a possible and legitimate procedure 
to overlook these further factors for the purpose of discover-
ing and formulating the "systematic coherency of its inature '~.7 
interconnections disclosed in cognisance by relatedness•3 but 
it becomes progressively evident in this very process that 
4 
•nature is significant of ideality.• 
We shall attempt to point out how this significance for 
ideality becomes evident in relation to and through some of 
the major categories of t he natural science period, i.e., 
events, ob jects, si gnificance, and rhythm, for in the growing 
significance of ideality the broadening basis for a metaphysi-
cal value synthesis and some of the major elements to be in-
corporated in that synthesis emerge. 
2. Nature's Creative Advance. 
Before turning to some of the basic categories of White-
head's concept of nature it is necessary to look briefly at 
3. POR, 63. 
4. POR, 20. 
1. POR, 63. 
2. POR, 21. 
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one of the fundamental characteristics of nature as a whole 
which the various other categories attempt to elucidate, i.e., 
nature's temporality and creative advance. This is the factor 
wh ich in the metaphysical period becomes the most fundamental 
category of all, ~The Category of the Ultimate, • creativity. 1 
Science itself has passed beyond the stage where the con-
cepts of points of ti :ne and space at an instant are very 
meaningful. The absolute space and time of Newton as also the 
concept of time as made up of discrete timeless moments--
succession of mythical absolute presents--have not only out-
grown their usefulness but are contradicted by the empirical 
investigations of the sciences and block progress in harmoniza-
tion of the sciences. Not only the development of the theory 
of relativity but the advance in biologs point in other di-
rections. Whitehead points out: 
In biology the concept of an organism can 
not be expressed in terms of a mate r ial 
distribution at a moment. The essence of 
an organism is that it is one thing 
which functions and is spread through space. 
Now functioning takes time. Thus a bio-
lo gical organism is a unity with a spatial 
temporal exte~sion which is of the essence 
of its being. 
Life demands temporal flow. 
Every expression of life takes time. 
Nothing that is characteristic of life can 
manifest itself at an instant. Murder is 
a prerequisite for the absorption of biology 
into phys~cs as expressed in ••• traditional 
concepts. 
1. PR, 31. 
2. PNK, 3. 
3. Art. (1919), 45. 
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If we turn to the field of our actual experience, i.e., 
consciousness, we find that in spite of its disorderly charac-
1 ter it is not made up of discrete instants but is a continuum. 
It needs very little reflection to con-
vince us tha t a point in time is no 
direct deliverance of experience. We 2 live in durations, and not in points. 
Now the justification for a concept of nature and its charac-
teristics as well as its origin lies in our present experience. 
If this present experience is a developing continuum, then, 
Whitehead insists, it must be admitted that 
the ultimate fact for observational know-
ledge is perception through a duration; 
namely, that the content of a specious 
present, and not that o f a durationless r 
instant, is the ultimate datum for science. 3 
Our experience is a changing develo ping process and our 
concept of nature, if it is to harmonize our actual experience 
and the advances of science, must be thought of in the same 
manner. The development of the concept of relativity adds 
weight to the contention. "The fusion of time and space and 
the dropping of the unique seriality involves the necessity 
of looking on ultimate facts a.s essentially a process. 114 Thus 
biology and relativity are in a greement with our experience, 
that of which we are actually aware. 
What we are aware of is a duration of 
nature with temporal extension. We are 
not aware of two facts, namely, a period 
of time and also of things existing in 
1. AOE, 157. 
2. Art.(l916), 108. 
3. PNK, 8. 
4. Art.(l922) 2, 223. 
that period. We are aware of nature en-
during, or--in other words--of the passage 
of nature. Thus the present contains with-
in it antecedents and subsequents, and the 
antecedents and subsequents are the~selves 
endurances with tempor al extension. 
This process of development which is nature is not mere 
random change and exchange but development, appearance of new 
fac t ors, act i on. Na t ure is a complex system2of interrelated 
oc currences, happenings, or passing events. 3 ~The process of 
nature can also be termed the passage of nature. 'r 4 This 
passage of na t ure, far from be i n g a mere passive cessation, 
re.s ults in development , in the gaining of new "intrinsic 
5 
character." Accordingly, Whitehe ad points out: 
Nature is ever ori ginating i ts own develop-
men t , and the sense of action is t h e direct 
knowledge of the percipient event as having 
its very being in the forma t ion of its natu-
ral relations ••• Natural knowledge is merely 
the other side of action. The forward moving 
time exhi bits t h is characteristic of exper-
ience, that is essent ially action. This 
passage of nature--or, in other words, ita 
cr eative advance--is its fundamental charac-
teristic.6 
Thus in his premetaphysical synthesis of nature, White-
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head, in Bergsonian fashion, considers t he fundamental charac-
teristics of nature to be cr eative advance, temporality, 
process, and by implication f r om "advance" progressive ach ieve-
ment.? The ground for value cons i derat i ons is thus laid in 
1. Art.(l919), 46. 
2. CON, 163 . 
3. CON, 166. 
4. CON, 154. 
5. CON, 82. 
6. PNK, 14. 
7. Whitehead indicates the si milarity of his own thought in 
this basic concept, for "progress,~ nadvance, n and ndevelop-
ment~ all imply some standards of valuation and positi ve 
achievement. What these standards are to be and what the na-
ture of the positive achievement can be expected to be will 
become pro gressively evident through analysis of the basic 
categories in terms of which nature with its crea t ive advance 
must be considered according to Whitehead, i.e., events, ob-
jects, si gnificance, and rhythm. 
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this natural science period to that of Bergson in The 
Concept of Nature: nr believe that in this doctrine--
7fiiiieana-duratlon7 I am in full accord with Bergson." 
TCON, 54.) The similarity is deeper than just the doctrine 
of duration. As pointed out above, Whitehead considers 
the fundamental datum to be the specious present. Bergson 
starts at the same point: "The existence of which we are 
most assured and which we know best is unquestionably our 
own." (Bergson, CE, 3.) We discover the fundamental nature 
of change, thus of duration here. Duration is not made 
up of discrete units of time, but is "the continuous 
progress ••• which swells as it advances.n (CE, 7.) While 
Whitehead and Bergson diverge in many respects, yet White-
head throughout his metaphysical period as well as in the 
natural science period continues to acknowledge his in-
debtedness to Bergson. Cf. PR, 49, 65, 174, 319, 336, 
428. Compare, for example, Bergson's conceptions of 
knowledge through presentational imme diacy and knowledge 
through causal efficacy. 
The difference between the two during Whitehead's natural 
science period is brought out by de Laguna: nMr. Whitehead 
appears to have felt very keenly the force of Bergson's 
criticism of natural science as incapable of expressing the 
continuity of things. But he finds the criticism to a pply, 
not to science as it may be, but to science as it has been; 
and the ulterior aim of his work is to reform science so 
that it shall no longer be open to any s u ch criticism.* 
(de La guna, Art.(l920), 269-270.) 
3. Components of Nature. 
a. Events. 
In his search for a series of basic categories in terms 
of which a philosophy of nature could be formulated, White-
head advanced the concept of event s as the least abstract of 
1 
the abstractions with which to describe nature's concrete 
units. But, about any single concept whatever, Whitehead 
offers the following warning: 
What I doubt is whether there is any term suf-
ficiently comprehensive to embrace the ulti -
mate concrete fact. It seems impossible to ob-
tain a t 'erm with positive content which does not 
thereby exclude. But in speaking2of ultimate fact there is nothing to exclude. 
Throughout the period of his primary interest in natural 
science Whitehead attempted to make his conception of events 
more concrete with the result that the meaning of events 
underwent a continual evolution from the term for mere tempo-
. 3 
ral extension in 1916 to "the organism as a unit of emergent 
value 114 of 1925. In the process of this development the 
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events became successively units of spatial as well as tempo-
ral extension, 5 the focal centers of relations to all the rest 
of the universe, 6 units of becoming and process, 7 units with 
intrinsic characteristics of their own, 8 and, as selective9 __ 
thus incipiently purposive, units with more and more of the 
2 67, 81, and CON 1. Art.(l922) 1 , 233. 6. PNK, 61, 2. Art. (1922) , 133. 182 and 109. 
3. Art. ( 1916), 107 7. PNK, 61 and 198. 
4. SMW, 157. 8. CON, 82 . 
5. PNK, 91. 9, CON, 110-111, 170, 186. 
f 
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characteristics of sentient organisms. Accordingly, the ap-
pearance of the value-centered Science an~ ~ Modern World 
should have been no surprise to close followers of Whitehead's 
philosophical development. 1 
Because of this development, the meaning of the term event 
is not always entirely clear. At least one critic decided 
that the term is so confused in Whitehead's thought as to be 
almost meaningless. This critic concluded his remarks on 
events by asking, "If it is true that an event is just what it 
is, why, then, what is it?" 2 While it is not within the scope 
of our problem to develop in detail the theory of events set 
forth by Whitehead in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of 
Natural KnowledBe and The Concept of Nature in its relations to 
the physical sciences as such and mathematics, yet, we shall 
try to point out those factors in tbe theory pointing ahead 
to the value conceptions of later developments. 
As pointed out, any survey of the recent advances in 
science which includes relativity in physics and evolution and 
organism in biology points to the inadequacy of the traditional 
conception of discrete particles of matter throughout an abso-
lute space at durationless instants of time. Such a view makes 
1. Cf. Stebbing, Art.(l926) 2 , 385, for expression of surprise 
on the part of one who, in the light of her own earlier 
comments, e.g., "Shall we not find that ••• values determine 
the selection of objects?11 in Art.{l925), 329, should have 
been expected to have foreseen this development. 
2. Robinson, Art.(l92l), 56. Cf. Mackensie, Art.(l923), 229-
234, and Murphy, Art.(l928), 574-586. 
the knowledge of change impossible. Our knowledge of nature 
is not based on "instantaneous facts" 1 nor is it based on 
"'an infinite given whole,' '"2 but rather on wa continuity of 
experience" 3 which, though ill radically untidy, ill-adjusted-!14 
in character, is a duration, 'the content of a specious 
present, 115 and continuum6 for each person which is temporal 
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through and through. Nature is in passage. Its ultimate units 
are, to use Lowe's description, "states of change •• extended 
both in space and time. ••7 These states of change, Whitehead 
calls events. 
The ultimate facts of nature, in terms of 
which all physical and biological explana-
tion must be expressed, are events connected 
by their spatio-temporal relations, and ••• 
these relations are in the main reducible 
to the property of events that they can con-
tain (or exteng over) other events which are 
parts of them. 
Events and not static particles are the ultimate units of 
reality. Nature is a complex whole of passing events,9 and 
we, as percipient events, are part of that complex wh~le. 10 
Our own experience is constituted by a aeries of events 
~extended over by other events of which it is a part·•11 making 
up "the content of the specious present"12 or present duration. 
Each perception is itself an event and is related not alon~ to 
1. PNK, 7 7. Lowe, Art.(l941), 72. 
2. Art.(l916), 120. 8. PNK, 14. 
3. PNK, 8. 9. CON, 166. 
4. Art . ( 1917), 61. 10. PNK, 69-70. 
5. PNK, 8 ... 11. PNK, 61. 
6. Art.(l917), 61. 12. PNK, 8 ·. 
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the events which extend over it to make up the specious 
present but to all the other events in the universe as well by 
the significance1 or reference of the objects 2 which it contains. 
In other words 1 the content of the event refers beyond itself 
to a world of events in interrelation. The universe is re-
vealed as a meshwork of occurrences of happenings. 
As there are not isolated instantaneous facts 1 so also there 
are no events in isolation. An event is named after the rela-
tions in which it is involved. 3 ~Events are the relata of the 
fundamental homogeneous relation of extension.n4 It must be re-
membered that during this period Whitehead considered events to 
be extended both spatially and temporally. Later a case may be 
made out for the ideality of space5 and the more basic nature 
6 of temporality 1 but the present emphasis on the spatial ex-
tension of all events and the fact tb~t the concept of prehen-
sion had not yet appeared7 are among the more evident reasons 
why value as such did not become an issue during Whitehead's 
natural science period. 8 
Events are the relational centers of reality. "Space and 
ti~e express relations between events.n9 The existence of an 
event is defined in terms of its relations. An event is in a 
1. Cf. sec. B. 7. Cf. sec. c. 
2. Cf. sec. c. 8. It must also be kept in mind 
3. PNKI 81. that Whitehead is dealing with 
4. PNKI 61. physical science 1 one of the 
5. Cf • 1 SMWI 105-1061 and characteristics of which is 
SlifE I 13-141 25-26. "that it ignores all judgments 
6. Cf. mffl 1 181. of value. • AOE 1 160. 9. PNKI 61. 
very real sense a synthesis of relations. 
Nature is ever originating its own develop-
ment, and the sense of action is the direct 
knowledge of the ~rcipient event as having 
its very being in the formation of its natu-
ral relB.tions ••• Relations are perceived in 
the making and because of the making ••• The 
sense of action is that essential factor in 
natural knowledge which exhibits itself as 
self-knowledge enjoyed by an element of nature 
respecting its active relations wfth the whole 
of nature in its various aspects. 
Enjoy seems to be used in s. Alexander's sense of the word, 
that is, immediate a.wareness. 2 Accordingly, in at least one 
class of entities, i.e. percipient events, awareness of re-
la.tion is a. primary condition of existence and the action of 
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the event is the establishment of relations. Part of the ground-
work is thus laid for the concept of prehensive unifica.tion3 
issuing in value. 
Tba t such synthetic a.cti vi ty is not restricted to per-
cipient events alone, but extends to all types of events is 
also indicated. The essentially active nature of the exper-
ience of t he percipient event indicates the activity of all 
events, or nature in the full sense of the word. 11 This pas-
sage of nature -- or, in other words, its creative advance --
4 is its fundamental characteristic." . The events themselves 
and not s orne underlying sub stance are "elements of a. cti vi ty 
and elements of becomingness.n 5 An event "is what it does be-
come.•6 The events are themselves the development of exper-
1. PNK, 14. 
2. Alexander, Std., 1, 12-13, 
and 23-24. 
3. SMW, 101-102 
4. PNK, 14. 
5. PNK, 61. 
6. PNK, 61. 
ience. "The facts of life are the events of life. 11 1 The 
world is a world of happenings, of advance, of development, 
in other words of event s, and in no sense as actual is it 
ever static or dead. 
Since an event is a unit of process involving a synthe-
Sis of relations, the third characteristic of events immed-
iately following from these is that each event bas its own 
intrinsic quality or peculiar character and contribution to 
make to the totality of events which is nature. Because 
each event involves just the relationships that it does in-
volve, and, as a unit of becomingness, synthesizes its rela-
tions in just the way it does, it has its own unique charac-
ter which can never be reproduced. "An event is just what it 
2 is, and is just how it is related and it is nothing else." 
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Accordingly, the appearance of any particular event is the ap-
pearance of something novel in the universe. It is a unique 
existent3 with its own particular contr i bution to make. The 
event could ba ve no existence without the rest of the uni-
verse as its condition of existence and that to which it is 
related -- an event's 11 embeddedness in an all-embracing fact ill4 
--, but, in turn, nature could not be what it is without each 
event and its particular contribution. 
In other words 1 ra ture is a structure of 
events and each event has its own position 
in this structure ~nd its own peculiar re-
lation or quality. 
1. PNK, 63. 
2. PNK, 61. 
4. Art.(l923) 1, 9. 
5. CON, 166. 
3. PNK, 198 . 
One further characteristic tends to bring an event even 
1 closer to the conception of the "emergent unit of value. 11 
Purpose as such does not enter into the consideration of 
events in tbe natural science period, but another concept 
strongly suggests it. Events are at least partially selec-
tive. Of course an _higher grade percipient event is highly 
selective, not merely of relations to be included in itself, 
but of the factors or other events to be included in the 
duration of which it forms a part. 2 For example, my present 
percipient event sets the general stage for its successors 
and selects the general conditions which they in turn will 
realize b y its own inclusion and exclusion of relations. 
The same thing holds true to a lesser degree of all events. 
All events are interrelated, but "every event is known as 
being related to other events which it does not include. 3 
Accordingly, each event possesses 11 the quality of exclusion111 
and, as Whitehead goes on to point out, ~exclusion is as 
positive a relation as inclusion."4 Thus all events have a 
certain amount of selectivity as an integral part of their 
activities which "determine the subsequent events to which 
5 
they will pass on the objects situated in the~" Selectivity 
necessarily involves a basis of selection, and this at least 
points to the role that purpose or subjective aim was to play 
later in Whitehead's thought. It is in connection with this 
1. SMW, 157. 4. CON, 186. 
2. CON, 110-111. 5. CON, 170. 
3. CON, 186. 
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problem of the basis of selection that L. Susan Stebbing 
suggests, 
Prof. Whitehead says, 'The values of nature 
are perhaps the key to the metaphysical syn-
thesis of existence. 1 Shall we not find that 
these values determine t he selecting ? If so, 
is there not an ~ssential relation between 
mind and nature? 
Without a purposive basis the concept of selection would tend 
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to be meaningless, or at best an arbitrarily assigned name for 
chance or predetermined emphasis. Ye~ in spite of her recog-
nition that t he conception of selectivity in even t s implies 
purpose, Miss Stebbing later objects to Whitehead's recogni-
tion of the fact. 
In his later expositions ••• Professor White-
head seems to me quite unwarrantably to stress 
the notion of value, vaguely conceived, and 
suggesting even the introduction of purpose 
into the scientific scheme.2 
Miss Stebbing 15later comment to the contrary, the selective 
activity of events seems highly suggestive of purposive 
action, even in Whitehead's earlier expositions. 
Unfortunately, in this period Whitehead introduces a 
further consideration in relation to events which tends to be 
the source of a confusion that is not entirely eliminated or 
cleared up in his later works. In spit~ of his insistence 
that events are the "elements of becomingness•3 and that 
1. Stebbing, Art.(l925), 329. Whitehead quotation, CON, 5. 
2. Stebbing, Art.(l92 8 ), 115. 
3. PNK, 61. 
~creative advance*1 is the fundamental characteristic of 
nature, Whitehead says, 
Events never change. Nature develops, in the 
sense that e becomes part of event e' which 
includes ~.7.we say that events pass, but 
do not chan~. The passage of an event is 
its passing into some other event which it 
is not.2 
Whitehead would seem to b e very near the point of losing the 
creative advance that he is asserting as fundamental. H. T. 
Costello, one of the reviewers of An Enquiry Concerning the 
Principles of Natural Knowledge, came to exactly such a con-
clusion. 
The term 'event' lays emphasis on the time-
covering character of the actual existent. 
Nevertheless, the tapestry of even t s, stretch-
ing away into past and future, absolutely 
actual, related only by relations of inclusion-
exclusion, is almost the antithesis of tempo-
rality. Physicists and philosophers are alike 
in their de~seated desire to view the world 
'under the aspect of eternity.' Professor 
Whitehead has tried to avoid such a tendency 
by making reference to action and creative 
advance. But somehow t he creative flow of the 
present be comes superficia 1 in the course of 
analysis, becomes a mere shadow that3flits across the fixed tapestry of events. 
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c. D. Broad does not help t he situation any by saying "Events ••• 
do not ••• change; all t hat happens to them is that as the course 
of nature advances fresh durationsare juxtaposed on the front 
of others. 114 If Broad's interpretation is correct, then the 
events would seem to be as static as Costello claims. 
1. PNK, 14 and 61. 
2. PNK, 62. 
3. Costello, Art.(l920), 329. 
Cf. Robinson, Art.(l921), 
48, for claim that events 
make knowledge impossib le. 
4. Broad, Art.(l920), 219. 
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That there is some basis for such an interpretation 
would be difficult to deny, particularly if this denial of 
change is read in li ght of Whitehead's earlier position (1916) 
that "temporal extensions" are "relations between events"l 
interpreted to mean that events themselves may be non-tempo-
ral in character. 2 But, if this denial of change is inter-
preted in terms of static events, then the contention that 
the theory of event s points directly to the concept of the 
"emergent unit of value 1• 3 becomes highly questionable. There 
are at least two factors, however, which tend to indicate 
that Whitehead does not mean to assert that events themselves 
are static. 
In the first place, in the light of the description of 
an event as an element of becomingness and its character as 
an n occurrence*4 or happening, also as a "field of activity, n5 
it would seem evident that Whitehead could hardly be denying 
that change or development or synthesis occurs in the becom-
ing of an event. For example, the percipient event at least 
has "its very being in the formation of its natural rela-
tions. n 6 The evidence would seem to indicate that what White-
head is denying is change of the event as regarded only from 
one aspect, that is, as a completed synthesis and thus passing 
1. Art.(l916), 107. 
2. That Whitehead never quite eliminates the ghost of static 
events would seem to be indicated by the following passages; 
RIM, 109; Pr, 92, 124; andAOI, 262. 
3. SMW, 157. 
4. CON, 170. 
5. CON, 171. 
6. PNK, 14. 
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or past. Whitehead adds to the denial of change, aThe irrev-
ocableness of the past is t~e unchangeability of event s. An 
event is what it is, when it is, and where it is."l He further 
adds: 
In a sense the event e does change, namely, 
in its relations to tFie events which were 
not and which become actual in the creative 
advance of nature. The change of an event 
e, in this ¢eaning of the word 'change,' 
will be called the 'passage' or e ••• Thus 
we say that events pass but do not change.2 
The event, then, as having become, is -fully actual and 
complete, but as complete it immediately ceases to be and is 
part of the next event's becoming. During the event's becom-
ing, it and its relations are ~in the making and because of 
the making, 113 but, as actual and complete, the "making"' and 
the ttbecoming1• are over and, then, so is the event. While 
it is becoming and thus changing the event not yet fully is. 
Whitehead later speaks of the n incompleteness"' of occasions 
and, in Hegelian fashion, of the union of being with "not-
being"4 as descriptive of the process of becoming. That the 
same reasoning applies here is indicated by his Aristotelian 
use of the words actual and actuality as opposed to potenti-
ality. The event is described as an element of actuality, and, 
Whitehead goes on to say, "An actual event is thus divested of 
all possibility. It is what it does become.n5 As having be-
1. PNK, 62. 
2. PNK, 62. 
3. PNK, 14. 
4. Art.(l927), 61. 
5. PNK1 61. Cf. Aristotle, 
Met. 1069° 15-20. 
co~e, the event is determined and without potentiality for. 
further becoming as that event. Its time of change is over. 
It is and then is no more. In other words, rather than deny-
ing change in the sense of becoming in the synthetic activity 
of an event, all Whitehead seems to be saying is that the 
event as having become cannot be changed. It is thus the is-
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sue of the event, which he later calls its objective immortal-
ity, from which change is excluded and not the event in its 
self-formation. 1 That past events cannot be changed most per-
sons would admit. Further, it is in the event's character as 
complete and past that it, as an unique existent, has made its 
peculiar contribution as an unreproducible element in nature. 
The second factor which indicates that Whitehead does not 
mean to assert that events themselves are static is to be found 
in his insistence, on the one hand, on creative advance, and 
on the other hand, on nature as the complex of events. To be 
sure, nature besides events also invol ves objects, but the 
qualification ~~changing, much more directly applies to objects 
than to events. 2 Accordingly, either creative advance would 
1. In PR and AOI the denial of change has a different meaning, 
that is denial of changing external relations based on 
the doctrine of contemporary independence. Cf. PR, 124, 
"The creature cannot have any external adventures, but only 
the internal adventure of becoming." Also cf. AOI, 251 
and 304. But this explanation cannot be advanced for the 
denial of change in PNK (even though Whitehead may have 
intended it) without a reading of later meaning into earlier 
materi~l which hardly seems justifiable here with no more 
internal evidence than is present. 
2. Cf. PNK, 62-63, and below sec. b. 
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have to be a third factor acting on events but separable from 
them1 or else it must be embodied in events themselves. Yet 
nowhere in An ~nquiry Con~rnin~ !he Principles of Natural 
Kn£!~dge or in The Concept £! Nat~ does Whitehead specific-
ally assert a separate existence for creative advance. 2 As 
pointed out, the events are elements of becomingness, and, 
Whitehead does identify ;•the becomingness of nature" with 
mcreative advance 11 and "its passage.n3 Thus, it would seem 
evident that the denial of change could only be meant in some 
such restricted sense as we have indicated. 
Events, then, having the following characteristics which 
prepare the way for the concept of occasions or organisms as 
emergent units of value~ Events are units of process involv-
ing syntheses of relations. Each event has its own· intrinsic 
quality or peculiar character and contribution to make to the 
totality of events which is nature. Events are selective of 
relations which they include in and exclude from syntreses in 
a manner that strongly resemb les choice in accordance with pur-
pose. 
1. PNK, 62 1 i.e., "Events which were riot and which become 
actual in the creative advance of nature," might be so 
interpreted, but not necessarily, for the creative advance 
of nature in t his case could as well be the group name 
for the many becoming events. 
2. PNK, 61. In one passage in S"MI/l (255) there is some pos-
sibility of the first alternative. However, the impossi-
bility of a separate creativity in Whitehead's later 
works would seem to be indicated by the ontological prin-
ciple. Cf. PR, 254. 
3. PNK, 14. 
b. Objects. 
One of the most characteristic doctrines of Whitehead's 
developed theory of value is that of ideality as formulated 
in the t heory of eternal ob jects. 1 While the term "eternal 
objects 11 does not make its appearance in the natural science 
period, yet many of the characteristics of the later doctrine 
are advanced in Whitehead's treatment of objects. In 1916 
Whitehead distinguished oetween events and objects by saying 
that nspatial extensions are expressed by relations between 
ob jects, temporal extensions by relations between events.n 2 
We have already seen that both forms of extension soon became 
characteristics of events themselves rather than objects. 
But the place and na t ure of ob jects also gained new charac-
teristics and significance. While there is no bifurcation, 
there is a duality in nature, Whitehead insists. 
There are two sides to nature, as it were, 
antagonistic the one to the other, and yet 
each essential. The one side is development 
in creative advance, the essential becoming-
ness of nature. The other side is the per-
manence of things, the fact that nature can be 
recognized. Thus nature is always a newness 
rela~ing objects which are neither old nor 
new. 
The events expressed the creative advance, the essential be-
comingness. Objects represent t he permanent, the unchanging 
amid diverse relationships, and are themselves relational. 
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1. Of. SI~V, Chapter X, and, in pa r ticular, "It is the founda-
tion of tbe metaphysical position I am maintaining that the 
understanding of actuality requires a reference to ideali~r ·" 
SMW, 228. Of. below, Chapter II, b, 1, b. 
2. Art. ( 1916), 107. 
3. PNK, 98. 
To put the matter in a slightly different manner, an analysis 
or, to use Whitehead's term, 0 diversificationnl of the ngiven 
presentat i on which is experiencen 2 discloses not events only 
but other factors within event s which are not themselves 
events. 1•For example ••• sky-blue is seen as situated in a 
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certain event ••• Sky-blue is found in nature with a definite 
implication in events, but is not an event itself.•3 White-
head distinguishes at least seven different types of objects, 4 
ranging from sense objects to mathematical, moral, and aes-
thetic norms, but all of these as objects have certain charac-
teristics in co~mon which relate them to the later concept of 
ideality. 
In the first place, Whitehead states that 11 objects may 
be looked upon as qualities of events.•5 All sense-~~lia 
are ob jects. But there is a fundamen t al difference between 
Whitehead's view of qualities as objects and the Aristotelian 
6 
view of qualities as the 0 differentia of essence" or "modifi-
cations of substance•7 where essence or substance is considered 
as an underlying static thinghood. As ~posed to such an under-
lying or substantial thinghood of things, Whitehead considers 
1. PNK, 59-60. 
2. PNK, 59. 
3. CON, 15. 
4. PNK, 60: percipient, sense 
perceptual, and scientific 
objects; PNK, 90: physical 
objects; CON, 125-~6: logical 
abstractions and geometrical 
relations; AOE, 230: 
"moral and aesthetic truths• 
or norms. 
5. Art.(l919), 51. 
6. Aristotle, Met., 1020~34. 
7. Aristotle, Met., 1020 9. 
physical objects as qualities of events which are the be-
coming ultimate units of actuality. In an almost Berkeleyan 
fashion Whitehead states, 3 The material pyramids of Egypt 
are a conception, what is actual are the fragmentary experi-
1 
ences of the races who have gazed on them." Again he says, 
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•rn the case of the Great Pyramid, the object is the perceived 
unit entity. 112 To take another example, the qualities of a 
chair do not inhere in a chair as a substantial thing; rather, 
3 the chair as a complex object qualifies certain events. Miss 
Stabbing illustrates the principle by pointing out that in-
stead of saying, *This is a table, 1• a more correct Whitehead-
ean formulation would be, •'This' speculatively demonstrates 
an event which is qualified by an adjective 'table.'" 4 
However, instead of generally using the word "qualify," 
Whitehead prefers to speak of objects as situated in events. 
"We refer •the object to some events as its 'situations. 1115 
This brings out a second characteristic of objects. Whereas 
events are passing, objects as logical identities are permanent. 
Objects convey the permanences recognised 
in events, and are thus recognised as self-
identical amid different circumstances; 
that is to say the same objec~ is recognised 
as related to diverse events. 
Objects are the given characteristics of events which events 
in turn pass on to subsequent events. 7 The specific charac-
1. Art.(l916), 120. 5. PNK, 67. 
2. CON., 77-78. 
3. PNK, 92. 
4. Stabbing, Art.(l925), 324. 
6. PNK, 62-63. 
7. CON, 170. 
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ter of an event is determined by the objects which it in-
1 
eludes. Accordingly, while we live through, or are aware of, 
or apprehend events, those features that we recognize again 
and again are objects. 
We all know that if we go to the Embankment 
near Cbaring Cross we shall observe an event 
having the characteristics which we recog-
nise as Cleopatra's Needle. Things which 
we recognise I thus call objects. An object 
is situated in those events or in that stream 
of events of which it expresses the character. 2 
Events having occurred cannot recur, but the objects included 
in those events remain constant and self-identical. From the 
standpoint of ita presence in many and successive events an 
object is "an irreducible, many-termed relation." 3 
Whereas events are temporally and spatially extended, 
objects, considered in themselves are neither spatial nor 
4 temporal. It must be kept in mind that objects cannot be 
separated from events in actuality. However, for purposes of 
investigation of the characteristics of objects such abstrac-
tion is legitimate. As a matter of fact, Whitehead points 
out, whenever we recognize an object we are abstracting. 
Recognition and abstraction involve each 
other. Each of them expibits an entity 
for knowledge which is less than the con-
crete fact ••• we cannot recognise without 
abstraction, and5we cannot abstract with-out recognising. 
Thus, as abstracted from event s, objects are neither spatial 
1. CON, 190. 
2. CON I 169. 
3. Art.{l923) 1 , 8. 
4. PNK, 62-63. 
5. CON, 189. 
nor temporal. As neither spatial nor temporal, except de-
rivatively in events, 1 objects are without parts, are unit 
concepts with their own particular identities. 
Yet this ability of objects to be self-identical in 
diverse events and the atomic characteristic of ob jects does 
not mean that objects cannot be in complex interrelation-
ships with each other, nor does it mean that there are not 
complex objects with simpler objects as their components. 
Quite obviously a "physical object• such as a chair or an 
aesthetic o b ject such as a tune are complex in character and 
can be further analyzed. Whitehead discussed the relation-
ship of "component ob jects" to "main o bjects•2 in a manner 
h ighly anticipatory of the abstractive hierarchies of eternal 
objects in Science and the Modern World. 3 Just what is meant 
by the atomic characteristic of objects--• the atomic proper-
ties of nature res i de in objects 114 --or their non-divisibility 
into parts becomes more evident in this discussion of the 
relation of components to main objects. 
A component is necessary to the main ob -
ject, but the main ob ject is not necessary 
to the component. For example, a certain 
note may be necessary for a certain tune, 
but the note can be sounded without the 
tune. The main object requires its com-
ponent, but the gomponent does not require 
the main o bject. 
1. Art.(l919), 55-56. 4. PNK, 66. 
2. PNK, 169. 5. PNK, 169. 
3. SMW, 242. 
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The tune, though composed of parts, as an ooject is an atomic 
unit for recognition. It cannot be subdivided or changed in 
any way and yet remain the same object. As characterizing a 
series of actual events the tune could be broken off, but as 
recognized it must be recognized as a unit or it will not be 
recognized at all. Further, literally speaking a series of 
events diverted before the tune is complete do not contain 
that tune but one which partially resembles the complete 
tune. Whitehead uses as another example a sock throughout 
its history. The sock grows thin and is darned until but 
little of the original cloth remains. Each stage of the 
sock's deterioration is an object, but so also the total 
sock as object remains the rr same object." 1 It would seem 
evident that by the atomic nature and permanence of ob jects 
Whitehead means subsistent logical identity. Such logical 
identity is one of the main charact~ristics of ideality. 
Because of their permanence or logical identity in and 
through diverse events,2 because of their characteristics as 
qualifications of events, 3 objects can be considered as the 
. given contents of events, as those given factors which are 
brought together or realized in the peculiar nature and be-
comingness of individual events. Whitehead states that the 
objects "are the recognita amid events.•4 Because of the 
passing and non-repeatable nature of even t s, those factors 
1. PNK, 92-93. 
2· PNK, 62-63. 
3. Art.(l919), 51. 
4. PNK, 81. 
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which are capable of comparison and which make possible 
reference to the various and peculiar events are the ~i ven 
objects included within the particular events and not the 
events themselve·s. "Recognised objects of one event are 
compared with the recognised objects of another event ••• 
What are com~red are the objects situated in events."1 
In other words, objects are the given factors in experience 
which make possible reference beyond the immediate event to 
the man,ifold of events. 2 
Since objects are the basis of comparison, recognition, 
and relation of events, they also serve as the differentiae 
of any types of classification. Accordingly, objects have 
all the characteristics of universals. Whitehead does not 
actually identify objects and universals until later; 3 in 
fact the term 11 universals 111 does not appear in any of the 
writings of this period. But the critics and reviewers 
recognized the similarity between them immediately. C. D. 
Broad in 1920 states that for Whitehead "objects are univer-
sals,•4 and Miss Stabbing in two articles asserts very much 
5 the same thing. Whitehead probably avoids the term for the 
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1. CON, 125. 
2. Art.(l923) 1 , 16. Cf. conception of objects as given factors 
in experience with Brightman, FOR, 337 and 351, for analy-
sis of given factors in experience of God and other selves. 
Cf. sec. c, on significance, for further discussion of 
reference of objects. Cf. Chapter III, A, 2, for Whitehead's 
developed conception of eternal objects where these factors 
are more explicit. 
3. SMW, 228. 
4. Broad, Art.{l920), 218. 
5. Stabbing, Art.{l925), 309-310, and Art.(l926), 211-212. 
same reason that he prefers not to use the term later, that 
is, "to disengage myself from the presuppositions which cling 
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1 to the ••• term owing to its prolonged philosophical history." 
In particular Whitehead would probably object to the idea that 
objects are purely conceptual in nature. Objects as including 
actual sense g~alia of experience are perhaps broader than the 
usual conception of universals, but it must be admitted that 
sense-objects as recognized and discriminated entiti~s are 
essentially abstractions, 2 and as so recognized and discrimi-
nated they do tend to be conceptual in nature. In fact White-
head does point out that objects other than sense-objects may 
be known only conceptually and may themselves be logical ab-
stractions. 111 0bjects which are not posited by sense-awareness 
may be known to the intellect ••• Thus objects for our knowledge 
may be me rely logical abstractions. rr 3 
For the relation of objects to events and the entrance 
of objects into eyents Whitehead uses the term "ingression." 
I am using the term 1 ingressj_on 1 to denote 
the general relation of objects to events. 
The ingression of an object into an event 
is the way the character of the event shapes 
itself in virtue of the being of the object. 
Namely, the event is what it is, because the 
object is what it is; and when I am thinking 
of this modification of the event by the 
object, I call the relation between the two 
•the ingressi~n of the object into the 
event. 14 
1. SMW, 228. 
2. CON, 189. 
3. CON, 125-126. 
4. CON, 144. 
This relationship of ingression brings into fonus certain of 
the major characteristics of events, in particular the syn-
thetic activity of events and their selectivity akin to pur-
pose, with the most striking characteristic of objects in re-
lation to the concept of ideality. The key phrase in the 
above quotation from the standpoint of ideality is "the event 
shapes itself in virtue of the being of the object." In 
light of this, objects not only form the given content of the 
event, have permanent logical identity, and have the charac-
teristics of universals, but they also assume the role of 
potentialities for realization in events. 
09jects considered in themselves are abstract, but they 
are abstractions which can become concrete characteristics 
of an event through selective realization on the part of 
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that event of objects in i~s own concrete synthesis. What the 
event will become, what it, as complete and actual, is, de-
pends upon which oojects it has selected for realization. Ac-
cordingly, Whitehead says, "Whenever the concept of pos si-
bility can apply to a natural element, that element is an 
object. 1111 Any object, considered in its abstraction as ob-
ject, is a potentiality for realization, whereas any object 
consldered as concrete is a realized characteristic of an 
event. An object's essence as object, then, is to be a possi-
bility or potentiality for realization. With this character-
istic the full ideality of objects is established. Translated 
1. PNK1 64. 
into other terms, the object serves as an ideal for realiza-
tion by an event. 
That this is the case in relation to certain types of 
objects is not difficult to grasp. Logical, moral, and aes-
1 thetic objects or norms have usually been recognized as 
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ideals or potentialities to be realized. Whitehead attributes 
the same status to all objects, including sense-objects• 
There is a very real sense in which green is as much a poten-
tiality for realization as goodness. Potentially an event 
may realize green or goodness or both, but also from the 
standpoint of mere potentiality the event may realize yellow-
ness, badness,squareness, or any other object or set of ob-
jects. In fact, in respect to mere potentiality, •we are 
driven to admit that each object is in some sense ingredient 
2 throughout nature." It . is because of this potential in-
gredience of all objects in every event that selectivity and 
exclusion are requisite to the becoming of an event. What an 
event is depends upon its particular selection, synthesis, and 
realization of objects. An event selects certain objects for 
positive realization, and thus for actual ingression, in its 
becoming and excludes others. It is because of the welter of 
diversity of potentialities that "exclusion is as positive a 
relation as inclusion. 113 If an event selects greenness and 
goodness it will be a good, green event, or more accurately, 
1. AOE, 230. 
2. CON, 145. 
3. CON, 186. 
... 
an event in which are posi t ively situated the realized ob-
jects greenness and goodness, or in which greenness and good-
ness have positive ingression. 
Thus every object has the characteristic of po t entiali-
ty in relationshi p to its realization or embodied situation 
in events. But any event is limited as to the potentialities 
which it may realize. This limitation is imposed by two 
factors: first, by any event's antecedent events, in that 
.... 
the antecedent events "determine the subsequent events to 
1 which they will pass on the objects situated in them, 11 and, 
second 1 by the compatibility of potentialities realizable 
with each other. The antecedent events stand as 11 condition-
ing events" 2 in relation to the potential! ties realizable 
in subsequent event s. 3 But because of the factors of selec-
tion and exclusion4 the objects or potentialities which an 
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event will emphasize and realize most predominently are not 
completely. determined by an event's antecedents. Thus, though 
the potentialities for any particular event are limited, it 
is due to the fact that there are real and diverse potentiali-
ties to be realized that any 11 unique novelty115 in events is 
possible. It must be admitted that the factor of novelty does 
1. CON, 170. The concept of God as a principle of limitation 
is not advanced during this period. 
2. PNK, 86. 
3. The later distinction between "real" and "general" potenti-
ality probably has its origin in this consideration of the 
conditioning effect of antecedent events. Cf. PR, 101-102. 
4. CON, 110 and 186. 
5. PNK, 198. 
not play as predominant a role in Whiter~a~s natural science 
period as it does later, but the significant factor for the 
present purpose lies in the fact that the concept of novelty 
is found at all. 
One further factor must be noted in relation to the 
"conditioning effect" of antecedent events. It has been 
pointed out that this conditioning effect is possible be-
l 
cause "events pass on objects situated in them." This pass-
ing on of objects in turn is possible because of the lo gical 
identity of objects in diverse and successive events. Ac-
cordingly, since t he influence of events is in terms of ob-
jects, the particular contribution of any event, in light of 
its partially novel synthesis, must be the novelty of that 
synthesis of objects itself which, as recognized, would gain 
the status of a new o b ject affecting all future event s. So 
considered, the theory of objects not only prepares the way 
for t h e concept of eternal ob jects but for the concept of 
objective immortality as well. 
The theory of objects then fulfills the following 
68 
functions in preparing the way for the developed value-centered 
philosophy of organism: Objects are the qualifying given con-
tents of events by which events can be identified. The pecu-
liar contri bution of an event is its peculiar synthesis of 
objects. Ob jects considered in themselves are potentialities 
for realization of events. An event's novelty is experienced 
1. CON, 170. 
in terms of the particular way in which it selects among 
potentialities those it will realize. The subsistent logical 
identity of objects in diverse and successive events not only 
assures permanence amid change but prepares the way for the 
consideration of the preservation of the cont ribution of 
events through objective immortality. 
C. Significance. 
The concept of significance plays a rich and somewhat 
varied role in the development of Whitehead's philosophy of 
science. It acted as the immediate predecessor of the con-
cept of prehension which appeared in Sci~~ and the Modern 
!orld. Whitehead's theory of value as such could not emerge 
until his theory of the affective nature of prehensions was 
developed, but the striking feature of the doctrine of sig-
nificance is that aside from the primary emphasis on feeling 
in the doctrine of prehensions (and even t h is is suggested1 ) 
many of the characteristics later attri buted to prehensions 
69 
are first worked out in relation to significance. In White-
head's thought of this per i od significance stands progressively 
and more and more inclusively for objective reference, re-
latednes s , condition of t he unity of nature, intrinsic charac-
ter of events and its condition, and contribution of even ts 
to creative advance. Thus Lowe points out: 
1. See below on conveyance and PNK, 88-89 and Art.(l919), 
53-54. 
Apparently Whitehead is ••• slowly transmuting 
his idea of significance from a mere description 
of the spatial relatedness disclosed in a single 
perception, into a description of the causal 
bonds--prehension--through which one occasion af-
fects the rise of another in the creative advance 
of nature.l 
Whitehead introduces the concept of significance in An 
Enqui~ ConcerninE !he Principles of Natural ~owledge with 
the same passage from Berkeley's Alciphron with which he 
later introduced the concept of prehensions in Science~nd 
the Modern World. 2 The problem involved the relation of 
present experience to that beyond it, perception to that to 
which it refers. In Berkeley's dialogue Euphranon says to 
Alciphron: · 
For your further conviction, do but con-
sider that curious cloud. Think you, that 
if you were in the very place that it is, 
you would perceive anything like what you 
perceive now? 
Ale. By no means. I should perceive 
only a dark mist. 
Euph. Is it not plain, therefore, that 
neitner the castle, the planet, nor the 
cloud, which you see here, are those real 
ones which you suppose exist at a distance?3 
Whitehead agrees that the perception of the cloud-here is 
not the cloud-there but he insists that Berkeley explicitly 
overlooks something which yet is implied in most of his writ-
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ings, i.e. the significance or the reference of present ex-
perience to something beyond itself. The contents of the per-
1. Lowe, Art.(l941), 78-79. 
2. Berkeley, ALC, 166-168; Whitehead, PNK, 9-10, and SMW, 
98-100. 
3. Berkeley, ALC, 168. 
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cipient event signify further events beyond. The perceptual-
object1 cloud signifies other events containing perceptual-
object cloud and the s i gnificance is as much a given part of 
the experience as the perception itself. Accordingly, White-
head insists, * 'Significance' is an essential element in 
concrete experience." 2 In other words, there is no experience 
which does not signify something beyond itself. "Signifi-
cance is experience." 3 Through significance we are aware 
that there is a "be yond to whatever is observed. 114 
That wh ich is signified is relation and the relation of 
events to each other is their si gnificance of and for each 
other. 
'Significance' is the relatedness of things. 
To say that significance is experience, is 
to affirm that perceptual knowledge is 
nothing else than an apprehension of the re-
latedness of things, namely of things in their 
relations and as related.5 
Through significance the percipient event is related to the 
whole of nature, not as something outside of nature, but as 
itself one event in the complex system which makes up nature. 
All of nature has significance for it and is signified by 
factors in it. 
1. It must be kept in mind tha t Whitehead is using 11 object" 
in the sense specified above, i.e., not as independently 
existent but as an entity of experience which as content 
signified other events, etc, in which the object as logi-
cal identity (not existent identity} is also ingredient. 
2. PNK, 11. 
3. PNK, 12. 
4. CON, 186. 
5. .PNK, 12. 
The point here to be emphasised is that 
natural knowledge is a. knowledge within 
nature, a. knowledge 'here within nature' 
and 'now within nature,' and is an aware-
ness of the natural relations of one ele-
ment in nature (namely, the ptrcipient 
event) to the rest of nature. 
Contrary to first appearances, Uhitehead is not advocat-
ing a relational view of consciousness of the nee-realistic 
variety. He would object to James' view that "Consciousness 
connotes a kind of external rela tion. 112 The percipient event 
is an active synthesis of internally related factors 3 which, 
while it can be defined in terms of its relations, as a 
synthesis is not reducible to relations considered as ex-
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terna.l. Significance implies reference. Now-present and 
here-present are significant of the there-present and then-
present. The here-present refers to the there-present. 4 
Awareness of spatial and temporal relations beyond t he present 
perception is possible because of their signification by per-
ceived spatial and temporal relations. The perception of the 
wall signifies space beyond. 5 The perception of the surface 
of a sphere signifies a center. The significa.t :i on: o·f my per-
cipient event for the center of the sphere is experienced, 
though the event qualified by being the center of the sphere 
is not. Significance is "the disclosure of t he discerni ble 
by means of its relations to the discerned. 116 The "now-
--·---
1. PNK, 13. 
2. James, ERE, 25. 
4. PNK, 69-70. 
5. CON, 50. 
3. Cf, above, sec. a. 6. CON, 51. 
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present-here" event "occurs as related to the events of ante-
cedent and concurrent nature," 1 and we are aware of this re-
lation through the signification of factors in the now-here-
present event. Whitehead goes on to add that the 11 common 
nature" of which these factors are significant 11 has to be 
constructed as an interpretation.•2 In other words, the indi-
viduality of an event, percipient or otherwise, is not dissi-
pated by significance. From the expistemological standpoint, 
significance itself would seem to be a dualistic relation. 
Whitehead states this in still another way by saying, "Sig-
nificance is relatedness with emphasis on one end only of 
the relation. • 
The fact of significance breaks dovvn both solipsistic 
subjectivism and Humian spepticism. Significance assures us 
of the existence of something beyond the percipient event, 
more immediately of the bodily events and, beyond that, of a 
common nature. Hume's scepticism, Whitehead points out, lay 
in the fact that his 
philosophy found nothing in any single in-
stance to justify the mind's expectation ••• 
If we are to get out of Hume 1s difficulty, 
we must find something in each slngle in-
stance which would justify the belief. The 
key to the mystery is to be found ••• in the 
intrinsic character of each instance ••• its 4 significance of something other than i~self. 
1. PNK, 79. 
2. PNK, 79. 
3. CON, 51. 
4. Art.{1923), 14. 
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Accordingly, the possibility of knowledge lies in significance. 
"Knowle dge is essentially the product of significance." 1 
Closely related to the doctrine of significance is the 
concept of conveyance. Perception is significant of perceptual 
objects qualifying events beyond the percipient event, but 
the given factors in perception are sensations significant 
of sense-objects of incompletely qualified events (from the 
standpoint of recognition). Sensations, however, not only 
signify sense-objects but indicate perceptual-objects as well. 
Instead of using the term significance for this second relation 
of sensation or the relation of the sense-object to the per-
ceptual-object, Whitehead uses the term conveyance. We recog-
nize a perceptual-object, Whitehead points out, as a permanent 
association of sense-objects. 2 But all the sense-objects 
capable of association in a sense-object do not have to be 
present for this recognition to occur. Usually only a few of 
all the possible sense-objects are pres ent which are associa-
ted with the perceptual object. At times a single sense-
object may bring about the recognition of a perce·ptual-
object. "A sense-object associated in a perceptual object 
is perceived both as itself and as •conveying' the perceptual 
object."3 A train whistle signifies a sound out there but it 
also conveys train in the night. 
It is at this point that the affective characteristic 
which later resulted in the conversion of significance into 
1. CON, 187. 3. PNK, 88. 
2. PNK, 88. 
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prehension as a felt relation enters. The conveyance of a 
perceptual-object by a sense-object is not primarily a matter 
of judgment. 1 Judgment enters into the picture but its function 
is not that of establishing the relation in question, rather 
its function is "to forment, or to exhibit, or to direct this 
conveyance. rr 2 The conveyance itself is a function of fee ling 
and this feeling function enters into all perception. Thus 
Whitehead says: 
You do not perceive a horse because you 
judge it to be a horse, but because you 
feel it to be a horse ••• The sight of the 
colour merely conveys a nameless complex 
of feeling which combined with the sight 
of the colour, is the perception of the 
horse ••• Judgment helps or abstracts this 
feeling, and adds to the immediate per-
ception the recollection of the many 
qualities assi5ned to horses in natural 
history books. 
Through conveyance, significance gains feeling content. 4 
While the concept of significance was primarily :tmportant 
in An Enqui~ Concerning the Principles £f Natural Knowledge 
and The Concep! of Nature as a basis for accounting for our 
1 • . PNK, 89. 
2. Art.(l919), 54. 
3. Art.{l919), 54. 
4. The distinction between sense-object and the nameless 
complex of feelings is perhaps the basis for the later 
distinction between knowledge by causal efficacy and 
knowledge by presentational immediacy first fully set 
forth in SME (1927). The further factor of projection 
characteristic of presentational immediacy appears in 
Art.{l923), 7-8: "Our awareness of nature consists in 
the projection of sense-objects---such as colours, shades, 
touches, bodily feelings---into a spatia-temporal con-
tinuum." 
awareness of the spatio-temporal continuum, t he richness of 
the conce pt was greatly expanded in The Principle of Rela-
tivi!l• Intimat i ons of this, however, were present in the 
two previous books as indicated by t h e concept of conveyance 
and the fact that the relati0n of significance was not 
restricted to spatio-temporal factors. In The Concept of 
Nature, for example, Whitehead insists that attention to sig -
nificance is the key to survival in the evolutionary process. 
In the course of evolution those animals 
have survived whose sense-awareness is 
concentrated on those significations of 
their bodily states which are on the av-
erage important for their welfare. The 
whole world of events is signified, but 
there are some which exalt the death 
penalty for inattention. 
Whitehead shifts his use of terms in The Principl~ of 
Relativity from events and nature as the total complex inter-
relation of events to factors embedded in fact. Fact is the 
total relationship of factors. 
Is is not the sum of factors; it is 
rather the concreteness (or, embedded-
ness) of factors, and the concreteness 
of an inexhaustible relatedness among 
inexhaustible data.2 
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There could be no factors apart from fact. Any factor con-
sidered apart from fact is an abstracti on. 3 Every factor 
refers to its "relationships withi n fact. Apart from this 
reference it is not itself."4 From the standpoint of knowledge 
-----1. CON, 194. 
2. POR, 15. 
3. Art.(1923), 9. 
4. POR, 14. 
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we are first aware of fact and then of fact as involving 
factors. 1 Among other things we are aware of the fact that 
our awareness itself is a factor within fact. Whitehead would 
seem to be leaning towards a much more monistic position ex-
cept for the condition that the relation of factors to each 
other and to fact is that of significance and not identity. 
Every factor in relation to fact is finite, is a limitation 
in relation to the totality. Every factor, event, or entity 
by its very finitude refers beyond itself, or transcends it-
self from the standpoint of its significance for the organic 
2 totality. The unity of nature is the unity of significance 
of factors or entities of and for each other. Every factor 
or entity in the universe is related to every other factor 
by significance, and every factor has meaning for every other 
factor in terms of significance. 
Two different meaningt:~ of the term significance begin to 
emerge. An entity may be significant or may be signified, 
that is, it may have intrinsic significance or it may be 
signified by something else. Every entity has both types of 
significance. Whitehead expresses this distinction by saying, 
There can be awareness of a factor as signi-
fying, and awareness of a factor as signified. 
In a sense this may be represented as an active 
or passive cognisance of the entity. The en-
1. POR, 14. cr. Art.(l916), 122: "In my view the creation of 
the world is the first unconscious act of speculative 
thought; and the first task of a self-conscious philoso-
phy is to explain how it has been done.• 
2. POR, 17-18. 
tity is either cognised for its own sake, that 
is to say, actively, or it is cognised for the 
sak~ of other entities, that is to say, passive-
ly. 
Cognizance of an event or factor as signifying is cognizance 
of its intrinsic quality; cognizance of an event as signified 
is cognizance as instrumental to the intrinsic significance 
of the entity which signifies it. 2 We have already indicated 
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that each event has its own intrinsic character of contribu-
tion to make to the totality of events which is nature. 3 White-
head now identifies that peculiar character or contribution 
with the event's significance. As such significance can 
almost be taken as synonymous with value. At least it is as 
close an approach to a theory of intrinsic valuableness of 
events as it is possible to make without using the term value 
itself. 
Whitehead proceeds to point out more clearly what charac-
terizes an entity as signifying. 
If an entity is cognised actively it is 
cognised for the sake of what it is in it-
self, for the sake of what it can make of 
the universe. I will call this sort of 
awareness of a factor, cognisance by ad-
1. POR, 18. 
2. Whitehead's usage may seem rather peculiar since "signify-
ing• would ordinarily be considered instrumental and •sig-
nified" intrinsic. For this reason it is necessary to keep 
Whitehead's own definition of terms in mind. His usage 
might have been less confusing had he used significance for 
intrinsic nature and signification for the transitive re-
lation of reference. Cf. Greene, AAC,229, for such usage. 
And yet Whitehead's usage is not so peculiar as it might 
seem, for part of the doctrine is that intrinsic signifi-
cance of an event or signifying is itself a function of the 
further events it signifies. See below. 
3. See above, sec. a. 
jective; since it is the character of the 
factor in itself rhich is then dominant 
in consciousness. 
This intrinsic significance is a complex function involving 
and resulting from the finiteness or limitations inherent in 
the event due to its exclusion and inclusion of dominant 
significance of other events 2 or its organization of the uni-
verse from its point of view, the way in which other events 
signify it, and its contrast with the significant character 
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of other events.3 Intrinsic significance is a mark of fulness 
of content of an event. There is even a "sense in which this 
type of cognisance marks a breakdown in relatedness,•4 i.e., 
as a concentration of relatedness in that event or entity. 
In light of such a clear emphasis on intrinsic significance, 
the following statement of L,owe is most surprising: 
Whitehead's philosophy of nature, then, 
'speaks of the condition' of physics 
only. It cares not one whit for the 
intrinsic significance of any event.5 
Cognizance by adjective or intrinsic significance pre-
supposes as of complementary importance and as a condition of 
its existence the other type of instrumental significance 
which Whitehead calls cognizance by ~elatedness. 
When an entity is cognised passively, we 
are awere of it for the sake of some 
other factor. We are conscious of factor 
A, because factor B of which we are ac-
tively aware would not be what it is apart 
from its relatedness to A.6 
1. POR, 18. 
2. CON, 186 and sec. a, above. 
4. POR, 18. 
5. Lowe, Art.(l941), 87. 
3. POR, 19. 6. POR, 18 
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In other words Whitehead is saying that the intrinsic signifi-
canoe or character of an event is a function of the reference 
or significance of the content of that event to other events 
signified and the events so signified are thus instrumental 
to the intrinsic significance of the event signifying. White-
head would tend to agree with T. M. Greene's analysis of 
significance in art: 
The term 'significance' has a dual mean-
ing i.e., (i) importance or value, and 
(ii) reference or signification. My 
thesis is that the significance (importance) 
of art is essentially conditioned by its 
signification (or leference to) something 
other than itself. 
That which an event signifies and through which it gains 
intrinsic significance may be made up of a number of factors. 
First of all, the event signifies the totality of events 
which consititute nature, for an event is a factor within fact 
and ttapart from this reference it is nothing at a11.• 2 Second, 
and implied by the first, every event signifies other events. 
Events are "mutually significant of each other.•3 This mutta 1 
significance considered abstractly and uniformly "be comes the 
uniform spatio-temporal structure of events.n4 Considered con-
cretely, mutual significance is content or experience. 5 Third, 
events signify ideality. "The factors of nature are also sig-
nificant of factors which are not included in nature.n6 •Nature 
1. Greene, AAC, 229n. 4 • .POR, 24. 
2. POR, 14. 5. PNK, 12. 
3. POR, 24. 6. POR, 21. 
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is significant of ideality.n 1 This has already become evident 
in our discussion of ob jects, 2 for objects considered in them-
selves are potentialities for realization by events. However, 
the sense in which events are significant of "logical, 
emotional, aesthetic, and moral apprehension•3 is not developed 
during this period. Concerning such ideality, Whitehead for 
the present states, "but this I propose to ignore.n4 Yet the 
important factor relevant to our investigation is Whitehead's 
explicit recognition of the significance of events for such 
ideality. 
The awareness of a factor under both types of signifi-
cance, cognizance by adjective and cognizance by relation, con-
stitutes "full awareness."5 Under such condi.tions both intrln-
sic character and mutual relations are jointly apparent. While 
full awareness is not a necessary precondition of thought about 
an object since significant contrast which makes awareness of 
individuality possible can be more or less realized by primary 
awareness of intrinsic character, yet full awareness is the 
condition of realization of full individuality and the intrin-
sic richness of nature. Through full awareness we are able to 
grasp the fact that "nature is a becomingn.ess of events whi .ch 
are mutually significant so far as to form a systematic 
structure."6 The possibility of systematic structure at least 
partially rests upon the individual contributions of each of 
1. POR, 20. 4. POR, 21. 
2. See above. 5. POR, 19. 
3. POR, 20. 6. POR, 21. 
its parts. We realize that the totality or fact and the sig-
nificance of the entity or factor are reciprocal. On the one 
hand, events in isolation would have no significance, but a 
totality not made up of significant events could have no 
structure on the other. "The patience of fact for A is the 
converse side of the significance of A within fact.u 1 
The doctrine of significance prepares the way for the 
metaphysical value synthesis of organic philosophy in the 
following manner: experience is meaningfull through its sig-
nificance of and for something beyond itself'; events are 
related to each other by their mutual signification of each 
other; every factor in nature is a synthesis of the whole of 
nature from its point of view and maintains its individuality 
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in the light of its peculiar synthesis due to selective ex-
clusion and inclusion; through the concept of conveyance, sig -
nificance takes on affective characteristics and thus approaches 
the status of prehension; survival of an organism is dependent 
upon its effective selection of significant factors; intrinsic 
significance of an entity is a funct i on of limitation and self-
transcendence in the form of signification beyond itself; events 
and the totality of events are significant of an ideality 
which transcends nature considered as the ob ject of scientific 
investigation. 
d. Rhyt~ and Pattern. 
While Whitehead's dominant technical interest in his natural 
1. POR, 24. 
science period was the development of a concept of nature 
capable of unifying the natural sciences and perceptual ex-
perience, yet throughout the period he maintained a continual 
interest in education as we11. 1 The two interests have a 
connecting link in the concept of life to which Whitehead 
devoted the last short chapter of An Enquirz Concernigg the 
Principles ££Natural Knowledge. Whitehead makes this connec-
tion specific2 in his discussion of the rhythm of education. 
The concept of life brings value considerations more directly 
back into the concept of nature, for Whitehead makes it evi-
dent that the characteristics of life are the characteristics 
of the achievement of value. 
The percipient event is related to an an integral part 
of the complex whole of events which makes up nature. 
The sense of action is that essential 
factor in natural knowledge which ex-
hibits itself as self-knowledge enjoyed 
by an element of nature respecting its 
active relations with3 the whole of nature in its various parts. 
Accordingly, life is an integral part of nature. But life is 
more than a percipient event or even a series of percipient 
events. Life can only be credited to a complex series of 
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1. Six of the articles on education in AOE were from this 
period and earlier and were originally published in Hib-
bert Journal, .!_he Atlantic Month1:1, and o~ 11 The Rhythm 
of Education,• as a separate pamphlet. The original dates 
of publication were 1913 , 1916, 1917, 1922 , and two in 
1923. The two which concern us most in the present dis-
cussion, "The Rhythm of Education" and "The Rhythmic Claims 
of Freedom and Discipline• were published in 1922and 1923 
respectively. 
2. See below. 
3. PNK, 14. 
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events organically related in terms of certain characteristics 
pervasive of that developing complex series as a whole. 
One of the basic characteristics of life, Whitehead as-
serts, is rhythm. While all of nature is rhythmical to a 
certain extent, life is predominantly rhythmical and involves 
the overt expression of that rhythm. 
Life preserves its expression of rhythm and 
its sensitivity to rhythm. Life is the 
rhythm as such, whereas a physical object 
is an average of rhythms which build no 
rhythm in their aggregation; and thus matter 
is in itself lifeless.l 
The rhythm characteristic of a living complex of events is a 
progressive and over-all rhythm involving all of its many 
factors. Further, there are progressive grades of life de-
pendent upon the expressiveness and novelty included in the 
rhythm. 
Life is a complex in its expression, in 
volving more than percipience, namely 
desire, emotion, will, and feeling. It 
exhibits variations of grade, higher and 
lower, such that the higher grade pre-
supposes the lower for its very existence. 2 
Whitehead in 1919 accepts and advances the concept of emer-
gence and t he dependence of the higher on the lower which was 
to be advanced in the i mmediately following years by Alexander, 
c. Lloyd Morgan, and Roy Wood Sellars. 3 But whether it be a 
higher or lower grade of life, Whitehead concludes, "the 
1. PNK, 197. 
2. PNK, 197. 
3. Cf. Alexander in STD (1920), Morgan in EE (1922), and 
Sellars in EN .(1922). 
rhythm is ••• the life, in the sense in which it can be said to 
be included within nature. 111 This near identification of 
rhyth.'ll and life and the extens i on of rhythm in some form to 
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all of nature may be one of the factors along with significance 
which led later to the attribution of sentient characteristics 
to all actual occasions. 
The rhythm characteristic of life is a developing or 
progressive rhythm but it is not sheer novelty, for sheer 
novelty would not be rhythmical. Accordingly, the rhythm 
of life involves two factors: On the one hand, without 
novelty rhythm would sink into mere r~pitition. ft A mere re-
currence kills rhythm as surely as does a mere confusion of 
2 differences. 11 . Thus the uniqueness and novelty of events is 
one necessary component. uAn event, considered as gaining 
its unity from t he continuity of extension and its unique 
novelty from its inherent character of 'passage,' contributes 
one factor to life.n 3 But equally important for rhythm and 
development is continued identity through the changing comp~ex 
of events. The condition of such identity is the factor of 
pattern which provides the identity through change and per-
sists through the passage of events as recurrent ob jects. 
Rhythm itself cannot be considered an object, for, Whitehead 
points out, as a progressive complex of events, "rhythm is too 
1. PNK, 197. 
2. PNK, 198. 
3. PNK, 198. 
concrete to be truly an object.•1 Whitehead summarizes the 
nature of the rhythm which identifies life as follows: 
A rhythm involves a pattern and to that 
extent is always self-identical. But no 
rhythm can be a mere pattern; for the 
rhyth~ic quality depends equally upon 
the differences involved in each exhibi-
tion of the pattern. The essence of rhy-
thm is the fusion of sameness and novelty; 
so that the whole never loses the essential 
unity of the pattern, while the parts ex-
hibit the ~ontrast arising from their novelty 
of detail. 
Life, then, involves progressive enrichment, development and 
realization through an organic complex of events related in 
significant and persistent pattern. 
The nature of this rhythmic development in the higher 
stages of life is elaborated more fully in Whitehead's essays 
on education. Here it becomes evident that the rhythm of 
which Whitehead is speaking is dialectical development in the 
Hegelian sense. The connection with the earlier discussion 
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of life is made clear and the thesis elaborated in the follow-
ing passage: 
Life is essentially periodic ••• There are 
the gross obvious periods which no one can 
overlook. There are also subtile periods 
of ment al growth, with their cyclical re-
currences, yet always different as we pass 
from cycle to cycle, though the subordinate 
stages are reproduced in each cycle. That 
is why I have choosen the term "rhythmic," 
as meaning essentially the conveyance of 3 difference within a framework of r.epitition. 
1. PNK, 198. 
2. PNK, 198. 
3. AOE, 27. 
Ment al growth follows definite rhythmic stages of develop-
ment. Whitehead explicitly acknowledges his debt to Hegel 
for the concept of rhythm. "Hegel was right when he analysed 
progress into three stages which he called Thesis, Anti-
thesis, and Synthesis. 111 The major failures of education are 
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due to overlooking this rhythmic nature of the growth process. 
Too often education is thought of as a mere uniform progression 
rather than the periodic, cyclical, or dialectical growth of 
the concrete living individual with which it has to be harmon-
ized. 
Whitehead descrioes the three stages of the dialectic of 
mental growth as the stage of romance, the stage of precisiCl} and 
the stage of generalization.2 The stage of romance is charac-
terized by first apprehension, immediacy, and novelty. 11 In 
this stage knowledge is not dominated by systematic procedure ••• 
We are in the presence of immediate cognisance of fact." 3 This 
can be called the romantic stage because of the excitement of 
first awareness. But we cannot stop with this stage of im-
mediacy. Both the data and the excitement must be present, 
but the data remain unordere d and essentially unusable unless 
we move on out of mere i~~ediacy. The mind seeks to order, to 
classify, to formulate. Accordingly, the second stage, the 
antithesis, is the stage of precision. "In this stage width 
of relationship is subordinated to exactness of formulation."' 4 
3. AOE, 28. 
4. AOE, 29. 
1. AOE, 27-28. 
2. AOE, 28. 
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Systematic order and analysis must replace the jumbled given-
ness of the first stage. Without subjection to order and 
precision the manifold of information ~ is simply a series of 
meaningless statements about bare facts, produced artificially 
1 
and without further reference." But system, order, and 
analysis are not enough. The danger of remaining in the anti-
thesis is that of over specialization, of pedanticism, of dry 
analysis, of loss of interest. The synthesis and final stage 
is the stage of generalization. " It is a return to roman-
ticism with added advantage of classified ideas and relevant 
2 technique." Strictly speaking, no stage is final. "We should 
3 banish the idea of a mythical, far off end of education," for 
the stage of generalization generates a new stage of romantic 
awareness of unordered fact to be grasped and ordered. 
In the 1923 article, • The Rhythmic Claims of Freedom and 
4 Discipline,• Whitehead identifies the three stages of romance, 
precision, and generalization with a progression from free-
dom, through discipline, to disciplined freedom. The aim of 
intellectual growth and thus education is what the ancients 
called wisdom. Such wisdom, Whitehead states, t' is freedom in 
5 the presence of knowledge. 11 It is possible to acquire knowl-
edge without acquiring wisdom, for wisdom "concerns the handl-
ing of knowledge, its selections for the determination of 
relevant issues and its employment to add value to our immediate 
1. AOE, 29. 
'2. AOE, 30. 
3. AOE, 30. 
4. AOE, 45-65. 
5. AOE, 47. 
expe rience. This mastery of knowledge which is wisdom is 
the most ultimate freedom attainable."1 The process begins 
and ends with freedom. The first freedom is the freedom of 
apprehension, of awakening interest and without interest no 
mental development, no progress, no realization of structured 
value is possi~le. 2 The first stage is marked by the joy of 
discovery, that joy which 11 is the normal healthy spur for the 
elan vital. • 3 But unless this awakened interest is subordi-
nated to discipline, to ordering , to system, to analysis of 
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subject-matter, it soon sinks back into loss of interest, 
frustration, and determination. Without the stage of discipline 
freedom is lost but with it the true freedom of wisdom is 
gained. "The d~scipline should be the voluntary issue of free 
choice, and ••• the freedom should gain an enrichment of possi-
bility as the issue of discipline. 114 Thus the cycle of growth, 
development, freedom, and achievement of value proceeds. It 
is this process which Whitehead calls "the general law of 
rhythmic progress in the hi gher stages of life emb odying the 
initial awakening, the disc i pline, and the fruition on the higher 
5 plane.• 
A word more must be a dded of comparison between the analy-
sis of the dialectic of mental growth as set forth by Whitehead 
and as set forth by Hegel, its admitted source. The similarity 
goes much further than just the triadic relation of thesis, 
1. AOE, 46. 4. AOE, 47. 
2. AOE, 48. 5. AOE, 62. 
3. AOE, 49. 
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antithesis, and synthesis. The dialectical mo vement of the 
}2egrif'f stage (Di~ Id~) of the ~griff of both the larger and 
smaller Logi~ of Hegel consists of the same essential stages 
as those set forth by Whitehead. The Sein of Die Idee is 
Life, the Wesen is the Idea of Cognition, the Begrif£ is the 
Absolute Idea. 1 The Sein stage, Life, is the stage of im-
mediacy2 and freedom-- 11 the Idea of Life for itself is freen3 
--, but this immediacy of life must be transcended (~£­
£ehoben). Its freedom is a false freedom unless it objecti-
fies itself in the disc i pline of cognition. 3 Life is the 
immediate Idea, or the Idea as its Notion which is not yet 
realized in itself. In its judgment it is Cognition in 
genera1.u 4 The synthesis of the immediacy of life with the 
objective discipline of cognition is Absolute Idea which is 
characterized by the rich and true freedom of personality. 
•The Notion is not only Seele but al~o is free and subjective 
Notion, which is for itself and therefore has personality.115 
Again in the Phil~phy of ~~ the progression from liberty 
to discipline and freedom occurs as follows: The thesis 
is liberty: "The essential, but formally essential, feature 
of mind is Liberty.•6 The antithesis is revelation: •As Mind 
is free, its manifestation is to set forth Nature as Its 
1. Hegel, SL, I, Table of 
Categories, and ·SL, II, 
401, 417, and 466. Also 
Wallace, LOR, 358, 362, 
and 373. 
2. Hegel, SL, II, 402. 
3. Hegel, SL, II, 
4. Hegel, SL, II, 
5. Hegel, SL, II 
6. Wallace, (tr.) 
403. 
416. 
466. 
RPM, 163. 
1 
world." The synthesis is .Absolute Mind of which Hegel says, 
8 That problem is not genuinely, and by rational methods, 
solved, so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the 
theme and soul of philosophy. 112 Whether or not Whitehead 
was fully aware of the similarity of his analysis to that of 
Hegel beyond the general dialectical structure may be open to 
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question, but that Whitehead is fully embued with the Hegelian 
concept of development and growth to the point in this case 
of almost exact si~ilarity of analysis would seem to be evi-
dent. In view of this, further similarities to Hegel's 
thought in Whitehead's developed s ystem should not be at all 
surprising in spite of a later disclaimer on Whitehead's part 
3 
of a comprehension of Hegel. 
Whitehead adds one further factor to t he process of mental 
growth. He has described the stages of mental growth in terms 
of the law of rhythmic progress. He has already stated that 
the issue or result of the process is that "freedom should 
gain an enrichment of possibility 114 and "to add value to our 
immediate experience.•5 He proceeds to make more explicit 
his contention that both the motive behind the growth pro-
cess and its result are the a~inment of value in terms of 
realization of potentialities. Thus in relation to motivation 
be says: 
1. Wallace, (tr.) HPM, 164. 
2. Wallace, (tr.) HPM, 164. 
3. Stated in private conversa-
tions of Whitehead with 
William P. McEwen and 
Edgar Sheffie~d Brightman. 
4. AOE, 47. 
5. AOE, 46. 
The ultimate motive power, alike in science, 
in morality, and in religion, is the sense 
of value, the sense of importance. It takes 
the various forms of wonder, of curiosity, 
of reverence, of worship, of tumultuous de-
sire for merging personality in something 
beyond itself. This sense of value imposes 
on life incredible labours, and apart from it 
life sinks back into the passivity of its 
lower types. The most penetrating exhibition 
of this force is the sense of beauty! the aes-
thetic sense of realized perf ection. 
In relation to the intended issue or result of such growth 
Whitehead further adds: 
Education is the guidance of the indi vidual 
towards a comprehension of the art of li f e; 
and by the art of life I mean the most com-
plete achievement of the varied activity 
expressing the potentialities of that liv-
ing creatu~e in the face of its act~l en-
vironment. · 
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The aim is • completeness of achievement•3 and, as to its source, 
Whitehead says, "Science, art, religion, morality, take their 
rise from this sense of value within the structure of being.n4 
Thus with the essays on e ducation Whitehead brings back 
into the picture the whole area of value consideration as such. 
Growth is a dialectical or rhythmic process motivated by aim 
at value, consumating in achievement of value, and proceeding 
from interested awareness of g iven data, through disciplined 
ordering and selection, to enriched fulfilment and novel 
synthesis valuable for its own sake but giving rise to a new 
and richer immediacy which reinitiates the process of further 
development and achievement of value. While Whitehead at this 
1. AOE, 63. 
2 • .AOE, 61. 
3. AOE, 61. 
4. AOE, 61. 
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time applies his analysis only to the higher stages of mental 
life the connecting links to a value centered metaphysics of 
all levels of reality embodying the same essential factors are 
present. The rhythm which Whitehead here identifies with dia-
lectical advance has already been pointed out as characteristic 
of all life and by extension as 11 an average of rhythms" to 
physical objects. 1 The process itself is at least analogous 
to the coming into being and passage of events in general, for 
we have discovered that events are units of process involving 
synthesis of relations, that events are selective of the re-
lations which they include in or exclude from synthesis, and 
that each event has its o\m. intrinsic quality or peculiar 
character and contribution to make to the totality of events 
and the on going process of further events. Events involve 
the realization of potentialities which Whitehead calls ob-
jects, and the novelty or peculiar character of an event is 
experienced in terms of the particular way it selects among 
potentialities those it will realize. Awareness of objects, 
as content and as potentialities to be selected from, corres-
ponds as the initial stage of an event to the stage of immedi-
acy in the rhythm of life. 
The concept of the universe as the complex manifold of 
inter-related indi vidual processes of value realization, or-
ganically related in terms of aim towards and production of 
value awaits not much more than the rephrasing of the concept 
-----1. PNK, 197. 
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of the transitive relation of significance into prehension and 
., 
of the concept of intrinsic significance into satisfact i on. 
The doctrine of signi ficance already contains the assertions 
that experience is meaningful through its significance of and 
for something beyond itself, that events are mutually related 
in terms of significance, that every factor in nature is a 
synthesis of the whole of nature from its point of view and 
yet maintains its individuality in light of its peculiar 
synthesis, and that intrinsic significance of an event is a 
function of llmitation and self-transcendence in the form of 
slgnificance beyond itself. Aside from the translation of 
signi ficance into affective terms, the further factor that ~s 
needed was something to give direction to the synthetic pro-
cess of each event and to c r eative advance as a whole. This 
factor has now been added in terms of aim at value realiza-
tion which corresponds to what will be calL~d subjective aim 
in the metaphysical period. 
Thus all of the major elements are at least incipiently 
present for "the metaphysical synthesis of existence'"' in terms 
of the values of nature 1 Whitehead indicated but disclaimed 
as his immediate task in The Concept of Nature. It was to 
this task that Whitehead set himself in Science and the Modern 
World. 
1. CON, 5. 
CHAPTER I II. 
Formulation of Value Theory (1925-1929). 
With the puolication of Sci~ and the Modern World 
Whitehead shifted his emphasis from the narrower problems of 
the philosophy of science to the basic questions of meta-
physics. As has been indicated, 1 from Science ~nd th~ Modern 
World to the end of his life Whitehead's major interest lay 
in the field of metaphysics. For the purposes of a develop-
mental study of Whi t ehead's concept of an axio-centric uni-
verse, however, the general period of metaphysical investiga-
tion can be subdivided into four sub-periods. But it must be 
kept in mind that there is no such major change of interest 
between these periods as there is between the three major 
periods of his life work. 
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Throughout all four sub-periods of his metaphysical 
investigations Whitehead's major thought framework, after once 
it had been developed in the earlier years, remained much the 
same. The differences between the periods lie primarily in 
the nature and method of the investigations undertaken and the 
further analysis and elaboration of particular fields and 
questions. However, on this basis, Whitehead's works from the 
publication of Science ~nd the Modern World in 1925 up to but 
not including ~~~ and Reali!I in 1929 fall together into 
what may be called the period of metaphysical formulation. It 
includes not only Scie~ and !he !odern World whlch launches 
1. See above, Chap. II. 
Whitehead's me taphysical venture with a re-interpretation of 
science as evidence for and in light of a world view rather 
than just in terms of the unity of the sciences, Reli gion!~ 
the Making (1926) which attacks the metaphysical problem from 
the springboard of man's religious consciousness, the article 
Time" in Proceedings of the Sixth International Congre~ of 
Philosophy {1927), and Symbolism, Its Meaning ~nd Effect 
(1927) which deals particularly with the epistemological 
1 prob lem. The second period may be said to be 1929 which saw 
the publication of Process and Real~, his great systematic 
exposition of his completed metaphysical system. 2 The third 
' 
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period, one of application and further elaboration of his meta-
physical position primarily in relation to the normative and 
social sciences, extends from 1929 through the publication of 
Modes of Thought in 1938. Besides Modes of Thought it also in-
cludes as major works The Functi~ of Re~~ (1929), Adventures 
of Ideas (1933), and Nature and Life (1934) later included in 
Modes of Thou~!· Finally, we must mention as a fourth period 
the year 1941 which marks the pub lication of two articles, 
•Mathematics and the Good" and "Im~ortality" in the Whitehead 
1. AOE also appeared at the end of this period (1929) but, 
as has been indicated, with one exception --"Universities 
and their Functi on" (1928)--it is composed of articles 
written prior to 1925. 
2. Strictly speaking , from the standpoint of his thought 
rather than publications, we should list 1927-1928 as the 
span of the s y s t ematic period for it was during these 
years that PR was delivered as the Gifford Lectures at 
the University of Edinburgh. 
volume of "The Library of Living Phi losophers 1•1 for these 
tend to mark a decidedly different emphasis in theory of 
value. 
With Science and the Modern World Whitehead embarked 
upon a new adventure of thought. He no longer thought of 
his task primarily as that of endeavoring tt to exhibit all 
sciences as one s ctence" 2 but rather as the task of a 
philosophy whose function 11 is to harmonise, refashion, and 
3 justify divergent in tui tiona as to the nature of things." 
To put it in slightly different fashion, the job of the 
philosopher is that of crit i cizing abstractions, of search-
ing for and demanding the return to the most concrete formul-
lation of the nature of reality. Thought by its very nature 
is abstract and we stand in constant danger of letting our 
abstractions run away with us with the result that we sub-
stitute the abstractions for the realities. 
You cannot think without abstractions; 
accordingly, it is of the greatest im-
portance to be intelligent in critically 
revising your modes of abstraction. It 
is here that pEIIOsophy finds its niche 
as essential to the heal tby progress of 
societi. It is the critic of abstrac-
tions. 
A philosophical criticism involves a return to concrete ex-
perience, the source of abstractions, 5 but also "comparing 
the various types of experience" 6 for their mutual correction 
and modificati on. The goal of philosophy can be stated in 
1. Schilpp, PA}TW, 666-700. 4. SMW, 86. 
2. CON I 2. 5. SMW, 26-27 and 129. 
3. SM\iiJ , x. 6. SMW, 27. 
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terms of Whitehead's definition of metaphysics. 
By metaphysics I mean the science which 
seeks to discover the general ideas which 
are indispensably relevant to t~e analy-
sis of everything that happens. 
Philosophical criticism of abstractions and cosmolo gi-
cal schemes of abstractions, Whitehead feels, is particularly 
important at the present time, for modern thought has become 
infected by a strange dichotomy and contradiction due to the 
very success of its most useful abstractions as embodied in 
science. We assert the dignity of man and at the same time 
the completely mechanical character of nature. 2 The diffi-
culty has arisen due to the fact that the very historical 
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revolt of science against the dogmatic rationalism of scholas-
ticism has itself issued in a dogmatic acceptance of the 
abstract cosmology of science. The pragmatic success of 
scientific investigation merely reenforced the dogmatism of 
acceptance of its assumed presuppositions, with the result 
that 
the historical revolt has thus been exag-
gerated into the exclusion of philosophy 
from its proper role of harmonising the 
various ~bstractions of methodological 
thought. 
But science through recent advances has reached a stage when 
its cosmological abstractions are a methodological hinderance 
rather than a help in its further advance. The old concepts 
1. RIM, 84. 
2, . SMW , 110. 
3. SMW, 26. 
of materialistic mechanism, 1 of i nert matter 1 of the absolute 
separation of mind and matter must be reinterpreted in light 
of advances in physics and biolog~ plus the value experiences 
of man. Accordingly 1 ph i los ophy must become the "critic of 
cosmologies • 2 in order to point out and overcome the "radical 
inconsistency" of holding at the same time " a scientific 
realism 1 based on mechanism ••• conjoined with an unwavering 
belief in the world of men and of higher animals as being 
composed of self-determining organisms. 113 To explain self-
determination and value 1 somehow they must be shown not to be 
forei gn to the nature from which they emerge. 
In 1920 Whitehead had pointed out, "The values of nature 
are perhaps the key to the metaphysical synthesis of exist-
ence."4 We have seen that in spite of his disclaimer--"such 
a synthesis is exactly what I am not a t tempting"5 --Whitehead 
throughout his natural science period steadily moved in such 
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a direction. Now, with Science and !g~ Modern World 1 he 
specifically takes up the task of working out such a synthesis. 
In light of his new perspective of his task as a philosopher 
in the broad sense of the word 1 the methodological stri ctures 
of the natural science period drop away. He is no longer con-
fining himself to "homogeneous" thought concerning nature and 
thus applying the stricture 1 llf:Nature is closed to mind.tt
6 Rather 
1. s M"ri , 74. 
2. SM"IN , x. 
3. SMVV , 110 
4. CON I 5. 
5. CON 1 5. 6. CON, 2 and 4. 
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he is searching for "logical coherence, adequacy, and exem-
plification"1 as applied to all experience, and these in turn 
become his criterion of truth. Thus be states with no re-
• 
strictions as to objects of thought, 
Progress in trutb ••• is mainly a progress in 
the forming of concepts, in discarding arti-
ficial abstractions or partial metaphors, 
in evolving notions which strike more deeply 
into the root of reality.2 
In spite of Whitehead's specific assertions of difference 
in method and orientation and in spite of the factors in the 
natural science period itself which led him in this direction, 
some of his reviewers and critics either failed to recognize 
that a shift had occurred or charged him with internal in-
consistency for failing to abide within the methodological 
limits of the earlier period. Miss Stebbing, for example, 
while recognizing that Whitehead was in fact using a different 
method, yet refused to see that there was even any connection 
between the two periods. 
This is not a mere change in terms; the o! 
different mode of approach has resulted 
in a different analysis. But as usual, 
Professor Whitehead makes no attempt to 
connect his two treatments of the same 
problem, nor to show how one bas developed 
out of the other.3 
She goes on to add: "Another doctrine which he seems to have 
1. RIM, 89. 
2. RIM, 131. 
3. Stebbing, Art. (1928) 2, 372. 
for gotten is that 'Nature is closed to Mind, ,.l She there-
fore found open contradiction and confusion in his thought. 
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Even C. Lloyd Morgan failed to recognize the provisional 
and methodological nature of the earlier principle and that 
the new departure involved its abandonment. As a result he 
charged Whitehead with "two-boatery," 2 that is, with putting 
~all qualities in the physical boatn but still maintaining 
a •mental boat.•3 Morgan goes on to say, "All forms of two-
boatery I reject.•4 It is our contention that such criticisms 
•miss the boat" altogether through failure to recognize pilot-
age points along the way and failure to heed specific instruc-
tions to change charts after passing the reef of abstraction. 
A. Conditions of emergent value. 
An attentive reader of the books of Whitehead's natural 
science period, we have maintained, could have expected a 
shift on Whitehead's part from philosophy of science to an 
axio-centric metaphysics. The groundwork for such a develop-
ment lay in Whitehead's very investigation of the natural 
sciences and their. underlying presuppositions. With Science 
and the ~!:.~World this shift definitely .occurs. Accordingly 
we shall consider two statements from Sci~ ~~.!?_he Mode~ 
World as containing the key to Whitehead's developing meta-
physical position. These two statements are: 11 'Value' is 
the word I use for the intrinsic reality of an event, 115 and 
1. Stebbing, Art.(l928) 2 , 372. 
2. Morgan, Art.(l930), 181. 
3. Morgan, Art.(l930), 181. 
4. Morgan, Art.(l930),181. 
5. SMW I 136. 
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-"The organism is a unit of emerging value. ,l But these 
statements considered in abstraction from the context of their 
~ssertion and development are more or less meaningless and 
serve at best to raise rather than to answer questions. 
Immediately a nl~ber of questions come to mind: In what 
sense is an organism a unit of emerging value? What right 
have we to consider an organism a unit of emerging value? 
What are the conditions of an organism's emerging? Are these 
also conditions of value? What does Whitehead mean by value? 
If the term value is made synonymous with the int rinsic reality 
of an event has not the term value been spread so thin as to 
be meaningless? If every event is intrinsically a value, can 
there be any disvalue? How does value offer a key to the 
unity and diversity of reality? 
In order to answer these questions and to develop more or 
less systematically Whitehead's theory of value in this his 
fo~mulative period from the standpoint of metaphysics we shall 
proceed to investigate, first, the nature and conditions of the 
existence of organisms and how these conditions are also the 
conditions of value realization. We shall do this in terms of 
three concepts: (1) prehension, the affective condition of 
organisms and value, (2) ideality, the subsistent condition of 
organisms and value, and (3) purpose, the efficient condition 
of organisms and value. Then, second, we shall turn to the 
concept of value itself and consider it in terms of its basic 
1. SMIN, 156. 
meaning for Whitehead, in terms of the implications of this 
meaning for existence, in terms of the distinction between 
value and disvalue, and finally, in terms of the categories 
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of increased value or the concept of importance. And, third, 
we shall investigate the relation of individual value realiza-
tions to value totality, or of realities to reality. Here 
our attention will center on the concept of God and his value 
funct1ons on the one hand and the concept of the relation of 
individuality to community on the other. 
1. Prehension, the affective condition of value. 
During the natural science period Whitehead had come to 
the conclus i on that the ultimate concrete units of nature are 
events which can be described as units of process and re-
1 lational centers of re~ity. Every event is related to 
every other event in the universe through signification or 
reference. That which constitutes an event as this particular 
event rather than some other i s its peculiar synthesis of 
relations in light of its selectivity. At least the percipient 
event, Whitehead insisted, has •'its very being in the forma-
tion of its relations ••• Re lations are perceived in the making 
and b'ecause of the making. 112 Whitehead proceeded to develop 
the concept of the nature of experienced relation in terms of 
the doctrine of significance. 3 All experience is referential 
or significant in the sense of indicating a "beyond to whatever 
is observed.n4 Experience can be defined in terms of signifi-
1. Chap. I, sec.a. 
2. PNK, 14. 
3 • Chap. I I, s e c • c • 
4. CON, 186. 
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cance. 1 Since the percipient or experienced event is not 
something outside nature but "'herewithin nature' and 'now 
2 
within' nature'" the relat i on of significance and mutual sig-
nification is characteristic of all even t s and is that relation 
which binds them together into the complex total structure 
which constitutes developing nature. 
With the shift in Whitehead's orientation from the more 
restricted philosophy of the sciences to the wider metaphysical 
task of the search for "the general ideas which are indispen-
sibly relevant to the analysis of everything that happens,n 3 
Whitehead turns again to the problem of relations and the re-
1ational contents of events. The j ustification, if apy is 
possib le, for t he ilt faith in reason11 which is t he "trust tha t 
the ultimate natures of things lie together in a harmony 
which excludes mere arbitrariness, 114 and on which the possibility 
of philosophic interpretation rests, must lie in an understand-
ing of the relations between and the relational activity of 
events. The conception of an entity with no relations to other 
entities or even to any one other entity is almost a contra-
diction in terms, for, not only would it be unknowable, it 
would have no effects and thus at least be the same as non-
existent. Whitehead points out, 
If it is out of relationship, then com-
plete ignorance as to it. Here by 'ig-
norance' I mean ~ora~~; accordingly 
no advice can be given as to how to ex-
pect it, in 'practise' or in any other 
way. Either we know something of the 
3. RIM,84. 
4. SM"vV, 27. 
1. PNK, 12. 
2. PNK, 13. 
remote occasion, or we know nothing. 
Accordingly, the full universe, dis-
closed for every variety of experience, 
is a universe in which every detail 
enters into its proper relationship 
with the immediate occasion.l 
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Thus Whitehead's search is for the most concrete form of 
relation discoverable in experience. The term "relation" it-
self will not do as a description of the togetherness or re-
latedness of factors characterizing reality because of its 
abstractness and ambiguous generality. Relations may be 
concrete or abstract, internal or external, real or imaginary. 
For the answer we have to turn to our own actual experience 
from which all investigation must start and to which it must 
ultimately appea1. 2 Among the contents of experience are 
cognitive elements or our acts of co gnition. Cognition or 
thought involves relation in that it self-transcendent, 
refers beyond itself to a world of known factors. nThe world 
as known transcends the sub.ject which is cognitive of it . .. 3 
But the difficulty of thought as the most concrete type of re-
lation is that by its very nature it always involves abstrac-
tion.4 Further, wh i le co gnition is a fact of experience for 
higher organisms, it is highly doubtful whether, as conscious 
reflection and recognition, it can be attributed to organisms 
lower on the scale than man and certainly not to forms of 
existence 0rdinarily referred to as inorganic.5 Thus awareness 
1. SMW, 38. 
2. SMW, 129-130. 
3. SMW , 131. 
4. SNfvV , 26. Of. :Br'adley, AAR, 
360: "Thought essentially 
consists in ••• separation." 
5. SMW, 107 and RIM, 101. 
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of relation must be more fundamental than conscious thought. 
In order to discover the most basic form of awareness of 
relation constitutive of events Whitehead turns to the problem 
of perception and considers again the passage from Berkeley's 
!lciEhron1 with which he introduced the concept of significance 
in An Enquirz Concerning the Principles £f Natural Knowledge. 
While Whitehead again rejects the particular type of idealis-
tic answer to the question "What do we mean by things being 
realised in the world of nature?'' 2 which Berkeley gives, i.e. 
that the factors in nature have no existence apart from the 
perceiving mind either of finite persons or of God, 3 yet he 
insists that the clue to the correct answer lies in perceptual 
reference. As further evidence Whi t ehead indicates . a passage 
from Francis Bacon's Natural~!!~ in which Bacon states: 
It is certain that all bodies whatsoever, 
though they have no sense, yet they have 
perception ••• and whether the body be al-
terant or altered, evermore a perception 
precedeth operation; for else4all bodies would be like one to another. 
In other words, the constitutive factor pointed out both by 
Berkeley and Bacon is the common fact of experience that given 
with the experience is the reference of its content to factors 
beyond itself. 
With the combined analysis of Berkeley and Bacon White-
head agrees but he hesitates to use the word perception for 
this awareness of other factors or entities because it is, he 
1. Chap. II, sec. c. Berkeley, 
ALC,l68. 
2. SMW, 98. 
3. Berkeley, PHK, 211. 
4. Bacon, Wrl, V, 62. 
insists, a more basic awareness than perception as such. 
The word Eerceive i s, in our common usage, 
shot through and through with the notion 
of cognitive apprehe nsion. So is the word 
apprehension, even with the adjective cog-
nitive omitted. I will use the word pre-
hension for unco gn i tive apprehens i on: 
by this I mean apprehension which may or 
may not be cogniti ve.l 
Berkeley's esse is percipi and ~ is percipere can be 
changed to "To be is to prehend 11 and "To be is to be pre-
handed. 11 
Prehension, far from being a static or passive rela-
tion is thoroughly active, constitutive, a nd referential. 
Whitehead stresses the referen tial and thus essentially 
dualistic nature, from the standpoint of epistemolo gy, of 
prehension in terms highly suggestive of his earlier dis-
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cussi on of si gn ificance. 11 There is a prehension, here in 
this place, of things which have reference to other places.2 
A natural entity is a realization of referential prehensive 
relations. Thus Whitehe ad says, 
We can substitute the conce pt, that the 
realisation is the gathering of things 
into the unity of a prehension; and 
that what is thereby realised is the 
prehension, and not the things. This 
unity of a prehension defines itself as 
a here and a now; and t h e things so 
gathered into~e grasped unity have es-
sential reference to other places and 
other times. For Berkeley's mind, I 
substitutg a process of prehensive uni-
fication. 
1. SMW , 101. 
2 . SMV~, 101. 
3. SMW , 101-102. Whitehead's terminol ,)gy during his meta-
physically formative period is still highly flui d . Thus 
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In reference to Alciphron's question as to the nature of the 
perception of objects Whitehead answers, 
The things which are grasped into a 
realised unity, here and now, are not 
the castle, the cloud, and the planet 
simply in themselves, but they are the 
castle, the cloud, and the planet from 
the standpoint in space and time of the 
prehensive unification.l 
he uses here, the term prehension both for the elemental 
awareness of relation in process of unification and also 
for the synthetic unification which is the unit of reality. 
Through this period of his development he tends to consider 
as synonymous prehension in the second sense, event (e.g. 
S1~V~ 174), natural entity (S~N, 101), actual thin~ (RIM, 
150), occasion (SMW, 253; RIM, 103; Art.(l927) 60), epochal 
occasion (RIM, 93), actual occasion (e.g. S1'f1N, 247, RIM, 
157), entity (RIM, 104), and actual entity (e.g. RIM, 100). 
The latter restriction of event to tra nexus of actual 
occasions..,. (PR, 113) and prehension primarily to the ele-
mental feeling factors (PR, 337-338) does not become stable 
until PR. 
1. SMW,l02. How, in light of the above, Whitehead cou~ be in-
terpreted -as opposed to epistemological dualism as Lovejoy 
at least suggests (Lovejoy, RAD, 159) is difficult to under-
stand. Whitehead does reject what he calls 11 subjectivism11 , 
i.e., that our experience is merely the expression of the 
individual peculiarities of cognitive acts..,. (Sl®N, 126) and 
affirms what he calls "'objectivism" which he defines as the 
view •that the things experienced and the cognitive subject 
enter into the commonworld on equal terms" (SMW, 129). But 
this itself would seem to be an assertion of reference ra-
ther than identity, particularly in light of his specific 
statement, "My point is that in our sense-experience we know 
away from and beyond our own personality." (SMW,l30.) A 
more dualistic statement is hardly conceivable. 
Swabey's interpretation of prehensive unification and 
~rofessor Whitehead's pan-objectivism~ is pe r haps the most 
amazing of all. He says 11 I understand this /E'he event as 
a prehensive unificatio~to mean that it is tne complex con-
tent of a possible act of perception conceived as independent 
of the perceiver underlining mine1 Or perhaps we shouiOi9ay, 
or a possib e ac of experience, using the term as indicating 
much more than mere perception.• (Swabey, Art.(l926), 274-
275.) ~fuitehead is not talking about "possible acts,. but 
•concrete fact• (SMW, 102-103). While Whitehead is denying 
an underlying soul substance as perceiver, he is hardly 
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According to Whitehead, all concrete occasions are pre-
hensive occasions. 
The actual world is a manifold of pre-
hensions; and a 'prehension' is a 'pre-
hensive occasion'; and a prehensive oc-
casion is the most concrete finite 
entity, conceiv!d as what it is in itself 
and for itself. 
If this is the case, then it follows that all concrete actuali-
ties considered as they truly are are units of awareness or 
apprehensions though not necessarily cognitive or conceptual 
in nature. Further, they are processes of realization. "A 
prehension is a process of unifying . 112 
Up to this point there would not seem to be a great deal 
of difference between the earlier doctrine of signifi cance and 
the doctrine of prehension except for a more specific assertion 
that prehensions may be, and, considering reality as a whole, 
usually are uncognitive in nature. But it is at this point 
that a question arises, the answer to which does indicate a 
most important difference and forms the basis for the intro-
duction of experienced value as characteristic of all reality. 
If prehension is apprehension but of an uncognitive nature in 
most cases, then what is the nature of that apprehension? 
Whitehead uses the term "perspective" as more or less synony-
mous with the term "prehension" and then goes ·on to point out 
denying a perceiver but rather is asserting that the per-
ceiver is constituted by his perceptions and perceptive 
unificat i on and that all realities are perceivers. 
1. SMW, 104-105. 
2. SMW, 106. 
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that the term 11 perspective illl1 as he is using it was first intro-
duced into philosophy by Leibniz in his discussion of monads 
as mirroring aspects of the universe. 2 The similarity between 
Leibniz and Whitehead is much deper than just the use of the 
term perspective, for Whitehe.ad's doctrine of prehension as 
presented in Science~£ the Mo~~g_W£rld follo ws Leibniz's 
doctrine of perception with very few modifications aside from 
terminology. Leibniz states: 
The passing co~dition which involves and 
represents a multiplicity in the unity, 
or in the simple substance, is nothing 
else than what is called Perception. 
This should be care·fully distinguisged 
from apperception or consciousness. 
Thus Lei bni~ is faced with the same problem as Whitehead. 
I. 
Whereas human consciousness is characterized by vivid and 
clear perceptions, as one goes down the scale of monads towards 
the inorganic the percep tions become confused and indistinct. 4 
Since intellectual cognition or conceptualization is not present 
in the lower monads, Leibniz identifies the root meaning of 
perception with another experiential factor, i.e. feeling or 
affection. Thus he insists that no monad could :"exist without 
some affe ction and the affection is nothing else than its per-
5 
ception. 
Whitehead's thorough analysis of the affective nature of 
prehension came only with Process and ,Eeal!!l; however, the 
1· SMW, 102. 4. Leibniz, MON, 264. 
2. Leibniz, MON, 270. 5. Leibniz, MON, 255. 
3. Leibniz, MON, 253. 
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identificat i on of prehension and feeling in Leibnizian form 
was made indirectly in Science and the ~odern ~orl~ and ex-
plicitly in Rel~ion 1~ th~ ~ing . The importance of the af-
1 fective factor in experience was first indicated in the con-
cept of conveyance attached to the doctrine of significance 
du~ing the natural science period. vVhile in Science and the 
Moder~ World cognitive mentality is restricted to hi gher types 
of prehensive unifications or events, yet Whitehead insists 
that "the psychological field exhioits what an event is in it-
self."2 The theory of prehens~_ on does "edge cognitive ment ality 
away from being the necessary substratum of the unity of ex-
perience,113 but, 11 a complex occasion includes that which in 
cognitive experience takes the form of memory, antic:tpa tion, 
4 ima gination, and thought" in "synthetic prehension" the re-
sult of which is essentially an "aesthetic synthesis.n 5 By 
aesthetic synthesis it becomes e vident that ·Whitehead means 
feelin g synthesis as he specifically states in the second 
series of Lowell Lectures: ~An actual fact is a fact of aes-
thetic experience. All aesthetic experience is feeling.• 6 
1. See above, Chap. II, sec. c, on conveyance. 
2. SMV'l , 278. Cf. also SMVV, 21.4: 11 The private psychological 
field is merely an event considered from its own stand-
point.·" 
3. SMW , 134. 
4. SMIN, 246. 
5. SMW , 245. Cf. also SMW, 40: • wherever there is a unity of 
occasion there is thereby established an aesthetic rela-
tionship between the general conditions involved in that 
occasion. " Cf. sec. B, 2 below and Chap. VII on Whitehead's 
aestheticism. 
6. RIM, 115. 
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And again he states: •Here 'feeling' is used as a synonym 
1 for 'actuality.' "' Accordingly, every occasion is a "unity 
of feeling" embracing "the whole, omitting nothing , whether 
it be ideal form or actual fact." 2 Thus the fundamental form 
of actual relationship is feeling which refers beyond itself 
to other centers of feeling relation. The universe is sentient 
through and through. 
Prehensive unity or feeling synthesis is what Whitehead 
calls the "substantial activity113 of events and thus reality. 
Every event is an individual in light of its peculiar feeling 
synthesis of its relations to all other occasions. i•Each 
event is an individual matter of fact issuing from an indi-
vidualisation of the substrate activity.n 4 But since its very 
individuality is dependent upon its felt relations to all the 
rest of reality, no event stands in complete independence. 
Thus Whitehead adds, "But individualisation does not mean 
substantia l independence. 115 Every event or occasion requires 
all other events as its felt complements. 11 An event has to 
do with all that there is, and in particular with all other 
events. n6 The universe is made up of an irreducible plurality 
of feeling occasions, but it is also a unity through the mutual 
feeling reference of all occasions to each other, or, as one 
1. RIM, 104. 
2. RIM, 112. 
3. s:Mw, 254. 
4. SMW, 103. 
5. S!~ , 103. 
6. SMW, 151. 
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commentator has stated it, a unity of "sympa the tic feeling . n 1 
From the standpoint of any one feeling occasion .its felt 
relations to all other occasions do not stand in equal rele-
vance to its own feeling synthesis, otherwise all occasions 
would be identical in content. The peculiar synthesis which 
constitutes this event or occasion is rather the result of 
• a graded grasping of the elemen t s of the universe into one 
fact,•2 and the grading is a function of the way in which the 
aspects ~3 of other events are prehended. As was the case 
with the doctrine of significance, i.e. the significance of 
an event was considered to be dependent upon its significa-
4 ti on of other events, so in relation to pre hens ion Whitehead 
asserts, nThe effectiveness of an event beyond itself arises 
from the aspects of itself which go to form the prehended 
unities of other events. 115 And conversely, "Its knowledge of 
itself arises from its own relevance to the things of which 
it prehends the aspects." 6 
1. Moore, Art.(l931), 269. Braithwaite in his review of SMW 
states: "Dr. Whi t ehead goes further towards monism, since 
he makes every event require everything else for its exist-
ence." (Braithwaite, Art.(l926), 491.) It must be kept in 
mind, however, that while with .SMW Vfuitehead definite be-
comes a qualitative monist he remains a quantitative plural-
ist. The universe is a plurality of organisms in mutual 
feeling relations, but the relations as referential do not 
thereby constitute identity. Thi s will become more evident 
as we proceed. 
2. RIM, 151. 
3. SMV'i, 174, 214, 216, 217. The concept of "negative prehen-
sion" as such is not introduced until PR, 35; however, "ex-
cluded relationships" which is the same thing with a dif-
ferent name are stressed. See for example, SMW, 234. 
4. Cf, Chap. II, sec. d. 
5. SMW, 174. 
6. SMW, 214. 
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If reality is essentially of the nature of feeling a 
number of other characteristics follow. Feeling by its very 
nature is transitory and passing . An actual occas i on is a 
prehensive unification or feeling synthesis, but as feeling 
synthesis it must give way, must be transcended, must become 
and die and give rise to new feeling syntheses. ~ccordingly, 
nature is i n continual change, not merely from the standpoint 
of its ou t ward aspects, but in its innermost reality. "This 
is one aspect of nature, its elusive change: a change not 
merely to be expressed by locomotion, but a change of inward 
character."1 Further, since each occasion is not mere de-
tached or random feeling but a prehensive unification, as are 
all its successor occasions, the change is evolving process 
or development. 
A prehension is a process of unifying . 
Accordingly, nature is a process of 
development, necessarily transitional 
from prehension to prehension ••• Thus 
nature is a s t ructure of evolving 
proce~ses. The reality is the pro-
cess. 
As a unit of process, as a synthesis of feeling , as pass-
ing and self-transcendent an event or occasion stands in inti-
mate relation not only to its contemporaries but to the past 
and future. "An event," Whitehead says, "has a past. This 
1. S:MW , 125. Cf. SMW , 135: '" One all pervasive fact, inherent 
in the very character of what is real, is the transit i on 
of things, the passa ge of one to another. • 
2. S!v'fW , 106. 
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means that an event mirrors within itself the modes of its 
predecessors, as memories which are fused into its own ac-
count. 1•1 The affect of past syntheses on the present is the 
causal efficacy which assures the on-going of process on the 
one hand and the continuity or conformity of the present with 
the past on the other. "The overwhelming conformation of 
fact, in present action, to antecedent settled fact is to be 
found here. 11 2 The event dies, but dies to rise again as a 
felt component in successive prehensive unifications. 
iiiAn event," Whitehead continues, 
has a future. This means that an event 
mirrors within itself such aspects as 
the future throws back on to the present , 
or, in other words, as the present had 
determined concerning t~e future. An 
event has anticipation. 
Without anticipation, without direction, without self-trans-
cendence feeling synthesis could not occur. The event's 
present is a process of feeling synthesis or realization. As 
a present synthesis, the event's relations are internal, for 
feeling is internal but with reference beyond itself. 
The position here maintained is that the 
relationships of an event are internal, so 
far as concerns the event itself; that is 
to say that they are constitutive of the 
1. SMW , 106. 
2. SME, 41. 
3. SMW, 107. Cf. below, sec. 3, on purpose. Note also Art. 
( 1927), 61: mThis doctrine, that the o bjectified future 
is prehended in each actual occasion, is only a version 
of the old doctrine that the process of becoming is the 
union of being with not-being.• 
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event 1tself. 1 
As transitory feeling synthesis, as a unit of process 
and realization an event is basically temporal. 11 Temporalisa-
tion is realisation" and "realisation is the becoming of time 
in the field of extension. 112 Each occasion is a becoming of 
time. In this sense, "~Jfuitehead says, "Time is atomic • 3 not 
' ' 
that is, as made up of descr ete timeless units, but as the 
temporal becoming of occasions each of which requires duration. 
Physical time and space, on the other hand, "are simply ab-
stractions from the tot ality of prehensive unifications as 
mutually patterned in each othe r. 114 The spat i o-temporal con-
tinuum5 is an abstract way of referring to the mutual related-
ness of the totality of occasions. 
The temporal and transitive character of occasi ons as 
prehensive unifications accounts for the flux of reality. 
The synthetic and referential character of prehensions ac-
counts to a large extent both for reality's plurality and 
unity. But something more is necessary. Reality is fluid 
but it also manifests permanences. The present conforms to 
t he past but this itself implies at least a logical identity 
of conformal elements. Reality is process, out process im-
plies development. Realization involves more than past actuali-
1. S1Tfv, 152. The doctrine o·f internal reJstions in present 
occasions necessitated by the feeling structure of the 
event is undoubtedly one of the major factors leading to 
t he further doctrine of contemporaiJr independence of oc-
casions first advanced as such in SME, 16. Cf. sec.C,2 
below. 
2. SM¥1, 185. 
3. SNf'N, 185. 4. SMW, 105. 5. SM1N, 181. 
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ties. It is inconceivable without reference to potentiality 
to be made actual. An event or occasion is an affective 
synthetic experience, but such an affective synthetic ex-
perience is not understandable without reference to the po-
tentialities, alternatives, and logical identities which 
constitute what can be called the realm of ideality.l To 
this realm as the subsistent condition of occas:t ons m d value 
we must now turn. 
In the concept of prehension the first and basic con-
dition of experienced value has been met. Reality as a whole 
and real1. ties individually are affective in nature. One of 
the "general ideas which are indispensible relevant to every-
thing that happens" 2 is, then, that reality is affective in 
nature and all feeling involves reference beyond itself. A 
second such idea is that every occasion is a unit process or 
synthesis of such feelings. Feeling synthesis involves a 
grading of the relevance of felt factors and the effective-
nasa of such synthesis is to be measured in terms of the as-
pects of itself felt by other even t s. Feeling, because of 
its transitory nature assures the necessity of continuing 
process and progress! ve synthesis. Each occasion as feeling 
synthesis stands in intimate felt relation to its past and 
through anticipation to the future, and, as constituted by 
feeling, an occasion's relations are internal and temporal. 
1. SM>N, 228. 
2. RIM, 84. 
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2. Ideality, the subsistent condition of value. 
In The frincipl~ of Re la ti viti. Whitehead stated, "Na-
ture is significant of ideality, 111 but at that time he went 
on to add, "but this I propose to ignore. u2 In Science and 
the Modern World the problem of the nature of ideality and 
its relation not just to nature in· the more restricted sense 
of the object of the sciences but to the becoming process 
of actuality in general becomes a central problem. We have 
discovered that the units of reality are prehensive ud[ica-
tions or. realizations of feeling synthesis, but realization 
involves the actualization of potentialities and, somehow, 
potentiality must be accounted for. Further, while an 
actual occasion is constituted by prehensions, yet an actual 
occasion also involves given content which maintains its logi-
cal identity in diverse occasions and is felt or prehended 
as referring beyond the present occasion. Prehension is ac-
tivity, is process, 3 but such feeling process is "an actual 
occasion of experience" whose contents are "diversified by 
reference to a realm of entities which transcend that immedi-
ate occasion of experience :tn that they have analogous or 
different connections with other occasions of experience . " 4 
These entities which fill the role of possibilities and 
qualifying contents of events Whitehead calls eternal ob-
jects. 5 They are .~elements required for the very being of the 
1. POR, 20. 
2. POR, 21. 
3 • SNfW, 1 06. 
4. SMVV, 227. 
5. SMN, 151. 
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process, nl and "the cond1.tioned potentialities which are there 
for synthesis." 2 These elements, potentialities, or eternal 
objects considered in themselves abstractly constitute what 
Whitehead calls the 11 realm of i deality.n3 Accordingly White-
head insists, ~ It is the foundation of the metaphysical 
position which I am maintaining that the understanding of 
actuality requires a referen ce to ideality. n4 
Both the basis and many of the details of the doctrine 
of eternal objects had already been worke d out, as we have 
indicated, 5 in Whitehead's theory of objects in the natural 
scie n ce period. In many respects the chapter entitled "~b­
straction" in Science and the Modern World is a restatement 
and elaboration of his earlier views. Whitehead had already 
insisted that objects, to which he now added the adjective 
eternal, are t he qualifyi n g given contents of events by which 
these event s can be identi f ied, that the particular cont ri-
bution of an event is its peculiar synthesis of objects, 
that objects considered in themselves are potentialities for 
realization by events, that an event 1 s novelty is dependent 
upon the particular way in which it selects from among ob jects 
those which it will realize, and that the subsistent lo gical 
identity of objects in diverse and succes s ive events assures 
permanence amid change and makes possible the preservation of 
the contribution of past events. 
1. SI\1W I 15 8. 
2 • s NNv, 25 4 • 
3. SMW, 228. 
4. SMW I 228. 
5. Chap. II, sec. b. 
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In light of these earlier developments, the almost unani-
mous chorus of disapproval of the chapter on abstraction from 
the reviewers of Science and ~he Modern !orld is surprising. 
Braithwaite, for example, states: 
T}j.ese two chapters L""Abstraction" and "God"7 
are in his 7Whitehead's7 best obscure style. 
Sometimes wKen one has-disengaged the mean-
ing it seems such a platitude that one cannot 
believl that this is all that Dr. Whitehead 
means. 
He goes on to add, "Dr. Whitehead sketches a method for getting 
'abstractive' hierarchies from the s e ob jects, though he does 
not tell us what be wants them for.• 2 In the same line Swabey 
states, "Tbe theory of abstraction is no doubt important--
could one understand it. "3 
PerP.aps the most difficult o'f the reviewer's comments to 
understand is the following by H. Wildon Carr: 
To us, however, it is not the expression 
but the thought of these chapters which is 
peculiarly perplexing, for it seems, at 
any rate at first, directly opposed to the 
theory expounded throughout the book, and 
particularly difficult to reconcile with 
the organic concept. 
And yet it would seem that if the concept of organism as a 
unit of emergent value is cent ral to Science and the Modern 
World, then the theory of ideality is vital to its develop-
ment. If actuality is to become, there must be potentiality 
to be made actual. If value is to be achieved, there must be 
ideals as plans of value which the purposive events or occasions 
can realize. If conceptual knowledge is to be obtained, there 
1. Braithwaite, Art.(l926),496. 
2. Braithwaite, Art.{l926),497. 3. Swabey 1 Art.(l926),278. 4. Carr, art.(l926), 208. 
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must be universals in terms or which it can be formulated. 
Unless there is given and potential content, there can be no 
synthetic activity. The concept or eternal objects is that 
of the given, un iversal, ideal, and potential contents or 
the experient occasions. Without these eternal objects the 
actual occasion, emergent organism, or experienced event would 
not be possible. 
Considered in themselves and in terms or their mutual 
relations to each other, eternal ob jects constitute ideality. 
Such consideration, however, will necessarily be abstract 
for these objects never exist apart from actuality. For 
purposes of analysis such abstracti on is both legitimate and 
possible, but to assume that eternal objects are existent in 
separation from prehensive occasions is to commit the fallacy 
of misplaced concreteness1 or hypostatization. 
Eternal objects are thus in their nature 
abstract. By 'abstract' I mean that what 
an eternal object is in itself--that is 
to say its essence--is comprehensible 
without reference to some particular oc-
casion or experience.2 
To be comprehensible without reference to some particular 
occasion, however, does not mean to be existent apart from 
all occasions. Love is comprehensible without reference to 
the particular love of John for Mary but love is only exist-
ent as some person's actual experience. ~ccordingly, the 
realm of ideality may be said to be the realm or subsistent 
1. SM.W, 82-85. 
2. SMW, 228. 
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lo gical i dentities, but these are real only as exemplified or 
actualized in particular occas i ons. As such, eternal ob jects 
transcend actual occas i ons but are never disembodied existents 
apart from them. Whitehead says, 
But to transcend an actual occasion does 
not mean to be disconnected from it. On 
the contrary, I hold that each eternal 
object has its own proper connection with 
each such occas i on, which I term its 
mode of ingression into that occasion.l 
As was t he case with ~'objects 11 during the natural science 
period, eternal objects include everything from~~ gualia 
--" definite shade of red,n2 Mcolours, sounds, and scen t s"3 
and geometrical shapes -- 11spherici ty 11'4 -- to aesthetic har-
monies and ideals. 5 What such seemingly varied factors may 
have in common becomes more evident upon analysis. Eternal 
objects vary from the simplest, most abstract, and unanalyzable 
sense qualities to exceeding ly complex norms and standards. 
1. SMW , 228-229. In light of Whitehead's insistence that 
eternal objects are abstractions and not existent in their 
own right the following statement of E. W. Hall would 
seem to be the result of a basic misinterpretation: 
"Besides ac t ual occasions, however, he /Whitehead7 gives 
us a realm of shadowy 'eternal ob jects'-whose function and 
status are not always clear. In fact, if he admits that 
. his division between actual occas i ons and eternal objects 
is metaphysically ulti~ate, he seems to have fallen into 
a fallacy which, in other connections he has himself force-
fully and correctly condemned: viz., the fallacy of bi-
furcation." (Hall, l~ rt. {193 0), 29.) The point Whitehead 
would seem to be insisting on in his cont ention that eternal 
objects are abstractions would seem to be just that there is 
no such metaphysically ultimate di vision of eternal ob jects 
and actual entities. The ultimate metaphysical status of 
the realm of ideality will be more evident as we proceed. 
See sec. C, 1 below. 
2. SMW, 227. 4. SMW, 227. 
3. SMW, 151. 5. SMN, 228. 
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For Whitehead as for Hegel1 bare sense ~alia are completely 
abstract and s:tmple when cons:tdered apart from the unity of 
experience or ingression into actual occasions. But regard-
less of degree of complexity each eternal object is in a 
sense unique and individual. 
Each eternal object is an individual which, 
in its own peculiar fashion, is what it is. 
This particular individuality is the indi-
vidual essence of the object, and cannot 
be described otherwise than as being itself. 
Thus the individual essence is merely the 
essence considered in respect to its unique-
ness.2 
A simple eternal object can only be intuited, not deduced or 
described. No possible descr iption would tell a blind person 
what yellow is. Even the more complex eternal ob jects while 
further analyzable, would cease to be the same eternal ob-
jects or lo gical identities if any of their analyzed parts 
were different. 
It is because of the characteris ics of logical identity 
and atomicity of these objects that \Vhitehead calls them 
"eternal." vVe do not make a particular shade of blue though 
we may will it into actuality by fulfilling certain conditions. 
When the conditions are fulfilled the shade of blue is given. 
Nor do we make either two plus two equal four or the quality 
of goodness. When certain conditions are fulfilled, they are. 
But if they are, then in some sense they must always have been 
potential. That shade of blue remains the same shade of blue 
1. Wallace, LOH, 78. 
2. SMW , 2 29. 
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no matter what other diverse conditions accompany it if its 
pe cul:tar conditions of coming into existence are met. 
A colour is eternal. It haunts time like 
a spirit. It comes and it goes. But when 
it comes it is the same colour. It neither 
survives nor ~oes it live. It appears when 
it is wanted. 
The color maintains its logical identity as does the most 
complex ideal or concept whenever that particular concept is 
thought about. Even God, who "is the most complete conceptwl 
real:t sation of ideal forms, 112 and is thus the locus of their 
conceptual actuality regardless of their ingression into pre-
hensive occasions, though he orders them, does not create 
eternal objects. Rather, the realm of ideality is g iven, 
eternal, and available for all occasions. "The forms belong 
no more to God than to any one occasion." 3 
To point out that certain conditions must be fulfilled 
before an eternal object is actual:tzed or ingresses into an 
actual occas:ion is to indicate the "metaphysical status of an 
4 eternal object" as 11 a possibility for actuality.n Blueness 
itself is a complete abstraction from actuality; if certain 
conditions are fulfilled blue will be experienced. According-
ly, there is an internal relatedness wi thin the realm of 
1. SMW, 126. 
2. RIM, 154. Cf. below, sec. C,l on God. 
3. RIM, 157. Cf. Brightman, POR, 337. For Bri ghtman as for 
Whitehead the " ultimate qualities of sense objects (qualia)" 
as also 11 the eternal, uncreated laws of reason'• "including 
logic, mathematical relations, and Platonic Ideas" are co-
eternal with God and con&itute (for Brightman} part of the 
"Given. 111 
4. SMW , 229. 
l 
125 
eternal ob jects, for the other conditions for the appearance 
or ingression of any one eternal object are also eternal ob~ 
jects. From the standpoint of what an eternal object is in 
itself divorced from its possibility for actualization in 
some occas i on, an eternal ob ject may be sai.d to have an 
"indi vidual essence" which stands in "isolation11 from all 
other eternal objects, 1 but since the metaphysical status of 
an eternal object is to be a possibility for actualization, 
the eternal ob ject also has a relational essence from which 
it cannot be divorced. 
An eternal ob ject, considered as an ab-
stract entity, cannot be divorced from 
its reference to other eternal objects, 
and from i~s reference to actuality 
generally. 
The realizat i on of the eternal o bjects which are the condi-
tions of the realization of blueness involves the realization 
of blueness, and wi thout the pos s ibility of these, blue could 
not be a pas si bi 11 ty. These relations do not in any way de-
termine into which specific occasion blue will enter, or what 
occasion will choose or select to realize blue, but once any 
actual occasion selects for inclusion the conditions, blue 
will be realized whether blue or one of the other conditioning 
1. SMW, 237-238. Whitehead calls this isolation of indi vidual 
essence "the principle of Isolation of Eternal ~~~~ects" 
and adds that this principle merely means that · err-re-
lationships as possi b ilities are expressible without 
reference to their respective individual essences." 
2. SMW, 22 9-230. 
l 
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eternal objects was the primary factor for sel ection. It is 
in its status as a possibility essentially and internally re-
lated to oche r possib ilities all of which are referent to 
actuality that blue is not only a qualitative modificat i on of 
an occasion as realized but also an ideal for realization. 
Eternal objects stand, then, in relation to actual oc-
casions in the process of synthesis as potentialities for 
realization. Since every actual occas i on is in prehensive 
relation to all the rest of reality there is a sense in 
which each occasion prehends t he total realm of ideality . 
The occasion-transcenden t world to which each occasion stands 
in active relation, besides other more immediate factors, in-
cludes "the complete world of abstract potentiality, the realm 
of eternal objects. 111 Conversely, from the standpoint of an 
e t e rna 1 o b j e c t, 
the essence of an eternal object is merely 
the eternal object considered as add ing its 
unique cont ribution to each actual occasion. 
This unique contribution is identical for 
all such occasions in respect to the fact 
that t he object in all modes of ingression 
is j ust its identical self.2 
Since no occasion can realize all potentialities or possi-
bilities, every occasion as a process of actualization in-
volves sele·ction. "Actualisation is a selection among possi-
bilities.~3 While theoreti cally the whole realm of possibili-
ties lies open for any occasion, actually t he possibilities 
1. SivfW, 218. 
2. SM"vv, 229. 
3. SMW, 229. 
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which any occasion can realiZe are very much limited. For 
any particular occasion there is what Whitehead calls "a 
g radation of possibilities in respect to their realisation 
1 in t hat occasion." Every such gradation is a limitation of 
pos sibi li ties. For example, for all occasions in the natural 
' 
order tbe spat i o-temporal continuum represents a limitation 
on possibility inherent in the process of actualization. The 
spa.tio-temporal continuum its elf belongs to the realm of 
eternal ob jects but is basic to the actualization by any oc-
casion of any eternal object. 
According ly, the spatio- t emporal relation-
ship, in terms of which the actual course of 
events is to be expressed, is nothing else 
than a selective limitation within the general 
system~tic relationships among eternal ob-
jects. 
Besides such general limitations on the reaL'TI of possibility 
for any occasion, every occasion or actualization :ts a limita-
tion on the realm of possibilities3 for all subsequent oc-
casion s. To actualize is to limit possibility by the exclusion 
of oth er possibilities than those selected for actualization. 
~rt has already been emphasised that an actual occasion is 
to be conceived as a limitation; and that this process of 
limitation can be still further characterised as a gradat1on. 114 
Whitehead would agree with Spi noza that all determination is 
-----1. SMW, 229. Cf. also SNfY'l , 231. 
2. SMW , 232. 
3. SIVPN I 233. 
4. S1WIT , 233 . 
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relative ne gation, 1 and, he would go on to add, such limi ta-
tion is the necessary condition of any actualization of poten-
tiality. The intrinsic value and individuality of any event 
is as much a function of what it is not as of what it is. 
With select :t on the occasion and the eternal ob jects involved 
lose indeterminate status. The prehensive synthesis is 
completed; the ideal is actualized. 
Thus the synthetic prehension, which is ~ 
is the solution of the indeterminateness of 
A into the determinateness of ex ••• Every 
actual occas i on ~is the solution of all 
modalities into actual categorical ingres-
sions: truth and falsehood take the place 
of possibility.2 
From the standpoint of its reality as process, an actual 
occasion grow s out of the determinate actuality of past oc-
casions which cease to be actual as prehended in the present 
occasion in terms of their realized eternal ob jects, and 
grows into actuality in terms of its own achievement of possi-
bility. The past gradations of eternal ob jects and realiza-
tions of dominant ones set the stage for the selectivity of 
present occasions. 3 The prehension of past events by any 
4 present occasion will be in terms of aspects of those events 
which are actualized eternal o b jects, or eternal objects "as 
1. Elwes, PBS, 39-40, 359, 360. Cf. Whitehead, RDIT , 150: "To 
be an actual occasion is to be limited. * 
2 • SM\¥ , 2 31. 
3. This concept of limitations on eternal ob jects to be chosen 
for actualization by past occasions in relat i on to the 
present occas i on as opposed to the total realm of possib ili-
ties is elaborated in PR in the theory of general as op-
posed to real potentiality (PR, 101-102). See Cha p . IV below. 
4. SMV'l, 151 and 154. 
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beingP1 On the other hand, those eternal objects prehended 
as possibilities for actu.alization in its own s ynthesis, as 
potentialities a s yet a re not, and thus are in a state of 
l11not-being . itl 2 Accordingly, Whitehead points out, 
In this sense, every o c casion is a synthe-
sis of beini with not-£eing ••• •Being ' here 
means indiv dually-eTfective in the aes-
thetic synthesis. Also the 'aesthetic 
synthesis' is t h e 'experiment synthesis' 
viewed as self-creative, under the limita-
tions laid upon it by ~ts internal rela-
tions to other events. 
The occurrence of an act ual occasion is the coming into b eing 
of what before was merely potential. 
An eternal o b ject not only has i n ternal relat ions to 
other eternal obj e cts from the standpoint of its rela tional 
essence, but it may be hi ghly complex in its own right, i.e. 
inclusive of other eternal o b jects as part of itself. White-
head describ es such a co mplex eternal o b ject in terms of what 
he calls an •abstractive hierarchy. • 4 An abstractive bier-
archy which as a whole can be considered as one complex eter-
nal ob ject even though it may contain an infinite5 number of 
1. s~w, 254. 
2. SMW, 234. 
3. S~w , 234-235. Whi tehead states this inter-relation of be-
ing and not-being in more fi gurative lan@lage in RIM as 
follows: "Th e V\0 rld is at once a passing s hadow and a 
final fact. The s hadow is pas s ing into t he fact, so as to 
be con sti t utive of it; and yet t h e fact is prior to t he 
shadow." (RIM, 87.) To this he add s a reli gious interpre-
tation in terms of t he "kingdom of heavenrr which will be 
discussed in sections C, 1 and 2, below. 
4. SM7'f, 241. 
5. SM~· , 242. 
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simpler eternal ob jects, Whitehead describes as an abstraction 
from possibility. 
Thus as we pass from the grade of simple 
eternal objects to higher and higher 
grades of complexity, we are indul ging in 
higher Trades of abstraction from possi-
bility. . 
Such abstractive hierarchies are the most complex, coherent, 
and complete of inter-related ideals on the one hand, and 
actual descriptions of contents of events on the other. The 
extreme of abstractness from actuality is gained in a simple 
' quality or potentiality such as blue, whereas the more inter-
related qualitative factors are involve~ in the concept of 
the ob ject or the ideal to be realized, the more concrete the 
ideal is. 
Whitehead distinguishes between what he calls 11 fini te l!l 
abstractive hierarchi es and •infini ten abstractive hierarch-
ies.2 Any _complex eternal object with a given maximum of 
complexity constitutes a finite abstractive hierarchy. 3 
Most complex ideals ~~~ ideals can .be considered finite ab-
stractive hierarchies. Next summer's vacation, the ideal of 
becoming an honest, trustworthy citizen, a general's plan of 
attack, 4 all form examples of finite abstractive hierarchies 
1. SMN, 241. 
2 • SMV'l , 24 2 • 
3. SMW, 245. 
4. Stallknecht, BPC, 129 uses the general's plan of attack as 
an example not only of an abstractive hierarchy (finite) but 
also of intrinsic versus relational essence of eternal ob-
jects. The plan itself has meaning regardless of its exe-
cut~on but it also involves relations to the plans of sub-
ordlnate groups. 
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with varying degrees of complexity. An infinite abstractive 
hierarchy, on the other hand, has no maximum degree of com-
plexity1 for it involves the graded relationship of the en-
tire realm of eternal ob jects. From what has been said before, 
it is evident that every actual occasion as a prehensive 
unificat i on involves an infinite abstractive hierarchy, for 
every occas l on, and only a concr ete actual occasi.on, stands 
in prehensive relation by inclusion or exclusion to the en-
tire realm of eternal ob jects. 
Finite abstractive hierarchies serve IB the plans of action, 
aims, or goals 2 which as realized issue in actual occasions 
transcending their most complex aims from the standpoint of 
complexity of actual relations. However, the complex ity of 
the abstractive hierarchies chosen will tend to determine the 
richness of the values realized. Some finite hierarchy is the 
occasion's dominant plan of organization, but it does not ex-
haust its relations. Whitehead points out: 
Thus an actual occasion is a prehension 
of one infinite hierarchy (its associated 
hierarchy ) together with various finite 
hierarchies. The synthesis of the oc-
cas,ion with the infinite hierarchy is ac-
cording to its specific mode of realisa-
tion, and that of the finite hierarchies 
is according to other specific modes of 
realisation:-3 
Every actual occasion is a realization of an infinite hier-
1. SII[\V, 24 3 • 
2. See sec. 3, on purpose. 
3 . SMW , 247. 
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archy which, in turn, is prehended by successive occasions 
as a more or less complex finite hierarchy, but no matter 
how it is later pr eh ended, the realm of possib ility is dif-
ferent as the result of its realization and future occasions 
must conform to the limitations on possibility its actualiza-
tion has brought about. 
Without the realm of ideality there could be no actuality, 
for actuality is a progressive realization or making actual of 
possibil1.ties and potentialities. While Whitehe ad does not 
reduce the "is" to the "oughttl he does maintain that without 
the "could bew there could be no 11 is,n for the 11 is" is the b e-
coming of the 11 could be. m 
Without the possible there would be no cont ent for t he 
actual, nor relation between actualities. For prehension on 
the part of one occas:ion of a second occasion is the feelin g 
of an eternal ob j e ct or complex of eternal ob jects in the first 
occasion as referent to an "aspect" (that is the same eternal 
ob ject as a log ical identity) of the second occasion, and the 
ingression or realization of that eternal object in the first 
occasion is due to the limitation placed upon possibility by 
the second occasion (if the second occasion is prior to the 
first, or by some t hird occasion prior to both if they are 
contemporaries). 
Without the possible there would be no structure or per-
manence i n the actual, for the structu re of an occasion lies 
in tbat which it actualizes and its permanence lies in its 
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addition to and limitation of the realm of possi b ility. The 
associated hierarchy of an actual occasion constitutes its 
form and the way it has preh ended possibilities into actu-
ality. Thus Whitehe ad says: 
This connectedness of an actual occasion is 
necessary for its s ynthetic unity and for 
its intelligibility. There is a connected 
hierarchy of concepts applicab~ to the 
occas i on, including concepts of all de-
grees of complexity ••• This associated hier-
archy is the shape, or pattern, or form, of 
the occasion in so far as the occas i on is 
constituted of what enters into its realisa-
tion.l 
Accordingly, without the realm of ideality there would 
be no oc casions and no emerge nt ·value. Whitehead descr i b es 
the situat i on in value terms as follows : 
Realised togetherness is the achievement of 
an emergent value defined--or, shaped--by 
the definite eternal rela tedness in respe ct 
to which the real to getherness is achieved. 
Thus the ·eternal relatedness is the form--
the ,a·D~ --; the emergent actual occas i on 
is t l~ superject of informed value; value 
as abstracteafiom any parti cular1 super-ject, is the abstract matter-the~~~-- which 
is common to all occasions; and the synthetic 
activity which prehends valueless possibility 
into s u perjicient informed value is the sub -
stantial activity.2 
In the concept of ideality the second basic condition of 
experienced value has been met. Real i ty as a wh ole and reali-
ties individually are only conceivable as realizations of 
ideal possibili t ies. · Reality requires and contains reference 
to subsistent possi ~)ility. Such possi bilities are subsistent, 
1. SMW , 245. 
2. SMW·, 238. 
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that is as yet unrealized, are systematically inter-related 
and thus contain as further possibilities the general con-
ditions of their own realization. Every actual occasion in-
volves a new gradation of the whole realm of possibility from 
its standpoint by inclusion or exclusion and constitutes a 
peculiar synthesis of the possibilities open to it. As a new 
gradation and actualization of possibilities, each event 
places limitations upon possioility for all future events or 
occasions and thus creates new particular conditions for 
realization of possibilities. Accordingly, while every possi-
bility as a log ical identity is an eternal object and stands 
in some aort of direct or indirect relation to every actual 
occasion, only a limited number of eternal ob jects will be 
available for actualization in or ingression into any particu• 
lar occasion. As actualized, eternal ob jects form the given 
content of the actual occasions which make feeling structure 
and thus feeling synthesis possi ble. 
3. Purpose, the effective condition of value. 
The third and effective condition of the organism as a 
unit of emergent value, purpose, receives t he least attention 
and analysis at Whitehead's hands of any of the three basic 
concepts during this period of development of his metaphysical 
position. The term "subjective ai m'~~ does not appear in any of 
the major works of the ps riod. Even the term 11 purpose,• while 
it does appear more often in Religion 1~ !he Making, is not 
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present more than a half a dozen times in Science and the 
~ode!:!! ~orl~,l and yet the concept of purpose is present by 
implication throughout and is as basic to the understanding 
of the developing philosophy of organism as is either pre-
hension or eternal objects. 
When it is asked how, or in light of what, or under what 
conditions does prehensive unification take place, the 
necessity for a concept of internal agency becomes evident. 
The concepts of ideality, of selection among eternal objects, 
of realization of possibilities, of achievement all further 
ind1.cate the necessity of a concept of internal agency. Given 
felt relations and diverse possibilities, the possibility of 
synthetie unification and achievement would seem to depend 
upon some sort of internal aim at achievement and syntheses. 
In Science and the Modern World Whitehead tends to make it 
clear that this internal agency is teleological in a number 
of different ways. 
In t he first place Whitehead rejects as a "monstrous 
issue of limited metaphysics and clear logical insight" both 
'*'the mechanism of God and the mechanism of matter. rr 2 Both 
are guilty of the fallacy of simple location, the assumption 
that things have independent and absolute location in space 
· and time regardless of other relations,3 or that they have 
independent existence, when, as has become evident, all actual 
1. SMW, 154, 157, 158, 219. 
2. SMillj, 109. 
3. SMQ(. 72. 
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occasions or entities as units of feeling synthesis are con-
stituted by their relations to the rest of reality. Mechan-
ism results from the artificial abstraction of certain re-
lational elements and prehended aspects of experience from 
the total situation in which they occur and then mistaking 
these abstractions, methodologically valuable though they may 
be, for concrete experience or actuality. "It is an example 
of what I will call the 'Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness.tnl 
If we are to understand the processes of nature, if we 
are to formulate a metaphysical interpretation of reality, we 
must return to the concrete units of experience from which 
such abstraction has taken place. The primal unit of ex-
perience and of nature is not, then, an hypostatized bit of 
matter pushed along in a rigid me chan ism or mechanical or 
2 physical causa. tlon but the experienced occasion 1. taelf, a 
specious present. 3 And such a specious present could not be, 
apart from the concept of realization. 
Within the specious present the event 
realises itself as a totality, and also 
i n so doing realises itself as a group-
i ng together of a. numl::>ei of aspects of 
ita O\VD tempo~al parts. 
Again Wh:1.tehead states, "A complete complex occasion includes 
that which in cognitive experience takes the form of memory, 
anticipation, imagination, and thought. 115 
1. SMW, 75. 4. s~~, 153. 
2. SMW, 246. 5. SMW, 246. 
3. SMW, 153. 
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Accordingly, the mechanistic concept of causation must 
be replaeed by something more fundamental; by something in 
terms of which the abstraction which is mechanism can itself' 
be understood. "The only way of mitigating mechanism is by 
the discovery that it is not mechanism." 1 The concept of 
mechanism as absolute or concrete in any realm leads to con-
fusion in every direction. If you bifurcate the organic and 
inorganie and hold "a scientific realism, based on mechanismu2 
in relat:lon to the world of nature and yet insist on the ef-
ficacy of ideals and the self-determination of men and the 
higher animals, the result is an impossible inconsistency. 
•This radical inconsistency at the basis of modern thought 
accounts for much that is half hearted and wavering in our 
civilization. ·n3 If you hold a mechanistic view of nature and 
yet insist on the existence of God, the result is the reduc-
tion of God to the status of a mechanic. "In other words, 
that mechanism can, at most, presuppose a mechanic, and not 
merely ~mechanic but its mechanic.n4 
If you assume the mechanism of nature and at the same 
time mld to the reality of mind, the result is either the 
destruction of the efflcacy of the mind and an epiphenomin-
alism in which the mind loses all responsibility for the 
actions of its body, or the mechanism is destroyed by the ef-
ficacy of the mind. 
1. SMW, 111. 
2. SMW, 110. 
3. SMN, 110. 
4. S1ffi I 111. 
For if the volition affects the state of 
the body, then the molecules do not run 
blindly. If the volition does not af-
fect the state of the body 1 the mind is 
still left in its uncomfortable position. 1 
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Even vitalism will not solve the problem with its assumption 
that wit h the appearance of life the mechanism is subordi-
nated in beings characterized b y life. For, Whitehead in-
sists, 
The gap between living and dead matter 
is too vague and problema tical to bear 
the wei ght of such an arbitrary assump-
tion, which involves an essential dual-
ism somewhere.2 
Thus because of its own internal contradictions and its 
insufficiency as a causal explanation when applied to nature 
as concrete fact, mechansim and materialism are only intelli-
gi ble as applied to "very abstract entities, the products of 
logical discernment. n3 
1. S'MW I 114. 
2. S~~~ 115. The narrowness of this gap becomes particularly 
striking when it is remembered th9. t the first organic sub-
stanee was produced synthetically as early as 1828 (Werk-
meister, POS, 322), that certain chemicals in combination 
and contact undergo a process of 11 budd ing21 (Werkmeister, POS 
354) J• that certain •crystals--like all organisms--have defi-
nite form and structure and often possess the power to 
'regenerate' their original form out of mere fragments ••• , 
and to 'fuse' with others without disrupting their axial 
orientation'" (Werkmesi ter, POS, 355), and that even viruses 
have now been reproduced synthetically (Ridenour,Art.(l949), 
10). 
3. SMW, 115. The insufficiency of mechanism and vitalism for 
biological explanation and the teleological presuppositions 
of mechani8tic explanation itself are pointed out by J.H. 
Woodger as follows: nonly two types of theoretical biology 
have so far been devised, ooth involving using the analogy 
of a humanly constructed machine~ (1) vitalism (with a 
mechanic), and (2) the 'machine theory' (without a mechanic). 
This provides no independent £iolo~cal way of thinking, 
because machines presuppose organisms. The vitalist puts 
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We must replace, Whitehead insists, abstract, external, 
mechanis t ic causality by the concrete, experienced, internal 
causality of organisms from which the concept of mechanical 
causality has been abstracted. The concrete enduring enti-
ties are not lumps of matter but norganisms, so t hat t h e plan 
of the whole influences the very characters of the various 
subordinate organisms which enter in to it·" 1 In the case of 
human be:lng s and more complex animals, the mental states which 
include conscious purposes 
enter into t he plan of the total organism 
and thus modify the plans of the successi ve 
subordinate organisms until the ultimate 
smallest or ganisms, such as electrons, are 
reached. Thus an ele ctron withi n a living 
body is different from an electron outs~de 
it, by reason of the plan of the whole. · 
Nature as a whole is teleologically oriented. The larger or-
ganisms which include communities of smaller or ganisms are 
oriented in terms of the plan, aim, or purpose of the whole, 
which plan affects and orients all of the smaller organisms 
which e nter into its communal life. 3 
himself into the machine he made. The other type of theorist 
forgets he made it. You obviously cannot escape from tele-
ology in this way, because machines are teleological instru-
ments made by men. An explanation of teleogy by analogy with 
machines simply attempts to explain internal teleology by 
means of external teleology, and hence still remains 
teleology." (Woodger, BP, 441.) 
1. SMW, 115. 
2. SMW, 115-116. 
3. We already have a principle to explain the manner in which this 
takeEi place (above, sec.2). The dominant occasion involves the 
realization of an infinite abstractive hierarchy of eternal ob-
jects of such a nature that it sets definite limits on the 
possib ilities for realizat i on of the subordinate organisms and 
vice versa. The realizable potentialities of all the or~n­
isms which constitute the community which is the larger or-
ganism would be mut ually interlocked. 
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Theoretically, of course, 11 the plan of the whol~" is as 
consistent with a created mechanism (external i •nposi tion of 
plan) as with a view of internal teleology. Further, to es-
tablish the existence of a plan of the whole in terms of an 
internal teleology does not necessarily imply that the par-
ticipating subordinate organisms are internally teleological. 
To establish a universal internal teleology of all occasions 
of reality it is necessary to show that purpose in the sense 
of aim at and achievement of an end is essential to the very 
being of every occasion of reality~~ occasion. 1 It is ex-
actly this which Whitehead proceeds to do. 
In the case of hi gher occasions capable of cognition or 
conscious conceptualization the presence of purpose as a 
formative element is explicit. Whitehead states: 
Cognltion is the emergence, into some 
measure of individualised reality, of 
the general substratum of activity, 
poising before itself possibility, ac-
tuality, and purpose.2 
But it could well be asked, what about the vast majority of 
nonco gni ti ve prehens :i.ve occasions? Can purposive activity be 
attributed to them·? We ba ve already indica ted Whitehead I a 
1. Hobhouse points out that three elements are essential to 
any teleology: (1) temporal process with definite results, 
(2) an element of achieved value in the results, and (3) 
at least partial determinat i on of the process from which 
it results by the element of value conceived as goal (Hob-
house, TOK, 582, also paraphrased in Woodger, BP, 432). 
It will be evident as we proceed that Whitehead 1 s actual 
occasions fulfillall three conditions, as fully in SMW 
as later in PR where analys is of the purposive element is 
much more thorough. If Hob'house is correct, then the ex-
istence of purpose implies value. 
2. S11Wi , 101 and sec. 1 above. 
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contention that every complete occasion "includes that which 
in cognitive experience takes t he form of memory 1 antic i pa-
1 tion 1 i ma gination 1 and thought." If cognition is necessary 
for the existence of purpose 1 then "uncogniti ve 112 prehensive 
occasions must be at least non-purposive in the sens s of being 
without interna l purpose. But there is no necessity for such 
an arbitrary restriction of purpose. The factor necessary 
for purposive activity is not necessarily cogni tion 1 but a p -
p rehension or awareness and select i on, that is 1 the occasion 
in process must in some sense apprehend that which is not yet 
and towards wh ich it is striving as selected for realization. 
According to Whitehe ad, such non-cognitive apprehension is 
exactly what prehension or feeling is. 3 Since every occasion 
is a prehensive uni fication, and, as such, prehends all other 
occasions and the wh ole realm of eternal ob jects, every occa-
sion is at least unco gnitively aware of the whole of actu-
ality and ideality. 4 Further, every pr e hensive uni ficat i on 
1. SMW, 246. 
2. SMW, 101. 
3. SMW , 101 and sec. 1 a bove. 
4. That feeling is a form of awareness can hardly be den ied. 
Further, that feeling may be and often is primarily non-
cognitive would seem to have adequate expe riential basis. 
But that feeling is every completely divorced from co gni-
tive elements may be highly questionable. Hocking , for 
example, insists: "It is true that ideas apart from feel-
ings do no work; but it is also true that feel~ng does no 
work apart from its ~iding ideas." Thus wes ~oul'cinot-­
ta!k about Taeas or Teeling s out a bout • i dea-feeling 
couples." (Hocking , MGHE, 69.) Since our purpose at this 
point is developmental rather than critical, t he ques t ion 
as to whether there is eve r completely uncogn i t ive appre-
he nsion is not at present ou~ concern. At least it wou l c 
seem eviden t t hat Whitehead at this point considered un-
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or actual occasion is a realization, 1 a becoming of definite-
ness,2 an atta:lnment, 3 an achievement. 4 The occasion from 
the standpoint of process can be analyzed into two stages, 
wunderlying activity of prehension" and ftrealised prehensive 
event.•5 Thus every occasion is temporal, is aware of possi-
bilities, and issues in achievement. The only further factor 
necessary to establish actual occasions as thoroughly teleo-
logical in nature is the connection of the awareness of pos-
sibilities with the realization of those possibilities by 
active sel e ction among them. 
In the secti on of Science and the Modern World in which 
Whitehe ad introduces the concept of prehension, he points out 
that an event has a past in the sense that it fuses within it-
self as memories, i.e. as given finite abstractive hierarchies, 
the modes of its predecessors. 6 He goes on to say that an 
event has a future in the sense of mirroring within i tself the 
__ , __ _ 
cognitive apprehension a reality. But it must be pointed 
out that eternal objects as prehended perform the functions 
of ideas. It may well be, however, that the difficulties 
in the idea of unco gnitive apprehension were at lea~t par-
tially the basis for the distinction between the mental 
and physical poles of an actual occasion which first oc-
curs explicitly in RIM (118) (see below), the second of 
the Lowell Lectures (S MN , 1925; RIM, 1926 ) , and became a 
major doctrine in Art.(l927) and PR. With the appearance 
of a mental pole in every occasion the difficulty tends to 
disappear for cogpitive elements are then present in every 
occasion. 
1. SMW, 103. 
2 • .ru.wv, 13 6 • 
3. SMW, 136. 
4. SMW, 228. 
s. s~rN, 102. 
6. SMW, 106. 
determinations which it as the present imposes upon the 
future. "Thus an event has anticlpation.iff1 Again, else-
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wrere, Whitehead points out that an actual occas i on through 
prehension has a perspective 11 envisagement" of all actuality 
and the whole realm of possi b ility. This ,.envl sa gement which 
enters into the synthesis is also a character which condi-
tions the synthesising activity. 112 In still another connec-
tion he states, 11 The definite entity is the selected mode 
which is the shaping of attain~ent; apart from such shaping 
into indi vidual matter of fact there is no attainment. 113 
From this passage alone it mi ght be concluded that some 
agent beside the actual occasion or definite entity did the 
selecting , b ut Whitehead proceeds to make clear that within 
t he limits set by its predecessors the selecting is due to 
the event's own agency. 
In the statement we have taken as the central thesis of 
the philosophy of organism Whitehead says, "The organism is 
a unit of emergent value 1 n and adds, "a real fusion of the 
4 
characters of eternal objects, emerging for its.£!!!!. sake." 
Accordingly 1 "we find that the emergence of organisms depends 
on a selectivity akin to purpose.n 5 The realm of eternal ob-
jects represents the possibilities from which selection is to 
be made by any becoming actual occasion, and, as pointed out,6 
the only way possibilities can be actualized is by selection 
1 • . SMW, 10'7. 
2. SMVi. 255. 
3 • . 5"MW , 136-137. 
4. S1m, 157, Underlining mine. 
5. SMW, 156-157. 
6. See sec. 2 above. 
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for actualization by an actual occasion. Apart from realiza-
tion or potential realization, possibilities as ideal sltua-
tions are valueless. Only as actualized do ideals have in-
trinsic value and only as 1'elements in purposen 1 do they have 
instrumental value. Thus it is only in relation to their 
potential selection as elements in purpose that eternal o b-
jects can be considered contributory to value, and only as 
selected or realized t h at they are t h e constituent forms of 
intrinsic values. Further, Whitehead states, "Thus actuali-
sation is selection among possibilities." 2 Accordingly the 
causal agency of an event's becoming is its selection among 
possibilities as ends those most suitable for its own real!-
zation. The result of the sel ~ ction is actualizat i on and thus 
completion of the event. As actualized and complete, the 
event ceases to be and passes on t h e results of its synthesis 
to subsequent occasions. "The emergent actua 1 occasion is 
the ~perject of informed value, ill3 is that teleolo g ical feel-
ing process reaching beyond itself in order to realize possi-
bilities in the achievement of which it finds its own comple-
tion. 
Becau§e of the teleological character of each event and 
the resulting contribution of each occas i on, nature can be 
described as in development, advance, and subject to continml 
evolution. It is in its character as sel e ctive and ~~rposive 
that an event 11 finds its own originality.i•4 As pointed 
1. S1vl1t'V . 154. 
2 • SMVv. 22 9 • 
3. SMW, 238. 
4. SMVi, 253. 
out, 1 the range of possibility from which an event may select 
is limited by its predecessors. In some cases an event may 
be •completely determined oy the past from which it issues.•2 
This simply means that its selection is limited to one group 
of possibilities with no alternatives. But even in such re-
stricted cases its form of realization is purposive. 
The basic nature of teleological causality does not mean, 
however, that antecedent causality is not also present, but 
it does mean that antecedent causality is derivat i ve from pur-
posive causality. Each event as complete and finished af-
fects the events of the immediate future as antecedent to 
consequent. "The activity passes beyond itself into the known 
transcendent world.~3 In other words, the event's final end, 
as realized, forms an antecedent condition of its successor. 
It is this fact of an event's reaching its completion that 
makes necessary new prehensive unifications and the ongoing 
of process. In Hegelian terms, an event starts with the 
thesis of immediate feeling awareness of diverse contribu-
tions of past events (being) passes to the antithesis of 
comparison and selection among the felt possibilities of the 
realm of ideality (not-being), moves to a synthesis or pre-
hensive unification of its diverse feelings in achieved ac-
tuality of relevant possibilities (becoming), but with the 
1. Sec. 2 above. 
2 • SMiN, 25 3 • 
3. SMW, 131. 
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synthesis the event is complete and over and its contribution 
for.ns part of the thesis of its successor. Accor dingly 1 
Whitehead says, "Any occasion <X issues from the occasions 
which collec t ively form its past." 1 
In Religion in the Making Whitehead offers a somewhat 
more specific analysis of purpose and, significantly,2 in 
connection with this analysis introduces the distinction be-
tween the physical and mental poles of an occasion. Purpose, 
Whitehead defines, is nadjustment of the present for the sake 
of adjustment of value in the future, immediately or re-
motely.iJI3 Every occasion "as the cause of itself, as its own 
creative a ct 114 is purposive. It is creature rather than crea-
tor only in the sense that the conditions for its occurrence, 
the necessity for its being, is a function of the completed 
purposes of past occasions and the limitations set on exist-
ence in general and its existence in particular by God. 5 But 
given the necessity for its becoming, what it becomes is a 
result of its own internal deter~ination. Thus an actual 
occasion can be thought of as "the self-creating cr~ature. 116 
The analysis of "one particular new birth of an element 
of experience"7 discloses a given field inherited from past 
occasions which can be called the "gro:!:!nd118 of that occasion. 
1. SMN, 253. 5. See sec. C, 1 below. 
2. See above, footnote • . 6. RIM, 102. 
3. RIM, 100. 7. RIM, 114. 
4. RIM, 101. 8. RIM, 113. 
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But, aside from very low grade occasions, the result of syn-
thetic activity is not merely a repetition of the ground but 
a new synthesis involving new ideal forms in actualization. 
In relation to the ground this new phase and form to be ac-
tualized can be called the 11 consequent." 1 "The novelty 
which enters into the derivative instance is the information 
of the actual world with a new set of ideal forms." 2 From 
this standpoint process can be defined as "the achievement of 
actuality oy the ideal consequent, in virtue of its union with 
the actual ground." 3 The appearance of novelty is the result 
of creative purpose selecting a novel consequent which both 
.,.preserve@ some identity of character with the ground" on 
the one hand and maintains "some contrast with the ground in 
respect to that same identity of character"4 on the other. 
In this way both continuity and development are assured. If 
creative purpose were to disregard identity of character the 
consequent could not be realized for it would violate the 
actual conditions of realization. If there were no contrast 
there would be no advance. Thus purpose must take both the 
past and the future into account if it is to be effective. 
Whitehead perhaps felt the difficulties involved in the 
concept of purpose attributed to units completEt:uncognitive 
in nature. He attempted to overcome these difficulties with 
the doctrine of the di-polar nature of all occasions. While 
1. RIM, 113. 
2. RIM, 113-114. 
3. RIM, 114. 
4. RIM, 115. 
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prehension may be an Qncognitive apprehension, at best such 
uncognitive apprehension would have to be described as ~blind 
perceptivity.•1 Though there are prehensive urn[ications 
which are primarily blind in this way--prehensive unifications 
which are little more than recurrent physical vibrations2--
such occas.i. ons would have a minimum of selectivity and would 
consist pri~arily of transmission of inheritance from the 
past. The inorganic world, Whitehead feels, is primarily so 
characterized. On the other hand, in higher 1tmental 113 oc-
casions the range of selectivity broadens out. "Ideal forms" 
are prehended in terms of concepts. "Concepts meet blind 
experience with analytic force. !' 4 Possibilities for actualiza-
tion widen and selection becomes intelligent. "Creativity 
wit h a purpose issues into the mental creature conscious of 
an ideal. 115 
While the breadth of selectivity and the potential rich-
ness of realization are proportional to the dominance of cog-
nitive elements, even the most elementary physical occasion, 
as an occasion, is still "a fact of aesthetic experience •• is 
feeling arising out of contrast under identity,n 6 and as such 
must have at least an element of conceptual prehension of 
ideality. On the other hand, even the most fully "mental" 
occasion involves inheritance from the past, has a "ground" 
1. RIM, 118. 
2. RIM, 116. 
3. RIM, 117. 
4. RIM, 117. 
5. RIM, 119. 
6. RIM, 115. 
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in relat i on to which the contrast introduced is meaningful 
a nd valuable, and to which it must in part conform. As such 
the men tal occasion is also constituted by physical as well 
as mental prehensions. To forget either constitutive factor 
of an occasion is to abstract. Thus Whitehead concludes: 
The most complete concrete fact is dipolar, 
physlcal and mental. But for some specific 
purpo se, the proportion of importance, as 
shared between the two poles, may vary from 
ne gl i gibility to dominance of either pole.l 
It is the mental pole which envisages the possibilities from 
which the occas i on as purposive may select for realization. 
With the distinction between physical and mental poles 
and the attribution of both to every concrete occasion, the 
purposive nature of all occasions is fully established. The 
Thi rd and effective condit i on of the organism as a unit of 
emergent value is incorporated as a b asic cate gory of the 
philosophy of organism. The doctrine of prehens i on attributes 
feeling and effective synthesis to all occasions. The doctrine 
of eternal ob jects opens up a realm of ideals from which the 
feeling occasion can select for realization. The doctrine of 
purpose attrlbutes the causal agency for such realization to 
the organism itself. Accordingly, the condit i ons of value 
1. RI M, 118. Cf. also Art. (1927)59: "The physical occasion, 
as conceived with the abstraction of the mental occasion, 
and the mental occas i on, as conceived with the abs t raction 
of the physical occasion, are each of them devoid of the 
full concr eteness of the dipolar occasion. In order to 
avoid misunderstanding, I interject t he statement ••• that 
there is a contrast of i mportance between the two poles, 
and that in this contrast the relative importance of 
either may be ne gligible." 
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realization are established. The further question becomes, 
what are the characteristics of the value realized by or-
ganisms? and are there any differentia tiona among values 
realized? 
· B. Indi vid.uali ty and value. 
1. The nature of value. 
Whereas in The Concept £f Nature Whitehead had merely 
indicated that 11 the values of na. ture are perhaps the key to 
the metaphysical synthesis of existence," 1 in Sci~ ~nd 
the Modern Eorld not only the values of nature (considered in 
the more limited sense of the object of the sciences) but 
the values of every type of existent are made constitutive of 
its na.ture as an existent, as an actuality, as a realization. 
Even the terms "event 11 and 11 occasion" are too abstract to 
describe the intrinsic nature of the concrete units of reali-
ty. Somehow, Whitehead feels, we must find a word to describe 
the emergent actual occasions of reality which will do full 
justice to their experiential, prehensive, purpose, self-
realizing natures. 
The unities which I call events, are the 
emergence into actuality of something . 
How are we to characterise the something 
which thus emerges? The name 'event' 
given to such a unity, draws attention to 
the inherent transitoriness, combined with 
the actual unity. But this abstract word 
cannot be sufficient to characterise what 
the fact of the reality of an event is in 
itself. A moment's thought will show us 
that no one j_dea can in itself be sufficient 
1. CON, 5. 
to characterise wb.a t the fact of the 
rea.lity of an event is in itself. By.t 
conversely nothing must be left out. 
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Whitehead believes, to an analysis of our own concrete ex-
perience to which any ultimate appeal must be made. 2 Such 
an analysis will emphasize first of all 11 the direct aes-
thetic content of experience" and this, in turn, simply 
means uan apprehension of what this experience is in itself 
in. its own peculiar essence, includin_g its immediate concrete 
3 
values." Thus, Whitehead continues: 
Remembering the poetic rendering of our 
concrete experience, we see at once that 
the element of value, of being valuable, 
of having value, of being something which 
is for its own sake, must not be omitted 
in any account of an event as the most 
concrete actual something. 'Value 1 is the 
word I use for the intrinsic reality of 
an event. Value is an element which per-
meates through and through the poetic view 
of nature. We have only to transfer to 
the very texture of realisation in itself 
that value which we recognise so readily 
in terms of human life ••• Realisation 
theref~re is in itself the attainment of 
value. 
The identification of existent reality, actuality, and 
value continues throughout both ;science ~nd ~he Mod~~ World 
1. SMW, 136. 
2 • SMW, 129 -130 • 
3. SM\IIf, 37. While White head would disagree with Mf1ns terberg 1 s 
concept of lsolation as characteristic of aesthetic ex-
perience, particularly if isolation be interpreted in 
terms of disconnection, yet, he would tend to agree with 
:Milns terberg 1 s insistence that the "highest truth about 
the thing must be the knowledge of the thing in itself" 
(Milnsterberg,PAE, 19} obtainable only through immediate 
aesthetic feeling awareness. 
4. SMW, 136. 
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and Religion !~!he Maki~: "An actual event is an acbieve-
1 2 
ment for its own sake." t'The actuality is the value." 
3 ·~he organism is a unit of emergent value. n ill The event con-
stitutes a patterned value. 114 "Realised to ge thernes s is the 
5 
achievement of emergent value." "The emergent actual occasion 
is the superjec! of informed value. 116 "The actual occasions 
are tre emergence of values." 7 "An organism is the realisa-
8 
tion of a definite shape of value." 11 RealitY•••LI'!7activity 
9 
emerging into individualised value .n "The actuality is ••• 
10 
the experience of value .n "Value is inherent in actuality 
itself."ll "The self-value is the unit fact which emerges.\!1112 
"'Each occasion ••• is a value. n 13 "One occasion, already ac-
tual, enters into the birth of another instance of experienced 
14 15 
value." nAn actual thing is an elicited feelin g-value." 
In light of t..h.e above, there could hardly be any question 
about our contention that the philosophy or organism, at 
least in this period of formulation, is axio-centric in nature. 
But beyond this assertion, a number of rather basic questions 
immediately arise. If every actuality is a value, and value 
is what every actuality is, then has not the term value become 
so extended as to be meaning less? What exactly does the term 
value so used mean? A chorus of criticisms of Whitehead's 
1. SMW, 152. 
2 • SMVI , 15 5 • 
3. Sli/M , 15'7 • 
4. SMW, 174. 
5. SMvlf, 238. 
6. S11W, 238. 
7. SMVv , 256 • 
8. SMW, 278. 
9. SMW, 287. 
10. RIM, 100. 
11. RIM, 100. 
12. RIM, 101. 
13. RIM, 109. 
14. RIM, 112-113. 
15. RIM, 151. 
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position immediately arose along exactly these lines. In her 
review of Science and the Modern World, Miss Stebbing insists 
that -Whitehead is using the term value in two different 
senses, i.e. as limitation and as the intrinsic reality of 
an event. But, she adds, "he has not made it clear that these 
two senses are connected; nor has he indicated his view suf-
1 ficiently to make speculation on it profitable." She states 
the same objections in stronger fashion in her review of 
~gi on l:!! !he . Makin_g. 
In spite, however, of his insistence that 
value is relevant to science and is to 
provide the key to metaphysics, Profes-
sor Whitehead has not yet ~ade clear what 
he understands by 'value.' 
The difference, she insists, disappears between value and dis-
value. 11!1Does 'value'" she asks, 11 cover both g£_Od and evil? 
If not, then what is the connection between value and limi-
tation, for evil would also seem to be a limitat i on and imply 
selection?• 3 In spite of her own earlier comment on White-
head's natural science writings, i.e., "Shall we not find 
that ••• values determine the selection of objects?" 4 she ob-
jects strongly to any inclusion of value in nature. 
Professor Whitehead seems to me quite un-
warrantably to stress t he notion of value, 
va guely conceived, and suggesting even the 
-----1. Stebbing, 
2. Stebbing , 
3. S te bbing , 
4. Stebbing, 
Art.(l926) 2 , 385. 
Art. ( 1927), 237. 
Art.(l927), 237. 
Art.(l925), 520. 
introduction of purpose into the sci-
enti f ic scheme.l 
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Whitehead, it seems to her, is guilty of "the illegitimate 
introduction of considerat i ons of value into the philosophy 
of nature. • 2 
For Bra i thwaite the only possible j ustification for 
Whitehead's i dentification of actuality and value is a sub-
jective emotional need on Whitehead's part. "Otherwise there 
wo uld. seem to be no good reason for t he use of t he word 
'value' for 'the intrinsic reality of an event. rn3 Swabey, 
1. Stabbing, Art.(l928), 115. If our ~nalysis of Whitehead's 
concept of purpose is correct (see above) Miss Stebbing 
could be accused of g ross understatemen t s. 
2. Stabbing, Art.(l928), 128. AS contrasted wi th Miss Stab-
bing's attitude compare that of A. E. Heath in the same 
symposium before the Aristotelean Society from which Miss 
Sta bbing's last two statements come: "I do not share Miss 
Stabbing's repugnance to including values in a philosophy 
of nature. I feel that their presence gives a surety 
that it is a philosophy of nature. Value like anything 
else, must find a natural place in any scheme of though pre-
sented as an account of this amazing world and all it con-
tains." (Heath, Art.(l928), 141-142.) 
3. Braithwaite, Art.(l926), 499. Probably the most severe and 
unjust of the cr iticisms brought against Whitehead's axio-
centric hypothesis because it appeals to ridicule rather 
t han evidence or even outri ght assertion (as is the case 
with Braithwaite) is the following by A. E. Murphy in his 
review of SMV'/: "The instinctive savage molecule is es-
sentially a good mixer and a social success. Nor is this 
instinctive life devoid of its higher reaches. From Religion 
in the Ma~il~we may learn that all events, and surely 
tnosesoc a odies e.t least, are 'elicited feeling -values' 
a1n 'facts of aesthetic experience' and the article on 
Time adds to their c:r·edi t 'pure perception, ' 'physical 
memory,' and a very genuine sort of 'ob jective immortality.' 
It is apparent that, in some very extended sense, molecular 
society is a jolly affair, wi th almost as many 'activities' 
as the average colle ge senior ••• ! su ggest that this manner 
of descri ption is misleading, and that Professor Vfuitehead 
does not really mean what he seems, even to himself to be 
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while he does not contend that Whitehead is engaged in 
rationalization of h :ts own emotions as does Braithwaite, does 
insist that the concept of value involved is based on an ab-
straction of such a nature as to make the term almost meaning-
less. 
For Professor Whitehead value is the ul-
timate factuality or absolute givenness 
of events. It is to be noted, however, 
that this idea of value is formed in ab-
straction from the concrete regions of 
experience where values are found, namely, 
ethics and aesthetics, and that it merely 
refers to a metaphysical or logical aspect 
of things. Thus the most insistent evils 
of human experience would, in so far as 
they were insistent possess value in Pro-
fessor Whitehead's sense. Consequently, 
it does not seem too much to say that 
this use of the term yalue is either mean-
ingless or equivocal. 
It is our contention, the reviewers to the contrary, 
that Whitehead's conception of value is neither equivocal nor 
meaningles~. Further, it would see m that while Whitehead 
does not develop the concept of value systematically in any 
one expositional section2 yet far from not having indicated 
his view sufficiently to make speculation profitable, perhap3 
the central theme to which all others contribute is the 
saying ••• With regard to such t ·eatures, the assertion s are 
more than misleading~ they are simply wrong." ( Murp~y, 
Art.(l929), 491-492.) . 
1. Swabey, Art.(l926), 277. 
2. The basic features of his view are worked out in three 
sections of S~V (135-137, 151-158, and 238) and in two con-
secutive sections of RIM (94-99, 100-105). It must be re-
membered, however, that these sections are only fully rele-
vant in li ght of the general position Whitehead was develop-
ing includi ng in particular the doctrines of prehension, 
eternal objects, and purpose (discussed above ) which are 
synthesized in the concept of value. 
156 
doctrine of value. His conception of value and its centrality 
to his system would seem to follow directly from his views of 
prehension, ideality, and purpose and to give these meaning 
in relation to each other. And, finally, far from being ab-
stract in relation to ethics and aesthetics, Whitehead's 
concept of value is more concrete than either the good or the 
beautiful which as types of value are restricted forms of the 
1 
more general yet more fu ndamental concept of value itself. 
If we return to the statement, "'Value' is the word I 
use for t he intrinsic reality of an event, 112 and consider it 
in light of what bas already been said about the event or oc-
casion, the meaning of the basic term value is not hard to 
see. We have discovered that an event or occasion is a pre-
hensive unification or synthesis, and that prehension is 
feeling . The e vent is a unit of process or actualization 
and as in process is thus the fusion of belng and not-being . 
It is not yet fully. However, as fully become, as fully ac-
tualized, as being , an event is the realized potentiality 1 
the synthesized feeling . As becoming , an occasion is a pur-
posive achieving ; as become, it is an achievement. Thus 
Whitehead says, "An actual event is an achievement for its 
1. It mus t be admitted that beauty is closer for Whitehead 
to the bas:tc characteristics of value experience than 
gpodness (see below) but both are derivative types (in 
the sense, fb r example, that true value a are deri va ti ve 
from empirical values for E. S. Brightman (Brightman, 
POR, 93)) from the more basic experience of value. 
2. SM~V, 136. 
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own sake, a grasping of diverse entities into~ ~alue by rea-
son of their real togetherness in that pattern, to the ex-
1 
cluslon of all other entities. 11 Accord i ngly, the intrinsic 
reality of an occasion is the realization of a feeling syn-
thesis. '"Aesthetic attainment is interwoven in the texture 
of realisation. 112 The occaslon 1 s existence as becoming , 
from its own standpoint, is its anticipation of having be-
come. As become it is no longer a diversity but a unity, a 
self-felt synthesis, a value. The fact that as become it 
immediately ceases to be and gives rise to a new occasion 
which becomes and then is not merely testifies to the tran-
s i toriness of intrinsic value. It still remains the case 
that its moment of being is its moment of achievement of 
feeling synthesis. 
This can be stated in another £ orm which perhaps makes 
the fundamental definition of value even clearer. From the 
standpoint of its internal teleolog ical efficacy, or pur pose, 
the aim of an actual occasion is its own synthetic feeling 
completion. Accordingly, Whitehead points out, "to be an 
actual entity is to have a self-interest.;lt3 Such a self-
4 interest is "an emotional tone" effecting its own fulfill-
ment. If this is the case, then the fulfillment which is the 
being of the self-interest is "the ultimate enjoyment of being 
1. SMVv , 152. Underlining 
mine. 
2. SMW, 137. 
3. RIM, 100. 
4. RIM, 100 . 
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1 
actual." But Whitehead goes on to add, iiiThe actuality is 
the enjoyment, and this enjoyment is the experiencing of 
value." 2 Accordingly, the root meaning of the term value for 
~· -hi tehead can be stated as the actual enjoyment which is the 
unit of experience as become. 
From this definition a number of further characteris-
tics of value immediately follow. There is no such t h ing as 
value in the abstract. There are only concrete experienced 
values. Value and the indlviduali ty of an occas :t on are one 
and the same. Only individuals experience values and to be 
an individual and to experience value are synon~rmous. "There 
is no such thing as mere value. 113 "Apart from shaping into 
individual matter of fact there is no attainment.•4 Reality 
is in process, is eternally active in nature, but that ac-
tivity considered in abstraction from the actual synthetic 
activity of individual occasions of experience is valueless, 
is pure abstraction. 5 Even though Whitehead sometimes speaks 
of 11 the general activity 11 in such a manner that it could be 
interpreted as more fUndamental than individual occasions, 
for exa.rn ple, 11 It is a general metaphy sical character which 
6 
underlies all occasions," it becomes evident in light of his 
concept of value that such general acti vity is an abstraction 
1. RIM, 100. 
2. RIM, 100. 
3. SNfW, 13 6. 
4. SMVI , 136-137. 
5. SMW, 155. 
6. SMW, 225. The same 
seeming difficulty 
appears in relation 
to the category of the 
ultimate (creativity) 
in PR (31-32). 
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with no reality or actuality apart from ac t ual oc casions. 
Whitehead's meaning in the abo ve example would have been 
clearer had he said the general activity is a constituent 
element of all occasions rather than "underlies" but, that he 
means constituent element rather than underlies in any 
literal sense follows from his definition of value. Thus he 
says, "But in abstract i on from actuali~, the eternal activity 
is divorced from value. 1 For the actuality is th e value. " 
Further, the individualized actual nature of value means 
that the reaLm of eternal object or ideali~ has no intrln-
sic value in itself apart from actualization in concrete oc-
casions. It is true tbat Whitehead does say, "Value, as ab-
stracted from any particular superject, is the abstract matter 
••• which is common to all occaslons. 112 But the point in this 
statement itself is that, so considered, "abstract matter" 
is abstract, non~actual, and thus intrinsically valueless. 
"Such ideal situations, apart from any reality, are devoid of 
intrinsic value 113 though they may, as "elements in purpose, n4 
as possibilities which are selected for actualization, have 
instrumental value. The realm of eternal objects is called 
the realm of ideality because eternal objects considered in 
themselves are ideals and not actualities, and as ideals they 
are devoid of int rinsic value. An ideal while a means to and 
conditions of the actual individual experience of value cannot 
1. SMW, 155. 3. SJ\flJil , 154. 
2. 'SNrll, 238. 4. SM\1, 154. 
160 
be substituted for it. 1 Accordingly, in spite of IJhitehead's 
manifest Platonism in many respects and the similarity of the 
concept of eternal objects to the Platonic Ideas,2 Whitehead 
is not in the present period a Platonic realist in relation 
to value. While he would agree with Plato that ;r·all creation 
or passage of non-being :i.nto being is poe try or making,'' 3 
yet he would insist that there is no "absolute beauty114 apart 
from actual experiences of realized ·beauty nor is there a 
~Form or essent i al nature of Goodne ss"'5 of the highest in-
trinsic value "even beyond being, surpassing it in dignity 
and power. 116 In the same way, while there is much similarity 
between Whitehead's realm of ideality and Nicolai Harmann 1s 7 
"Realm of Ethical Values, 118 Whitehead does not in this p eriod 
confuse values and ideals as Hartmann does; 9 as opposed to 
1. Compare Brightman, POR, 90: "Ideals constitute a special 
class of instrumental values.77TE6re is no intrinsic value 
in entertaining an ideal. The value of' an :tdeal is purely 
instrumental ~n that it may serve as cause of or means to 
the actual intrinsic value. Only the actual attainment of 
the value defined by the ideal is an intrinsic value." 
2. For a short but excellent discussion of Whitehead's Pla-
tonism in this early period of metaphysical development 
see :T:Lylor. PMW, 190n, 440, and 456n. 
3. Plato, SYM., 205C:. 
4. Plato, Sym., 211D. 
5. Plato, Re p ., 508D. 
6. Plato, ~., 509A. G. Morgan points out that Platonism for 
Whitehean-would be gu :tlty 11 of the 'fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness'" because it 111deifies abstractions." (G. 
Morgan, Art.(l937), 312.) 
7. Cf. Hazelton, VEHW, for an analytic comparison of Whitehead 
and Hartmann in relation to theories of value. 
8. Hartmann, ETH 11, 385-471. 
9. Cf. Millard, fHE, 139-140 1 142. "Throughout the Ethics 
Hartmann's tendency to confuse values and ideals Ieads to 
the failure to distinguish between situations of value and 
general concepts of situations which man values and uses as 
ends to be realized." (Millard, THE, 142.) Hazelton tends to 
overlook this difficulty in Hartmann. 
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Hartmann, \Vhitehead insists that there is no independent 
reaL~ of values apart from existence. Possibilities are in-
1 
strumentally valuable only. 
Although there is some external similarity in defini-
tions of value between the "enjoyment~• of Whitehead and the 
1
•happiness" of hedonism, Whitehead is no hedonist. Value is 
no mere enjoyment, or happiness, or feeling of accomplishment 
cons ide red in abstraction that i:t is possibilities for realiza-
tion considered in abstraction. "Value is the outcome of 
limitation. The definite finite entity is the selected mode 
which is tbe maping of attainment.n2 It is this particular 
entity 1 this particular realization, this particular achieve-
ment, this particular enjoyment which is the value and not 
realization, achievement, enjoyment in the abstract. "The 
salvation of reality is its obstinate, irreducible, matter-
of-fact entities, which are limited to be no other than 
thernselves." 3 It has already become evident that actualiza-
tion is determination and limitation, that the possibility of 
actual iz at ion rests upon exclus ion4 of conflicting posslbili-
ties. The hedonistic concepti-on of enjoyment or happiness is 
1. In the last phase of Whitehead's thought on the subject 
as repr-esented by the articles "Immortali ty11 and "Mathe-
matics and the Good;• ( Sclilpp, PANW, 666-701) this dis-
tinction can no longer be made for Whitehead talks about 
rrThe World of Value" as opposed to "The World of Fact11 but 
at least at the present time the distinction between value 
and ideals is definite and clear. 
2. SMW, 136. 
3. SMW I 13'7. 
4. See above, sec. A, 2. 
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as much an abstraction as are the Platonic Forms. "Restric-
1 tion,• Whitehead insists, "is the price of value." A 
realized event as a · value is one intrinsic value and not 
many, but its constitution as a val~e is structured. It is 
a synthesis and not an undifferentiated unity. Each event 
ar~ t h us each value has an associated infinite abstractive 
hierarchy. 2 The organism as a unit of emergent value is • A 
real fusion of the character of eternal objects. 113 Every 
value is enjoyment in felt, real, structured synthesis, is a 
Upatterne d value. 114 The organism, event, or occasion is it-
self by reason of its particular felt synthesis of relations 
to everything else. It is not the everything else to which 
it is related , ho wever, which is the value, but the actual 
patterned synthesis of those relations. 
An organism is the realisation of a 
definite shape of value. The emer-
genc~ of some actual value depends 
on limitation which excludes neu-
tralising cross lights. Thus an event 
is a matte r -of-fact which by reason of 
its limitation is a value for itself; 
but by reason of its very nature it 
also reguires the whole universe to be 
itself. 
For Whitehead no bifurcation exists between fact and 
value. G. Morgan points out that .vhitehead's theory of value 
"is his answer to tbe divorce between value and fact. 116 
1. SMW, 265. 
2. See above, sec. a,2, and 
SMW, 247. 
3. SMW, 157. 
4. SM.W, 174. 
5. SMW, 278. 
6. G. Morgan, Art. 
(1937), 310. 
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Actual facts considered int rinsically and values are one and 
the same. The reason we tend to bifurcate fact and value is 
that most of the time when we think that we are talking about 
facts we are really talk ·ng about abstractions from facts. 
While factuality does require reference to ideality if we are 
to understand how it came and is corning to be, it does not 
require reference to values above and beyond the facts, for 
when we are really talki ng about facts we are talking about 
values. 
Every intrinsic value is a private, irreducible, and 
individual experience. While every value experience refers 
beyond itself, it is not that to which it refers that is 
intrinsically valuable from the standpoint of the occasion 
but the realization of the reference as actual in present 
experience. !Vhitehead would agree with Brightman that "actUll 
value is the presence in experience o f the painting or the 
masslll1 and not painting or mass considered in abstract i on. 
Rather than n:a intaining as Perry does that value is "any ob-
ject of any interest. 112 Whitehead would insist that value is 
the realization of any interest in any object as present ex-
perience. 
To be an actual entity is to have a self-
. interest ••• The value of other things not 
one rs self, is the derivative value of 
being elements contr~outing to the ul ti-
mate self-interest. 
1. Brightman, POR, 88. 
2. Perry, GTV, 115. 
3. RIM, 100. 
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Thus public value is instrumental value while intrinsic value 
is private. 1 Every actualization considered for its own sake 
or in itself is an intrinsic value. This does not mean that 
all intrinsic values are equal. 2 What it does mean however, 
is that no matter how crippling or dis-valuable instrumentally 
any particular event may be to its successors, from its own 
standpoint as even a limited achievement it is an intrinsic 
value. 
The nature of instrumental value follow s from the con-
sideration of intrinsic value. Anything cont ribu ting to the 
becoming of an event is an instrumental value. Thus the whole 
realm of possibility or ideality has instrumental but not in-
trinsic value. But so also do all other events have instru-
mental value to the becoming of any one event. As pointed 
out, 3 other event s have derivative value as contributory to 
the event in question and its self-realization. Since every 
event is a synthesis of prehensions and t he prehensions are 
feelin g awareness of other events, then every other event as 
giving rise to a prehension is an instrumental value to the 
becoming of any one event. Thus an event's intrinsic value 
is afunction of the instrumental value of other even t s for 
it, and its own intrinsic value is to be judged as higher or 
1. C~. Millard, Art.(l949), 130: •rt is as impossible for 
empirical value experiences to be public as i t is im-
pos sible for me to feel someone else's feeli n gs towards 
an : ob ject as he feels them • ., 
2. See below, sec. 2. 
3. RIM, 100. 
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lower in terms of its instrumentality to other events. 
The instrumentality of one occas i on to the intrinsic 
value of another is particularly evident in an event's self-
transcendence • . :As a complete intrinsic value an occasion 
ceases to be, but its completion gives rise to a new feeling 
synthesis which is its successor. As no longer, the first 
occasion's intrinsic value .h..as ceased to be, but it is pre-
served as instrumental value for the new occasion. 
The creative process is thus to be dis-
cerned in that transi t l on b ~1 which one 
occasion, already actual, enters into the 
birth of another instance of experienced 
value. There is not one si mple line of 
transition from occas i on to occasion, 
though there may b e a dominant line. The 
whole world conspires to produce a new 
creation.l 
Process itself can be described as the progressive achieve-
ment and transcendence of intrinsic values, or as the rhy-
thmic alternations of in~rinsic and instrumental value. 2 
Thus every occasion is both intri nsically and instru-
mentally valuable. Whitehead points out: 
It is only itself as drawing to gether in-
to its own limitation the Js. rger whole in 
which it finds itself. Conversely it is 
only itself by lending it aspects to this 
same environment in •mich it finds it-
self.3 
And again, 
There is an intrinsic and an extrinsic 
reality of an event, namely, the event 
as in its own prehension, and the eve2t 
as in the prehension of other events. 
1. RIM, 113. 
2. Cf. Chap. II, sec. d. 
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The concept of mut ual significance as constitutive of reality 
of the natural science period1 has become that of mutual in-
strumentality to attainment of individual intrinsic value. 2 
The principle Whitehead is stressing can well be illustrated 
in terms of human personality. My intrinsic value is to a 
large extent a function of the intrinsic value of others as 
instrumental to my becoming , that is, as synthesized by me, 
and of my instrumentality in the becoming of others. On 
Whitehead's principle this relationship is extended to all 
occasions of ex:pe rience and not j ust those on the human level. 
There is no intrinsic value without instrumen tal value and no 
instrumental value without intrinsic value. 
On the basis of the mutual instrumentality of intrinsi-
cally valuable occasions the distinctlon can be made between 
value and disvalue. If we consider actual entities from their 
own standpoints or in themselves alone discounting for a moment 
their instrumentality for each other, then every entity by 
its nature as an entity is a positive intrinsic value as a 
1. See a bove Chap. II, sec. c and POR, 18-19 in particular. 
2. In light of the above passages Hazelton's contention that 
Whitehead oonfused and failed to distinguish "extrinsic'" and 
"intrinsic" value v.ould hardly seem valid. Hazelton says; 
"If 'value 1 is for the individual, then it is not the indi-
vidual. It is contributory to it, but it b6Tongs to the 
category of 'objective determination' rather than to the 
'subjective unity,' except derivatively. Into the consti-
tution of an indlvidual, or actual entity enter 'the ele-
ments of being .' But in so far as 1value 1 is attributed 
to them the term is extended to that which is 'extrinsic 1 
rather than 'intrinsic' reality.~ (Hazelton, VEB~ , 240.) 
Yet Whitehead would seem to be making extremely clear exactly 
this distinction. All reality has "extrinsic" value as 
relative to the becoming of each occasion of "-intrinsic 
Va.lue". 
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self-enj oyed limited attainment of some internal purpose, 
restricted though that attainment and purpose may be. ~The 
endurance of an entity represents a limited aesthetic success.n1 
Even if when judged from other standpoints an event is evil, yet 
2 
*evll, triumphant in enjoyment, i s so far good.n But to consi-
der an entity only in itself is to consider it abstractly, for 
its very individuality and attainment is, as we have seen, a 
function of mutual and reflexive instrumentality. Accordingly, 
while considered in its own right, as existent it represents 
some degree of success, yet 
if we look beyond it to its external effects 
it may represent aesthetic fa :i.lure. Even 
within itself, it may represent the conflict 
between lower success and higher failure. 3 The conflict is the pressage of disruption. 
We have al~eady discovered4 that every event brings about 
a new gradation or rearrangement of potentialities for future 
event s. If the realized possibilities in one event are less 
than the could have been, the real possibilities for successive 
events may be correspondingly restricted. Then, from the stand-
point of the successive events, that event is an occasion of 
disvalue. Whitehead considers endurance to be one of the con-
5 ditions of heightened value. While strictly speaking a value 
experience does not endure, yet it may recur in the sense that 
the pattern of eternal objects involved may be realized with 
1. SMW, 137. 
2. RD!, 95. 
3. SMW, 137. 
4. See above, sec. A,2. 
5. See below and SMW, 153. 
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variations in successive event s. 1 Such a group of occasions 
may be referred to as an "enduring individuality." 2 Such an 
enduring individuality depends on the condition t hat each of 
its occasions 11 realises itself under the guise of an enduring 
individual life history contained with in itself. 113 Any oc-
casion in the series that fails to realize the potentialities 
of its line of succession, even though it is a positive 
achievement, is, from t he standpoint both of its predecessors 
and successors an occasion of disvalue, a npresage of dis-
... 
4 
ruption." For example, a cancerous cell in the human body 
considered as an occasion in itself is a positive achievement 
but considered in relation to its place in enduring individuality 
to what it could have been, to its disruptive effect on other 
occasions, it is an instance of positive disvalue. 
Evil or disvalue can also oe described i n terms of f ailure 
of adequate purpose, realization of lesser purpose than was 
pos siole, or fragmentary purposes. As realizations of purposes 
all occasions are intrinsic values, but as failures to realize 
what could bave oeen, some occasions are evil. 11 Evil is the 
brute motive force of fragmentary purpose ••• Evil is over-
riding, retarding , hurting.•5 •There is evil when things are 
1. Called societies, social orders, · enduring creatures, and 
personal orders in PR. Cf. PR, 50-52, in particular. 
2. SMW, 153. 
3. SMW, 153. Human personality would be of such a nature 
according to Whitehead. 
4. SMW, 137. 
5. SM"IIV , 276, 
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1 
at cross purposes.n In a sense evil tends to its own "elim-
2 ination by destruction, or degradation, or elevation.• As 
disruptive, disvalue is unstable, but successive occasions tend 
to relative stability on whatever level results from the dis-
crepencies of realization by past occasions. If the successive 
occasions are realizing the possibilities open to them, even 
though these are less adequate fulfillments than they might 
have been had it not been for the disruptive occasions, posi-
tive intrinsic and instrumental value must be attributed to 
3 them. In such cases evil has entered into reality, however, 
by comparison of the might have been with the is. 
It must be noted that the state of de-
gradation to which evil leads, when ac-
complished, is not itself evil, except 
by comparison with what mi ght have been. 
A hog is not an evil beast, out when a 
man is degraded to the level of a hog, 
with the accompanying atrophy of finer 
elements, he is no more evil than a hog. 
The evil of the final degradation li·es 
in the comparison of what is with what 
might have been. During the process of 
degradation the comparison is an evil 
for the man himself, and at its final 
stage it remains an evil for others. 
Complete failure or absolute evil would be extinction and thus 
is non-existent. Actual evil in any occasion presupposes 
1. RIM, 97. The cancer cell mentioned would be an example of 
an occasion at cross purposes with the dominant occasions 
of the organism of which it is a member. 
2• RIM, 96. 
3. From the standpoint of moral judgment of occas i ons it might 
be said that Whitehead is urging the necessity of taking 
into account what E. s. Brightman calls ·•The Law of the 
Best Possiole" and "The Law of Specification." Cf. Bright-
man, ML, 156 and 171. 
4. RIM, 97. 
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achievement of some intrinsic value (in this sense every oc-
casion is a positive value) but a.n intrinsic value which is 
also disva.lue by prehensive comparison of the fuller "ought to 
be" with the limited "is.• 
2. Categories of i mportance. 
While every actual occasion considered intrinsically is 
a. value for Whitehe ad, it does not follow that all intrinsic 
values are of equal worth. The values attained vary both in 
magnitude and quality, and since the value is t he intrinsic 
reality of an occasion, it can also be said t hat occasions vary 
in individual significance in direct proportionro the richness 
of value realized by each. 1 "Values differ in i mportance." 
Such difference i mplies definite standards on the basis of 
which occasions or values can be ranked in relation to t he 
relative richness of the value realized . 
It must be pointed out immediately, however, that rela-
tive worth or relative hei ghth of value does not i mply rela-
ti ve oeing in the sense of de grees of being . A small or 
slight value is just as real an occurrence as an important 
value, and each ma kes its own contribut i on, great or small but 
never the less definite, to the totality. At no point does 
White head intimate that there are degrees of reality among 
concrete occasions. The only sense in which the concept of 
degrees of reality could be applied would be to relative 
1. SMW, 152. 
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abstractions. 1 Every occasion affects all other occas i ons and 
alters the realm of possibilities. 2 If it becomes, there is 
no question that it is or has been, but its relative intrinsic 
richness and instrumental effect may be great or small. An 
electron and a poe t both may be, and both as being have and 
are intrinsic values; each as being affects the other; but the 
intrinsic richness of any present occas i on of the poet will 
vary tremendously from the intrinsic richness of any present 
occasion of the electron. 
The statement, "Values differ in importanoe, 113 tends to 
indicate rather clearly what the concept of importance means 
to which Whitehead later4 devotes so much discussion. At 
least in this period of metaphysical development, rather than 
being the generic term for value as Miss Emmet contends, 5 im-
portance indicates rela tive degree of value, both intrinsic 
and instrumental. Not only does such an interpretation of the 
term make intelligible the above statement but it harmonizes 
1. In admitting that abstractions are partial realities 
Whitehead would probably agree with Bradley (Cf~ Bradley 
AAR, Chap. 24), but whereas for Bradley reality is one 
abstractly consistent, all-inclusive, nonrelational whole, 
for Whitehead reality is a plurality of concrete actual 
existents or reals each of which is intimately related to 
the totality. Out of context with the totality any occasion 
is abstract and as described would be partial reality, but 
as a real concrete ·existent, each occasion has real indi-
viduality as well as relation to totality. As is evident 
Whitehead would agree with Bradley that all concrete reality 
is sentient in nature (Cf. Above sec. A, 1 on prehension and 
PR, vii and viii, also Bradley, AAR, 145, 160.) 
2. See sec. A, 1 and sec. A, 2 above. 
3. Sbfi'V , 152 • . 
4. MOT. 
5. Emmet, Art.(l946), 234. 
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with such additional statements from this period as "Every 
human being is the natural guardian of his own importance," 1 
and, 111 Importance depends on endurance •112 However, there does 
seem to be a secondary meaning derivative from the first in 
connection with instrumental value whereby i mportance does 
not mean relative degree of value in the sense of increase of 
value but in the sense of positive or negative effect upon 
further value syntheses. This second sense is illustrated by 
the following: 
In considering religion, we should not be 
obsessed by the idea of its necessary good-
ness. This is a dangerous delusion. The 
point ~o notice is its transcendent impor-
tance. 
Again in illustrating the function of symbols, Whitehead says, 
In an army there is one set of symbols to 
produce automatic obedience in a limited 
set of circumstance, and another set of 
symbols to produce a general sens4 of im-
portance of the duties performed. 
In the present discussion we shall use the word inthe first 
and major sense, that is as relative degree of value. 
Since values do differ tremendously in importance, ex-
istence implies standards of value. The standards are caLls d 
for by occas j_ons and are relevant to occasions in two senses: 
First, standards are called for by any occasion itself as a 
bas is for the selection (from among pos s ibi li ties realizable} 
1. SMW, 201. 
2. SMVJ, 278. 
3. RIM, 18, 
4. SJY'.tE, 75. The word in this case perhaps being used in both 
senses at once. 
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of that combination of potentialities which will issue in the 
richest value for it. "There cannot be value without ante-
cedent standards of value, to discriminate the acceptance or 
rejection of what is before the envisa ging mode of activity. ul 
As such the standards of value function as norms for selection 
and purpose for each occasion in light of its own potentiali-
ties. But, second, each occasion as having selected and 
realized value, in other words, as actual, is to be judged as 
relatively rich or poor in intrinsic value by the standards 
of value relative to all occasions regardless of the limited 
possibilities of any one occasion. "Thus though each event 
is necessary for the co~~unity of event s, the wei ght of its 
contribution is determined by something intrinsic in itself.u2 
In spite of his insistence on the necessity of standards 
of value and the difference in importance of realized values 
of the diverse occasions, Whitehead does not in any sense of-
fer a detailed elaboration of these standards during this 
period. Anything approaching a full treatment of levels of 
value does no t appe ar until Adventures of lde~. However, he 
does suggest what some of these conditions of hei ghtened value 
may be. It will be recognized i~~ediately t hat these standards 
as categpries of increased intrinsic value are neither absolute 
nor systematic but rather are, as G. Morgan points out of even 
the more comprehensive treatment in Adventures of Ideas, sug-
gestions "which may ••• illuminate, though they do not exhaust, 
1. S'MW, ~56. 
2. SMW, 15~. 
1 the depths of individuality. 
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Further, the standards Whitehead suggests are not nec-
essarily those of moral achievement. As a matter of fact moral 
cate gories are more or less conspicuous by their absence, 
though, as will become e vident, the conditions of morality are 
more or less indirectly indicated by the categories of impor-
tance and more directly so by the concept of individuality in 
2 
community. The present standards are essentially aesthetic 
in nature and the conditions of hei gh tened aes thetic indi-
viduality. 
It is characteristic of White head's general metaphysi-
cal position t hat aesthetic experience and aesthetic cate gor-
ies are basic. This appeal to aesthetic experience and aes-
thetic categories tends to follow from his insistence on the 
primacy of feeling , but it might equally be said that t be 
primacy of feeling tends to follow from his aesthetic pre-
suppositions. Thus Whi tehe ad says, nAn actual fact is a fact 
of aesthetic experience," to which he adds, "All aesthetic 
experience is feeling arising out of realization of contrast 
under ident 1ty. 3 "'Aesthetic attainment is interwoven in the 
texture of realisation. • 4 Every entity is •a limited aes-
thetic success.•5 The ultimate faith in reason on which the 
possibility of knowledge rests is rrthe trust that the ultimate 
natures of things lie together in a harmony which excludes mere 
1. G. Morgan, Art.(l937), 312. 4. SM\IY, 137. 
2. See below, sec. C, 2. 
3. RIM, .115. 
5. SMW, 137. 
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. . t i • 1 aro1 ra.r ness. To have this f'ai th is to lmow "that this 
sy stem L?t realitie!7 includes the harmony of logical ra-
tionality, and the harmony of aesthetic achievement. 112 But 
the rationality itself is derivative from aesthetic harmony: 
The harmony of the logical reason, which 
devines the complete pattern as involved 
in the postulates, is the most general aes-
thetic property arising fromthe mere fact 
of concur3ent existence in the unity of one 
occasion. 
Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that aesthetic categories 
for Whitehead take precedence over moral categories. White-
head acknowledges the primary character of aesthetic factors 
in his metaphysical position as follows: 
The metaphys ical doctrine here expounded, 
finds the foundations of the world in 
aesthetic experience, rather than--as with 
Kant--in the co gnitive and conceptive ex-
perience. All other is therefore aesthetic 
order, and the moral order is merely certain 
aspects of aesthetic order. The actual world 
is the outcome of aest hetic order, and the 
aesthetic order4 is derivative from the im-
manence of God. 
We s hall briefly consider what appear to us to be, for 
Whitehead, seven of the more basic categories of importance: 
harmonious individuality, endurance, novelty, contrast, 
de pth, vividness or intensity, and personality. Further ad-
ditional categories will become evident in our discussion of 
the totality and value which will include the occasion's re-
la tion to God and to the community of occasions which is reality. 
1. SMW, 27. 3. :sMW, 40. 
2. SMW, 27-28 . 4. RIM, 104-105. 
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a. Harmonious individuality. 
Every occasion as a prehensive unification is by its 
1 
nature as an occasion a "real togetherness" in the indivi-
2 duality of prehended aspects of all reality. As such, the 
basic condition of being and thus the basic condition of any 
value is harmonious individuality. Apart from harmony there 
would be no occasion, for u there would be no creatures, since, 
apart from harmonious order, the perceptive fusion would be a 
3 
confus i on neutralising achieved value." This basic require-
ment of internal harmony for any value can be described as 
both a lo gical and an aesthetic harmony. 
The logical harmony involved in the unity 
of an occasion is both exclusive and in-
clusive. The occasion must exclude the 
inharmon4ous and it must include the har-
monious. 
Since in order to exist internal harmony is a necessity, any 
occasion depends upon limitation of possibilities. • The 
emergence of some actual value depends on limitation which 
5 
excludes neutralising cross lights." 
The necessity of harmonious indi viduality for the very 
being of the occasion does not mean that an occasion cannot 
grow out of conflict nor does it mean that its harmony will 
-----1. SMW, 152. 
2. '"Individual matter-of-fact. !' (SMW , 137.) 
3. RIM, 104. This statement in context is offered as reason 
for the necessity of God's existence but it describes 
equally well the state of affairs for each occasion. 
4. SM\'V I 41. 
5. SMW, 278. 
177 
not involve contrast and differentiation. As will be seen, 
contrast is a condition of hei ghtened value. But the occasion 
itself cannot contain open conflict or contradiction. Some-
how, to be, it must synthesize the conflicting elemen t s. If, 
however, an overtone of conflict persists and becomes insoluable 
conflict for the future, the succession of occasions to which 
that occasion is a contributor is headed for extinction. •The 
1 
conflict is the presage of disruption.tt 
Since harmonious individuality is the condition without 
which no occasion could exist, it is the basic category of 
value but also the minimum cate gory. Without it no value is 
possible, out its presence is not an assurance of any high 
de gree of value. A spatial electro-magnetic occasion would 
be, according to Whitehead, an harmonious indi vidual and thus 
have intrinsic value, .but its degree of intrinsic value, i.e. 
its importance, would be very low. 
b. Endurance. 
If a value is to have anything but the minimum importance 
it must be characterized by a second condition which Whitehead 
terms "endurance.112 111!rrnportance," among other things, ·· depends 
on endurance." 3 Strictly speaking, as we have seen, 4 no value 
1. SMW, 137. This is only too well illustrated in human per-
sonality where insoluble conflict results in dissociation 
and destruction of that personality. "Conflict, with its 
emotional tension and accompanying indecision and paralysis 
of action, cannot persist indefinitely; it is a biolo gical 
necessity that some way out of the l mpasse, should be 
found.u Conflict is "the mechansim upon which this dis-
sociation depends.~ (Hart, POI, 95 and 98.) 
2. SM.W , 137. 3. SMW, 278. 4. See above, sec. B,l. 
endures. Its actualization is its completion. However, a value 
may be said to be characterized by endurance when it involves a 
1 
re-actualization of the same finite abstractive hierarchy made 
directly available to it by the transcendent completion of its 
predecessor. 
It is the property which we may call 
indifferently retention, endurance, or 
reiteration. This property amounts to 
the recovery, on behalf of value amid 
the transitoriness of reality, of the 
self'-identity which is also ~njoyed by 
the primary eternal objects. 
The category of endurance assures continuity of develop-
ment, progressive realization of value, and in higher occasions 
accounts for the feelin g of unity of personality. Endurance is 
made possible by the self-transcendent nature or "ob jective 
3 immortality• of each event. It gives to each occasion a feel-
ing of permanence and of being apart of a life h i story. The 
occasion 
thus realises itself under the guise of 
an enduring indi v idual entity, with a 
life history contained within itself. 
1. It would have to be re-actua lization of a finite abstrac-
tive hierarchy rather than an infinite one, for re-actu-
aliza ti on of an infinite one would be the literal recurrence 
of' the previous event. This would be a logical impossi-
bility, for neither the res t of reality nor the realm of 
eternal objects would be the same for any two successive 
occasions. Amon g other things, possibilities would have · 
been altered because the first event was, and each oc-
casion as prehending the universe prebends a universe dif-
ferent than it was a moment before due to the continuance 
of process. As prehending differently it is a different 
event. 
2. SMW, 152. This self-identity enjoyed by eternal objects, 
it is to be remembered, is log ical and not existential 
identity. 
3. Art.(l927), 62. 
Furthermore, the extrinsic reality of 
such an event, as mirrored in other events, 
takes this same formof enduring indivi-
duality; only in this case the individuality 
is implanted as a reiteration of aspects of 
itself in ihe alien events composing the en-
vironment. 
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As characterized by endurance the occasion's own realiza-
tion of its contribution is increased. But endurance alone 
does not assure a very high importance. Endurance easily ap-
proaches mere repetition. The occasions constituting a boul-
der are individuals characterized by endurance; each has in-
trinsic value; but the importance of their indi viduality, of 
their intrinsic value, is relatively low. Each is little more 
than a repetition of its predecessor. 
c. Novelty. 
As opposed to endurance, importance ~ay be significantly 
increased by the novelty of the value realized. 11 A static 
value becomes unendurable by its a ppalling monotony of en-
2 durance." Every occasion by its nature as an occasion con-
tains some novelty for no two occasions are exactly alike. 
While every occasion prehends the aspects of past occasions and 
must conform to t he limits set on possibility by these past oc-
3 
casions, yet, as a synthesis, as ~~ ~~effect, \~! as "one limited 
value, 114 it is at least s 1 igh tly different from all others, 
and therein does its individuality lie. "The birth of a new 
5 instant is t he passa ge into novelty." Within the limits set 
1. S~lfW , 153. 4. SM:Vi, 152 • 
2. SMW , 290. 5. RIM, 113. 
3. RIM, 113. 
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by possibility, the more novelty of which an occasion is 
capable (up to a point), the more strikj_ng the individuality 
and the higher the degree of intrinsic value. The hi gher 
types or organisms are those in which si gnificant novelty is 
dominant. "Thus in the birth of the mental occasi on the con-
1 
sequent of ideal novelty enters into reality." The appearance 
of life is a result of the urge towards novelty. •The emer-
gence of life is better conceived as a oid for freedom on the 
2 part of organisms." When the urge towards novelty becomes 
predominant there is a corresponding loss of endu~ance and, in 
the larger organisms constituted by societies of occasions, a 
loss of survival value, 3 but there is also a corresponding in-
crease of intensity of experience which can be described as 
increased importance. 
However, there can be too much no velty. Our discussion 
of evil has so indicated. For any novelty to occu~, there 
4 
must be some conformity. But in some cases the possioilities 
open include novel syntheses of such a nat~~e as to be radi-
cally disruptive of enduring factors. While in some cases 
realization of such a novelty may lead to radical revision up 
the scale of importance (as degrees of positive value), in 
others it may lead to violent degradation and disruption. 
1. RIM, 117. 
2. SME, 65. 
3. SME, 64. 
4. Conformity is pro oably always greater than novelty or ex-
perience would be impossible, for real possibilities are 
determined by antecedents. 
181 
The cancer cell mentioned above, the atom oomb , murder, and 
1 
suicide would be examp-les. Both no velty and endurance are 
conditions of increased importance, but either carried to the 
extreme leads to decrease of importance. The extreme 
penalty of too great novelty is non-entity. 
d. Significant contrast. 
Neither endurance nor novelty canoe understood without 
reference to the cate gory of contrast, the cate gory which 
brings aoout the synt hesis of the preceeding two. As was the 
case with the previous three categories, contrast is present 
to some extent in every occasion, out contrast stands in the 
rather peculiar situation that its extremes nullify its effec-
t i veness. For exam.ple, if one of the contrasting factors is 
reduced to ne gli gibility, then for practical purpose no con-
trast exists. 2 Occasions primarily characterized by endurance 
or primarily characterized by novelty, while actually involv-
ing the extremes of contrast, have in effect nullified contrast. 
Contrast as a categ ory of increased importance functions in a 
manner highly s imilar to the Aristotelean mean, 3 since for 
1. Each of these would be hi ghly important in the second sense 
but not in the first. I 
2. Cf. RIM, 118, and Art.(l927), 59. Both passages point out · 
that when in an occasion either the mental or the physical 
pole has been reduced to negli g ibility, that occasion can 
be considered either a physical or mental occasion for all 
practical purposes. 
3. Aristotle, Eth. Nic., ll06a 30-35 (tr. Rackham): .uBy the 
mean relative to- us, that amount which is neither too much 
nor too little, and this is not one and the same for every-
body." The concept of the mean has oeen adapted to "ar-
tistic perfection" by T. M. Greene (Greene, AAC, 395-401). 
182 
every occasion there is a ri ght amount of contrast for maximum 
importance. 
The consequent must agree with the ground 
in general type _so as to preserve definite-
ness, but it must contrast with it in re-
spect to contrary instances so as to obtain 
vividness and quality.l 
Every occasion is infected with polarities and/or duali-
ties which, as harmonized in significant contrast, hei ghten 
each other and incr ease intrinsic value. Ground and conse-
2 quent, other names for inheritance from the past and the realm 
of ideality, form an ever presen t duality. Every occasion in-
volves contrast of mental and physi cal poles. 3 In the higher 
concrete occasions at least, the mode of prehension through 
causal efficacy is contrasted with pr ehension through presen-
tational immedlacy. 4 The intrinsic value of an occasion is 
contrasted with the instrQmental value of other occasions. 
Whitehead would a gree with Bri ghtman that 11 t he facts of duality 
in human experience are far too complex to be reduced to a 
5 
single f ormula." Whitehead would extend this statement to in-
clude all levels of occasions. Whenever synthesis through si g-
nificant contrast occurs, impOrtance and s i gnifi cant indi vidu-
ality are increased, 6 for contrast involves a hei ghtening of 
Whitehead's view of contrast is somewhat a mean :ltself be-
tween a moral and an aesthetic conception. In terms of pur-
pose of the occas :ton it is in a sense moral; in terms of 
aesth~tic feeling synthesis it is primarily aest hetic. White-
head himself identifies the term contrast as primarily aes-
thetic. (RIM, 115.) 
1. RIM, 115. 
2. RIM, 115. 
3. RIM, 118 and Art. ( 1927), 59. 
4. SME, 43-44. 
5. Brightman, NAV, 17. 
6. Thus for example in P~ con-
sciousness as one of the 
highest forms of individuality 
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factors and of their mut ua l relevance to each other. 
The next t .hre e categories of i mporta nce depend upon con-
trast for their functioning and mi ght well be called cate-
gories of hei ghtened cont rast. 
e. Depth. 
Depth can be identified with keeness of aes thetic appre-
hension and definitenes s of selection. Every occasion prehends 
the whole of reality, out in lower occasions that prehension 
may not be much more than a "unity of blind perceptivity."1 
Every occasion as a synthesis is one value and not many ;Jut it 
may b e relatively diffuse or lacking in positive definiteness 
for other occas i ons. 11 It may represent the faintest ripple. \U2 
On the other hand, depth increases with increase of positive 
awareness and definiteness of selection. "The limitations are 
the opportunities. The essence of depth of actuality is 
definiteness. 113 Depth as a contrast factor invol ves not only 
the positive awareness on the part of an occasion of what it 
is but also of wbat it could be. All occas i ons exclude but 
not all occasions are positive ly a ware of what they have ex-
eluded. An occasion with depth is not only aware of what is 
is bu t of what it is no t . ·.u Each occasion only achieves its 
depth by reason o f its limi tations , ~hat is, by reason of its 
4 
exclusions." As opposed to the occasion which is t h e "faintest 
is described 
t heory, with 
1. RIM, 118. 
2 • m.rw , 15 5 • 
as "the feeling of con t rast of t heory , as mere 
f act, as mere fact." (PR, 286.) -
-- 3. RD~, 113. 
4. Art.(l927), 60. Underlining mine. 
ripple, '1!1 
in the other extreme it may rise to con-
scious thought, which includes passing 
before self-conscious judgment the ab-
stract possi b ilities of value inherent 
in various situations of ideal together-
ness. 
From the standpoint of human personality, dept is a 
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functlon of int uitive sensitiveness plus positive cho i ce and 
action. To be a conscious person at all requires a relatively 
hi gh d egree of depth, out this depth can be further increased 
by training and development through aesthetic education to 
greater sensitivity and the fosterin g of creative initiative. 
What we want to draw out is habits of aes-
thetic apprehension. According to the 
metaphysical doctrine I have oeen develop-
ing , to do so is to increase depth of 1n-
dividuality ••• You will not obtain the ap-
prehension without the initiative, or the 
initiative without the apprehension ••• 
Sensitiveness without impulse spells 
decadance, and impulse 2without sensitive-ness spells brutality. 
Depth mi ght be said t o be fineness of realization and realiza-
tion of fineness. 
f. Vividness or intensiveness. 
With depth, and often as a function of deptq, usually comes 
a sixth mark of heightened individuality and intrinsic value 
which can be called vividness, intensiveness, or strengh of 
value. While all occasions have some degree of intensiveness 
or vividness--•the zero of intensiveness means the collapse of 
3 
actu.ali ty" --the type of intensiveness or vividness character-
istic of hi gh importance presupposes the positive awareness of 
1. SMIN, 15~. 2. SNN'l, 287 • 3. RIM, 103 . 
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the 11 is not11 of depth plus a striking awareness of t he "is." 
Intensiveness is complementary to depth, is emphasis upon the 
definiteness of selection an.:i its sing le issue. "All intensive 
quantity is merely the contrioution of some one element of 
synthesis to this one intensiveness of value. 111 Vividness 
grows out of contrast and the realization of contrast and as 
such involves the realization on the part of the occasion of 
other values, once i n trinsic, as instrumental to its own 
2 definitnes s of achievement. 
Vividness or intensity, as was the case with deptlf, is 
particularly a pplicable as a cri te!'ion to value experiences of 
conscious personality. Increased vividness of value real ized 
is possible for personality through keenness of synthetic 
awareness of many o t her values as vivid in a contributory 
sense. Thus Whitehead says, 
What is wanted is an appreciation of the 
infinite variety of vivid values achieved 
by an or ganism in its proper environment. 
When you u nderstand all about the sun and 
all about the atmosphere a!ld. all a bout the 
rotation of the earth you may still miss the 
radiance of the sunset. There is no sub-
stitute for the direct perception of the 
concrete achievement of a t h ing in its actu-
ality. We want concrete fact with a hi gh 
list t hrowg on what is relevant to 1 ts pre-
ciousness. 
g . Personality. 
Whitehead has little to say about personality by name in 
any of the writings of this peri od of development of his 
1. RIM, 103. 3.SM1Jv, 286. 
2. RIM, 115. 
ltl6 
metaphysics. And yet our investigation so far has shovm the 
essentially personal nature of all existence as experiential, 
as affe ctive, as purposive, as individual, as conditioned by 
ideal possibilities, and as synthetic value. Further, the 
cate gories of i mportance as cate gories of heightened indi-
viduality and value would tend to be cate gories of higher 
grades of personal exp erience. Whereas in no sense can it be 
stated that for Whitehead all reali t y is made up of persons 
in the sense of human or higher personalities, yet it would 
seem that Whitehead is contending all realities, even the 
1 
"faintest ripple," are selves. Every reality is a "self-
creating creature'ill 2 with 11 self-interest 113 of which Whitehead 
states, 11 Thj_s self-interest is the interest of what one's 
existence, as in that epochal occasion, comes to. It is the 
4 
ultimate enjoyment of being actual. ~ While our primary con-
cern is not with an analy~is of Whitehead's conception of 
5 human personality, but rather with the concept of value as 
such and as applicable to all types of reality, yet occasions 
of human personality would appear to be particularly hi gh in 
the scale of importance of selves or values. The categories 
discussed and the examples Whitehead cites would tend to indi-
cate that personality, though not listed as such, is another 
and higher category of' importance. 
1. SMW, 155. 
2. RIM, 102. 
3. RIM, 100. 
4. RIM, 100. 
5. The nature and 
meaning of human personality for White-
head already has been exhaustively 
analyzed and criticized with PR par-
ticularly in mind by W. P. McEwen. 
(McEwen, WMI. ) 
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Vividness, we have seen, finds i ts hi ghest exemplifi-
cation in personality and actually is no longer quite the same 
category as when appli ed to simple r types of occasions, for 
1 
whereas in simple r occasions vi vidness is singul ar, in per-
sonality it may be plural. Thus one personal oc casion may 
enjoy an "infinite variety of vivid values." 2 Depth also 
changes sufficiently in degree to mark a difference in kind. 3 
In addition, Whitehead descr i bes what he calls "the life of 
s pirit": 
The self-identity of a human being is more 
abstract than that of a crystal. It is the 
life of s pirit. It relates rather to the 
individualisation of the creative activity; 
so that t he chang i ng circumstances from the 
environment are differentiated from living 
personality, and are t hought of as forming 
i t s· perceived field. In truth, the field 
of perception and t he percei ving mind are 
abstractions which, in the concrete combine 
into the successive bodily event s. The 
psychological field as restricted to sense-
objects and passing emotions, is the minor 
permanence, barely rescued from the non-
entity of mere chan ge; and the mind is the 
major permanence, permeating the complete 
field, whose endurance is the li ving soul ••• 
The freshness of t he en vironmen t 4 is absorbe d into the permanenc e of the soul. 
Whitehead is not ur ging a scholastic underly ing soul, as it 
mi gh t seem on first reading . Rather, as we ha ve seen i n the 
case of the principle of endurance, the permanence of the 
soul is the pro gressive re-actualization of a finite ab-
stractive hierarchy constantly enriched by ne w infinite 
1. RIM, 103 . 
2~ SMW, 286. 
3. SMW, 155. 
4. SMW, 289-290. 
In speak l ng of an actual individual, such 
as a human being , we must mean that man in 
one occas ion of his exp erience ••• The life 
of a man from b irth to death is a historic 
route of such occasions ••• bound together 
into one society by a partial identity of 
forms and by the peculiarly full s~~ation 
of its predecessors wh ich each moment of 
the life history gathers into itself ••• 
The 'man in his whole life his t ory' in an 
abstraction compared to the 'man in one 
moment.' 
In light of its complexity, of its ·•peculiarly full 
J.tH:I 
S1.Lmma tion of its predecessors, 11 in light of its being 11 life 
of spirit," personal occasions rank as peculiarly high in-
stances of value and personality becomes one of the hi ghest 
cate gories of value or importance. Whitehead significantly 
adds, "Every h1.Lman oeing is the natural guardian of his own 
importance.u 2 Personality is a level of value to be gained 
and cherished, a value which may be lost for it has to be re-
actualized in every successive occasion of experience. 
With personality we conclude for the present our survey 
of the categories of i mportance, or levels of value achieve-
ment or hei gh tened individuality. The first four--harmonious 
individuality, endurance, novelty, and contrast--are neces sarily 
present to a certain extent in every occasion. They become 
the basis of inc r eased importance in accordance with predomi-
nance of the second, third, or four th. The last three--depth, 
vividness, and personality--are particularly necessary for 
higher types of experience. In any case, each level of im-
portance (with the pos s ible exception of the relation between 
1. SMB, 27. 2. S1\1W, 201. 
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the second an d t h ird--permanence and novelty) tends to involve 
the pre s upposit i on of each of the lower as already operative 
before it comes into effect. The richest, fullest, and most 
intrinsically valuab le occasions of experience are only possi-
ble for pers onalities. 
c. The totality and value. 
The analysis of t he ongoing process of reality i n ex-
periential terms has led to the insistence upon the particu-
larity and individuality of actual occasions of experience--
1 the trobs tina te, irreduci ble, matte~ of-fact entities • 111 In-
tri nsic value, we have dis covered, is always ind i v i d ual en-
joyment of actualization, and u value « as a general c haracter 
divorced from particular value experiences has no re~i ty , is 
pure abstraction. But the fact t hat value and attained 
atomic individuality are synonymous does not in any sense me an 
that there can oe values or indi viduals in isolation. It has 
already b ecome evident that indivi duality is possi J le because 
of community of rela tions. Intrinsic and instrumental values 
are reciprocal in nature; each is both and each dema nds t he. 
other for its be :tng. 
Accord i ng ly, it will be our contention in this section 
that, for Whitehead, value is not only the indi vidualizing 
factor of reality but t he unify ing factor as well. It is t he 
individualizing factor in that the attainment of value is t h e 
1 • SMV'i, 15 7 • 
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a ttairunent of ind:J. viduali ty. It is the unifying factor in 
that the community which is the totality of reality is a 
community and totality because of and in terms of the ins t ru-
mental value of all intrinsic values to each other. Because 
it is a community of mutually related intrins i c values, the 
co~~unity itself is intrinsically valuable, and over and abowe 
realization of intrinsic value of the whole without which in-
dividual intrinsic value would be meaning less. It is because 
of aim at a nd continual realization of the intrinsic value of 
the whole that reality as a whole can be described as an or-
ganism--an organism which, far from surpressing or negating 
t he individuality of its component occasions, itself is a 
function of the diverse component indiv idualities as continu-
ously preh ended into the unity of total intrinsic value by 
another entlty among them, God, who through h is to t al vision 
as prehended by other entities is also a necessary condition 
of the indiv idual value realizations which are these entities. 
1. God. 
Whitehead is strongly insistent that we have no ri ght as 
rational individuals to blind or easy faith in God. If the 
concept of God is to be hrought into the metaphysical picture 
at all it must rest upon careful metaphysical and experiential 
investigation, and it mus t itself be a positive principle of 
explanat i on. Whitehead would be the first to agree with 
Spinoza's condemnation of those who "pursue their questions 
from cause to cause, till at last, you take refuge in the will 
l9.L 
of God--in other words, the sanctuary of i gnorance. -" 1 In the 
same spirit Whitehead says: 
My point is that any summary conclusion 
jumping from our conviction of the exist-
ence of such an order of nature to the 
easy assumption that there is an ultimate 
reality which, in some unexplained way, is 
to be appealed to for the removal of per-
plexity, constitutes the great r~fusal of 
rationality to assert its ri ght. 
The concept of God must be calJ.e d for as integral to a meta-
physical position. It must stand or f all with that position. 
It cannot be used as a dumping ground for what cannot other-
3 
wise be explained. 
There are two types of e vidence, Whitehead feels, which 
point to the metaphysical necessity of the concept of God. 
One type, and the more basic from the standpoint of the 
1. Elwes, POS, 74. 
2. S ivfW , 135. 
3. It is necessary at the outset _ to point out Whitehead's 
insistence upon the concept of God as allowable only as 
a positive principle of explnation integral to a meta-
physical posit ion, for he was charged with exactly the 
type of thing that he here deplores. Braithwaite not only 
charges Whitehead with using the word 'llr value 11 to satisfy 
his o-..m emotional need (see above) but brin~s the same 
charge against his use of the term • God. • Perhaps 'the 
metaphysical need for a principle of determination' is 
really an emotional need. Otherwise there would seem to 
be no good reason ••• for calling 'the ground of concPete 
actuality' by a name with the associations of 1 God. 1 • 
(Braithwaite( Art.(l926), 499; see also Stebbing , Art. 
(1927}, 238.) Swabey also sug gests, "One wonders whether 
the last name L'Cbanc~_7 is not the true one, since the idea 
of God seems to indicate merely the ultimate inexplic-
able factuality of experience rather than a positive 
explanatory principle." (Swabey, Art.(l926), 278.) 
If these charges are correct, Whitehead stands condemned 
not only in the eyes of the critics but in li ght of his 
own words as well. 
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rational grounding of the concept, is made up of the i mplica-
tions from the metaphysical analysis of the nature of occasions 
of experience as actualizations of potentialities and in their 
1 inter-relations. The second type of evidence, pertinent as 
evidence primarily after t h e first type has been envoked but 
then of correlative and of corrobrative worth, is that from 
more particular and direct experiences. ;11What further can be 
known about God must be sought in the re gion of particular ex-
2 periences, and therefore rests on an empirical base • 11 
We have already discovered that actuality involved a 
necessary reference to a realm of ideality, 3 a realm analyzable 
in terms of complex inter-related eternal objects. Further, 
this realm of eternal obje cts considered in itself is abstract 
antt non-existent. Its metaphysical status as a realm is only 
that of possibility for actualization . 4 From the standpoint 
of actuality the component objects of the realm of ideality can 
only be called eternal as logically identical though realized 
in diverse actualities. But this poses a dou iJle problem. 
From the standpoint of any process of realization, as yet un-
realized potentialities are non-being and thus as yet non-
existent5 ("process is the fusion of being with not-being• 6 ) 
and yet to be prehended they must in some sense be, for t here 
1. Cf. SMVi, Chapt. XI, which deals with the concept primarily 
from this standpoint and, significantly, immediately follows 
the chapter on eternal ob jects entitled 11 Abstract i ons.n 
2. SNPN I 257 5. SMW, 234. 
3. SMW , 228. See a bove, sec. A, 2. 6. RIM, 114. 
4. SMW, 229. 
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are no loose subsistents floating around in the universe. 
But also, theoretically and from the standpoint of possi bility 
alone the universe and every actual occasion making it up could 
have become anything , but it and they have not. 1 Certain gen-
eral limitations can be considered as " limitations of antecedent 
selection," 2 and these include such factors as the necessary 
3 
conformity to ~special logical re~ tions• on the part of all 
occasions, the spa tio-temporal continuum as "the general system 
is limited to its relevance to the general fact of actuality, 11 4 
and the very fact of the necessary particularity of actualiza-
5 tion itself. While for any one actual occas i on these limi-
tations may be largely account ed for in terms of its ante-
cedent occasions, the same reasoning cannot be applied to the 
system as a whole. For the very fact t hat these limitations 
do apply is itself a limitation for which there is no necessary 
reason from t he standpoint of po s sibility alone. Accordingly, 
there must be some actual reason for the i mposition of general 
limitation. Now the actual reason must itself be an entity in 
the total situation of reality a nd yet one unlike other en-
titles in that it is eternally actual and present and co n tinu-
ally envisages all possibilities. Otherw i se that act ual reason 
would i tself be subsistent and only a possib ility. This eter-
nal, actual, present entity or reason which by its existence 
1. SMW, 255. 4. SNf1N, 235. 
2. SMW, 256. 5. SMW, 256. 
3. SMW, 255. 
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imposes general limitations is God. 
Whitehead states the same argument in still another way 
--a way which if taken out of context provides phrases which 
might imply quite a different view from the one he subscribes 
to (according to our interpretation) and whtch has as a re-
sult led to a great deal of confusion. If we consider all 
actual occasions, their most predominant characteristic is 
activity (feeling activity), so much so that we can describe 
the ''mode~ of their being, to use a Spinozistic term, as 
' 1 
activity. To carry the analogy further, Spinoza's substance 
for Whitehead would be 11 the one underlying activity of rea lisa-
tion individualising itself into a plurality of modes.n 2 
From an abstract standpoint we can talk about substantial ac-
tivity,3 or general activity, 4 or abstract matter, 5 or sub-
6 
strata activity. . But from the standpoint of concrete reality 
we must remember that any a uch terms are abstractions. 1' Each 
event is an individual matter-of-fact.•7 ~The salvation of 
reality lies in its obstinate, irreducible, ootter-of-fact 
entities, which are limited to be nothing other than them-
8 
selves." An underlying substantial activity is as abstract 
as mere possibility, but, from the standpoint of mere possi-
bility, there is no reason why undifferentiated substantial 
activity should not have been reality. Yet, since this is not 
the case, since to be real or actual is to be an indi vidual, 
1. SMW, 102. 
2. SMW, 102. 
3. SM'Y'l1 257. 
4. SMW, 25. 
5. SMW 238. 
6. SMW: 103. 
7. SMW, 103. 
8. SMW, 137. 
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11 some particular how is necessary, and some particularisation 
in the what is necessary111 to account for realities' incurable 
particularization. Unless we are ready t ·o deny the reality of 
actual occasions and assume that reality is some underlying, 
11 behind the scene312 substrate being or activity of some sort, 
we must provide a ground for limitation 
which stands among the attributes of the 
substantial activity /~he abstraction7. 
This attribute /a reatitl7 provides the 
limitation for which no reason can be 
given: for all reason flows from it. God 
is the ultimate li!D.itatidn and his ~xist­
ence is the ultimate irrationality. 
The reasons for assuming his existence are not irration~ nor 
is God irrational, nor is his effect on other activities ir-
rational, but his existence, his imposition of general limi-
tations and the mode of his being are themselves irrationali-
ties because they themselves as the bas is of reason. nNo 
reason can be given for the nature of God, because that 
nature is the ground of rationality. n 4 Considered in hi rnse lf 
apart from relation to the whole process of becoming actual 
1. SMW I 256. 
2. S l'viV'I, 256. 
3. SMW, 256-257. 
4. SMW, 257. Braithwaite insists that Whitehead is talki ng 
nonsense. "But surely the problems why a fact and how it 
can be a fact as just nonsense questions. Dr. Whitehead is 
worried by the child's question 'Why is a mouse when it 
spins?' (What is the reason for the ingression of eternal 
objects mouse and spinning into the particular actual oc-
casion which is the fact that it is now spinning?) and is 
apparently more satisfied with the answer 'Because of God' 
than the more usual "aecause the higher the fewer. tn 
{Braithwaite, Art.(l926), 498.) Whitehead is notaaring 
or answering the question whythere is something rather than 
nothing as Braithwaite seems to think, but rather , given 
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occasion, "God is not concrete, but he is the ground for concrete 
actuality." 1 However, to consider God apart from the rest of 
reality is as much an abstraction as to consider any other single 
entity apart from its relations. The definiteness and particu-
larness of individual entities demand God as explanation, and, 
conversely, God demands occasions as his purpose for being . 
The argument for God from limitation of actual occasions 
is also the argument for God from value realizations. The 
conditions for actual occasions and the conditions for value 
realization are the same. But considering actual occasions as 
realizers of value does underline one further evidence of God. 
As pointed out, 2 the fact that occasions are value realiza-
tions, for Whitehead, also implies that there are antecedent 
standards of value which introduce "cont raries, grades, and 
3 
oppositions '• among the values that can be realized. Some 
values if realized by contemporary or successive occasions would 
cancel each other out. But again, such standards can not exist 
actual experience, he is asking , how are we intelligibly to 
interpret lt. There is all the difference i.n the world be-
tween the questions: what constitutes the basis of order in 
the universe? how are facts int er-related? how do these facts 
come about? --questions which serve as the basis both of 
science and philosophy--and the seemingly implied question at-. 
tributed to Whitehead by Braithwaite: why should there be 
fact? Mere facts are, to borrow a term from Hegel, "dead 
bonesn (Hegel, SOL, I, 64) which must be vitalized by inte:r-
pretation and explanation. Perhaps Braithwaite's argument is 
with what consitutes explanation for Whitehead. Whitehead 
makes clear that for him explanation consists in careful ana-
lysis and systematic coherence (e.g. cf. SMW, 27: FOR, 53:· PR, 
8-9, 15-17, 25-26, 30) what what it is for Braithwaite is not 
at all clear from his criticisms. 
1. SJ./f#, 257. 2. s:MW, 256 and above. - 3. SMW, 256. 
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!~ ~£ any more than can eternal objects. Since this is the 
case, their effectiveness implies their existence in or for an 
entity aware o f all value possibilities and which grades those 
possibilities. Whitehead summarizes the evidence as follows: 
Accor·ding to this argument the fact tb..a t 
there is a process of actual occasions, 
and the fact that the occasions are the 
emergence of values which require such 
limitations, both require that the course 
of events should have developed amid an 
antecedent limitation composed of conditio£s, 
particularisation, and standards of value. 
The evidence which comes from more particular and direct 
experience rather than metaphysical analysis for the existence 
of God, comes, as might be expected, from reli gious experience. 
The fundamental religious experience and the type of experience 
on which religion is based, is, Whitehead contends, 
founded on the concurrence of three allied 
concepts in one moment of self-consciousness, 
concepts whose separate relationships to fact 
and whose mutual relations to each other are 
only to be settled jointly by some direct in-
tuition iF,to the ult,ima te character of the 
universe. · 
Again, as might be expected, all three of these concepts are 
value concepts. Whitehead considers them to be: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
That of the value of an individual for 
himself' . 
That of the value of diverse individuals 
of the· world for each other. 
That of the value of the objective world 
which is a community derivative from the 
interrelationships of its individuals, and 
also necessary for tge exi stence of each 
of these 1ndi vidual s. 
1. SMW, 256. 2. RIM, 59. 3. RIM, 59. 
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With H8~fding Whitehead would hold that religion is primarily 
concern about the status of values in the universe. 1 That 
which such an intuitive realization gives rise to is not 
necessarily an intuition of God but rather "the concept of the 
rightness of things, partially conformed to and partially dis-
2 
regarded.• Thus it is an appeal to the general character in-
herent in the nature of things, 113 and God is an inference from 
this • 
. When we turn to Whitehead's conception of the nature of 
God and the way in which he influences the world the picture 
becomes more complicated largely because Whitehead's own view 
of God is still in a process of formation during this period 
I 
and lacks both the systematic formulation and some of the most 
familiar and striking characteristics of the developed concept 
in Process ~nd Reality. 4 Thus in Science and the Modern World 
God seems to be little more than the eternal and actual en-
5 
visagement of the realm of' eternal objects graded in accord-
ance with the general conditions for realiza tbn of eternal 
objects by actual occasions. As eternal with the process which 
1. Hoffding, POR, 215. 2. RIM, 66. 3. RIM, 67. 
4. The most stri Jdng feature not developed during this period 
and one without which Whitehead's concept of God is ex-
tremely dif.ficult to compreh end is that of God's conse-
quent nature which while it is foreshadowed in RIM (87, 93, 
154-155) (see below) is by no means developed. Ita 
omission leads to Whitehead's repeated assertion in RIM 
that God is a non-tempor al entity (90, 94, 157). 
5 • iJMW, 154. 
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is the rest of reality God is both antecedent and consequent 
to every ac t ual occasion. 
God's manner of affecting actual occasions, as does his 
nature, receives fuller treatment in Religion in the Makin_g. 1 
.!A.side from the general ante cedent limitations set on actualiza-
tion by his existence--such as the spa tic-temporal continuum 
and the conditions of ra tionali ty2 - -God 1 s power is the persua-
sion of the ideal. In Science and the Modern World Whitehead 
defines religjon as 
the vision of some, thing which stands beyend, 
behind, and within, the passing flux of im-
mediate things; something which is real and 
yet waiting to be realised; something which 
is remote possibi$ity, and yet the greatest 
of present facts. 
This vision is the result of man's search for God. 4 It is 
effective in human 1 ife as an ideal, bu t, Whi. tehead adds, 
the vision never overrules. It is always 
there, and it has the power of love present-
ing the one purpo se whose fulfillment is 
eternal harmony. Such order as we find in 
nature is never ·force--it presents itself as 
the one harmonious adjustment of complex de-
tail ••• ~he power of God is the worship he in-
spires. 
1. That Whitehead held substantially the same view in writing 
SMW and RIM becomes clearer from the statement: ·.nrn the 
place of Aristotle's God as Prime Mover, we require God as 
the Princ iple of Concretion." (SMU, 250.) Also his conten-
tion in SMN that God is not responsible for evil. (SMW, 258, 
See below.) indicates identity of views . Throughout we are 
considering SM'w and RIM more or less together as forming a 
unit. The fact that they were two successive series of 
Lowell Lectures would tend to substantiate this. 
2. See above and SMvV , 233 and 255. 
3. SMW, 2'75. 
4. SM\N, 2'7 4. 
5. SMW , 2'75-2'76. 
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In Beli gion in the Maki~~ Whitehead contends that t his 
power of God is the kind of power he exerts over all levels 
of occasions. Since God sets the general conditions of 
reality, all realities must conform to his being in the gen-
eral sense if they are to be at all, but beyond the general 
conditions, what each occasion does realize is at least par-
tially contingent from God's standpoint. God envisages the 
most satisfactory mode of realization for every occasion, but 
individual occas:!.ons are under no necessity to conform. What-
ever potentialities are sele cted for realizat i on are of course 
envisaged by God but not necessarily in the combination 
selected by the specific occasion (in the sense of not 
necessarily as best for that occasion). 
The power by which God sustains the world 
is the power of himself as the ideal. He 
adds himself' to the actual ground from 
which every cr-eature takes its rise. The 
world lives by its incarnation of God in 
itself. 
From the standpoint of any occasion God is 11 an actual 
fact in the nature of things.'' which it necessarily prebends, 
but it also prebends other occasions with their actualized po-
tentialities. As itself' selective, the occasion may not choose 
in its entirety the particular finite abstractive hierarchy 
for dominance which in God's envisagement would be best for 
it, i.e. by which it would realize the greatest intrinsic value 
of which it is capable. Thus God's power, by its very nature, 
is limited. Accordingly God is not responsible for evil, but 
0 
1. RIM, 156. 2. RIM, 156. 
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rather as envisaging the highest possibilities for each oc-
casion he is the measure of good in light of which any actual 
occasionwhich has not realized its fullest possibilities is to 
be considered evil (the 111 ise as ppposed to the 11 might have 
1 been111 ). 
Thus, 
If He be considered as the supreme ground 
for limitation, it stands in His very nature 
to divide the Good from the Evil, and to 
establish reason within her domains supreme. 2 
the limitation of God is his g-oodness. He 
gains his depth of actuality by his harmony 
of valuation. It is not true that God is in 
all respects infinite. ~f He were, he would 
be evil as well as good. 
God does determine the world in the sense of imposing by 
his existence the general conditions of ordered existence, but 
he also ma lres freedom possib le by pres .enting alternate possi-
bilities for fhller realization of value to each occasion above 
the general determinations i mposed by him and the speci f ic 
determinations whi ch any occasion's antecedents would allow. 
As such, God by being the principle of limitation or concre-
tion is also the principle of freedom. God is "the actual but 
non-temporal entity whereby the indetermination of mere 
1. See above, sec. B, 2. 
2. SMW' , 25 8 . 
3. RIM, 153. In the tradit i on of Plato, Mani, Hume, Mill, 
and Brightman, Whitehead refuses to pay "metaphysical 
compliments" to the Deity (S MW, 258). For a short 
historical sketch of theisitic finitism see Bri ghtman, 
POR, 286-301. 
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creativity is transmuted into a determinate freedomtr • Neither 
complete indetermination nor complete determination by ante-
cedent occasions would leave room for purpose or the self-
causation of an actual occasion which is one of the conditions 
of its value. The limitation of God is the condition of the 
freedom of existents from which freedom, in turn, evil in the 
world springs. 2 
Eternal objects, as has been evident, form ~'the link 
between God and the actual world • 1113 Strictly speaking, they 
belong no more to God than to any particu~r occasion, 4 but 
they have a continuous actuality in his conceptual real:t.za-
·' 
tion as an ideal ~ision of what might be. 5 God's ideal vision 
of the realm of possibility is 11 one ••• conceptual fusion, em-
bracing the concept of such possibilities graded in harmonious, 
relative subordination. 116 But his vision is more than an 
1. Rll1, 90. 
2. In light of this the objections of Ely and Braithwaite that 
God, as the principle of concretion, is, whether Whitehead 
thinks so or not, responsible for evil do not stand up. 
Ely contends: "To regard God as merely the Principle of 
Concretion is to court the charge that God is responsible 
for evil. Although God ••• is not metaphysically ultimate, 
yet he is responsible for the choice of all types of order 
that actually prevail, and this makes him responsible, one 
would suppose, for whatever happens. Whitehead would appear 
to deny this implication, but ••• he has no right to do so." 
(Ely, RAWG, 12.) Braithwaite says,"I cannot see how a 
'principle of concretion' which is not concerned with the 
relations among themselves of the eternal o bjects but with 
the 'ultimate irrationality' of facts can in any way be an 
ethical principle. The realization of cruelty in Tiberius 
is as much a concern of the principle as the realization of 
wisdom in Socrates." (Braithwaite, Art./I9267, 499.) 
3. RIM, 156. 5. RIM, 1'5'7, 154. 
4. RIM, 157. 6. RIM, 157. 
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abstract ordering of possibilities. Rather, this vis i on is 
an harmonious ordering of the entire realm of possibility in 
relation to what is. His vision involves a synthesis of the 
l 
entire universe as realized, realizing, and realizable 
ve.lues. 
These forms are not realized by him in mere 
bare isolation, but as elements in the value 
of his conceptual experience ••• The ideal 
forms are in God's vision as contri buting 
to his complete realization of their possi-
bilities ~s elements of value in every 
creature. 
God's purpose is the constant purpose of ·ttthe attainment of 
value in the actual world.•3 According ly all forms of har-
monious order have their ground in hi;·n and he is the measure 
of all order. 
As the ground of order, "God is tb_a t non-temporal actu-
ality which has to be taken account of in every creative 
4 phase," for, Whitehead points out elsewhere, "an evolving 
5 
world ••• is actual because there is order." God is the ground 
of the rationality of the universe wh ich makes possible science 
and rat i onal i n terpretation, 6 for above all, as harmonious 
vision he is consistent. "He must be exempt from internal in-
consistency which is the note of evil." 7 "There is some con-
sistency in creative action, because of his immanence.n8 It is 
l.R IM, 156. 5. RIM , 156. 
6. SMW , 256, and RIM, 143. 
7. RIM, 98. 
8. RIM, 99. 
2. RIM, 154. 
3. RD.1 , 158. 
4. RIM, 94. 
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probab ly the co mbination of eternal envisagement of possi bili-
ties, lack of inconsistency, and steadfastness of purpose 
which leads Nhitehead to insist t hat God is a non-temporal 
entity. Tbat this may .well 1Je the source of God's non -
temporality is further indicated by his view that God "is the 
1 
one systematic, complete fact. God's completion militates 
against his temporality, for whereas each occas i on as complete 
is past, 2 God as eternally present, consistent, steadfast 
purpose cannot pass. Whitehead states that '"His completion so 
that he is exempt from transition into something else, must 
mean that his nature remains self-consistent in re la tion to 
3 
a 11 change." 
The fact that Whitehead tends to overlook i n the conten-
tion of God's non-temporality is that consistency of intent 
and temporality are not necessarily contradictory. While 
Whitehead recognizes this in the case of human being s as 
societies of occasions, 4 he tends to overlook it in God. If 
the realm of possibility undergoes new gradat i on with the be-
comi ng of each occasion, 5 then God as envisaging that realm 
of possibilities must either revise his gradat i on according ly, 
or it must be asserted that God not only envisages all combina-
tiona of possibilities but the order in which they will occur. 
------1. SMW , 154. 
2. See above, sec. ·A, 3. 
3. RIM, 98-99. 
4. See above, sec. B, 2, g. 
5. See a bove, sec. A, 2. 
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But if he does envisage all possib i lities in the order in 
which they will occur, then he has des t royed the fre e dom of 
occas~ons as thorough ly as the old view of omniscience in re-
gard to the future, for it is then predestined that thing s 
will occur in the exact manner in wh ich they do1 whether God 
is t h e agent of predestination or not. Further, Whitehead's 
ascription to God of purpose and his descr i ption of the nature 
of purpose would tend to indicate development and temporality 
in God. The purpose of God, as has b een pointed out, is the 
attainment of value in the temporal world. whitehead follows 
this ascription of purpose to God with the statement, • An 
active purpose is the adjustment of the present for the sake 
of the adjustment of value in the fut ure, i mme d iately or re-
motely. ·•2 Surely, if God is engaged in active adjustment of 
the present for the sake of adjustment of the future, he is 
temporal. Finally, if God not only embodies purpose for the 
community of values which is the becoming world of occasions, 
but purposes and ideals relevant to each occasion in its 
3 
specific situation as well, then God must be in active re-
lation with all occasions, even if the effect of God is the 
prehension of tbat ideal in God by the occasion, for tha t must 
1. In this case the o l)jections of Braithwaite and Swabey would 
be valid. 
2. RIM, 100. 
3. RIM, 85 and 94. Note in rarticular RIM, 159: •Every act 
leaves the lAO rld with a deeper or fainter impress of 
God. He then passes into his next relation to the world 
with enlarged or diminished presentation of ideal values. 
2Ub 
mean that God has specific relevance for each occasion above 
and beyond the general conditions for all occasions. If White-
head really does mean that God is non-temporal, we would have 
to agree with Tennant's statement, "I cannot see ••• how 1if 
God be an actual entity which enters into every creative phase' 
He can be 'above change. rnl However, Whitehead may well mean 
non-tempor al, not in the sense of timeless, but non-temporal 
in the sense that God's purposes and envisagement of eternal 
objects as transtemporal. If he does not mean transtemporal 
rather than literally non-temporal there would seem to be a 
basic inconsistency in the g round of rational order. 2 
In addition to the rational order God is also the ground 
of the moral order. 3 The discussion of evil and God's limita-
tion has already indicated this. God makes possible that in-
tuition of "the concept of the rightness of things, partially 
conformed to and partially disregarded. n4 As presenting ideal 
possibilities for realization, "it stands in his very nature 
. 5 
to divide Good and Evil," for only in comparison with "'what 
l.Tennant, Art.(l927), 226. We do not agree with Tennant's 
further contention, i.e. •I suspect that God is reached, in 
Dr. Whitehead's theology, by definition or fiat, and find 
no ar gument to show that any actual entity is denoted by 
the definition." Rather than being an arbitrary assumption, 
Whitehead's God is the result of careful metaphysical ana-
lysis. 
2.Whitehead solves the problem in PR in terms of the primor-
dial as opposed to the consequent nature of God either of 
which is unreal in abstraction from the other. (PR, 523-
524.) It will be evident that many of the features of ooth 
natures are predicated of God in the present period though 
the two natures are not distinguished as such. In PR, God's 
consequent nature is chan ging and develo ping while his pri-
mordial nature is constant and .eternal. 
3.See above. 4. RIM, 66. 5. SMW, 258. 
mi ght have been" does t he 11 is 11 stand as evil. God has 
11lmowledge of e vi 1, of pain, of de gradation," 1 but it is pres-
ent in his conceptual nature along side of the possi bilities 
for overcoming it 11 by what is good. 112 God is not an Old Testa-
ment God of Wrat h , but a God of love, of compas ion, of sal va-
tion. 
The depths of experience lie beyond the 
vulgarities of prai se or power. He gives 
to suffering its swift insi ght into 
values which can issue from it. He is the 
ideal companion who transmutes what has 
been lo3t into a living fact within his own 
nature. 
From the standpoint of his envisagement of the highest 
ideals or potentialities for all occasions, '" the kingdom of 
heaven is God." 4 But this is rr the kingdom of heaven prior to 
t he passage of actual t h ings. 115 Through God 1s teleolo gical 
causal efficacy "there is t he same kingdom of heaven fi ndi ng 
its completion through the accomplishment of this pas s a ge. 116 
Even though evil enters into actuality through failure to 
realize their places in this kingdom of ideal ends on the part 
of actual occasions, God tries to incorporate such occas i ons 
into t he kingdom of realized mut ual values by overcoming their 
evil wi t h good in t he sense of utilizing the de gradation of 
possibilities by such occas i ons to conserve even t hat little 
intrinsic values have been realized in the value realizations 
1. RIM, 155. 4. RIM, 153. 
2. RIM, 155. 5. RIM, 87. 
3. RIM, 154-155. 6. RIM, 87. 
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1 
of their successors and in his own realized vision of actu-
ality. Thus God loves the world with a conscious, all-
embracing love. 11 The con sci ousne ss which is individual in us 
is universal in him: the love which is partial in us is all-
embrac i ng in him.•2 
Due to the limitations set upon existence by God, intrin-
sic value for self of any occasion is an inverse function of 
the instrumentality of t hat occasion to the intrinsic value 
3 
of others. In a sense, then, altruism is the condition of 
self-attainment for all reality. In relation to persons and 
God's effect on them Whitehead states the doctrine of converse 
relation of intrinsic and instrumental value as follows~ 
He is the element in virtue of which our 
purposes extend beyond values for our-
selves to values for others. He is that 
element in virtue of which the attainment 
of such value for others trans f~rms it-
self into values for OU!'selves. 
Finally, and most basically, God is the ground of the aes-
thetic order. Both the moral and tbe rational orders are 
aspects of aesthetic order according to Whitehead. 5 •God is 
the measure of the aesthetic consistency of the world." 6 He 
is the supreme and complete embodiment of harmonious order. 
1. RIM, 157. 
2. RIM, 158. God's moral nature would hardly support the view 
that he is non-temporal, for as conscious, as loving , as 
adjusting universal potentialities for good to deficient 
actualities, surely he must be temporal. 
~. See above. 
4. RIM , 158. 
5 • Cf. RIM 1 105 1 and above , sec • B, 2. 
6 • .RIM, 99. 
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He is the completed ideal harmony1 which, as an actual en-
tity,2 is a coherent unity of feelin g . 3 The kingdom of God, 
while a moral concept, is even more basically an aesthetic 
one, for once an occasion has become, low in relation to possi-
bilities and thus evil though it may be, it is over and all of 
God's love and overcoming of evil with good cannot change it. 
Accordingly, its salvation is an aesthetic salvation as an 
element in contrast for God and for its successors. 
In its union with God that fact is not a 
total loss, but on its finer side is an 
element to be woven immortally into the 
rhythm of monal things. Its very evil be-
comes a steppi~g stone in the all-embraci ng 
ideals of God. 
The prir~ry concern of God, deeper than morality, deeper than 
rationality, of which morality and rationality are aspects, is, 
for Whitehead, the aesthetic harmony and unity of the universe. 
"The actual world is the outcome of the aesthetic order, and 
the aes the tic order is derived from the Ll'h"1l&nence of God. 111 5 
God, himself the hi g,hest complete intrinsic value, is, for 
Whitehead, the ultimate final cause of value. 
2. Individuality and value totality. 
a. Solitariness. 
The world as process· is constituted by the becoming of 
1. RIM, 120. 
2. RIM, 98. 
3. RI M, 104. 
4. RIM, 155. See Chap. VII on criticisms of Whitehead's 
aestheticism and Chap. VI on the Consequent Nature of 
God. 
5. RIM, 105. 
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individual occasions. The mark and the being of value is 
separate individuality. Every occasion of reality is pre-
hensively related to all the rest of reality, is ~a grasping 
of diverse entitles into a value, by reason of their real 
togetherness in that pa ttern• b ut, Whitehead adds, 11 to the 
1 
excluslon of other entitles." Every entity as actual mlrrors 
"perspectives of the universe," 2 but alone. In its moment of 
actuality it is something lntrinsic 11 ln 1tself."3 It is 11 in-
dividual matter-of-facta and indi vidual attainment "limited 
to be no other than11 4 itself~ Each occasion is a 11 unifica-
tion of the universe, whereby its various elements are combined 
into aspects of each other, 11 but its reality as such a unifi-
cation 11 is an atomic unit within the real world.n 5 Ac t uality 
is incurable subjective and alone. 6 '*You cannot retreat from 
1. SMW, 152. 
2. SMW, 102. 
3. SMVv, 152. 
4. SMW , 137. 
5. RIM, 100. 
6. The aloneness is a fact for Whi tehead in spite of his pro-
test a gainst what he calls "subjectivism" in SM'vi (128-132). 
By the sub jectivism to which he objects Whitehead evident-
ly means the view that the occasion itself is the cause of 
the factor s which it prehends, but not that its prehension 
and prehensive uni ficat i on are not subjective experiences. 
That this is the case is indicated by the following pas-
sages: 11 By a subjectivist basis I mean the belief that the 
nature of our immediate experience is the outcome of the 
perceptive peculiaritles of the subject enjoying the ex-
perience," (SNlW, 128} and, "It is difficult to believe that 
the experienced world is an attribute of our own personality. • 
(S MW , 130.} The occasion does not create the factors pre-
hended. Past occasions are, as indicated, the efflcient 
antecedent causes of the rising of a new occasion, and, as 
such, the new occasion's content felt is given for it by 
the self-transcendency or completion and ob jective immortality 
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mere subjectivity; for subjectivity is what we carry with us.nl 
Life and intrinsic value are realization alone. 
Life is an internal fact for its· own sake, 
before it is an external 'fact relating it-
self to others. The conduct of external 
life is conditioned by environment, but it 
receives its final quality, on which its 
worth depends, from the internal life which 
is the self-realisation of existence.2 
Among the higher occasions there is a present perception 
of contemporary events, but that perception is under what 
Whitehead calls the mode of "presentational i:mmediacy,\lt3 and 
is derivative from a more basic felt relation to the past--
causal efficacy." But the mode of presentational immediacy, 
far from being an actual contact with contemporary events, is 
a "projection of our immediate sensations"4 which, as eternal 
objects, are inherited from the past. The contemporary world 
under the guise of presentational immediacy is clear and dis-
5 tinct, is a plenum of organisms rather than atomic occasions; 
it exists objectively for us, but, Whitehead points out, to 
of past occasions. In this sense the con t ent can be con-
sidered objective in origin and reference. The individual 
occasion does not make the world to which its prehensions 
refer. However, its own actualization or completion or 
enjoyment is subjective and in the moment of itself en-joyment the occasion is private and alone. 
1. SME, 45. 
2. RIM, 15-16. 
3. SME, 13-23. 
4. SME, 13. 
5. SME, 23. Cf. Leibniz, MON, 252: nwe imagine a plenum of 
completely filled space where each part receives only 
the equivalent of its previous motion." 
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exist objectively is to e x ist abstractly •1 Sin ce contemporary 
occasions may inheri t the same eternal objects in the more 
basic mode of causal efficacy from the past, presentational 
i mmediacy may more often than not g ive an occasion even in 
terms of its own ob jectification of content a true though ab-
stract ins ight into contemporaneity, but it does not establish 
actual contact between contemporary oc casions. As contempo-
raries, each occasion realizes itself alone. "In so far as 
contemporary thi.n gs are bound together by mere presen t a t i.onal 
immediacy they happen in complete i ndependence." 2 The world 
of' presentational i mmediacy as informed by the rich inheritance 
of causal efficacy is meaningful, out in i t self it is shadow, 
appearance, .emptiness. tt In some tired moment there comes a 
sudden relaxation, and the mere representat i onal side of the 
world overwhelms with the sense of its emptiness.s3 Presenta-
tional immediacy offers no escape from the subjective and pri-
vate nature of individuality and intrinsic values. 
The paradox of value and individuality lies in the fact 
that its achievement, its hi gh point, its enjoyment, its success, 
is also its tragedy , for its hi gh point cannot be shared and 
its realization is its cessation. True, considered instrumen-
tally, the value is not lost. The world is richer for its having 
1. SME, 26. •This entrance/Into presentational irrunediacr7 is 
that individual existing-o ofectively, that is to say--
existtng abstractly, exempl fy i ng only some elements in 
i.ts content.!H 
2. SME, 25. 
3. SME, 48. 
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been intrinsically, but for any particular occasion the moment 
of value is the moment of aloneness. 
These actual entities are for themselves 
their own value, individual and separable. 
They add to the common stock and yet they 
suffer alone. The world ii a scene of 
solitariness in community. 
Thus, for the higher occasions, Whitehead defines reli gion 
as 11 what the individual does with his solitariness. 112 Of 
course reli gion involves common emotions, herd psychology, 
ritual, institutions, conwunity. Whitehead insists that re-
ligion began in ritual to arouse common emotions. 3 But, he 
points out, all the ritual, all the collective emotion, all the 
herd psychology aleave untouched the awful ultimate fact, 
which is the hu.man be:tng consciously alone with itself, for 
its own sake. 114 Communal and institutional religion involve 
efforts to overcome this. The reli gious reaction to the basic 
realization of solitariness Whitehead descri bes as passing 
through 
three stages, if it evolves to its final 
satisfaction. It is the transition from 
God the void to God the enemy, and Srom 
God the enemy to God the companion. 
1. R~M, 88. 
2. RIM, 16. 
3 • . RIM, 20-23. 
4. RIM, 16. Wright's objection to Whitehead's definition of 
religion would seem to have missed the point completely. 
Wright says, 11 It will hardly do to make 1 individual ism' and 
even 'solitariness' the distinguishing rio t es of reli gi ons 
that have developed such highly socialized institutions as 
the Buddhist brotherhood and the Christian Church, and in 
their more rigorous periods have been intent upon social 
reformation in this world as well as the next." (Wright, 
Art.(l927), 503.) 
5. RIM .. 16-17. Cf. Hocking, MGBE~, 233-234: "God has co me upon 
man,s world scene in quiet, ann man's terror results when 
••• he suddenly sees God standing there. 11 
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In other words, the first realization of aloneness in value is 
one of anger at a God who restricts realizat i on to solitari-
ness and thus seems to rob it of its very worthwhileness, but 
the final realization is that God by the very limitation of 
aloneness which he imposes on realization has made value and 
realization possible. Hazelton's comment would seem to have 
caught Whitehead's essential meaning: 
The point of his famous definition of 
religion as 'what the individual does 
with his solitariness' is not the 
'solitarilj:ess' but what must be done 
about it. 
Subjectivity, individuality, aloneness are the conditions of 
intrinsic value, but they are not the whole story of reality. 
b. Community. 
The world as process is a community. No entity or oc-
casion is self-sufficient. Each requires all the others for 
its existence. Every occasion prebends the totality of reali-
ty: "Actuality is through and through to getherness--to gether-
ness of otherwise isolated eternal objects, and togetherness 
of all actual occasions.n 2 Every occasion issues from or grows 
out of the completion of the occasions which form its past. 3 
All other occasions are formative factors for any one occasion, 
and any one occasion is formative for all others. "The world 
is a community of organisms; these organisms in the mass de-
4 termine the environmen t al influence on any one of them." Each 
occasion is an instrumental value in the realization of any 
1. Hazelton, VEHW, 257. 
2 • SIVJ1V, 251. 
3. SMW , 253. 
4. SME, 79. 
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1 intrinsic value. As a community the occasions have common 
value which is intrins:tc from the standpoint of the com.rnunity 
as a whole and for God's prehension of the whole, and instru-
mental value from the standpoint of the becoming of t he pecu-
liar intrinsic value of any one occasion. 
The actual world, the world of experi-
encing and of thinki n g, and of physical 
activity, is a community of many diverse 
entities; and t hese entities cont ribute 
or dero gate from, the 2common value of the community as a whole. 
As we have discovered, t he intrinsic value of any one occasion 
is to a large extent an inverse funct i on of its instrumental 
value in the becoming of ot her occasions or intrinsic values. 
No intrinsic value and thus no occasion can be considered 
concretely apart from the community of which it forms a part. 
"Every entity is in its essence social and requires the society 
in order to exist ••• The society for each entity ••• is the all 
inclusive universe, 83 
God's purpose in the universe is increase of value in the 
temporal IDrld.4 He formulates that purpose in terms of com-
5 
munlty, as the kingpom of heaven. Evil is the failure in 
communa 1 obligation, that is, failure to realize the fullest 
int rinsic value possible an d thus increase the value of the 
community, failure to realize t he kingdom of heaven. God is 
not necessarily conformity to the status quo, in fact it may 
1. See above. 4. RIM, 100. 
2. RI M, 88. 5. RIM, 87. 
3. RIM, 108 . 
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involve quite the opposite. In a society such as the present, 
for human personality at least, good may involve radical in-
troduction of novel intrinsic value. In the growth of our O\"lrl 
capitalistic society too often higher values have been ignored. 
Whitehead points out: 
They _ were politely bowed to, and then 
handed over to the clergy to be kept 
on Sundays. A creed of competitive busi-
ness morality was evolved ••• entirely de-
void of conside~ions of human life. The 
workmen were conceived as hands drawn from 
the pool of labour. To God's question men 
gave the answer of Cain--'Am I my brotherls 
keeper?'; and they incurred Cain's guilt. 
But while good does not mean mere uniformity, yet it cannot be 
defined apart from community. The value levels of individuals 
and the value levels of society reciprocally condition each 
other. Good is not mere conformity but realization of the 
highest value possible in and for self and in and for community. 
What applies more specifically on the human level applies on 
all levels at least in part, for society i n cludes all actual 
entities. 
Community of value is as basic a concept as individualit,y. 
c. Individuality in community. 
If the individuality is depe ndent uponcomm~Lity and 
community is dependen t upon indi viduality the way of salvation 
from the aweful ultimate fact of aloneness~ 2 becomes evident. 
1. mlfW, 291-292. Cf. Marx and Engels, CM, 23: 
struments of labor, more or less expensive 
ing to age and sex. 1111 
2. RIM, 16. 
11 All are in-
to use, accord-
In its solitariness the spirit asks, What , 
in t he way of value is the attainment of 
life? and it can find no such value ilntil 
it has me r ged its individual claim with 
t he objeltive universe. Reli g ion is wor ld 
loyalty, 
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and we mi ght add, loya 1 ty to the ideal of the kingdom of heaven 
as the realization of the highest value pos sible in each oc-
casion and thus the mutual enrichment of all occasions . In 
this answer, it is our claim, lies the value key to 'Whitehead r s 
metaphysical synthesis of reality. He does not mean by "merged 
its individual claim" a pantheistic or mystic or substantial 
unity which would destroy individuality. The understanding of 
the nature of reality involves the three concepts Whitehead 
2 pointed out as fused in the reli gious intuition of "ri ghtness, " 
that is: 
(1) That of the value of an individual for 
itself. 
(2) Tbat of the value of diverse individuals 
for each other. 
(3) Tb..at of the value of the objective world 
which is a commun:tty derivative from the 
interrelations of its component individu-
_als and also necessary for th~ existence 
of each of these individuals. 
The basic constituent factors of reality are individual 
value realizations dependent on the affective condition of 
prehension, the suosistent condition of ideal i ty, and the 
effective condition of purpose united in ach ievement of intrin-
sic self-enjoyment. But every value realization is instrumen-
tal to every other value realization and thus has instrQ~ental 
1. RIM , 60. 2 • Se e abo ve • 3. RIIvi, 59. 
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as well as intrinsic value. Further, the relative rank of 
i mportance or degree of int rinsic value achieved is directly 
proportional to the de gree of instrumental value it has for 
other intrinsic value realizations. Through prehensive aware-
ness every occasion in the universe has some instrumental 
value, either positive or negative, to the realization of any 
one intrinsic value. 
Accordingly the u n ity of the u n iverse in spite of or rather 
because of its atomic component individualities lies in five 
factors:. (1) the mutuality of all value realizations as both 
intrinsic and instrumental; (2) the nature of value as feeling 
and feeling as referent beyond itself; (3) the limitations, or 
antecedent standards, or types of order set on reality by the 
existence of God in light of his purpose of increased value 
realization; (4) the relevance of God's envisagement of the 
realm of ideality, and particularly the kingdom of heaven as 
the best possible ideals for realizat.ion for each occasion, to 
each occasion or value realizat l on; and (5) the preservation 
of the contribution of each occasion of intrinsic value (a) 
in objective immortality in its successors, (b) in the result-
ing alteration in the realm of possibility, and (c) in the 
realized kingdom of heaven preserved in God's vision of 
actuality--all three of which are mutually relevant aspects 
of the same thing , i.e. the effect of the occasion on subse-
quent reality. Thus the oneness of reality as expressed in 
con~unity and the manyness of reality as expressed in indivi-
duality are both funct i ons of value realization. 
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While Whitehead's view presents difficulties, some of 
wh ich as applicable primarily to this period have been men-
1 tioned and others of which will be discussed later, it also 
offers solutions worthy of careful consideration to some of 
the moat persistent problems of philosophy. It resolves the 
conflicts between the one and the many, indi vidualism and 
organism, i nternal and external relations, determinism and 
freedom, and teleology and mechanism. Further, it does away 
with such traditional stumbling b locks as inert matter and 
simple location and such dualisms as those between fact and 
value and matter and mind. All reality, while not necessarily 
of the nature of consciousness, as he later defines conscious-
ness, is yet sentient in nature and intrinsically valuable. 
With Symbolism, ,!ts Meaning and Effect published in 1927 
Whitehead's period of metaphysical formulation draws to a 
close and hi s next work, the Gifford Lectures of 1927 -1928 
pu0lished as Pro~ and Realit"l_ in 1929, is t h e systematic 
exposition of his fully developed metaphysics. But in a very 
real sense most of the major doctri.nes of his fully developed 
sys tern were worked out more or less fully if not s ystemati cally 
in the p3riod we have been invest:t ga ting . The major differences 
to be found in Pro~~ ~nd Beali:SZ: aside from more systemati c 
formulation will lie in more careful analysis of certain phases 
of his thought and revision based on that analysis. The general 
axio-centric framework developed up to this point continues and 
1. Of. Chap. vrr· 
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is given fuller content. Whitehead has disc~vered hi s earlier 
prediction to be true: "The values of nature are ••• the key 
to the metaphysical synthesis of reality." 1 
1. CON, 5. 
.., ... _ 
CBAPTER IV 
Process and Value 
A. Concrescence as process of value realization. 
1. Actual entities - the final realities. 
1 The "final real things of which the world is made up," 
2 11 the ultimate facts of immediate experience" in their full 
concrete reality, the 11 Final Realities or Res Ver~~n3 are, 
for Vfuitehead in Pro~~ ~nd Reality, the actual entities. 
In the preceding period of metaphysical formulation these en-
titles were considered the true individualities and intrinsic 
values from the standpoint of their realized actuality or 
actualizat:i.on of ideal possibilities of the universe. If, as 
we have con t ended, the axio-centric framework developed in 
the earlier period is primarily systematized and g iven fuller 
content through more thorough analys i s and coheren t elabora-
tion in Process ~nd Reality, then we should discover that the 
same general value characteristics of reality and conce pt ion 
of the nature of value and val u.e totality are basic in Process 
and Reality as in the earlier period. Furt her, if this is the 
case, then our i mmediate task lies not in repetitive exposi-
tion of the structure of Process ~nd Reali!L but in indicating 
the si gnificant elaborations and alterat i ons in the basic 
view of value and value atta inment. 
That the actual entities or ac tual occasions of Process 
1. PR, 27. 
2. PR, 30. 
3.PR, 30. 
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!:nd Real~ are characterized by the same ain at and achieve-
ment of individuality and value as the occasions or organisms 
o f the previous period is evident on the briefest survey. An 
actual entity is a process of feeling synthes~a 1 arising out 
of and related to the whole settled world of past occasions 
wh:tch provides its 11 real potentiality." 2 An actual entity is 
a process of "self-creation" or "self-format:ton113 in li ght of 
its suojective end or aim4 which as realized is "its at tainment 
of satisfaction115 and constitutes its individuality. 6 With 
its attainment of satisfaction the occasion is complete and 
finished, and its intrinsic value becomes instrument al value 
7 for its successors. 
Actual entities are the fundamental units of becoming of 
the creativity which characterizes all reality. While White-
head lists creativity as "the Category of the Ultimate"8 prior 
to actual entities (the first cate gory of existence 9 ), yet 
apart f'rom the actual becoming of co ncrete actual entities, 
creativity is neither existent nor understandable. All reali-
ties and reality as a whole are cr~racterize d by creativity, 
by the becoming of novel syntheses of feeling perspectives of 
reality10 • As such, creativity is the ultimate condition of 
1. PR, 233, 236. 
2. PR, 12r1, 227. 
·3. PR, 38. 
4. PR, 37. 
5. PR, 305. 
6. FR, 22, 227. The process 
of the occasion is "the 
definition and attainment 
of a determinate indi vidu-
ality.• (PR, 227-228.) 
7. PR, 126: "The pragmatic use 
of the actual entity ••• lies 
in the future. n 
8. PR , 31-32. 
9. PR, 32. 
10. FR, 31: "Creativity is the 
principle of' novelty." 
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any existent a nd the most general statement possible about 
realities, yet, cr eativity apart from the actual self-creative 
occas i ons is an abstraction, a non-actuality. Thus Whitehead 
says, " 1 Crea ti vi ty 1 is the un:l..versal of universals character-
1 izing ultimate matter of fact~ in relation to which any par-
ticular actual entity is an a ccident 2 in the sense that t he 
fact that all actualities are instances of creativity does not 
in itself assure or make necessary the existence or particular 
creativeness of any particular actuality . Whitehead adds that 
creativity 
is an ultimate which is actual in virtue 
of its accidents. It is only capable of 
characterization through its accident al 
embodiments, and apart fro3 the accidents 
it is devoi d of actuality. 
Creativity, in other mrds, is the fundamental fact that 11 an 
actual occasion is a novel ent ity diverse from any entity in 
4 
the 1many 1 ·which it unifies. • Its metaphysical status is 
to be the fundament al characteristic of al1. actual entities as 
progressive realizations of novel intrinsic values. 
1. PR, 31. 
2. PR , 10. 
3. PR, 10-11. 
4. The status of creativity for Whitehead has been a subject 
of much discussion among his commentators and critics. On 
the basis of the "ultimate" nature of creativity on the 
one hand and the plurality of actualities on t he othe r 
Bidney, for example, insists that Whitehead is guilty of 
a basic internal vacillation if not contradiction in that 
"he is trying to combine a monistic metaphysics with a 
pluralistic theory of physics and biology ••• He wishes to 
retain a monistic substrate and also to keep the indepen-
dence of individua l events and their self-creativeness. n 
(Bidney, Art.L!93~7, 591.) Vlastos, on the other hand, in 
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Whitehead formulates the basic existential nature of 
answer to Bidney maintains that n the basic event from which 
••• everything else is derived in Whitehe ad's thought is the 
actual entity.n (Vlastos, Art./!9377, 262.) The result, 
according to Vlastos, is that c r eativity is ultimate in 
t he sense t hat no actual entity can be characterized with-
out it. Hazelton, as a t h ird alternative, suggests that 
t he status of creativity dep ends on how you look at this 
view: the notion of formless activity , corres pond i n g but 
by no means identical to Descartes 1 idea of substratum' 
or 1 thinghood 1 (res); and indi vidual becoming in terms of 
'actual entities1 -which qualify the bare the r eness of fact 
by giving it complete indi v iduat1on. 11 (Hazelton, VEHR , 211.) 
Hudson (AOW) seems to vacillate. On t he one hand he reco g-
n i zes that "the un:tversal creativity is inseparable from the 
particular fact of concrete existen ce" (Hudson, AOW, 22) and 
"there is for Whitehead no ultimate · separation between 
creativity and the actual occas i on " ( Hudson , A OW(r 22), 
but he goes on to insist that on t he other hand 'the ulti-
mate creativity is the ground of the phychical and the 
physical, yet in itself is an ideal detachment from the 
psy chical and the physical." (Hudson, AOVi, 148.) (For 
further interpretations see Das, POW, 172, and Johnson, 
Art.L!94B7, 729.) Finally, Miss Emmet takes t he view that 
"creativity itself is simply pure, formless activity; and 
it is uncha racterized, telling by itself no tale of the 
creatures which may characterize it." (Emmet, WPO, 73. Cf. 
71-73.) 
While admitting that there is ground for such a wide 
variety of opinion, yet it would seem to us that Whitehead's 
major emphasis or int ention in rela tion to creativity is 
not that crea ti vi t y is an underl;,' ing monis t ic substra te 
or in any sense a pure formless activity characterized by 
creatures, but rather that creativity is the most general 
trait characterizing the plurality of becoming actualities. 
Whitehead makes clear (see text a bove) that creativity 
considered in itself is "devoid of actuality ." (PR, 10-11.) 
In itself cr eativity may be an "ideal detachment" b lJ.t as 
such it would be non~existent. Rather than emphasizing 
actual entities as character i zing creativity, ~fuitehead 
says, " 'Creativity' is the universal of universals 
characterizing ultimate matter of fact. 11 ( PR, 31.) In 
actuality creativity is always involved in the "meaning of 
the synonymous terms 1 thing , 1 'bei ng, 1 1enti ty.1 11 ( PR, 
31.) Wh i le Whitehead does say, " This Cate gory of t he Ulti-
mate replaces Aristotle's cate gory of primar y substance,n 
(PR, 32) (Aristotle, l017b22: •The ultimate substra tum, 
which is no longer pre dicated of anything else") it is to 
be noted t hat he say s "replaces" and not "is," and the re-
placement would seem to be that creativity is t-he concept 
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actual entities in what he calls the ontological principle. 
"This ontolo gical principle means that actual entities are 
the only reasons; so that to search for a reason is to search 
for one or more actual entities. 111 Again, and more strikingly 
he describes the ontological principle as meaning "that ,~part 
from the expe riences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, 
nothing, bare nothingness. 112 The concept of realities as 
individualities and reality as a community of individualities 
in interrelation continues as the fundamental truth of the 
philosophy of organism. 3 The primary difference between 
Process and Reali tz and the former period lies in the further 
analysis of process in terms of which the prehensive unifica-
tions or actual entities attain their satisfaction or intrin-
sic value. 
For the earlier term tlprehensive 1.mificationa 4 as des-
criptive of the becoming of an actual entity Whitehead sub-
stitutes the somewhat more indicative term "concrescence." 
11 The actua 1 entity j_s the real concr escence of many potentials .n5 
The concrescence of an actual entity is its progressive process 
which can be predicated of every actua 1 existent. Our con-
tention is further born out by Whitehead's continual in-
sistence on the ontolo gical principle (PR, 254. See below.) 
1. PR, 37. Eighteenth cate- not exclude complex-
gory of explanation. ity and universal 
2. PR, 254. See also PR, 95- relativity.• 
96, 113, 223-224, 234-235. 4. SJVIW, 102. Cf. Chap. 
3. Cf. PR, 53: "Thus the ulti- III, sec. A, 1. 
mate metaphysical truth is 5. PR, 33. 
\ atonism •••• But atonism does 
226 
of feeling synthesis1 and attainment of individuality involv-
ing three or four· stages depending on whether or not the oc-
casions 1 s effe ct on its successor s is included as a stage in 
its development. The ori gin of an actual entity is given in 
t he completion of its predecessors, 2 the Wtmany' which it 
3 4 
'unifies. ,u It then passes through a nsupplemental stage,. 
or stage of process as such5 during which it progessively 
synthesizes the felt given factors i.n light of its emerging 
subjective aim or purpose.6 The th i rd and final stage as far 
as the attainment of its individuality is concerned is its 
completion or "satisfacti on"7 or attainment of its final aL"ll 
and intrinsic value. With the satisfaction it is over, but 
in relation to its successors it may be said to have a fourth 
phase called by Whitehead its "decision, 118 or self-transcendent 
or superjective character, 9 which is its bequethal to the 
future in the fonn of given content for its successors of its 
intrinsic value as instrumental value in the becoming of fur-
ther intrinsic value. 
While we shall not follow Whi. tehead throuf)l the de tailed 
analysis of the full l-nplications of these stages, yet the 
nature of the sat i sfaction as realizat i on of intrinsic value 
and the value relations of actual entities to each other 
and value totality demands closer attention to certain features 
1. PR , 323. 6. PR , 227. 
2. PR , 127, 134 . 7. PR , 323, 227 . 
3. PR, 31. 8. PR, 227. 
4. PR, 323. 9. PR, 134. 
5. PR, 227. 
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of the process of concrescence of an actual entity. Accordingly 
we shall briefly reconsider the prehensive nature of occasions 
in terms of phases and t ypes of feeling along with the role of 
eternal o bjects in terms of real as opposed to general poten-
tiality, and purpose in terms of subjective aim and relative 
autonomy of actual occasions. 
2. Prehension and potentiality. 
Whitehead continues to stress the prehensive or feeling 
nature of all occasions and the reference of feeling beyond 
itself. An actual entity is a r'concrescence of prehens l ons, 111 
and must be analyzed in tenns of its prehensions. Every pre-
hension refers bey ond itself to other entities, societies or 
nexus of entities, or eternal objects. Purther, prehension can 
be analyzed into five components or factors: 
These factors are: (1) the 1 subject 1 which 
feels, (ii) the 'initial data' wh ich are to 
be felt, (iii) t he 'elimination' in virtue 
of ne gative prehensions, (iv) the 'objective 
datum 1 which is felt, (v) the .1 sub je cti ve 
form which is how the subject feels that 
objective datum~ 
The initial data are the given factors or content giving 
rise to the new occasions as the result of the complet i on and 
passing of its predecessors. These initial data are the 
eternal objects characterizing the syntheses of the previous 
occasions (their abstractive hierarchies3 ) and are present as 
the result of the former occasions' decisions or passing and 
1. PR, 35. 
2. PR, 3 37 -33 8 • 
3. Chap. II, sec. A, 2. 
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conditioning of potentialities. "These eternal o b jec t s de-
termine h ow the world enters into the constitu tion of each 
one of its members via its feelings. 111 
11 
'Elimination' in virtue of negative prehension" is de-
serving of more attention, for ne gative prehension is the 
developed concept of "excluded'' relat i ons hip we first met in 
2 S cience ~£ t he Modern Worl£ and is the means by which the 
selectivity so important for purposive realizat i on takes 
place. An ac tual oc casion stands i n prehensive reJa tion to 
t h e whole universe of actual enti t ies and eternal obje cts. 
"The sub ject emer ges from the world :w 3 and as a resu lt the 
4 
who le of antecedent reality is a ~ totality of g ivenness" 
for it. But such a g iven totality is a me re multiplicity 
containing disorder as well as order . 5 If a value or satis-
factlon is to be realized, there must be eliminati on from 
this totality t .he re by making an harmonious achieved unity of 
positive feeling possi ble. 6 According ly Whitehead proposes 
the concep t of ne gative prehens ion or elimination from fe e l-
ing . "A ne gative prehension holds a datum inope rative in the 
progres sive con crescence of prehensions con s t itu ting the unity 
of the sub ject.•7 While negative pre hensions b lock or elimi-
nate data from positive feeling synthesis, they do not destroy 
1. PR, 225. 
2. SMN, 234. 
3. PR , 136. 
4. PR, 127. 
5. PR, 127 
6. Cf. Cate goreal o bligations 
(i) "The Categ ory of Subjec-
tive Unity"(PR, 39) and 
( i i) "The Cate gory of Sub-
jective Harmony." (PR, 40-
41.) 
7.PR, 35. 
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relation but effectiveness of relation for tb....at occas i on's 
realization. Thus ne ga tive prehensions are as i mportant for 
concrescence as positive prehensions. Further, a ne gative 
prehension, while an elimination from feeling , is itself a 
form of feeling , a feeling of inhibition or exclusion. 1 nThe 
ne ga tive prehension of an entity is a positive fact with its 
emotional subjective form. 112 As is evident from our earlie r 
3 discussion of excluded relations, the factor of negative pre-
hension is one of the means of new gradation of eternal ob-
jects by each occasion in its process of becoming. The opera-
tive principle where b y ne gativeprehe ns i on takes place, however, 
will become evident in the concept of su bjective aim. 4 
Due to ne gative prehens l on, simplification of the initial 
data occurs and the eternal objects representing them are now 
felt as one complex objective datum for that prehension. 
1. Cf. Hegel, SOL, I, 65: "Ne gation is just as much an affir-
mation as negation.• 
2. PR, 66. Cf also PR, 35: " Ne ga tive prehensions also have 
subjective forms • 11 In light of this Dunham 1 s content i on 
that the doctrine of negativeprehens i on is self-contradic-
tory involves an oversig ht on his part. He says 1 "The 
theory of ne gativeprehension is directly opposed to t h e main 
tendencies of the philosophy of organism; without it the 
philosophy is inadequate, with it the philosophy is in-
coherent." 11 In truth they are unfeeling-feelings, dis-
junc t ive-conjunctions, external internalities." (Dunham, 
Art./!9321, 42 and 44.) Ushenko on the other hand points 
out that-negative prehensions occur all the t i me in 
ordinary vision: "This means that the process of building 
a perspective 1s select i ve: some individuals admit into 
their field of vision items which other reject and vice 
versa." Ushen_tco, Art./r9371, 246.) Dunham's objection 
overlooks also the all-too-human habit of conscious re-
pression of undesirable factors in experience which repres-
sion is certainly felt and ·may have serious consequences. 
3. Chap. III, sec. A, 2. 4. See below. 
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The many become one by abstraction and the one is objectively 
felt as the gross object of the occas i on's environment. Th e 
occasion gains a unified perspective view. 
Objectification is an operation of mutually 
adjusted abstraction, or elimination, where-
by the many occasions of the actual world 
become one complex datum. This fact of 
elimination by reason of synthesis is some-
times termed the perspective of the actual 
world rrom the standpoint of that concres-
cence. 
Groups of occasions forming nexus or socieities by virtue of 
their mutual implication in terms of com'TI. on dominance of the 
same group of eternal o b jects (abstractive hierarchies) 2 in 
its diverse occasions referent to each other are prehended 
objective~y as one o b ject--the chair, the table, the tree, 
the man. 3 Further, the particular occasion's membership in 
some society is a function of oo jectification 'oy reason of 
its realization of 11 the complex of eternal objects which con-
4 
stitutes its Lfhe society',:~? defining characteristic." 
The fifth factor in prehension, the "subjective form, n 
introduces the concept of types of prehension based upon how 
the su bject feels its objective datum and the referential 
5 
nature of the datum. Whitehead points out that "there are 
many species of sub jective forms, such as emotions, valuations, 
1. PR, 321. Cf. PR, 40: Categoreal obligation (vi) or the 
Cate gory of Transmutat i on which is a more formal way of 
stating the same thing . 
2. PR, 140. 
3. FR, 98-99. 
4. PR, 1940. 
5. PR, 338. 
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d . . Ill purposes, a vers1ons, avers1ons, consciousness, etc. 
From the standpoint of types of prehensions as based on sub-
jective form and the reference of the felt datum, prehensions 
distinguished as physical feelings, 2 conceptual feel-may be 
3 ings, hybrid 4 feelings, and the negative feelings already men-
tioned. 
The most basic type of prehension is physical feeling in-
volving the given factors from the past present as the result 
of the efficient causation5 due to the transmission of de-
cisions of the occasion's predecessors. Such feeling is the 
vectoral result, via initial data, of the past occasions felt, 
and is referent to those occasions. 6 Its "how" felt is blind 
emotion closely related to sympathy in the higher organisms. 
The primiti ve form of physical experience is 
emotional--blind emotion--received· as felt 
elsewhere in another occasion and conformally 
appropriated as subjective passion. In the 
language appropriate to higher stages of ex-
perience, the primitive element is sym2at~y, 
that is feeling the feeling in an~ther an 
feeling conformally with anotEer. 
1. PR, 35. 4. PR, 163. 
2. PR, 35. 5. PR, 228. 
3. PR, 35. 6. PR, 28. 
7. PR, 246. It must be kept in mind in reading this passage 
that Whitehead does not mean feeling the feeling in another 
in the sense of existential identity of feelings. The 
feeling the feeling in another is the form of the feeling 
of another but the other so felt is usually no longer even 
existent. In so far as feeling the feeling in another 
refers to contemporary occasions it is a doubly removed 
relation, for the feelings of both are causally derivative 
from a common past since the contemporary occasions are 
causally independent of each other (PR, 95.) In either 
case the initial datum felt as referent to the feeling 
of another is made up of given eternal objects and not 
otheractual occasions in their immediacy. The failupe-
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Thus Whi tehead says, 11 The primitive experience is emoti anal 
feeling s felt in its rel e vance to a world beyond. 111 These 
feelin gs are simple c ausal feelin gs 2 and are basically 
present in every occasion as constituting its physical pole. 3 
But derivat ive from physical feeling s and more directly 
relevant to value realization as such are the conceptual 
feeling s present in every occasion. The conceptual feeling s 
are feeling s of eternal o b jects as eternal objects, that is, 
as potentialities to be realized. The eternal objects in 
the occasion are first felt physical:W,as referent to past 
feeling occasions, but 
from each physical feeling there is the 
derivation of a purely concep tual feeling 
whose datum is the eternal ob ject deter-
minate of the definiteness of t he ac tua14 . 
entity, or of the nexus ·physically felt. 
The past occasions bequeath to the becoming occasion their real 
potent:talities for wha t it may b ecome .J ut the present occasion 
must become aware o f t he se as potent ialit ies and se~ ct ac-
cord i n gly. Thus t he present occasion mus t abstract these 
ete rna l ob jects from their reference to the past and consider 
to ke e p this in mind leads to endless confusion in inter-
pretation and t he mistaken attribution (it seems to us) 
consistent wi t h the ontological principle and the atomism 
of occasions. As Tlfeeling the feeling in a nother" referen-
tially, prehension is, as Hartshorne points ou t , "social 
fe eling11 (Hartshorne, Art ./19357, 328 ). The prehens i on 
could even be said t o have-a mystical aspe ct as Moore 
indicates (Moore, Art./!9317, 273), but t hat mysticism 
does not involve an existential identif i cation with the 
occasion prehended. 
1. PR, 247. 3. PR, 49. 
2. PR , 361. 4. PR, 39-40. 
them in relation to its own becoming . It is this func t ion 
which conce pt ual feeling performs, and because it is a 
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becomi ng a ware of real po t entialities as potentialities White-
h ead calls . the operation "Valuation. 111 Valuation thus in-
volves the awarenes s of t h e ins t rumen t al values of elements 
from t he past a nd evaluation of these in terms of its own 
real i zation of intrinsic value. " A conceptual prehens i on is 
a direct v i s i on of some possi bility for good or evil--of some 
possibility as to how actuality mal be definite. 112 
Thus in the process of valuation the eternal object in-
volved is assessed in rela tion to its relevan ce to concrescent 
i n clusion in intrinsic value realizat i on in accordance with 
t he major purpose or sub jective aim of the occasion in question. 
Thus the occasion not only realizes what any particular po-
tentiality for its actualization is but also assesses the po-
tentiality 1s relative place or instrumental value for actual-
ization. 
Accordingly as t he valuation of the con-
ce ptual fe e ling i s a 'valuation up' or a 
'va luation down', t he impor tance of the 
eter nal objects as felt in the int5grated 
feelin g is enhanced or attenuated . 
In other words, valuation along with ne gative prehens i on ac-
counts to a large extent for the grading of eternal objects 
by each occasion, and also, since g rading of eternal ob jects 
by one occasion limits the potentialities for future occas i ons, 
1. PR, 39-40, 336. 
2. PR, 50. 
3. PR, 368. 
r --~ 
1 
:lt accounts partially at least for moral responsi bi lity. 
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Finally, it also acc ounts in part for the uniqueness of value 
realized. But g radin g, re sponsioility, and uniqueness of value 
real iz ed are only fully 1.mderstandable in li ght of the further 
factor of su -oje cti ve aim. 2 
Still another type of prehension must be mentioned, how-
ever, as particularly i mportant in the ori gin and formulation 
of t h e sub jective aim or purpose in terms of whi ch an occasion 
controls the various types of prehension and thereby achieves 
satisfact i on or intrinsic value. This further t ype of pre-
hension is known as a "hybrid prehension113 or 11 hyorid physical 
4 feeling ." An actual occasion not only has physical feelings 
of ot her actual occasions (1.e. as referential to them} as 
complete and of past actuality ' as a whole, but it may also 
objectify a past occasion or other entity in terms of that 
other entity's conceptual feeling s or, in o.ther words, in terms 
of its awareness of potentialities to be actualized whether 
those potentialities were actualized or not. \ff in a hybrid 
physical feelin g the actual entity forming the datum is ob-
5 jectified by one of its own conce ptual feelings." When it is 
kept in mind6 that God in his conceptual envisa gement is the 
locus o f the realm of ideality and tha t he envisages t h e f ullest 
1. PR, 22-23. 
2. See below. 
3. PR, 163. 
4. PR, 376. 
5. PR, 376. The antecedent of the prono1.m 11 its 11 is t h e actual 
occasion felt as the referent of the datum. 
6. See Chap. III, sec. C, 1. 
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ideals for each occasion, the importance of hybrid prehension 
for the achievement of value be comes e vident. .hn occasion 
may have hybrid feeling s of the conceptual feelings of other 
occasions but every occasion has hybrid feelings of the con-
ce ptual feeling s of God. Thus Whitehead says, "The objecti-
fication of God in a temporal subject is effected by the hy-
brid feeling s with God 's conce ptual feeling s as data. 111 Thus 
theoretically the po tentialities for each occasion exceed 
those set by its immediate predecessor occasions. As feeling 
throug h hybrid prehension God's ideal for it, each occasion 
2 
acquires its own · sub je cti ve aim. 
Thus the various types of prehension account for t he man-
ner of ingression or inclusion of eternal o b jects of potentials 
or ideals as also for the manner in which they are considered, 
acce pted, or rejected and g raded for actualization in each oc-
casion. Physical feeling s constitute the basic manner and 
form of the presence in the occasion of the real potentialities 
from the past which set the limits of actualization of po-
3 tentialities for the present occasion. An occasion must con-
form to its past within l i mits. 4 Physical feelin g·s present 
the solidarity of the wo rld under the form of an extensive 
5 
continuum. The heavy hand of the past and necessity of con-
formi ty may be so strong in many cases as to make novelty in 
concrescence ne gligible. But included among physical prehensions 
1. PR, 377. 
2. See below. 
4. PR, 249. 
5. PR, 103-104. 
3. Cf. PR, 101-102. 
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are hybrid physical feelings with relation to God's conceptual 
nature which thereby open up relation to the realm of general 
potentiality1 and wider ideals. Thus at least the possibility 
for real, novel selection in so far as such selection is har-
monious with the real po ~entialitiesset by other occasions is 
theoretically present for most if not all occasions. The 
awareness of inheritance felt physically is felt in terms of 
possibilities for further actualization through valuation by 
means of derivative conceptual feeling s. The one further factor 
still to be considered as a necessary prerequisite of realiza-
tion of intrinsic value is the regulative principle in terms 
of which these various feeling operations occur and concrescence 
takes pla. ce. 
3. Sub j e c t i ve a Ln at va 1 ue • 
Whitehead's emphasis on purpose as a basic condition of 
value realization not only continues in Process an1 Reality 
but becomes more pronounced. The nature of purpose is more 
carefully analyzed in terms of its fUnction, origin, and re-
sults. Every occasion is a "selective concre s cence" not in 
relation to selecting the initial data, for these are gi ven,2 
but in relat:lon to what it does with the initial data, what it 
becomes, its synthesis and actualization of potentialities and 
the exclusion of conflicting euements. The principle of control 
of the various types of prehension and that in terms of which 
there is a "subject which feelsn 3 is the suojective aim or 
1. PR, 102. 
2. PR, 233. 
3. PR, 337. 
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purpose of the occas ion. The given factors in the occasion 
are present via causal efficacy o r efficient causality--"the 
1 transition from actual entity to actual en ti ty\1\f --but the 
becomine; of the occasion itself ls the result of its ovm final 
causality. 2 As we have discovered before, efficient causality 
is both the product and the original phase g iving rise to 
teleological causality. The in t ernal harmonization and g uiding 
principle of the occasion, the means to concrescence is the oc-
3 
casion 1 s subjective aim or purpose. In relation to their 
relevance the various types of prehensions are regula ted in 
accordance with the "preestablished harmony" imposed by the 
4 
subjective aim. The occasion only loses "the final causat ion 
which is its internal principle of unrestn5 upon~taining its 
satisfaction or completed intrinsic value. The value of ele-
ments in process of concrescence aside from their purely in-
strumental nature is the reflected anticipated intrinsic value 
which is the satisfaction of final end as realized. 6 
In light of its subjective aim every occasion 1.s a self-
realizing occasion. 11 Self-realizat i on is the ultimate fact of 
facts ••• Whatever is self-realizing is an actuality." 7 The 
occasion itself decides ·within the limits of real potentiality 
1. PR, 228. 
2. Chap. III, sec. A, 3. 
3. Cf. PR, 40-41: Categorea1 obligations (vii) and (viii), The 
Cate gory of Subject ive Har mony and the Category of Sub-
jective Intensity. 
4. PR, 338 and 389-390. Cf. also PR , 39: Categoreal obli ga-
tion (1); The Category of Subjective Unity. 
5. PR, 44. 6. PR 323. 7. PR, 340. 
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what eternal objects will and what will not be allowed " ad-
1 
mission into ••• reality of concep tual feeling." Whitehead 
repeats insistently that each occasion in li ght of its sub-
jective aim 11 is causi sui." 2 The movement from the many g iven 
in initial data to immediate realizatlon of actualized intrin-
sic value 11 is dominated by the final cause, which is the 
ideal. 1113 In fact it can be said that the creativity charac-
terizing the universe is the combined self-causation of all 
ac tual entities. 
The creativity is not an external agency 
with its ovm ulterior purposes. All actual 
entities share wit~ God this characteris ti c 
of self-causation. 
It is in virtue of its self-realization that an occasion 
5 becomes an intrinsic value. Further, it is in virtue of its 
self-causation that every occasion to a greater or lesser ex-
tent introdu ces novelty into reality. From the standpoint of 
its inheritance from the past the occasion is creature; froM 
tbe standpoint of what it becomes it is self-creator; t hus it 
can actually be called a self-creating creature. 6 
1. PR, 131. 
2. PR, lol-132, 228 -229, 339. 
3. PR, 229. 
4.PR, 339. 
5. See sec. B below. 
6. Whitehead does not say, however, tha t any entity is comple-
tely self-creating . Whi le there is some external similarity 
in terminology ~hitehead is not asserting for man or any 
reality as does Sarte that "man is nothing else but what re 
makes of himself." (Sarte, EXI, 18.} For Whitehead , on 
the contrary , man or any oc casion can only make of its elf 
what is possible in light of the real potentiality set by 
the efficient causation of past occasions and God. In light 
of this Das's comraent that the concept of self-crea~ing 
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Since the unity of the becoming occasion as subject1 and 
its realization of intrinsic value as superject 2 are depend ent 
upon the occasion's subjective aim, that ai m in part at least 
must be given as datum with t he initial phase of the occasion 
itself. Whitehead assures us that this is the case. The ori-
gin of the ideal which forms the initial subjective aim is God 
and the form of the prehension of that ideal by the occasion 
3 is a hybrid physical feeling . God envisages the ideal poten-
tialities for every occasion. •He is that actual entity from 
which each temporal concrescence receives t he initial aim from 
which its self-creation starts. n 4 But this im.media tely raises 
a further pro blem. If the real potentialities of concrescence 
are set by previous occasions and the su b jective aim i s fur-
nished by God under t h e form of an appetitive ideal which 
operated by attraction, then, can the occasion really have any 
self-realization or self-causation in any valid sense of the 
word? Is t here any thing left for it to do? Rather is not 
its occurrence as completely determined from without as the 
turning of iron filing s towards a magnet?5 
cr eature--~a thing being both creator and created i n respect 
to the same creative act" (DAS, POW, 172) --*invo 1 ves self-
contradiction~ would seem to be a confusion on Das's part 
rather than on the part of Whitehead. From the standpoint of 
human experience it can be pointed out that unless our acts 
are ooth self-creating and c r eated in the sense in which 
Whitehead is using the terms there can be no moral responsi-
bility. Our creat i vity lies in what we do with what we 
have given and for that, Whitehead insists, we are responsible. 
1. PR, 39: Cate goreal obligation (1). 
2. PR, 41: Cate goreal ob li gation (ix). 
3. 
4. 
5. 
See above sec. 2. 
PRi 374. Cf. Also PR, 164, 287, 342, 343 , 373 • . 
Il ustration used by E. S. Bri ghtma n in conversa--tion. 
240 
In answer it can be pointed out that Whitehead d istin-
guishes four different grades of occasions from the extremely 
simple to the highly complex: occasions in 11 so-called empty 
space,n 1 inorganic occasions, living occasions, and occasions " 
in the life history of end1ITing objects with conscious know~ 
edge.n2 In t he lower two g rades the past rules with almost 
complete determination. The selection and mental phases of 
such occasions tr are ne gligible. 113 These occasions do little 
more than pass on what t hey have received. While in some sense 
the same formal factors as in the hi gher occasions are present, 
for all practical purposes many of them are non-existent. 
These lower· occasions could well be described in terms of t he 
iron filing s analo gy . The question is, does the same thing 
hold true of higher occasions only with a more elaborate 
mechanism? Whitehead insists that this is not the case; rather 
within definite limits Vhitehead contends an occasion is really 
self-creative, autonomous, and with a measure of freedom. 
While the initial sub je cti ve aim is derived from God, the 
occasion's full subjective aim is not necessarily entirely so. 
Vvhi tehead says, "An orig inality in the temporal world is con-
ditioned, though not determined, oy an initial sub jective aim 
supplied by the g round of all order and orig inality. 114 Again, 
he points out, an occasion "derives from God its basic con-
ceptual aim ••• yet with inde t erminations a waiting its own de-
5 
cision." 
1. PR, 269. 
2. PR, 269. 
3. PR, 269. 
The .occ.asions starts with nconditioned alternativesn6 
4. PR, 164. 
5. PR, 343. 
6. PR, 342. 
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in light of which the ini t ial sub jective aim can be modified. 
~lhitehe ad adds, "The doctrine of responsi b ility is entirely 
concerned with this modification." 1 Furthe r , t hrough the pro-
cess of valuation2 de pendent on the su o jective aim the "posi-
3 tive conce p tual prehension of relevant alternatives ~ b ecomes 
possible and with it genuine novelty. Accordingly, Whitehead 
insists, "Each concrescence i s to be referred to a definite 
4 free initiative and a definite free conclusion." God and the 
worl d together set t he conditions for the initial phase of an 
occasion, ~ut "the sub ject, thus conditioned, is the autono-
mous master of its own concrescence into sub ject-superject. 11 5 
In all exce pt t h e s imple types of inor ganic and lower occasions 
"the sub ject is responsible for being what it is in virtue of 
its own feelings. 116 Thus value achievement is a real and posi-
tive achievement on the part of the relatively autonomous 
a gency of actual e~tities. 7 
B. Value, self-realiza tion of aesthetic satis f act i on. 
The result of t he process of self- l'"' ealizat i on, the f'inal 
phase and issue of concrescence, is the 11 satisfact i on of the 
completed subject, 118 the realized 111 individual self-attainment," 9 
1. PR, 342. 3. PR, 380. 
2. See a oove, sec. 2. 4. PR, 75. 
5. PR, 374. Note also PR, 41: " Whatever is determinable is 
determine d , but trere is always a rema i nder for the decision 
of the subject-superject of that conc r·escence. 11 
6. PR, 339. 
7. Whitehead warns us, however, that t he a utonomy becomes pro-
gressively negli g i ble as the energy involved in conceptual 
feelin gs is decrease d . PR, 390 . 
8 . PR, 29. 
9. PR, 53. 
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1 
the positive 11 enjou.>:nent 11 of the self-attained ideal, and thus 
intrinsic value. It is i~mediately evident that no major s hif t 
in the meaning of intrinsic value ha s taken place between 
Whitehead's formulative and systematic periods. The attain-
ment of intrinsic value is the attainment of an inte grated 
unity of feeling . 2 It is the resolution of conflict and in-
3 
compati oles in harmonious unity. It is the achievement of 
ordered feeling out of the relatively chaotic and hi ghly di-
verse initial data. 4 The occasion's intrinsic value is the 
achievement of a full determinati on and thus limitation to be 
this actual achievement ou t of the relative indeterminism of 
it . i 5 s orl g n. Its unity, its determination, its harmony is 
not mere conformity but rather a co mplex inte grated unity of 
enjoyed, achieved, satisfaction. "The term 'satisfaction' 
means the one complex fully determinate feelin g whi ch is t h e 
6 
complete d phase in the process. 11 
Intrinsic value for Whitehead could well be described as 
the attainment or self-realization of an ideal, div ine in 
ori gin, in an inte grated complex feeling unity which in it s 
very attainment is sel f -transcending . We have pointed out 
that the s ub jective aim g·u iding the process culminating in 
real i zed intrinsic value is at least initiated by a d i v ine 
ideal for that particular occasion7 and tha t its partial or 
1. PR, 130. 
2.PR, 3 68. 
3. PR , 170. 
4 • PR, 12 9 , 16 9. 
5. PR, 38, 39, 41. 
6. PR, 39. 
7. See above, sec. 3. 
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complete fulfillment is a function of the self-creative capa-
city of the occas ion . Further , the attainment of satisfaction 
is the attainment of individuality on the part of t he occasion. 1 
Bu t also, the moment of satisfaction is the occasion's moment 
of completeness. It is over but as over is sel f -transcendent . 
nit Lfhe satisfactio!?;7 close s up the entity; and yet is the 
su perject adding its character to ••• a becoming of entities 
superseding the one j_n question .;lll 2 And yet the occasion's ve_ry 
self-transcendence in its moment of self -realization is a 
fac tor which adds to the enjoyment or satisfaction itself and 
thus is a condition of heightened intrinsic value. Vhitehead 
says, 
ThG actual entity as sel f -creating creatl~e 
passes into its immortal function of part-
creator of the transcendent world . In its 
self -creation the actual entity is guided 
by its ideal o f itself a s individual3 satis-faction and as transcendent creator. 
In even more s triki. n g manner 'Nhi tehe ad says, 11 The sense of 
worth beyond itself is i mmediately enjoyed as an overpowering 
element in the individual self-attainment. 114 Whitehead is 
reasserting5 the nature of intr i nsic value as itself to a 
large extent a function of its own transcendent instrumental 
value. 
Whitehead 's conception of intrinslc value as the satis-
faction of self-realization and yet self-transcendlng in nature 
indicates a strongly perf ectionistic side to his theory of value 
1. PR;,' 129. 
2. PR, 129. 
3.PR, 130. 
4. PR, 53. 
5. Chap . III, sec. B, l 
and C, 2. 
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and relates him to t he long historical line of perfect i onists 
from Aristotle to the present. Particularly s t r i king is t h e 
similarity of Whitehead's view to that of the per f ectionists 
of the tradition of absolute idealism. We have ind i cated1 
the s i milarity of 1 hi tehead 1 s earlier view of " t he general 
law of r hythmic pro gress in the higher stages of life 2 to 
He gel's dialectic of mental growth. It now becomes evident 
that achievement of :Lntrinsic value at any level of existence 
follows the general He gelian d ialectical pattern. An occasion 
of value realization be g ins with a g iven immediacy of felt 
3 initial data, the He gelian Sein stage. Its concrescence to 
intrinsic value involves a process of elimination of incompa t -
ibles by ne gative prehension and objectification of the data 
as referent beyond themse 1 ves , 4 the Hegelian i'fesen (ne ga ti vi ty5 
and otherness of Wesen6 ) stage. The satisfaction is a synthsis 
1 • Chap • I I, s e c • d • 
2. AOE, 62. 
3. PR, 337. 
4. PR, 321. 
5. Hegel, SOL, I, 65. 
6. Cf. Whitehead's statement of the nature of oojectifi-
cation: "Objectification is an operat i on of mutually 
adjusted abstract l on, whereby the many occasions of the 
actual world become one complex datum," (PR, 321.) with 
He gel's statement, "Essence is neither in itself nor for 
itself; it is through an Other, namely external or abstract-
ing , and it is for an Other, namely Abstractions.n (Hegel, 
SOL, II, 16.) For Whitehead it is during this period of 
concrescent process tbat conceptual feeling s or awareness 
of possi bilities as possibillties and essence arises (see 
above and PR, 39-40, 50-386.) Compare this with Hegel's 
statement opening the Wesen section of Th~ Philosophy of 
Mind: 'The objective Mind is the Absolute Iaea, out on!j 
in Pos~." (He gel, POM, 240.) 
of the diverse elements in a complex determinate liDi ty, 1 a 
r e al unity of contrasting2 and even opposing factors, 3 and 
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thus is very close to the He gelian Be griff. Finally an oc-
cas ion 's realizat i on of intrinsi c va lue is its self -trans -
cendence.4 It dies, but in dy i n g gives rise to the initial 
phase of its successors and in them its value contribution 
lives on as its o o ject ive imm9rta.lity and i n strumentality 
in the self -realizat i ons of its successors. "What is divested 
of its own li vi ng i mme d iacy becomes a real component in o ther 
5 living immediacies of becomin g ." In He gelian terms, with i ts 
satisfaction an e ntity is aufgeho ben. 6 
Whitehe ad is perhaps even closer in some respects to t he 
perfectionistic view of value of the British I dealists, Thomas 
Hill Green and F. H. Bradley, than to He ge1. 7 Green, for ex-
a mple, considers the good to be "the self-reallzat i on o f t he 
8 divine principle in man.u Whe n it is remembered that suo-
ject i ve aim is 
realiza t i on is 
divine in orig in for Whitehsad , 9 that self-
10 11 t he ultimate fact of facts," and that self'-
reali zation is satis fa ct i on or i ntrinsic value, the chief 
1. PR, 39 . 
2. PR , 349. 
~5 . PR, 518 . 
4. PR,l 30. 
5. PR , ix. 
6 . Cf. He gel, SOL, I, 119: \IIWhat i s t ranscend e d is a l s o pre-
served; it ha s only los t its immediacy . 11 
7. Howeve r , it must be pointed out that Whitehead is much closer 
to He gel than to the neo-He gelians in his temporalism, his 
analysis of process, and h is general metaphysical position. 
In one sense he i s close r to He gel in value t heory also in 
that for !Nhitehead theory of value and general metaphysical 
posit i on cannot be se parate d . 
8 . T. H. Green, PTE, 210. 9. PR, 347. 10 . PR, 340 . 
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difference between Green and Whitehead would se em to be White-
head's extension of perfectionism to all realities, not j u st 
man or man and God. Greeri proceeds to descrToe the continu-
ing good as "a life of becoming, of constant transiti on from 
possibility to realization, and from this again to a new possi-
bility.a1 Again Whitehead would oe in complete agreement, for 
2 
every enduring object as a society of occasions or personal 
order is exactly such a transition from actuality to possi-
bility to actuality in pro gressive self-realization. A human 
personality as an enduring object is self-realizing in every 
occas i on of its e xperience, and each self-realizat i on gives 
rise to a new self-realization in which furthe r potentialities 
open out for actualization. 3 
Even though Whitehead would radically differ from Bradley's 
4 
content i on that the finite self is ap pearance and not reality, 
yet with Bradley's view that the most general expression of the 
end in itself is self-realizati on5 , he would fully a gree. He 
would furthe r agree that self-rea lized reality is harmonious, 6 
1. T. H. Green~ 236. · 
2. See Chap. I~ I sec. A, 2, and PR, 51-52. 
3. While t h e tuli statement of the nature of human personality 
in thi s form is not present as such in PR, it certainly is 
implied by (1) the sel f -realizing nature of all occasions 
( PR, 374), ( 2) the description of a personal order as a 
"society ••• when the genetic relatedness of its members or-
ders these members 1serially 18 (PR, 51), and {3) the more 
restricted definition, "the life of man is a historic route 
of actual occasions." (PR, 137.) The most explicit statement 
of the prog res si ve self-realization of human life occurs in 
MOT (221-222): "The one individual is the coordinated stream 
of personal experiences, which is my thread of life or your 
thread of life. It is that succession of self-realization, 
each occas i on with its direct memory of the past and with its 
anticipation of the future." Cf. also McEwen, W:Kn, 15. 
4. Bradley, AAR, 119. 5. Bradley, ES, 61. 6. Bradley, AAR, 151. 
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that it is experience, 1 and that it is feeling unity. 2 
Whitehead accepts the general perfectionis t i c contention 
that self-realization is the condition of val~e but he would 
strong l y insist that t he nature of that self-realization is h..a.r-
monious feeling of self-enjoyment or satisfact i on as actual in 
each occasion's self-realization rather than self-realization 
in general or self-realization of the absolute alone. ·~ hi te-
head would reject as abstraction the rre re form of self-
realization as a definition of intrinsic value as well as t h e 
mere conten t of satisfaction. 3 Intrinsic value is the deter-
minate satisfaction of the realized self or occasion. Further, 
self-realization is not restricte d b y Whitehe ad to certain 
types or g roups of actual occasion but is characteristic o f all 
actual occasions. 
Whitehe ad does introd uce a distinction in Process and 
Reality which tends to modify his f ormer statement that •• rvalue ' 
4 is the word I use for t h e intrinsic reality of an event.'' 
Value is still the intrinsic reality of an occasion considered 
from the standpoint of its completion. However , with his more 
1. Bradley , AAR , 147. 
2. Bradley, AAR , 146. In PR, ~»'hitehead specifically a cknow-
ledges his debt to Bradley: "Though throug hout the main 
b ody of the wo rk I am in sharp disagreement With Bradley, 
the final outcome afte r all is not so great l y different. 
I am particularly indebted to his chapter on the nature of 
experience in his Essays on Truth and Rea l ity . His in-
sistence on 1 feeling t-t8 very consonan~with my own con-
clusions." ( PR, vii-viii.) 
3. Cf. Chap. II, sec. B, 1 on 1/lh i tehead as opposed to Hedonism. 
4. S IIfW , 1 36. Whitehe ad no long er uses event and occasion as 
synonymous as in SMW but rather restricts the term event 
in PR to "a nexus of actual occasions. " (PR, 113.) 
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explicity analysis of the actual occas i on into the sta ges of 
concrescence--~ (1) the responsive phase, (11) the suplemental 
sta ge, and (iii) the sat l sfaction\111 --and t h e identification 
of the supp lemen t al stag e as the stage of process,2 he tends 
to restrict primary intrinsic value to the third stage. It 
mi gh t be more accurate to say that the term actuality is ex-
tended i n Process and Realitl to include the process as well 
as the completion of actualization. The intrinsic value is 
only actual as the completion of t h e occasion's concrescence 
and t h e concrescen ce is only actual as aiming at in t rinsic 
value or satisfaction, but the occasion and the intrinsic 
value are no longer completely s y nonymous. Thus Whitehead s ays, 
The notion of 'satisfaction' is the notion 
of the 'entity as concrete' abstracted from 
the 'proces s of concrescence'; it is the out-
come separated from t he process, thereby 
losing the actuality of the atomic3entity which is both process and out come. 
The coming into oe i n g of t h e intrinsic value is i t s ces-
sation. The int rinsic value is the supe rject4 which is 
achieved and then is not exce pt as dec i sion5 for successive 
occasions in the form of O'Jjective i r!'L.'llOrtality6 and ins t rumental 
value for other occas ions. Accord :i..ng ly, for Process ~nd Reality, 
1 • PR , 32 3 and a o o ve s e c • 1 • 4. PR, 129. 
2. PR, 227. 5. PR, 227. 
3. PR,l29. 
6. Whitehead is sometimes in danger of losing intrinsic value 
altogether by maki n g it so transitory it is never existent. 
For example, whereas on the one hand he insists that 
actuality is "the process and out come" (PR, 129) and con-
tinually speak s of t he real "attainment" of satisfac t ion 
(e. g . PR, 3 8 , 3 9, 129,130 , 227, 251, 3 35,448 , etc.) yet 
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Hudson's statement that an actual occasion is "a process of 
aiming at and achieving value ~1 is more accurate than Vhite-
head's own earlier statement that value 11 is'' the intrins i c 
reality of an occasion. 
However, while the moment of primary intrinsic value 
is no longer to be considered synonymo u s with the full actu-
ality of the occas i on, there is a sense in which the actuality 
of t he process of the occasion as well as the satisfaction 
which is the primary intrinsic value can still be considered 
intrinsically valuable. Strictly speaking , from the standpoint 
of the satisfaction as the moment of intrinsic value, all 
phases of the pr ocess leading to it are only instrument ally 
valuable. But there are two cases and senses in which factors 
in the process not yet having reached satisfaction of intrin-
sic value aimed at may be sa id to have a derivative intrinsic 
?. 
value which is more than just instrumental.~ First, since the 
on the othe r hand, after having identified satisfaction 
with the super ject, he says, "This is the sense in which 
the Philosophy of Organi sm interprets Plato's phrase "and 
never really is'; for the superj e ct can only be inter-
preted in terms of its 'objective irnmortality. 111 (PR, 129.) 
1. Hudson, AOW, 37. 
2. The term "derivative intrinsic value ~ i s not Whitehead's 
but our own offered in an atte mp t to explain (l) Whitehe ad's 
use of the term value in a secondary sense and (2) to indi-
cate the pos s ible source of a train of thought with quite 
different implications from the insistance on the refusal 
to bi-furcate fact and value which was so predominant in 
the formulative period (Chap. II, sec. B, 1). This secon-
dary train o f thoug ht reach es its culmination in the articles 
"'Mathepatics and the Good" and ~mortalityil of 1941 (Art. 
/!9417 , 666-681, and Art./I9417G, 682-700 ) where values tend 
to replace eternal o b jects-and-the confusion of value terms 
Whi tehead so forcefully rej e cted in the earlier pe ri od 
creeps in. 
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ideal embodied in the su : >jective aim1 is the ideal of the 
achieved satisfaction towards which the occasion is aiming 
and whi ch when realized will be intrinsic value, the occasion 
may anticipatorily and ye t intrinsically enjoy that aim it-
self as yet unrealized though it may be. In fact, Whitehead 
goes so far as to identify the anticipatory enjoyment with the 
su b jective aim. 
In its self-cr eation the actual entity is 
guided by its i d eal of itself as individu-
al satisfaction and transcendent creator. 
The enjoyment of this i deal is the sub-
jective aim. 2 
In the sense that the sub jective aim is actual enjoyment it 
may be said to have reflected intrinsic value a b ove its mere 
instrumentality. Yet it must still be said that it is pri-
mar i l y val1~ble instrumenta lly as a means to t he int rinsic 
value of satisfaction. 
But there is a se cond sense in which other elements in 
proces s besides t he su b jective aim may be said to have the 
same type of derivative intrinsic value. All the prehens ions 
in an actual occasion are synthesized in the satisfaction a nd 
thus are instrumental to t h at satisfaction. 3 But in hi gher 
types of occasions (i.e., more complex) some ty pes of feel-
· i ng may almost be consi dered sub -satisfact i ons in that t hey 
are themselves conclusions of minor processes ( bu t n ot f u ll 
occasion s) and enter dire ctly into the satisfaction. The 
example of such feeling s which Whitehead spefically mentions 
1. PR , 130. 3. PR, 322. 
2. PR, 130 . 
251 
is that of judgm.en':;s . _  ,_ j udgment is a positive affi rmat i on of 
the relation of concep tual feelings of eternal o b jects to 
phys ical feeling s of the "o b j e ctified actual occasions" as 
really together in the occasion judg ing . 1 Thus Whitehead says, 
A judgment is a feeling in the 'process' 
o f the j u d g ing subject, and it is correct 
or incorrect respecting that subje ct. It 
enters as a ~alue i nto tFi'eSatisfaction of 
the subject. 
While it is evident that both cases of derivative intrin-
sic values are much more highly instrumental than intrinsic, 
yet in the sense that they are intrinsic as well as instru-
mental the satisfaction can be said to be a synthesis of in-
trins i c as well as instrt~ental values. The importance of 
this douole sense of intrinsic values and the restriction of 
prima ry intrinsic values to less than the full actuali ty does 
not at this ti me alter the g en eral value contentions of the 
formulative period except in the sense of entering a be g inning 
wed ge between fact and value. This wed ge is not of a seriou s 
----1. PR , 291. By "obje c tified actual entity ," it must be re-
membered , Whiteh ad means an objective datum as a res ult 
of abstraction by ne gat:tve p r ehens ion constituent of the 
prehending occasion out referent to some actual occasion 
beyond itself, as we have indicated under the f ourth factor 
of prehension ( sec. 2 a b ove), (cf. PR, 337 and 321) . On 
this basis , judgment is, Whi tehead says, an affirmat i on 
of 11 a real fa ct in the constitution of the judging sub ject" 
( PR , 291..) "Judgment is concerned with the conformity of 
two components within one experience. 11 (PR, 291.) ·'hereas 
a proposition is true or false (PR, 291.) as a referent 
description rather than an internal conformity, a judg-
ment can only be considered C01' rect or incorrect in terms 
of 1 ts unity of fe eling and can only be j udged to be so by 
suoseqtlen t occas i ons ( PH , 291) . 
2. PR, 291. 
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nature in~!:£~~~ and Reali.t~ or i.n the per i od i mmediately fol-
lowing althoug h other contri buting factors widening t he di-
vergence of fact and value do a p pear in the subsequent pel' iod, 
but it does mar k t h e be g inning of a very differen t tenden cy 
i n t h ough t about value which becomes predominant in the late 
1 
a r t icles, ur~iathematics and the G-ood, ·• and "I.m..rnor tality . n 
The nature of the atta ined int rinsic value for Whi t ehead 
i n £roce~ and ~~lity , as was the case in the formulative 
period, is pri marily aesthetic, and the occasion as a wh ole 
can be considered as an aesthetic experience or the atta inment 
of aes thetic satisfaction . Wh i tehead repeats his earl ler 
statement , nAn actual fa ct is a fact of aesthetic experience, 112 
and adds that particularly in the case of highe r t y pes of or-
ganisms the ca te goreal condlt ions of r i cher e x per ience " are 
to be generalized from the aesthetic laws in particular arts. " 3 
Further, while the new fo rm s or potentialities to be incor-
porated or synth esized i n the satisfact i on as int rodu cted con-
ce ptually, i.e. by conceptual feelin g , yet s i nce t he final 
satisfaction is a synthesi s of concep tual feeling and physical 
feeling4 , the final aesthetic satisfaction is a psycho-
physical fact . Physical reaction is inte gral to aesthetic 
rea 1 iz a t ion • 
Every stag e o f an oc c asion is aesthetically rele vant. 
The initial data received are instrumentally valuable primarily 
1. In S chilpp , J>AJ\.'W, 6 66 -700. 
2 • PR , 4 2 7 , and RI M, 115 • 
3. PR , 427. 
4. PR , 470. 
1 
as data 11 for aesthetic synthesis." The supplemental phase 
of the occasion or its process of concrescence is to be 
descri b ed primari-ly as a process o f aesthetic adjustment of 
prehended factors in li g,ht of the subjective ai n. 
In the aesthetic supplement there is an 
emotional a ppreciation of the contrasts 
and rhy thms inherent in the unification 
of the o jective content in the concres-
cence of one actual occas i on ••• It is the 2 phase of inhib it i ons and int ensifications. 
Whitehead descri be s a living occasion in terms of hei ghtened 
aesthetic activity. 
Thus a single occasion is alive when t h e 
sub jective aim which determines its pro-
cess of concrescence has introduced a 
novelty of definiteness not to be fotmd 
in the inherited data of its primary phase. 
The novelty is introduced conce p tually and 
disturbs the inheri t ed 'responsive' adjust-
ment of subjective forms. It alter2 'values 1 
in the artist's sense of t h e term. 
4 The npreestab lished ha rmony" of an occasion mentioned 
a bove as imposed by the sub ject i ve a im 1 is the expression of 
the general aes thetic nature of occasions whereby a mong the 
conditions of becoming of any occasion are the compat i bility 
for integration of its many physical feelings 5 and its valu-
ation of t h e po l::; entialities o f its conce ptual feelings in 
accordance with their adaptation to aesthetic harmony with the 
subjective aim in the final satisfaction. 6 In other words 1 
1. PRI 323 . 
2 . PR I 325 . 
3. PRI 159. 
4. PR , 338 , 3 89 . See above, sec. 3 . 
5. PR, 39. The Cate gory of Subjective Unity. 
6. PR, 40-41 1 and 389. The Cate gory of Subjective Harmony. 
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the preestab lished harmony i s a statement of the aesthetic 
sensitivity1 of the sub jective aim and t h e necessity for aes-
thetic adaptation of factors 2 in any concrescent occasion. As 
for L.eibn :i_z, 3 so also for Whitehead, t he general conditions 
of existence are imposed by ·the existence of God who thus is 
t be ultimate cond ition of preestablished harmony. But unlik e 
Leibniz, for Whitehe ad preestablished harmony is not an exact 
determination of similar contents of windowless monads, 4 but 
rather is the general condition tha t occasions must internally 
ach ieve harmonious aesthetic adjustment and thus intrinsic 
aes the tic value. 
Accordingly, every occasion is the attainment of an 
aesthetic satisfacti on or inte grated aesthetic experience. 
It could almost be said in a Crocean sense that ever y occa-
sion is an attainment of a unified aesthetic intuition which, 
to carry the analo gy with Croce further, in the very moment 
5 
of attainment is expressed in t he f orm of objective immor-
tality or decision for futur e occasions. 11 The process of 
concr escence term:i.nates with the attainment of a fully de-
terminate 'satisfaction'; and the creativity thereby passes 
over into the 1 g iven 1 primary phase of the concrescence of' 
other actual entities. 116 Each occasion as self-caused and 
1. PR , 338 : "This mutu al sensitivity expresses t h e notion of 
fihal causation in the guise of preestablished harmony. 11 
2. PR, 389: "Aesthetic adaptation for an end is the formative 
cond ition in the preestablished harmony.'' 
3. Le ibn:tz, 1\WN, 268 . 
4. Leibniz, DOM, 24-25: MON, 25 2 and 26 8 . 
5. Cf. Croce, AES , 11. 
6. PR, 130. 
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and self-realizing is a creative artist and its issue is its 
self-expres si on. The experie nce of intrinsic value is the 
moment of completed creation which i '1lme diately becomes the 
c reat ed for others. Whi tehe ad would agree wlth Croce in 
Croce's description of the relation between intuition and ex-
pression in which he points out that "the one ap pears with the 
other at tbe same instant, because they are not two but one,"1 
as also with Croce's fUrther statement: 
One often hear s people say that they ha ve many 
gr eat t h oughts in their minds, but they are 
not able to express them. But if they real~y 
had them, they ••• would have expressed them. ' 
At least, Whitehead would add , to themselves in subsequent 
occasions of their e xperience. 3 
Since intr:tnsic values are aest hetic facts 4 and are the 
result of aesthetic creation a nd appreciation, 5 it follows for 
Whitehead in Process and Re~lity as in the earlier period6 
1. Croce, AES, 9. 
2. Croce, AES , 99. 
3. Of. MOT, 22-39. Whi le Whitehead does not discuss expression 
as such in PR, he devotes a chapter to the subject in MOT. 
Further, he introduced the concept in RI M by pointing out, 
" Expression is the one fundamental sacrament. It is t he 
outward si gn of an inward and spiritual g race. !! (RIM, 131-
132 .) We have introduced t he concept here, however, instead 
of in our discussion of the formulative period for t wo 
reasons: (1) the basis of the expressive nature of the oc-
casion becomes particularly evident through Whitehead's in-
creased doub le emphasis on t he occasion as self-caused or 
self-realizing and on b oth the process and c omple tion of 
the occasion as aesthetic in character, and (2) the formula-
tion of these factors in PR tends to form the basis for the 
fuller elaboration in MOT. 
4. PR, 427. 
5. PR, 159, 323 , 325. 
6. Chap. II I , sec. B, 2. 
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that the cate gories of importance or levels of intrinsic value 
reached are aesthetic cate gories. While the cate gories of 
1 i mportance of tbe earlier period all still apply, they no 
longer stand in quite the same relation to each other, and 
from the standpoint of classifica tion of satisfactions6 one 
o i' them, depth, with its own sub p cate gories, tends more or less 
to usurp by inclusion all the others. 
The canons of art are merely the expression, 
in specialized forms, of the requisites for 
depth of expe rience. The principles of mo-
rality are allied to the canons of art, in 
that they also expregs, in another connection, 
the same requisites. 
Four of the earlier categories of importance, because of 
the necessity of their presence for any occasion, are primarily 
represented in what Whitehead calls the Ca te goreal Obli ga-
tions. 4 Thus harmonious indi vid ua li ty a ppears both in 11 The 
5 Cate gory of Subjective Unityw and in "The Category of Sub -
jective Harmony. 116 Endurance appears in 11 The Cate gory of Oo -
jective Identity. if(7 Novelty a ppears in "The Cate gory of Fre e -
dom and Determination.n 8 Vividness or intensity appears in 
ttThe Categ ory of Sub jective I n tensity. 111 9 Expressed in terms 
of Cate goreal Obligations these four factors become minimum ' 
1. Harmonious individuality, endurance, novelty, contrast, 
de p th, vi vidness, personality. Bee Chap. III, sec. B , 2. 
2. PR, 170. 
3. PR, 48 3. 
4. PR, 39. 
5. PR, 39. 
6. PR, 41. 
7. PR, 3 9. 
8. PR, 41. 
9. PR, 41. 
257 
conditions of existence of occasions. Every occasion must to 
some extent exemplify them. Contrast is felt by Whitehe ad to 
be so basic tba t he lists it as the e i ghth cate gory of exist -
ence -- 11 Contrast or Modes of Synthesis of Ent:i.. ties in one 
Pre hens ion. 111 Considered from the standpoint o f cate gories of 
importance these five may still be used to judge levels of 
intrinsic values when more than the minLI'lum conditions of 
existence are fulfilled. Thus , for example, hei ghtened con-
t t i . t •t 2 hi h . t dd t d th 3 ras , ncreases 1n ens 1 y w c 1n urn a s o ep _. 
The achievement of depth requires a c omb:i..na ti on of what 
d lls b t b o d" o f o n 4 Whitehea. ca t _,_e wo as1c 1mens1ons o sat1sraction: 
narr owness and width. 5 Narro·wness, Whitehead says , •~ refers 
to the intensities of individual emotions arising out of ind:i..-
6 
vidual components in the datum." It results from elimina-
tion of irrelevant detail, from positive i dentificat i on, 7 from 
concentration on defining cba racteris tics of groups of actual 
entities or nexus or societies rather than on individual oc-
casions. 8 The result for satisfaction is clarity , realiza-
9 tion of order and pattern and thus of heightened contrasts of 
simplified elements in final unity. But narrowness alone re-
sults in vaguene ss , 10 in loss of relevant detail , in such nar-
row identifica tL n that little remains with which to contrast 
- --·-1 . PR , 33 . 6 . PR , 251 . 
2. PR , 128 . 7 . PR , 170 . 
3 . PR, 4 85 . s . PR , 172. 
4 . PR , 252 and 169-170. 9. PR , 176 . 
5 . PR , 169 , 251 . 10. PR , 170 . 
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the distinguished factors. Thus vagueness is a deficiency 
level of depth characteristic of low levels of occasions and 
over specialization in higher levels with resulting loss of 
intrinsic value in the satisfaction. 
Width, the second dimension of depth, might be described 
as coordinated inclusiveness of positive factors in the satis-
faction.1 Whitehead points out, 
The savouring of the complexity of the 
universe can enter into the satisfaction 
only through the dimension of width ••• 
The function of· w~dth is to deepen the 
level of feeling. 
Width increases the massiveness3 of the satisfaction through 
supplying relevant background against which the intensive 
narrowness of the first dimension increases in effective con-
trast. But width without narrowness sinks into triviality. 
Triviality is due to the wrong sort of 
width; that is to say, it is due to 
width without reinforcid narrowness in 
its higher categories. 
Triviality is the result of lack of coordination.5 "'Trivi-
ality'arises from excess of incompatible differentiations. 116 
Thus neither narrowness nor width is sufficient to insure 
the depth which marks a high degree of intrinsic satisfaction 
or value. Either alone indicates a low degree of importance 
as does also their ineffective combination. The key to the 
proper combination for the highest degree of intrinsic value 
1. PR, 252. 
2. PR, 251. 
3. PR, 171. 
4. PR, 170. 
5. PR, 170. 
6. PR, 170. 
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is, according to Nhitehead, "adequate order."1 But adequate 
order, like contrast, 2 is a mean or proper amount. 
There are different types of order; and it 
is not true that in proportion to the or-
derliness there is depth. There are various 
types of order, and some of them provide 
more trivial satisfaction than do others.3 
This order cannot be a rigid order or it would "degenerate 
into mere repetiti'on." 4 Nor on the other hand can there be 
too little order, for 11 in proportion to the chaos there is 
5 triviality." 
The order re~uisite for depth which combines narrowness 
and width is order infused with novelty and freshness. "What 
is required ••• is order entering upon novelty.•6 The result 
of such a proper combination is significant contrast with in-
creased intrinsic values attaining "the last delicacies of 
7 feeling• on the one hand, and the assurance of creative ad-
vance on the other. Whitehead summarizes the conditions of 
the fullest depth of satisfaction as followst 
1. PR, 
2. See 
3. PR, 
4. PR, 
5:. PR , 
Order as it sinks into the background before 
new conditions, has its requirements. The 
old dominance should be transformed into the 
firm foundations upon which new feelings 
arise, drawing their intensities from deli-
cacies of contrast between system and fresh-
ness. In either alternative of excess, 
whether the past be lost or be dominant, the 
present is enfeebled. This is only an appli-
catiog of Aristotle's doctrine of the golden 
mean. 
169. 6. PR, 515. 
Chap. III, sec. B, 2. 7. PR, 515. 
169. 8. PR, 515. Cf. 
515. sec. B, 2, d. 
l69. 
Chap. III, 
I 
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The nature of morality on the one band and disvalue on 
the other, for Whitehead as has already become evident, 1 
follow from the nature of intrinsic value as self-realized 
aesthetic satisfaction. In the formulative period we dis-
covered that while every occasion as a completed occasion is 
an intrinsic value and otherwise would not be an occasion, yet 
in spite of its intrinsic value an occasion could be judged 
to have disvalue also if under comparison the value realized 
is lower than it might have been as envisaged by God. That 
the same relation holds in Process and ~eal!!I is evident from 
our discussion2 of the origin of subjective aim, achievement, 
and dimensions of depth. An occasion whose achievement is 
either trivial or vague when it could have attained thenar-
rawness and width prerequisite for increased depth is subject 
to disvalue in rela t:ton to the "might have been." Such an 
occasion is a positive disvalue to its successors in light of 
the fact that past occasions through the efficient causality 
of objective immortality set the real potentiality in the form 
3 
of g iven initial data for any new occasion. 
In spite of the fact that there are only six references 
4 to morality in Process an~ Real!!l and all of these are more 
or leas passing remarks, if anything t he moral nature (in the 
generic sense) of actual occasions is more strikingly implied 
than in the earlier period. That this would be the case is 
to be expected from Whitehead's more specific emphasis on 
1. See above, and Chap. III, 
sec. C, 2, c. 
2. See above, sec. 3. 
3. PR, 101-102, and a bove, sec.2. 
4. PR, 23, 160, 339, 483, 521. 
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self-realization as the condition of intrinsic value. 1 With 
the actual, though not theoretical, exception of the two 
lower types of occasions, occasions as self-caused2 within the 
limits of real potent i ality is to a greater or lesser extent 
directly responsible for what it itself becomes as also for 
t he real potentialities of its successors. Thus Whitehead 
says, 
The subject is responsible for being wba. t 
it is in virtue of its feelings. It is 
also derivatively responsible for the con-
sequences of its existe~ce because they 
flow from its feelings. 
Even more pointedly, he says elsewhere, 
The point to be noticed is that the actual 
entity ••• determines its own ultimate defi-
niteness ••• This4is the whole point of moral 
res pons ibili ty. 
Accordingly, the highest moral good for an occasion is 
the realization of the fullest, richest, deepest satisfaction 
possible for it, for in its satisfaction it enriches instru-
mentally all values and thus all realities to come. In its 
richest privacy an occasion is most adequately fulfilling its 
social obligation, for its primary intrinsic value is a result 
of (in part) and issues in society. 
Each task of creation is a social effort, 
employing the whole universe. Each novel 
actuality is a new partner adding a new 
condition. Every new condition can be ab-
sorbeg into additional fullness of attain-
ment. 
1. PR, 269. 
2. PR, 131-132. Above sec. 3. 
3. PR, 269. 
4.PR, 390. 
5.PR, 340-341. 
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But that private realization must be social in reference to 
be the fullest possible. The fullest satisfaction cannot be 
realized without refer ence beyond itself. Intrinsic value is 
to a large extent a funct i on of its own instrume ntal! ty. "The 
se nse of worth beyond itself is immediately enjoyed as an 
overpowering element in the individual ·self-attainrnent. 111 
Translated into ethical terms the same statement becomes: 
Morality of outlook is inseparably con-
joined with generality of outlook. The 
antithesis between the general good and 
the individual interest can be abolished 
only when the individual is such that 
its interest is the general good, thus ex-
emplifying the loss of minor intensities 
in order to find them again with finer 
composition in a wider sweep of interest. 2 
3 
:Moral evil is thus obstructiveness, is failure to be-
come what one could have become, is satisfaction with minor 
intensities, triviality, excessive vagueness when greater 
depth is possible. It is the modification of initial sub-
jective aim away from the intended fullest ideal of God for 
the occasion, is the choice of lesser a lterna t i ves, is for-
getting that richness of value is proportional to social con-
tribution. Moral evil is "insistence on birth at the wrong 
season.•4 But an occasion characterized by moral evil is not 
a total loss even to its immediate successors. It is obstruc-
tive. It may cause pain, suffering, and does cause loss of 
potentiality, but it may also be a means to increased depth 
1. PR, 53. 
2. PR, 23. 
3. PR, 517. 
4. PR, 341. 
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of satisfaction either through selective elimination or through 
contrast or through both. 
Selection is at once the measure of evil. 
and the process of its evasion. It means 
the discarding the elements of obstructive-
ness in fact. No element in fact is in-
effectual. Thus the struggle with evil is 
a process of building up a mode of utiliza-
tion by the provision of intermediate ele-
ments inyroducing a complex structure of 
harmony. 
But there is another side to disvalue or evil not due to 
moral deficiency of occasions. In the concept of solitariness2 
we found the paradox of intrinsic value and individuality to 
lie in the fact that an occasion's achievement and high point 
is also its tragedy for its high point cannot be shared and 
its achievement i s its cessation. The world is infected by 
a transitoriness and constant loss of intrinsic value. So 
transitory is realizat i on of intrinsic value that it nne:ver 
3 
really is." Further, while in the lower type occasions where 
there is little more than repetition, the intrinsic values 
realized may be said to be characterized by endurance, 4 but 
the values thus re-actualized are very low in the scale of 
importance. Yet in the hi gher types of occasions where the 
richest intrinsic values are realized, the endurance factor 
is very much cut down, discord and obstruction are much more 
frequent, and societies of such occasions with their measure 
of endurance are still short lived by comparison. Rocks 
1. PR, 517. 3. PR, 129. 
2. Chap. III, sec. C, 2,d. 4. Chap. III, sec. B, 2,b. 
persist but human beings die. Whitehead thus points out: 
The evil of the world is that those elements 
which are translucent so far as transmission 
is concerned are of slight weight; and those 
elements with individual weight, by their 
discord, impose upon vivid immediacy the ob-
ligation that it fad! into night. 'He giveth 
his beloved--sleep.' 
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The unavoidable persistence of such evil and tragedy in the 
very fruition of intrinsic value for which the universe 
strives raises again the problem of God and value totality. 
Is there any real preservation of value and does individual 
value realization make any difference in the long run? 
c. The source and conserver of values. 
One of the most important advances of Process and Reality 
over the formulative period is Whitehead's more thorough 
analysis of the nature of God. In the earlier period we dis-
covered a basic contradiction between the activity and func-
tions of God on the one hand and his asserted "non-temporality• 
on the other. 2 In ~~~ and Reality this seeming contra-
diction disappears and God as both eternal and temporal be-
comes the originator and conserver of values in active temporal 
relation with the world of actual occasions. In light of the 
present fuller analysis of the nature of God his purpose--"tbe 
attainment of value in the temporal world 113--his love, 4 and his 
5 
consciousness become consistent with his full and developing 
nature. The shades of a God who is merely an eternal logical 
1. PR, 517-518. 4. RIM, 158. 
2. RIM, 64. and Chap. III, sec. C,l. 5. RIM, 158-. 
3. RIM, 100. 
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principle of concretion disappear in a God with 11 a tender care 
that nothing be lost,n1 a redeemer who assuages the evil of 
2 perishing through real and eternal conservation of realized 
value and assurance that no occasion shall have died in vain. 
Yet the expansion of God's nature does not negate any of 
the functions or attributes of God of the earlier period. He 
continues to be the eternal envisagement of the realm of 
3 ideality, the ground of rational, moral, and aesthetic or-
der,4 the principle of concretion who 11 at once exemplifies and 
establishes the categoreal conditions•5 of all existents. He 
remains the highest complete intrinsic value and the ultimate 
final cause of value, 6 but the richness of the concept of God 
is expanded. In order to take into account all of his various 
functions Whitehead analysizes the concept of God in terms of 
God's threefold nature which corresponds to the threefold 
character of every actual entity. 7 Accordingly, God must be 
considered from the standpoint of his "primordial nature,•8 
1. PR, 425. 4. See Chap. III, sec. C, 1. 
2. PR, 517-518. 5. PR, 522. 
3. PR, 329. 6. Chap. III, sec. C, 1. 
7. PRf 134: "Thus an actual entity has a threefold character: 
(iJ it has the character 'given' for it by the past; (ii) 
it has the subjective character aimed at in its process of 
concrescence; (iii) it has the superjective character, which 
is the .pra@llatic value of its specific satisfaction qualify-
ing the transcendent creativity." It is to be noted that 
God is never called an actua 1 o ccas;ion but always an actual 
entity, for unlike other actual entities God does not 
perish. This, however, in PR does not mean that he is non-
temporal. Hudson feels, nevertheless, that the failure to 
call God an actual occasion while holding him to be an 
actual entity implies non-temporality, for it "complicates 
the problem of actual occasions ••• The refusal to _,apply the 
term to God lifts him out of the time process. Uod as 
his 11 consequent nature," 1 and his "superjecti ve nature, 1112 
each of which fulfills different value functions. However, 
it must be kept in mind that God is not three but one. Any 
3 
one of the "natures, 11 considered alone is an abstraction 
from the actuality which is God, is non-existent in itself. 
The failure to keep the unity of God in mind can only lead 
to confusion. 
1. God's primordial nature, the ultimate source of value. 
From the standpoint of his primordial nature God is the 
principle of concretion4 and the envisagement of all poten-
tialities as eternal objects5 of Science and the Mod~~ World. 6 
Considered in abstraction the primordial nature is God's con-
ceptual experience of all possibilities. 
This experience is the primordial fact in 
the world, limited by no actuality which 
it presupposes. It is therefore infinite, 
devoid of all negative prehens ions. This 
side of his nature is free, complete, pri-
mordial, ete~nal, actually deficient, and 
unconscious. 
actual entity has for Whitehad the status of being non-
temporal." (Hudson, AOW~,. 153-154.) While Hudson's state-
ment does apply to the ~od of the formulative period (cf. 
Chap. III, sec. B, 1.) it does not seem to apply to PR for 
the consequent nature of God as "incomplete, consequent, 
'everlasting', fully actual, and conscious" (PR, 524.) 
would certainly seem to be temporal. God is not an occasion 
because he is "everlasting" but 11 everlasting" and non-
temporality are not synonymous. "Lasting• to the contrary 
itself implies endurance in time or through time. 
B. PR, 46. 
1. PR, 19. 5. PR, 50. 
2. PR, 135. 
3. PR, 521. 
6. See Chap. III, sec. B, 1. 
7. PR, 524. 
4. PR, 523. 
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God's primordial nature is the "subsist nt111 condition of 
all value realization, for it is the n·conceptual realization 
of the absolute wealth of potentiality. 112 In an even mor~ 
direct manner than in the formative period Whitehead points 
out that, as a requirement of the ontological principle, 
everything must be somewhere, and here 
'somewhere' means 'some actual entity.' 
Accordingly the general potentiality of 
the universe must be somewhere;. since it 
retains its proximate rele vance to agtual 
entities for which it is unrealized. 
And this somewhere is God's primordial nature which in abstrac-
tion as primordial Whitehead descr ibes as "a non-temporal ac-
4 tuality,• but, he goes on to point out, it is a "deficient 
actuaP' 5 and lacks "the fulness of actuality" 6 considered con-
cretely. 
God's primordial nature is co-eternal with all process. 
He is not the creator God in the sense of being prior to all 
actualities, but as envisaging all potentialities he is the 
necessary condition of all creativity and value realization. 
In the sense that creativity is the most general condition of 
existence and thus the category of the ultimate God can be con-
sidered as creativity's "primordial non-temporal accident"7 
without which as given actuality there could be no creativity. 
He is an naccident" in the sense that "no reason can be given 
8 for the nature of God• but not in the sense of not necessary 
1. PR, 73. 5. PR, 521. 
2. PR., 521. 6. PR, 521. 
7. PR, 11. 
8. SM'I}ll 1 257. See Chap. ITI; sec. B,l. 
3. PR, 48. 
4. PR, 48. 
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for actual creativity. In other words, there is no necessity 
in the concept of creativity why there should be God, but for 
actual crea ti vi ty in the actual world God is a necessary fac-
tor. Thus, Whitehead says, God in his primordial nature 11 is 
not bef~ all creat i on, but with all creation. 111 Nor, as 
pointed out before, does God create the eternal objects which 
he envisages. They constitute the gi ven2 for God, "the 
Platonic world of Ideas. 113 "He does not create eternal ob-
jects; for his nature requires them in the same degree as they 
4 
require him." 
If we do God the injustice of considering only his pri-
mordial nature he would have to be characterized as morally 
indifferent and only the source of ideals for value realiz~­
tion in the abstract sense of Aristotle's unmoved mover. 5 
Whitehead is perhaps guilty of some internal contradiction if 
in saying that God's primordial nature is non-temporal he 
means completely non-temporal even in relation to itself, for 
he does assert that 11 h is unity of oo nceptual opera tiona is 
free creative act." 6 From the standpoint of other occasions 
1. PR, 521. 
2. Cf. Chap. III, sec. A,2: 
RTI~, 157; and Brightman, 
POR, 337. 
3 • . PR, 73. 
4. PR, 392. 
5. Aristotle, Met., 1072. 
6. PR, 522. If God's primoidial nature is active it must be 
temporal, for non~temporality implies no change or process 
and thus no acti vi t ~l · That the primordial nature does in-
volve activity is not only indicated b ·y the above but also 
from Whitehead's contention that the "incomplete conceptual 
valuation of all eternal objec t s" involves achievement (PR, 
48 .) In the sense that Vfuitehead attributes activity but 
non-temporality to the primordial nature he is following 
Aristotle's confusion. 
the primordial nature's priority and complete indifference 
would be the same as non-temporality for them. Whitehead 
points out: 
God's primordial nature is abstracted from 
his commerce with 'particulars,' and is 
therefore devoid of all those 'impure' in-
tellectual cogitations which involve pro-
posit ons ••• It is God in abstraction, alone 
with himself. As such it is a rere factor 
in God, deficient in actuality. 
Accordingly, 
in his primordial nature, he is unmoved by 
love for this particular or that particu-
lar; for in this foundational process of 
creativity, there are no presconstituted 
particulars. In the foundations of his be-
ing God is indiffere~t alike to preserva-
tion and to novelty. 
Thus the primordial nature of God is little more than the 
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graded adjustment of possibilities or ideals in relation to 
each other. But as such, the primordial nature is the ulti-
mate ground and source of value realization in that as the con-
ceptual mutual adjustment of possibil1.ties to each other it 
sets the corrlitions for the realization of any and every pos-
3 
sibility, eternal object, ideal. Accordingly the aim or 
ideal f-or any occasion is ultimately derivative from the pri-
mordial nature of God by the hybrid prehensions of occasions.4 
In his primordial nature God envisages every, and all, 
1. PR, 50. 
2. PR,l60. 
3. See Chap. III, sec. B, 2, on interrelations in the realm 
of ideality, and sec. C, 1, on God as principle of order. 
4. Cf. PR, 287, and above sec. A, 3. 
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and the fullest possibilities for any and all occasions, but 
his envisagement is without reference to any particular oc-
casion as primordial. Again, however, it must be remembered 
that the primordial nature is not all of God and that accordingly 
God's effect on any particular occasion is not limited to his 
primordia 1 nature. While from the standpoint of any cc cas ion, 
that occasion's subjective aim as a more or less comp~x ideal 
is referable back to God's primordial nature and from the stand-
point of that occasion's hybrid prehension of its aim or ideal 
the occasion is pri lfarily aware of the ideal rather than God as 
concrete actuality, it does not follow and Whitehead does not 
assert that from the standpoint of God the initiation of sub-
jective aims in and for particular occasions is purely a 
function of his primordial nature. In other words, the fact 
that God's primordial nature is the ultimate source or condition 
of value realization does not necessarily mean that it is the 
immediate source or conditions. It is our contention that 
while Whitehead does not make it as explicit as he perhaps 
could have, yet for hi m it is God's superjective rather than 
primordial nature that initiates subjective aim in particular 
occasions. 1 That this is the case would tend to be indicated 
not only by tbe indifference of his primordial nature in ab-
2 
straction to particular occasions but also by Whitehead's 
description of the superjective nature: 
The 'superjective' nature of God is the 
character· of the pragmatic value of his 
1. See below, sec. 3. 2. See above and PR, 160. 
specific satisfaction qualifying the con-
cresence creativity in the various tempo-
ral instances. 
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While we shall return shortly to this function of God's 
superjective nature 2 it is necessary to mention it now in or-
der to stress the fact that God considered primordially is 
general and not real or specific potentiality3 and thus avoid 
what seems to us to be a confusion in interpretation of White-
head's view of possibility, novelty, and the primordial nature 
of God. Stallknecht, following the lead of Miss Emmet, in-
sists that Whitehead's view of creation reduces to a 11 catalogue" 
theory. 4 Miss Emmet feels that the fact that there are no new 
eternal objects according to Whitehead raises a difficulty, 
for "this sounds as though all the novelty we can look for is 
the choice between alternative forms of definiteness already 
envisaged in the Primordial Nature of God.n5 Stallknecht 
phrases the objection more strikingly: 
By insisting upon the subsistence of an 
exhaustive, eternal possibility, White-
head reduces 6creation to selection from a catalogue. 
While it is true tba t for 1r.Tb.i te head there are no new 
eternal objects (otherwise they would not be i'eternaln) and 
that all eternal objects are envisaged in God's primordial 
nature, it must also be remembered thatas so envisaged they 
are pure potentials7 ordered in rel~tion to each other but not 
in relation to any pa.rti cular occasion--" there are no 
1. See below, sec. 3. 5. Emmet, WPO, 116. 
2. Cf. PR, 101-102 and 134. 6. Stallknecht, SPC, 137. 
3. Stallknecht, SPC, 137. 7. PR, 32. 
4. See below, sec. 3. 
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preconstructed particulars.•1 God does envisage the fullest 
possible ideals for each occasion, we have insisted, but such 
envisagement in reference to that particular occasion is a 
fu r ction of real, not general potentiality. Is not this en-
visagement a selection from general potentiality? The answer 
would have to be yes but in light of intervening actuality and 
its limitations. The qualification makes the difference. Tbe 
pure potentialities if they are potentialities at all must al-
ways have been potentialities, but this does not mean tb..at they 
have alvmys been real potentialities for any occasion. To 
become so, actuality must intervene. From the standpoint of 
real potentiality for actualization really new forms do arise, 
and the fact that what was merely potential has become really 
potential does involve real ·novelty in the realm of possibility. 
Further, the actualization of those real potentialities in-
volves additional novel synthesis. God and the occasions are 
continually faced with new situations involving new real po-
tentialities. The primordial nature does not rule out real 
novelty. What it does rule out is floating subsistents. Ra-
ther than excluding novelty the primordial nature as envisage-
ment of general potentiality is an "organ of novelty." 2 
1. PR, 160• 
2. PR, 104. Stallknecht's own attempt to do away with general 
potentiality tends to indicate that confusion between real 
and general potentiality is probably the source of his 
charge that Whitehead as a catalogue theory of creation, for 
in place of the general potentiality of the primordial na-
ture of God Stallknecht proposes "super-possibility." 
"There is" he says, "a sort of 'super-possibility' which 
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Fortunately God's primordial nature is an abstract i on. 
It cannot be understood and it is not real apart from his 
consequent and superjective natures and the world. 1 His pri-
mordial nature as an integral part of his total nature is the 
source of order, ideals, rat i onality, and values. As the source 
of order and general potentiality in the unity of God it may 
be considered 11 the principle where by there is initiated a 
definite outcome from a situation otherwise riddled with ambi-
. 2 
guity." In abstraction the primordial nature is non-existent. 
Thus in order to understand the primordial nature more fully 
it is necessary to consider the consequent nature of God. 
2. God's consequent nature, the conserver of values. 
In contrast with the primordial nature Whitehead describes 
God's consequent nature as the side of God which 
originates with physical experience derived 
fro m the temporal world, and thus acquires 
integration with the primordial side. It is 
determined, incomplete3 'everlasting,' fully actual, and conscious. 
It is in his consequent nature that God is the conserver of 
values, for "the consequent nature of God is the fluent world 
becoming 'everlasting' by objective i mmortality in God." 4 
Not only does God initiate subjective aim and thus originate 
stands to possibility as the latter does to actuality. 
Tbere is a process in which new possibility is created and 
this p,rocess enters intb a realm beyond possibility proper." 
(Stallknecht 1 SPC, 138.) Stallknecht's super-possibility 
and Whitehead's general potentiality would seem to be the 
same thing. 
l. PRI 52 B. 
2. PR, 523. 
3. PRI 524. 
4. pR 1 527 • 
1 
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process towards value but every occasi on as having reached its 
satisfaction or intrinsic value affects both it successors as 
cause of initial data and God. Thus Whitehead says, 
He shares with every new creation its actual 
world; and the concrescent creature is ob-
jectified in God as a novel el~me nt in God's 
object ification of that world. 
The consequent nature of God as such is made up of his physi• 
2 
cal feelings of the completed occasions of the world. As a 
result of his consequent nature he is an ever growing develop.. 
ing Uod and nneither God nor the world reaches static com-
3 pletion." Every advance, every new intrinsic value is in-
corporated as complete into God. God is not inclusive of other 
actual enti t ies from the standpoint of e xistential identity 
4 
with them but he is inclusive of their contributions to 
enriched reality. The occasions enrich God in their passing 
5 
and thus their value is preserved "everlastingly." 
But God 's consequent nature is not exhausted as a mere 
1. PR, 523. 
2. PR, 523. 
3. PR, 529. 
4. Hazelton seems to think that God for Whitehead does actually 
include other actual entities and would thus make Whitehead 
a pantheist. He says, nGod has no contemporaries, and is 
thus inclusive of all actual entities even though some of 
them as contemporaries do not interact with each other." 
(Hazelton, VEHW, 292.) Whitehead's emphasis on the contem-
porary independence of entities (e.g. PR, 485.) on atomism 
of actualities (e. g ., PR, 53), and his insistence that oc-
casions become part of God's consequent nature only as ob-
jectively immortal (PR, 527) and thus as peris·hed existen-
tially would indicate that God does not include actual oc-
casions in their actuality in h i s own nature. 
5. PR, 5 24, 527 • . 
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receptacle for value of past occasions. God's consequent na-
ture is conscious 1 Whi t ehead insists 1 1 but physical feeling 
alone is not conscious. Whi t e head defines consc i ousness as 
"the feeling of the contrast of theory as ~ theory with fact 
as mere fact. 112 In other words 1 consciousness involves con-
trast a nd comparison of the ideal and the actual. "It is the 
contrast between 1 in fact' and 'might be 1 " 3 It involves com-
parison a nd evaluation. Now the consequent nature supplies 
the " i n factn but the primordial nature supplies the "might 
be." Accordingly, strictly speaking 1 Whitehead should perhaps 
have said that God is conscious rather than that God's conse-
quent nature is conscious, for his consequent nature alone 
would no more be conscious than his primordial nature. That 
Whi t ehead regards God as a u nity who is conscious becomes evi-
dent in the followin g statement: 
The consequent nature of God is conscious; 
and it is the realization of the actual 
world in the un ity of his nature, and 
through the transformation of his wisdom. 
The primordial nature is concep nal, the con-
sequent nature is t he weaving of God's phy- 4 sical feelings upon his primordial concepts. 
The union of the two na tures in the one conscious be1ng 
of God is a function of God's subjective aim or purpose. In 
the formulative period we discovered5 the purpose o:f God to 
be "the attainment of value in the temporal world. 116 In terms 
of the kingdom of heaven7 t he purpose included the 
5. Chap. III, sec. C, 1. 
6. RIM 1 100 . 
7. RIM, 154-155 . 
1. PR, 524. 
2. PR, 286. 
3. PR 1 407. 
4. PR 1 524. 
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transmutation of "what has been lost into living fact in his 
1 
own nature . 'r The same subjective aim continues for God in 
Process and Reality. His subjective aim arises from his con-
ceptual •realization of the absolute wealth of potentiality"2 
in his primordial nature. Considered in relation to the pri-
mordial nature alone that subjective aim is "that the sub-
jective forms of the feeling shall be such as to constitute the 
3 
eternal objects into relevant lures of feeling,• but a.s such 
in abstraction the aim is a more or less disinterested (from 
the standpoint of particular actualizations) appetition to-
wards rea.liza.tion. 4 This general appetition is a. general con-
dition of process. But actual process through the objective 
immortality of the occasions is the condition of the conse-
quent nature which is in turn united with the primordial nature 
by the then conscious awareness a.nd modification of purpose 
or subjective a.i m as personal, specific, and interested aim 
at actual achievement and preservation of value. The pri~or-
dial and the consequent natures become one in virtue of the 
actual subjective aim of God which is that all actual realities 
will be as they could be. Thus Whitehead says, 
The wisdom of subjective aim prehends 
every actuality for what it can be in 
such a perf ected system--its suffer-
ings, its sorrows, its failures, its 
triumphs, its immediacies of joy--woven 
by rightness of feeling into the harmony 
of universal feeling, which is always 
1. RIM, 155. 
2. PR, 152. 
3. PR, 134. 
4. PR, 160. 
immediate, always many, always one, al-
ways with novel ~dvance, moving onward, 
never perishing. 
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Thus the subjective aim of God in relation to the world is that 
each actual occas i on will realize the fullest, most harmonious 
intrinsic value possible for it, and in relation to himself 
his airn is the preservation and increase of those realized 
values by means of harmonious fusion of them into the per-
fected and developing actuality of his consequent nature. 2 
This is the sense in which Whitehead says the God's consequent 
nature is best conceived under the i mage of a a tender care 
3 
that nothing be lost.~ 
It must be remembered that the division of God's nature 
into primordial and consequent is legitimate for purpose of 
differentiation of functions, out the divisions are abstrac-
tions and nei ther the functions nor God exist so separated. 
While the div ision between primordial and consequent does in-
dicate a logical priority of the primordial to the consequent 
nature and a temporal priority of the completed primord ial 
nature to any particu~r stage in the g rowth of the consequent 
nature it does not mean that there was ever a time when there 
was no consequent nature. The world and God are Co-eternal4 
and thus so are the consequent and primordial natures. White-
head points out that "God's conceptual realization is nonsense 
if thought of under the guise of a barren eternal hypothesis."5 
4. PR, 528. 
5. PR, 530. 
1. "PR, 5 25 • 
2. PR, 532. 
3. PR, 525. 
It is the consequ ent nature of God with it2presupposition and 
uhion with the primordial nature that "is God as really ac-
1 tual." If this is the case, then God's subjective aim which 
unites the two natures has always been production, increase, 
and preservation of value in actuality (which a.ctuality in-
cludes himself but also the world). 
Accordingly, in light of God's subjective aim, if we con-
aider the consequent nature in its function as consequent, 
that is, as 11 derivative 11 and "consequent upon the creative ad-
2 
vance of the world," that function is not merely the preser-
vation of values of realized occasions but their transforma-
tion into the completed unity of value which is God's ever-
growing intrinsic value experience or satisfaction. In this 
sense, God is not only the preserver, but the saviour, 3 and 
4 
the redeemer of value. 
He saves the world as it passes into the 
im..rnediacy of his own life. It is the judg-
ment of a tenderness which loses nothing 
which can be saved. It is also the judg-
ment of a wisdom which uses wha~ in the 
tempora world is mere wreckage. 
Even the evil in the world enters into God's consequent nature 
but as evil, overcome by its transormation into higher value 
in unity of contrast with its ideal opposite. 11 The temporal 
occasions are completed by their everlasting un:ton with their 
6 transformed selves.n 
1. PR, 530. 
2. PR, 523-524. 
3. PR, 525. 
Whitehead points out: 
4. PR, 533. 
5. PR, 525. 
6. PR, 527. 
It is in this way that the immediacy of 
sorrow and pain is transformed into an 
element of triumph1 this is the notion 
of redemption through suffering which 
haunts the world. It is the generali-
zation of its very minor exemplifica-
tion as the aesthetic value of discords 
in art.l 
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Thus God in his consequent nature is the "perfected actuali tyn2 
of t he kingdom of heaven where the discordant and the less 
than best values of the many are synthesized into everlasting 
intrinsic value of the one. "In this sense God is the home 
of values 1 " as Bidney points out. 
3 
It becomes rather obvious that the salvation and redemp-
tion of God's consequent nature is primarily an aesthetic 
salvation. Sorrow, suffering , and evil are overcome 1 out, if 
we stop with God's consequent nature 1 they are overcome for 
God but not for us. Out of suffering and evil God realizes 
aesthetic enjoyment. Further, the very aesthetic enjoyment of 
God 1s consequent nature would seem to require suffering if 1 as 
in art, discords up to a point increase the richness of the 
experience. On the surface at least it would ap pear that some-
thing has happened to God 1 s moral nature. Ely in his !he 
Religious A~ailability ££ Whitehead's God draws exactly the 
seemingly implied conclusions from God 1 s consequent nature. He 
points out 1 "It is no help for present ills to know that God 
sees them in such a way that they are valuable for him. \11 4 At 
the very least 1 Ely insists, Whitel:md 1 s view means that we 
1· PRI 531. 
2. PR, 5 32. 
3. Bidney 1 Art.(l936) 1 590. 
4. Ely, RAWGI 41. 
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existents do not really know what evil is. If we had "the 
long view and the broad view--God's view--what seems to us 
evil is not really evil. 111 God's goodness becomes highly 
questionable. 
The obvious but sinister implication is 
simply this: whatever happens is of no 
account in itself, since it is valuable 
only in so far as it cont ributes an ele-
ment to God's experience. Such an im-
plication sucks the vital juices from 
Whitehead's basic metaphysical conten-
tion that every a~tuality is something 
for its own sake. 
Ely then concludes~ 
God, overwhelmed with an immense vision 
of cosmic beauty, is not concerned with 
our finite sufferings, difficulties, 
triumphs--except as material for aesthe-
tic delight. God, we must say definitely, 
is not pri~rily good. He wills the 
beautiful. 
That the Q~ity of achieved value in God's consequent 
nature is primarily aesthetic can hardly be denied. Further, 
if we stop with the account of God's consequent nature Ely's 
charges would certainly seem at least to have a basis in 
fact. However, Whitehead does not stop with God's conse-
quent nature. It must not be forgotten that God has a super-
jective nature also. But before we proceed to look at the 
value function of God's superjective nature which, it seems 
to us, furnishes an answer to Ely's main contention that God 
is indifferent to what happens i~ the actual world except as 
1. Ely, RAWG, 51. 
2. Ely, RAWG, 50. 
3. Ely, RAWG, 50. 
1 
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contributing to his value experience, it must be pointed out 
in defense of God's consequent nature that Whitehead does not 
say that evil is necessary for the contrast in God nor does be 
say that God is m1concerned with evil. Evil is obstructive 
and destructive for God as well as for actual occasions. The 
implication throughout is that had the evil occasions realized 
the highest ideals God in t ended for them in initiating their 
subjective aims higher value for all including God would have 
resulted, but since they did not, God in so far as possible 
dismisses the evil into "triviality of mere individual facts,tt 1 
but he saves what can be saved, and every occasion as a satis-
faction has some intrinsic value low on the scale though that 
value may be. "It ••• is a judgment of a wisdom which uses 
2 
what in the temporal world is mere wreckage" in order that 
•the gpod they did achieve in individual joy; in individual 
3 
sorrow; in the introduction of needed contrast is saved. 1' Thus 
in his consequent nature God saved whatever in the way of value 
is present. 
3. God's superjective nature, the immediate source 
of value. 
The superjective nature of God is God's effect on or ac-
tive relation to the world of becoming. It must be pointed out 
-----1. PR, 525. Underlining mine. ••rn so far as possible" is a 
necessary qualification because of the unavoidable effect 
on real possibility of such occasions. 
2. PR, 525. 
3. PR, 525. 
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that God's superjective nature is no more a part of his imme-
diate experience as an actual entity than the realized super-
ject or decision is a part of the immediate experience of 
actual occasions, except for the fact that God does not perish 
with his superjective influence. Further, if the superjective 
nature is to be understood it again must be kept in mind that 
God is not two Gods, primordial and consequent, but one. 
With these considerations Whitehead's description of God's 
superjective nature becomes extremely important to an under-
standing of the concept of God as a whole and his value rela-
tiona to the world. Whitehead describes the superjective 
nature only twice. In the first statement he says, 
The 1superjective 1 nature of God is the charac-
ter of the pragmatic value of his special satis-
faction qualifying the transcendent creativity 
in the various temporal instances. 
In the second description Whitehead says that in God's super-
j e c t i ve na tur e 
the creative action completes itself. For the 
perf ected actuality passes back into the tempo-
ral world, and qualifies this world so that each 
temporal actuality includes it as an immediate 
fact of relevant expe~ience ••• This is the love 
of God for the world. 
In other words, God's effect upon each oc casion is from 
God's standpoint a superjicient effect. It is a result not 
just of his primoridial nature but of his complete being. 
But, the question arises, just what is this effect? We have 
already discovered that the way in which God affects each 
1. PR, 135. 2. PR, 532. 
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no i t h e r prL orC:.i ;:- 1 1. or c onr;eq_llf:nt n·>.ture . 
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of past actualities in his consequent nature as well as be-
cause of God's primordial nature and envisagement of poten-
tialities. If this is the case then the charge of indifferen-
tism brought by Ely loses its sting, for God's "tender care" 
and salvage of value out of disvalue is not for himself alone 
but for the fullest possible enrichment of future occasions 
as well. An occasion may so modify the initial subjective 
aim that in comparison with God's relevant ideal it is evil. 
God does not act by force but rather is "the poet of the world, 
with tender patience leading it by his vision of truth, beauty, 
and goodness." 1 Together God and the world form a community 
of mutually enriching intrinsic value experiences. 
What is done in the world is transformed 
into a reality in heaven, and the reality 
in heaven passes back into the world. By 
reason of this rec i procal relation, the 
love in the world passes into love in 
heaven, and floods back again into the 
world. In this sense, God is the great 
compani~n--the fellow suf ferer who under-
stands. 
1. PR, 526. 
2. PR, 532. In light of the whole nature of God and the 
mutual value relations of God and the world the so-called 
antitheses of PR {Cf. PR, 528) lose their antithetical 
character. For example, from this point of view "it is 
true to say that God creates the world as that the World 
creates God." If we are correct, Miss Stabbing's state-
ment, "To me at least the possitions remains a flat contra-
diction, which reveals the hopeless confusion of the 
philosophy of organism" (3ebing, Art.Lf9307, 299} 1 results from a failure to grasp the basic contentions of White-
head's position. In contrast both to Miss Stebbing and 
Ely, Bixler would seem to be much nearer to Whitehead's 
spirit: "God is not ••• the 'twholly Other' of arbitrary 
sovereign will, or despot ••• God needs the world as much as 
the world needs God.• {Bixler, Art.if94l7, 509.) 
Perhaps the most significant addition to Whitehead's 
theory of value in ~££~ and Real!!l is his more careful 
analysis of the concept of God as the source and conserver 
GOO 
of values, and the recognition that God as the source of value 
for actual occasions on the one hand and the realizer of value 
on the other. is temporal and developing. From the standpoint 
of God's realizat i on of value the actual occasions can be 
considered the sources of value. The nature of the community 
of value realization which is the universe has become more 
evident. 
In Process and Reality both Nhitehead's perfectionism 
and his aestheticism receive further elaboration. Intrinsic 
value can be defined as self-realized aesthetic satisfaction. 
Intrinsic values as experienced values are sub jective in nature 
whereas ideals as eternal objects can be considered objective. 
Whereas in the period of metaphysical formulation intrinsic 
value and actuality were considered to be synonymous, White-
head now considers actuality to be a wider term than intrinsic 
value which he restricts to the completed satisfaction of the 
occasion. However, in a derivative sense the antic i patory 
enjoyment of subjective aim as also certain subordinate feel-
ing syntheses may be said to have intrinsic value. However, 
the general axiocentric framework of the earlier period has 
persisted without major alteration in Proce~ and Reality and 
many of the missing or inadequate features have been added or 
subjected to more careful analysis. 
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In the period to follow the one feature of value theory 
which has been more or less conspicuously absent up to this 
point, i.e. types of value and their relations to each other 
tend to become a central problem. For the completion of his 
value theory, Whitehead next proceeded to this essential task. 
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CHAP'l'ER V. 
Adventures in Value. 
In th3 period following Process and Reality VVhi tehead 
returned a gain to his emphasis upon the approximate iden-
tification of actuality and value of the formulative period.l 
The restriction of intrinsic value to the final phase of 
actuality characteristic of Process and Reality2 becomes 
less predominant. Experience reveals and presupposes "a 
contemporary world throhh ing with energ etic values. rr3 
There is no dead nature. 11Al l ultimate reasons are in 
terms of aim at value ••• I t is the essence of life that 
it exists for its own sake, as the intrinsic reaping of 
value." 4 The older mechanical concept of "a dead nature 
can g ive n o reasons," for tta dead nature aims at nothing .n5 
But if existence is value experience, then, as noted 
before, 6 unless the term value is to become a meaning less 
g enerality it b ecomes i mportant to consider more carefully 
differe nces between values in terms of deg rees of value 
(intrinsic and instrumental) on the one hand and inter-
related types of value on the o ther . If we are to beg in 
with uthe sense of existen ce as value-experience," we cannot 
proceed very far in awareness or understanding hefore rtthe 
total value-expe rien ce is discriminated into this value-
1. See Chap. III , sec. B, L . 4. MOT, 184. 
2. See Chap. IV, sec. n . 5. NIO'r , 184 • 
3. AOI , 282. 6 . See Chap. III, sec • .o ,l. 
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ex perien ce and t h ose value-experiences .rrl Whi le White-
head had already pointed out a number of ways o f distin-
g uishing bet wee n degre e s of value real ized2 , yet he retur n s 
in the present period to a more care fu l analysis of certain 
of the conditions o f increased value and t h e con cept of i m-
portance itself as contrasted with the more abstract con-
ce p t of mere ma tter-of-fact . Furth er, wh ile Whitehead does 
not undertake any thing lik e a n exhaustive treatment of 
types of value, he does suggest more clearly than in the 
earlier p eriods3 what some of t h e major types of va lue (a t 
le a st from the standpoint of h wnan experience) are and h ow 
these types of value are interrelated or interpe netrate. 
However, b efore investig ating this renewed emphasis on 
importance and types of value it is necessary to cons ider 
first Wh itehead's restatement of the fundame n tal r.ature of 
value itself. 
A. Value experie n ce and i mport ance. 
1. Individual i ntr insic value and societies . 
I n each of the maj or work s of this period of elabora-
tion Whitehead re-emphasizes the individual, self - determining , 
aes the ti c and i mmediate chara cter of all occasions of realit y 
as value experiences. Thus in The :fi'unct ion o f Reason Wh ite-
h e a d insists, rr Each actuality is an occasion of experien ce, 
1. MoT, 150. 
2. Cf. Chap . III, sec . B,2, and Chap . IV. sec. 6 . 
3. Cf. Chap . III, sec. i5 ,2. 
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the outcome of it~ O\m purposes ." 1 In Adventures of Ideas 
he states: 
The individual immediacy of an occasion is 
the final unity of suhjective form , wh ich 
is t h e occa sion as an a b solute reali t y . This 
immediac ~r is it s moment of sheer individ ual-
ity ••• It en joys its decissive moment of ab -
solute self-attainment as emotional unit y . 2 
Aga in in Modes of Thoug ht , Wh itehead says: 
The essen ce of existence lies in the tra n si-
tion from datum to issue . Th is is the pro-
cess of self-determination ••• The vividness 
o f life lies in the transition , with its forms 
arisi ng at the issue . Actuality in its esse n ce 
is aim at self-formation.~ 
Eac h occasion is an intrinsic value experie n ce. As 
self-for mative it is characterized b y the " notion of worth11 
which 11 is the sense of existen ce fo r its OV'm s ake, of axis-
te n ce wh ich is its ow n justification, of existence with its 
own character. 114 .Every occasion is a llself-e n joyment . 11 5 
This self-enjoyment is essentially aesthetic in nature . 6 
As a n aesthetic experience, a n occ a sion in its a ctuality 
is individua l a nd private . 
It involv es a suhjective se nse of individuality. 
It is ~ enjo~rment . I may forg et mysel f' ; b ut 
all the same the e r_ j oyment is mine. Aesthet i~ 
Brijoyment demands an individualized universe. 
! . .f'OR , 25. 
2. AOI, 227 . 
3. MOT , 131. 
4 . MOT, 149. 
5. AOI, 249. 
6. AOI, 249; MOT, 108; ESP , 160. 
7. ESP , 130. ESP , like AOE , is a collection of articles 
by Whitehead, nine of wh ich-- 11 Historical Chang es" (1930), 
"Process arrl Reality 11 (1932), 11 The Study o f the Past 11 
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Accordins l y , as a unit o f aesthetic self-realizationl an 
occas ion is a 11 value-exper ience 11 and 11value-experience" 
can e described as 11 con stituting the essential nature of 
each pulsa t ion of actuality . Everyt :n i n&j has some value for 
itself, for others, and for the whole . This characterizes 
the meaning of actuality . n2 
Again in this peri od Whitehead emphasizes the a loneness3 
o f experience of intrinsic value. 'Nhile all occa sions orig i-
nate from the common pa st through the o1'J jec tive imnJ.Ortality 
of past occasi on s yet i n t heir moments of triumph they are 
alone. 11 The immediate activity of self-causation is se parate 
a nd private so far as contemporaries are concer ned. 114 It is 
this very ind epende n ce from contemporaries that makes possib le 
the freedom i n self-realization which higher occasion s do have 
in actuality and which all oc casions have theoretically . "The 
n ovelties which face t h e contemporary world are solved in 
isolation by t he cont e mporary occasions. 115 An occasion 's 
freedom fro m contemporary interference alloVTs that oc casion 
"a welcome environment for irrespon s j_r ilit y 11 6 and the rery 
imposes res ponsibility on each oc ca sion7 f or wha t it does 
b ecome. The universe contain s an element of real con ting ency 
pre sent in every actuality. "'rhe vast causal indep ende nce 
(1933), ttrndication, Classes, Numher , Validation11 (1934), 
11 Memories" (1936), 11 Harvard, The F'uture" (1936 ), nAn Appeal 
to Sanity" (1937), nAnalysis of I ea n ing " (1937), "John 
De wey and h is In~lue ncen (1939)--are from the period under 
con sideration. 
1. Cf. Chap. IV, sec. B. 5. AOI, 255. 
2. MOT, 151. 6. AOI, 251. 
3. Cf. Chap. III , sec. C,2,a . 7. ESP , 160. 
4. AOI , 252. 
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of contemporary occasions is the preservative of elb ow-room . 
within the universe. nl According ly, vVhi t ehead states, rtThere 
always remains the aolus cur~ solo. We have developed a moral 
individuality; and in that respect we face the universe--alone. 112 
Aloneness and individuality, however, are not the whole 
story. An occasion must have some value for itself, but; it 
also must have some value !tfor others, and for the wholen3 
to have value for itself. As Whitehead has contended from 
the b eg inn i ng of his metaphysical formulations so he continues 
to insist now: the occasion's value for self or intrinsic 
value is itself a functio n of t h e value of ot hers for it 
a nd its va lue for others. An occ a sion's "imrnediac ~r· is the 
r ealization of p o tentia lities of the past, and is the store-
house of the p otenti a 1 it ie s of the future. rt4 li'rom the 
stand p oint of i nheritan ce from the pas t of t h e issues o f 
past occasions, t h ose past occa sions c an h e said to h e 
11 i wma :rent n 5 in the pr e s e r:t, and from the standpoint of t h e 
presePt occasion's issue i n the future, t h e future and thus 
the occasion's value for ot hers ca n als o he s a i d to h e 
i mma nent i n the present by a n ticipation. 6 Accordin(; l y , wb ile 
all con teffip orary occasions are a lone and inde pe ndent i n intrin-
sic value realization , yet at the same time all occ a sions a s 
tnstrumental to each other can b e co n sidered mutual l y ifl'l..manent 
in each o ther . 7 Even contemporary occasions can h e c on sidered 
1 . AOI, 251 . ESP, 118 . 
2. ESP , 160 . 6. AOI , 250. 
3. MO'I' , 151 . 7 . AO I, 278 . It must l)e k e pt in 
4 . L!OT , 136 . mind that mutual immanence does 
5 . AOI, 250, 254' 258 , 278 ; not mean existe n tial _ide n tity. 
292 
mutua lly i !J1...manent from t h e standpoint o f inheritance from 
a common pa st ard. contribution to a common f uture and as 
mut ually ob jectifying e a ch ot h er . 1 Thus 1Vhitehead say s, 
11 The k e y to metaphysics is t h is doct rine o f mutua l i mmar:.ence, 
each side lendirg to the oth er a factor necessary for its 
reality . 112 This doctrine of mutua l imman en ce whi ch o n f irst 
v i ew mi g ht see m f latly c ont r adi ctory to the doctri ne of 
contemporary i ndepe nde n ce be comes not on l y intelli3 i h le 
bu t a n eces sar y principle of expl anati on vvhe n it is recog -
nized t ha t i t is simp ly a n o ther way of stat i ng the rr..ut ua lly 
i n s t r umen t a l va l u e of a ll occas ion s to t h e rea lizati on o f 
ir:.trin sic va lue on the part of any on e occasion and its 
i nstrumental value to a ll the others . 3 Lecause of mutua l 
immanence, nsocial l ife is the provision of opportunity , 11 4 
and wi t h out mu tua l i mmane n ce n o occa si on cou l d ecome . 
Those occ asions which form societies 5 a r e more d ir e ctly 
mutual l y i mmane n t , t hat is , more d irectly mu t ua lly i ns tru-
me ntal to ea ch ot her 1 s va lue rea lizati on s , than a ny o f the 
membe rs of t r_.at s ociet y are t o o ther occa sion s . Such mem-
bersh i p in a societ y i mposes restricti ons or poss i b ili t ies 
f or realiza tion . 11 The me mlJers of a societ y ar e alike l:lecause , 
by rea son of their co!!l...mon ch ara c te r , t he ~r i moose on other 
mem ers o f t he society the condition s wh ic h lea d to t ha t 
1 . Cf . Chap . IV , sec . A, 2 . 
2 . ESP , 1 18 . 
3 . Cf . Chap . I II , se c . C,l . 
4 . ESP, 65 . 
5 . Cf . Chap . I V, sec . A, 2 . 
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likeness . n l Me mhership i n a societ y is t he fi rst condition 
of increased value realization , f or s u c h membership is the 
onl y p os sihi lity of the e1"1_durance we discover·ed to he one 
of the categ ories of inc reased value in the for~ l ative 
p eriod . 2 
While in societie s of a low order3 -- so-called ira n imate 
obje c ts - -conf ormit y and restriction are paramount , yet in 
h i sher types of societies the societ a l co nditions-- the re -
actua lization of t h e societies ' cha r acteristic o te n tia lities 
i n s u ccessive occasior< s--are also the condi t ion s o f' si ; n i f i-
cant n ove l ty i n t h ose occ a sions . Wit h s uccess ive occasions 
the inh eritance , t h e potentialiti es, and the realiza tion s 
are pro2 ressively enriched i n lig ht o f steadfa st n ess of pur -
pose . The hi ,.,.her up the scale an occasi or: is, t h e more 
i mportan t its societ a l re l ation s are for its own e nriched 
i ntri ~s ic value . For examp l e , i n the c a se o f fu lly liv ing 
o ccasion s , 
the essence of l ife is the l;ele olog i cal 
introduction of novelty, with some con -
f ormat ion o f objects . 'rhus novelt y o f 
circ ums tance is met with nove lt v of func-
tion in; adapted to steadiness oi purpose. 4 
The h i ghest type values are on l y reac h ed by occa sions 
i n societies wh ich in turn are s upported by societies of 
societies wh ich make possib le the widest real pote n tialities . 
1. AO I , 261. 
2 . Chap . III, sec. B , 2 , b . 
3 . AO I , 271. 
4 . AOI , 2 66 . 
l 
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For the dom i nant pers ona l societie s mak ing up the "soul o f 
man" or "the indi v idua l experiences of' t h e animals" 
t b e whole h ody is org anized , so t ha t a 
g eneral coordination of ment a lity is 
f inally poured i n to the succesive occa-
sion s of t h is per sonal society . l 
The occ a sions of a ll of the s ubor dina t e societies are in 
turn e nriched or destroye d by wh et h er or n ot the occasion s 
o f the per sona l societ y realize the heig h th o f intrin sic 
v a l ues made poss ib l e f or them by a l l o f these s ubordinate 
occ a sions . All o f the i ntrinsic values rea lized a r e 
realized i n and by i nd ividua l occ a sion s b ut s6cieties a nd 
societies of societies are the conditions of a ll such 
higher rea liza tion s . In th is sense, \Vh i tehead p oint s out, 
" the ·universe achieves its value s hy rea son of' lts coordinat ion 
into societies of societi e s . " 2 Exi ste n ce is a cooperative 
en deavor . "There is a unity in t h e universe, enjoyin;; value 
and ( hy its i mman ence) sharing va lue . " 3 
As a membe r o f socie ty , a s dependen t on society, as 
r ea li z i ns its i ntrinsic value through its relation t o 
society , as e nrich i nG (or i mpoverishing ) society through 
its r e a l izat ion o f value ard objective i mmortalit y , "each 
occ asion , a lthough engaged in i t s own i mmediat e self-rea li-
zati on , is concerned with t h e universe. 114 In fa c t , e a c h 
occ a sion , 1,-h iteh e ad s ay s, can h e considered 11a n activit y o f 
1 . AO I, 271 . 
2 . AOI , 264 . 
3. _,!OT , 164 . 
4 . I'.~ Ur , 229 . 
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co:r: cern , i n the · u alc er se r:. se of t ha t term. nl It feels t h e 
re levance of all other occa sion s for it and its relevance 
beyond itself to all ot ~er occasion s . The relevance lies 
i n mutua lly i n strumen tal value re l ati on s . 
Yot on.Ly then is the societ y a cond ition of value 
re a l i za tion o f the individual occa sions , hut, conversely , 
t h e occasions are the condi tion s o f the value of the societ y 
i n i t s i n strumenta lit y as a s ociety . From the s ta nd poir:.t o f' 
ary occasion of the socie ty the wort h o f t h e societ.·- to tha t 
occ a s ion is proportiona l to the value rea l ization which it 
ma lces possib le . 1.'h i t ehe ad poi n ts out t he extre mely i mp ortan t 
i mp l i cat ion f or human societies . 
The worth of any social system de pe nd s on 
the va lue experience it promotes a mons in-
dividua l human 'b ei n~ s •.• A commun it ~· lii·e 
is a mode of elicitinG va lue for t h e pe ople 
co n cerned . 2 
Thus a s ociety wh ich hinders a nd destroys v a lue realization 
is a s ocie ty wh ich ou.g h t to h e chang ed . But t h e converse 
of the stat ement is e qua lly true . The worth of a soci.et y is 
prop ortiona l to the intrin sic va l ue s rea lized or t h e worth 
o .f the i ndividua l o cca sion s . Thus if the societ ~r is to e 
chang e d the individua ls must 'l) e chanc;ed . 11 There i s n o one 
1 . MOT , 229 . Cf . al so AO I , 226: 0 The 11asic ex )erie n ce is 
e motiona l. Stated more :enera lly , t he 'basi c fa ct is 
t he rise of an affective tor e orig inatin r.· from t h ing s 
whose re levance is g iven ••• Thus the '.).u a l{e r word 1 con -
cern ,' divested o f any s ugzestion of kn owledg e, is 
mor e fitted to express t h is funda me n tal struc ture." 
2 . ESP , 64 - 65 . 
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American v a lue experie n ce other tha n t e man y e x perie n ces 
of indiv i d ual Amel"ica n s . rrl 
The justification of a society lies i n t h e va l ue s it 
ma kes possih le . The ind iv idual ' s ohligation t o society is 
to realize the h i ghest va lue s o f which he is ca pab le. Eut 
a society ' s ob l i t;a tion t o the individual is the o'l;l l.gat ion 
o f a ll i nd ividuals to each o the r t o promote mutua l va lue 
rela tion s. To a ce rt a in extent. t h is mu tua l re l ation , \rhi teh ead 
fee 1 s, h old s through ou t the universe b e twee n a 1 1 soc ie ti e s 
and occa sions . It is in t h is sense t ha t ·~v:'1 itehe ad i n s i sts , 
11 The ba sis of de mocra c y i s the common fa ct o f va l ue - experien ce, 
as con stuti r.s t he esse r. tial nature of eac h pulsation o f 
actua l ity . 112 'rhe universe mi ght be des crib ed a s a democra c y 
of va lue realizing o c casi on s . 
2 . Importance . 
I n I·.r: odes of Thought Whitehead turn s to an analy sis or 
co Ds iderat i on of the con cept of i mpor t an ce itself . \V e have 
a lready me t th e con ce pt i n the formati ve period3 where its 
mea n ing s we re re l a tively clear . We discovered t ha t at that 
time i mpor ta n ce primaril y me ant relative d egrees of va l u e, 
b o t h i n tr i rsic and i nstrume nt a l, and , on t he basis o f t ~ is 
me an i r.g we wepe ab l e to poi n t out a numher o f' cate,sorie s of 
i mportan ce. Alon,g wtth the primary mear:. i n ; we a lso disc overed 
a s econdary meaning derivative from the first wh ereh y i~por ta n ce 
l. E SP , 65 . 
2 • I vi OT , 1 51 • 
3 . Chap . I II , sec . B, 2 . 
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d id not me an relative deg ree of value i n the sense of 
increas e of value but rat t ter relative degree of p·os itive 
or negative effect upon further value synthesis . 
In Hhitehead ' s return t o and more leng t h3r d iscussion 
of importance i n Modes of Thou rzht at fir st g lance at lea st 
the problem is complica ted rather than clarified . )\T o such 
clear cut meaning s emerg e as i n the earlier per iod . 1 ot only 
are hoth of the ear 1 ier mean ing s pr· es en t but many of ·.~Jl..:li tehead ' s 
statements wou ld seem t o equate impor tan ce and value . 1 In 
su ch sta tements a s "The i mp ortance of man is the s upreme 
exampl e of a livine; organ ism"2 \'Vh i tehead would seem to be 
usi ne; the term as meanil).:; both relative de gree of intrin sic 
va l ue a nd relative degr ee of posi tive or ne gative e ffe ct 
on other value synthesi s . Yet his use of the term 11 i ntri nsi c 
i mportar:. ce 113 and such statene nt s a s "Actuality is t be sel f -
enj oyment of importa nce, ~ 11 My importance i s my emo t ional 
worth n ow, " 5 and 11 The dim mean ing of fact ••• is intrinsic 
h 1 n6 importance for i t self , for others , and for the w o_e would 
see m to equate i ntrin s ic value ar:.d i mportan ce . 'upt her, ~-.'l.._,_ it e-
head says that i mportance can be partia lly d e fined as 11 inte r est 117 
on the basis of whi ch f eeling s and potentialities are ·r ad ed 8 G 1 
and yet in the same parag r aph he insists that that wh ich is 
gPaded is i mportance - -"but perspective i s g rada tion of 
1 . E . g .' MOT , 159 , 15 0 , 161. 5 . MO'r , 1 6 0 . 
2 . AOI , 29 . 6 . MO'J: , 159 . 
3 . AOI , 5 . 
' 
I1EO'r, 159 , 162 . 7 . l'!IOT , 1 6 . 
4 . lVi OT , 161. 8 . Tv!. OT, 14 . 
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relevance, that is to say , it is gr adat i on of i mpor tance . "l 
F inally, i n line with ~/!iss Emmet 's contention that importance 
is the gene ric term f or va l ue 2 Whit ehead does say , 
Importa nce is a generic r..otion wh ich ha s lJeen 
ob scured by the overwhelming promine n ce of a 
few of' its innumerab l e s pecies. r.rhe terms 
' mora lity , I 1 log ic , 1 ' relig ion , 1 ' art , 1 have 
each of' t h em be en claimed as exha·usting the 
whole mean i ng of importance.3 
To b orrow a phrase f rom a popu l ar mac azine , 4 i t would a l mo st 
seem at first tbat t h e concept. of' importance lJelonc; s in "the 
de partment of utter confu s ion . " 
T ith furt her consideration, however , the mea nins of 
imoorta nc e ter.d s to hecome more evide n t . Tha t i mportance 
is no~ t o lJe equated with va lue wou l d s ee m t o "lJ e i nd icated 
by the fa ct that VV1'l i tehe ad uses 1:-l oth terms --value a nd i mport -
an ce -- in 1'/~ odes of ·rhought wit h out posil~ive ly ide ~ti fyin2: 
the m. Va lue wou l d seem to he the more basi c term characteri z -
i nb a ll re a l itie s ~ realiti e s . As ha s lJeer- evide n t through-
out our di scu ssion o f the philosoph,y of organism, intrin sic 
value is t h e actual exper ience of the se l f-realized a esthet ic 
unity of an occasion , its se l f - enjoyment , i ts satisfaction , 
and , as s uch , is t h e qualitative nature of an oc casion a s 
actual . In t odes of Thought Wh itehead i d e ntifi e s the se nse 
of existe nce ·wi t h va l ue expe rie nce 5 and considers "value -
1. IV::OT , 14 , 
2 . _;mmet , Art.(l946 ), 236. 
3. MOT , 1 6 . 
4 . The 1r ew Yorker. 
5 . MOT , -r50. 
experience as constituting the esse n t ial nature of each pul-
sa t. ion o f actuality . nl Bn t as has b e en and is also e v ide n t 
occa sions a s experiences of i nt rinsi c v a l ue differ in degree 
o t value realized. Further, part of the intr insi c value 
itse l f is realization on the part of an occasion of its own 
re l a ti ve stand i ng i n r ela tion t o o t her occasi ons and what 
i t could have bee n , of i t s instrumentality b e y ond i t sel f , 
and of the instrume nta li ty positive or n egativ e o f oth er 
I 
occasions of instrin sic value to itsel f . As pointed out, 
the occasion as va l ue experie n ce ha s trco n cern "2 ab out itsel f , 
its past , and its futur e. According ly, the awareness, or 
reco5n ition, or judgment ( in h i gher occasions) o f re lat i ve 
deg ree o f i n tri n sic and i nst r umenta l v a lue and/or disvalue 
and the funct ion o f that a'Narene s s in inte n sifying the value 
realized is, i t see ms to us, what is meant by the co n ce pt of 
imp orta n ce f or Whitehead in t h is period . If t his is t h e case , 
the n the me~n ing o f the term i mpor tance , while more comp l ex , 
has not substantially s h i fted from its use i n the format iv e 
period thoug h the functi on of i mpor tan ce a s a co nstitutent 
o f value rea l iza tion is made more evide n t . 
'rhere would see m to be a number o f f a ctors supportin g 
our i n terpretation . In the first p l ac e, Wh i tehead po ints out , 
the se n se of i n:portance is a f unc t ion of the 
analysis o f ex perienced qua li ty . It is ha r d l y 
too much to s ay this . But it is too mu c h ; or 
r ather, it is too s i mp l e an explanation.3 
1. ~OT , 151 . 3. MOT , 162. 
2. MOT , 226, 229 , and see a b ove. 
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The reason it is too simple an expla natior is twofold: First 
analysis implies clarity and distinctness, but clarity is 
not a sure guide to i mpor tanc e. 1 The aware ness of relevance 
and the releva n ce of awareness which is import an ce may be a 
dim feelins dis crimi nation-- 11 the dim mea n ing of f act 11 2 __ 
whi c h makes all the difference in value realized. Sec~nd, 
a nd foll owing from the first, t h e i mportance is not merely 
the discriminat ion o f' analysis but the function of' t hat dis-
criminat ion as itself par t of t h e value exper ie n ce. The 
rr Have a care, here is something that rnattersn 3 or the dis-
crimina tive f eature of i mportance is also importa n t as an 
element in realization or value experience. Furth er, the 
a wareness of its own relative deg~ee of intrinsic va l ue 
either (1) i n reference to its own instrumentality beyond 
itself or (2) in relation to the releva nce of factors i n its 
own bec omi ng on the part of an occasion is what \'\11J. iteh ead 
means by "intrinsic i mportance. 11 On t h is 'bas is ~:!h i t e h ead 
ca n say "Intrinsic i mportance means 'imp ortance f or itself 111 4 
and "There has t o he i n every case a selection of ends depen ... 
den t partially on intrinsic i mportance if attained 115 without 
running into the dlffi c ulties i nvolved in ide n tifying value 
a nd import ance. Intrin sic importance, i.e. awareness of 
relative degree o f intrinsic value, is itself a compnnent 
1. AOI , 210. 4. l'JOT , 162. 
2. MO'r, 159 . 5. AOI , 72. 
3. MOT, 159 . 
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and condition of h eighte ned intrin sic value. 
It is i n this dou'b le se n se o f awarenes s of relative 
a e ,;ree of va lue (instrumental and intrin sic) as condit ion 
a nd comp on ent of value realization that Whitehead poi r ts out: 
'Importance' ••• can ~e i nade quat ely defined 
as 'Interest,' i nvolving t hat i nt e nsity of 
individual feeling which leads to pub licity 
of expression ••• The d e f inition is i nadequate 
b ecause t h ere are two as pects to Import an ce; 
one ba sed on t h e unity o f the Universe, the 
o ther on the ind ividuali t y of the deta ils, 
the word 'In tere st' suggests the l atter a s pect ; 
the word 'Importan ce' le an s towards the 1'ormer.l 
On the basis of i mportan ce pers pectiv e is possihle hut the 
2 
per spec t i v e is itself a " g radation of' i mpoPtanc e 11 of the 
i nst rumentality o f other i n tri n sic value r ealiza ti ons. The 
seemi ng contradiction disappears. It b ecomes prog ressively 
eviden t t ha t importance is prima rily another way o f sta ting 
the converse relati on of instrumental and intrin sic v a lue 
·with emphasi s p l a ced upon de g re e s of v a lue aD.d relatednes s . 
As the con cept of relevan ce of types and d egre es o f value 
fo r realization i mport ance is a a0 e n eric n otionrr 3 which i :r.. -
cludes "' moral i ty ,' 'log ic,' 1 art 1114 as relevar:. t to any 
particul ar v a lue r e a l i za t ion. The con ce pt of' i mporta n ce is 
ne c e s sary to any va lue realization b ot h a s co ndition and a s 
compOnent a n d a ccording l y tends to t ake the place i n ~odes 
of Thought of the more specific conce pts of ne gative prehen-
s ion and valuat ion whi ch in Proce ss a r:>d Realit y f or the basis 
1. .ViOT, 11. 3. I\WT , 16. 
2. MOT , 14. 4. IviO'r , 16. 
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and ac t of selection and assessment of pote n tialities f or 
1 • .L. i 1 rea _l za~,. o n . 
Wh itehead proceeds to relate t h e con ce p t of iw portan ce 
as awareness and a ssessment of value relations to two other 
con cepts, matter-o f -fact and ex pression . Mat t e r-of-fact in 
its fu ll concreteness is co n s t ituted by the man i f old o f i nter -
related value realizations whi ch are reality, but i f we think 
of mat ter - of-fa ct in terms of' t he settled past or the g i ve n 
factors in a prese n t occasion of ex perie n ce, or o f reality 
pr i marily i n terms of its "ob stina te, irreducible , limited 
fa c ts , " 2 i n terms o f the Hfa cts " with which the scie nces 
dea l, suc h matter-of-fact tends to stand i n opp os i tion to 
importance and its character as aware!less of i n trinsi c and 
instrumental value relations . So · con sidered i t be come s 
11 me re matter-of -fac t . " 3 Such mat ter-o f -fa ct considered a s 
t h e stahle, inherited, analyzable, g iven character i st ics of 
experience is i ts elf an i mportan t con ce p t , for awareness 
a nd knowledge of matter-of - fa ct in this se n se is awareness 
a rxl k now 1 edg e of rea 1 pot e n t i. a 1 it y . As such rna t t e r-of-f a c t 
not only ha s g i ve n r ise to the sciences but is necessary to 
the co n cept of i mportan ce . 
'rhere is n o escape from s heer matter-of-fa c t . 
It is the ba sis o f importance; and the i m-
por t ance is i mportan 4 be caus e of the ine s cap-
able ma tter-of- f a c t . 
1. Cf . Chap . IV , sec . A,2. 3 . I1Wr , 10 . 
2 . Sl'/i.VV , 137 . 4. I:o·r , 15 . 
'rhe sett l ed pas t is always with us and is the hasis for 
present realization and adva n ce . 
As i mportant as matt er-of-fact is, however, it is an 
abstraction 1 from concrete axiocent ric reality. The concept 
of ma tter-of-fact is the abstraction of the form2 of process 
from the actuality of pr ocess as realization of value. It is 
the abs traction of determinism and necessit y from teleologica l 
freedom and selection . 3 
The mere not ion of rna tter-of-fact is the 
emerg ence into t h ou ght of t he habit o f 
mere exi ste n ce to coordtnate itself with 
the nece ss ities of external activity. It 
is the recognition of the g oing s-on of 
nature in which we, and all thing s of al l 
types are iw~ersed . It has its orig in in 
the thought of ourselves as process i mmersed 
in process beyo nd ourselves . This g rasp of 
factualit y is one extreme of thought. 
n ame l y , it is the concept of me re a 0 itation 
of thi n; s a;ita ted. 4 
The co n cept i s b oth valuahle and applicable within limits 
and when recogniz ed for the abstraction which it is. It 
corresponds to Royce's World of Descripti on, 5 but like Roy ce's 
··orld of De scription matter - o f - fa ct in itsel f is a n ab stra c -
tion, is not reality, is tts h ow 11 ( Sche in ) as Be ,;el wou l d say,6 
is .myt h , 7 whe n considered apart from the World o f 1 ppreciation. 8 
The con ce p t of matter-of-fact is itself the result of a 
judgment of i mportance or value relevance . 
1·. MOT , 25 . 5 . R. oy ce, SMP , 3 8 1, 397 . 
2. r:! O'r , 25. 6. Df . He ge l, SOL, II, 20. 
3. r . .n:oT , 1 0 . 7. ~ OT , 13. 
4 . ~.·~OT, 10-ll. 8 . Royce, m;'~P ' 397-408 . 
We concen trate by reason of a s e nse o f i m-
por t an ce., And wh en we con ce n trate we attend 
to ma tter -of-fact . Those peop le who i n a 
hard h eaded way co nfi n e t h eir atten tion to 
matter-of- f act d o so b y re a son of their 
se n se of i mporta n ce of such an attit ude . 1 
304 
Suc h proce d ure is . le g itimate a nd i mportant so low r a s we 
r eme mb er t hat our conception i.s no long er one of concre te 
rea li t y . 
I n t h is wa y t he finite intelle ct de a ls with 
t h e my t h o f f inite facts. There can h e n o 
objection to t h is procedure, p2ovided t hat 
we remember what we are doing . 
But i f we f org et we have ab stra cted , i f we set up 
''me r e e x isten ce '' a s r ea lity , 3 we a re left wi t h a wor l d o f 
"4 5 11make b elie f , with an "ah stra ct my t h olog y . n Only t h e 
husk s of reality re main . Not h i ng sh ows t h e ex te n t o f Wh ite-
h e a d's depar ture from the co r,ce p t of "l,' ature closed t o mind tt6 
o f the na tura l scien ce period , part i cula rly a s int erpret e d 
11y some of h is e a rl y r evie wers, 7 more completely than the 
following condemnation of ex clusive preoccupa t ion wit h phy-
sical scie n ce in for ming a world vie w: 
1. :W.:OT , 
2. !~.COT, 
3. MOT , 
4 . I,iOT , 
Scie n ce can f i nd n o i ndividua l e nj oyme n t in 
nature. Sc ie n ce c an f i nd n o a i m i n na t ur e ; 
it f ind s mere rules o f s u ccession . These n e -
ga tion s a r e tru e o f Na t u r a l Scien ce. The y 
are i nher·e nt i n its me thod olog :r . The rea son 
for t h is lindness o f physical scie n ce lies 
i n the fa ct that scien ce only de a ls wit h ha l f' 
t h e evid e n ce provided by h uman experience. 
It d ivides the seamless coa t- -or , t o chang e 
the meta phor into a h a pp ier f orm , it exam i n es 
the coat wh ich is super f ic &a l, and ne g lects the 
b ody which i s f u nda mental . 
5 . ·5. MO'r, 24 . 
13-14. 6 . COE , 4 . 
227 . 7 . Chap . II , sec . A, 1. 
25 . 8 . MOT , 211 . 
Exc lus i.ve corJC entra t i. on on ahs tract matt er-o f - fact i. s, 
Wh itehead insists, 11 the s upremacy of the desert . 111 we 
only understa~d concrete reality when we reme mb er t hat 
matter-of-fact ca nnot be separated from 1~he notion of 
i mportan ce, the sense of i mporta nce , the presupposition 
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of importance, 112 or in oth er words , its value releva nc y , 
its 11 impact upon individual experience 11 3 whic h is value 
experience. 4 To return to Royce's terms, the World of Des -
cription is an abstract way of describing the World of Appre -
ciation5 which is t h e concre te reality. 
In so far as importance is a n occas ion's aware ne ss of 
degree of the i~strumental value relevance of other occasion s 
for it, of their impact upon it, and a lso awareness of the 
relative d egree o f its own intrinsic value as included in 
its O\'VYl value realization, the complementary concept to i m-
portance is expression ,6 t hat is, a n occasion's ob jectiv e 
immortality considered as its-value contribution to successor 
occasions . 11 Expressio~ is found ed on the finite occ a sion . 
It is t h e activity of fi nitud e i mpressing itself on the env i r or.. -
me nt . 117 The occasion 1 s express ior. is what in Process and 
Rea lity White h ead ca lled its decisi on, 8 its self-transce ndent 
or su e rjective character, 9 its ohjective i mmorta lity. Th e 
occ a sion 's expres s ion is the result of its own self- f ormation 
l. r.~ O'l' , 27 . 6 . Cf . Chap . IV, sec. B. 
2. 'HOT, 5. 7. i\.W'I' , 28 . 
3. MOT , 27. 8 . PR , 227. 
4. I.TO'l' , 150. 9. PH, 134. 
5 . ~ oyce, m .. ~P, 411 . 
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and creativit y , ut as expression it is f or others rather 
than for itself . Tlu"oug h expression the importance (as 
de ~ree of i ntrinsic value) realized by an occasion is passed 
on to the many subsequent occasions. ·rhrou.§;h importance (as 
awareness of degree of irstrumental value of other occas ions ) 
expression is the lega cy of the many previous occasions . 
Thus Wh itehead points out: 
The two together , name l;y Importance a nd 
Expression , are witnesses hoth to the mon -
istic aspect of the un iverse and to its 
p luralistic ch.a:r•acter . Importance passes 
from t he V\T orld as one to the 1Norld as many ; 
whereas Expression is the g ift of the World 
as many to t he 1:7orld as one . 
From t h e stardpoint of ex pression a n occ a sion ca n be 
termed an 11 expressor112 and i ts expression as the · i1diffv.sion 
in t he environment 113 of its influe nce as instrumental to 
t he r ecomin · oi' ftlrther occasions . The reception of' an 
expression by a successor is under the form of pre h ension 
and aware r:- es s of i mp or t a nee . 11 -·x pre s s ion s are t he da ta f or 
f " . t: h . ' rt4 feelin ~ di 1used 1n .. e env1ronmen1;:; . ~~rther , Whiteh ead 
poin t s out, 11 it is the very nature of feeling to pass into 
expression . "5 Accord in~ly, in terms of expressio n , r eality 
can be described as the al t ernation of' felt and expressed 
values . Ex pression further emphasizes t he reci procal r e la-
tion of ach ievement a n d sharing or intrinsic a nd i n strumen-
tal values . 
. 1 . MOT , 2 8 - 29 . 4 . MOT , 32 • 
2 . ~WT , 2 9 . 5 . HOT , 37. 
3 . IWT , 29 . 
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Expressions diffe,r in importan ce, and the same expres -
sior may differ radically in import a nce for different occa -
sions . In g e nera l it can he poin ted ou t that the importance 
of an expression f or successive ex pressers is di rectly pro-
portionate to the si 6nificant individua lit y of the occ a sion 
of which i t is t h e exp ress ion . Thus Wh it ahead sa Jr s , "There 
is noth i n~ averag e about expression . It is esse n tially indi-
vidua l . In so fa r as t h e avera g e domina tes, expression fades . 11 1 
But a lso t he i mportance of an expression will b e apt to be 
g reater f or t he oc casi ons of the society o f which it is a 
member ttBn for occasions of ot h er societies. 2 Fu~ther , 
t h e i mporta r ce for ot her o c cas ions , as well as for the occa -
sior s of that society , of the society itself wi ll he a f unc -
tion of the expressions of the individua l memhe rs . 
The ohvious i mplicat ion of the importance - expression 
relation is t he tremend ous responsibility that expr ession 
i mp o ses u por every self-realizing occasion . 1."'.' ha t we do and 
s ay in e a ch occasi on Ls never immateria l or irreleva.E t , for 
we a re mak i ng future reality in the sense of setti ng t h e 
limitation s o f its real p o t e n tialities . Ex pression is t h e 
comp l ement and in a sense the k ey to i mportance, for y i ts 
expression we can jud3 e t he importan ce (re lative deg ree of 
i n strumental value) o f any past occasion for the present , 
its i n trinsi c i mportance ( relative deg ree of intrin sic valti e 
it realized), a nd wh at it con sidered i mpor tant (deg ree of 
1: 1'(0T , 2 9. 2. See above, sec • 1 . 
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instrumental value for it of ot h er occasions) , the t h ree 
component features marking the importar"' ce or rela t ive de ~ ·ree 
of int r insi c value of any ~cca s i on . Express i on is revelation 
ot value significance . An.d value sign ifica nce , that is , 
d eg ree of value or effect on value , is i mp ortance . 
A ccordi n~ly , deficiency of importa nce wou ld he , as Miss 
Emmet indicates, 1 n ot evi l but triviality . Evil may he ex-
t re me l y i mportant in its effect on furt her value realizatio • 
The trivial a s t h e deficien c y of importa rce does not ma tter2 
very much . The complete deficiency of importa nce, however , 
is non-e n tity , for in so far as an occa s ion is existent it 
must ma t ter to some exte nt . ·rhus the simpl est definition 
of i mportance inc l usive of its frl...B. ny meaniD8s and functions 
is perhaps value releva nce . In licht of t h is it would still 
he co rre ct to call conditions of increased value ( intrinsic 
or i nst rumental) cat e0 ories of importar: ce • 
• Types of value and value interpenetrati on . 
~very oc ca sion of real it y by virt ue of being an experi-
e nt occasion i s an experience o f il':! tri ns ic value . 3 oy its 
nature as an occasion ea ch occasion is a f usion or s~rnthesis 
1 . Emmet , 1. rt . ( l 94 6 ) , 236 . Cf . AOI , 344, and a b ove Chap . IV , 
se c. B. Wh i tehead does not specifically point out in 
t h is period t ha t: tr ivia lit y is deficienc y o l' i rnport av ce , 
but it would appear evidev t t ha t this i s the case f rom 
the natur e of i mpor tar:>.ce as a lso from 1.'!h itehead 1 s cov-
tention t ha t 1 in so far as t h e ave r a ge dominates , ex pres -
s io r: fades . " (1\;IOT , 29 , a lso see above . ) 
2 • G f • 1\I 0 , 15 9 • 
3 . 1tOT , 149-15 0 . 
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o f i dea l p ote ntia lit y with a n tec ede n t re a lity i n more or 
less ~~ovel a ctua lity . n'l'D. is synthesis oi' the ideal and t h e 
re a l is ~ust wha t h_appens in each finite occasion . nl :Out , 
a s vv e hav e see n so f'r·e q ue n tly , v a lues d iffer treme nd ou sly 
in i mportan ce, i . e . , in releva n ce and in degree of intrin sic 
value r ealized . 2 '1Ve have discovered t ha t imp or tance or de -
g re e of i n trin sic value var ie s a nd increases with h armon iou s 
ind ividuali.ty , enduran c e , novelty, significa r. t co tra st , 
depth , vividness , and persona ltty , 3 a s also t ha t wit h t h e 
rig ht co n tra sting dime n sions of narrowness and width, dep t. h 
i ncreases pro portiona lly . 4 
A s we a scend t h e sc a le from t he simp l est t y pes o f in-
org an ic o cc a sioYJ s towa r ds o c ca sion s of con scious human pe r -
sonality the possib ilities of z reater i mp ortan ce, of h i ;her 
and more suhtle type s of v a lue increa ses proportiona lly . 5 
Th i s inc r eased p ote n tiality for variety of intrinsic v a lues 
in h i t;her occasions be come s a real p ossi':lilit y throus h the 
coo perative and coordinat ed efforts and ende a vors o f soci et ies 
o f societies o f s imp ler oc cas ions and through societal order -
ing of the co mp l ex h i gher occasions t h emselves . 6 The resu l t 
is t ha t for t h e h i Gher occasior~ s 11 the transiti ons to rew fruit -
fulness o f und erstanding are achieved 0y recurre n ce to the 
utmost depths of i n tuit i on f or t h e refres hme n t o l' i ma g i na tion." 7 
1 . AO I , 357 . 
2 . Cf . Chap . Ill , sec . n , 2; 
Cha p . I V, sec . b . 
3 . Chap . III , sec . 3 , 2 . 
4 . Ghap . IV , sec . B . 
5 . Chap . III , sec • .6 , 2, g . 
6 . Ab ove, sec • . , 1 . 
7 . AO I , 203 - 204 . 
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F'or higher occasions the p ower of dtverse a nd novel 
tdeals is pro_portionatelJ increased and t h e he a vy hand of 
n ec essa ry c onf ormi t y to t he post l es se !led . Prom t h e stand -
point o f h i gher occ a sions , the vast h oard of lower and 
supporti nG occasions ap e a r a s neutral to the t y pe o f va lue 
r ea lized y the higher so lons as t ha t hisher t ype o f v a lue 
d oes n o t violate the conditions i mp osed by the lower occasions . 
Thus Wh iteh ead p o ints out: 
1.'v.hen we examine the ,. en era 1 wor ld o f occurren t 
fa ct , we fi nd t h at its ~e re ral character , pra c-
tically i n escapable , is neutral i r r e s pect to 
the re a lization of intrinsic value . The elec-
tromagnetic oc ca s i ons and t h e electroma&neti c 
laws, the molecular occasions and t h e molec u -
lar laws , are all alik e neut ral . They cond i -
tion the sort of values wh ich are possib le , but 
t he y do not determine the s peci a lties o f value . l 
S i nc e t~ h is is t h e case , then t h e problem of types of va l ue 
and t heir interpenetration e comes a real prol;lem on l y fo r 
h i ,:sher occas io!l s ard in pa rticular for occ a sions of human 
p ersonality . Accordin; l y , ~efore proced ing to an ana l y sis 
o f some of t h e t ypes of value indicated hy Wh it ehead , i t is 
ne c e ssary to cor,s ider b rie f l y some of the character is tics 
o f occa sions of human personality and the relations o f t h ese 
to God a n d the univer se which ar e conditions of i mpor t ar ce 
o f hi~her types of va lue e xpe rience . 
1 • . , ersona lity as a cond ition of re l eva n ce o f types of 
va l ue . 
A hmnan pe rson lik e any end urin; object is a soci et y 
1 . AOI , 53 . 
of occasions. 
'rhe one indiv i dua l is t h at coord ina te stream 
of pe rsonal experie n ces , which is my thre a d 
of li fe or your thread of life . It is that 
succession o f self - realization, each occasion 
with its direct memory of t h e past and with 
its anticipation of t he future . This claim 
t? end t;rin6 self-~de nt~~y is our se l f - asser -
tlOD 0 1 pe rsona l 1d e n t11:: y . -
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But t he major difference be tween the occasions of a human 
pers ona l societ y and lower t ypes of occasion s lies in the 
much g reater pre d omina nc e of the mental pole wi th its con -
ceptual valua ti.on2 and t hus awa reness of n ovel possi"!Jilities 
for value rea lization . Human personal occasions are ca pable 
oi' introduction o f n ovelty and a de t; ree of self-creat ivity 
unimas tnahl e f or lower occas ions . The e r v ironment of other 
oc ca sion s in its role of causati on is contributory to the 
self-realization of intrinsi c value for any occasion , but , 
in the case of man , co nt rol over the environment in teleolog-
ical and novel self- realization of intrinsic value reac he s 
an un precedented hei~ht . 
The individual enjoyment is what I am in 
my role o f natural a ctivity, as I shape 
the activ ities o 1' my environment into a n ew 
creation , which is myself at t his moment . 3 
Thus Wh iteh ead points out : 
When we come to mankind creation see ms to 
have "burst tnrouz;h a nother of its boundries . 
1. ~OT , 221-222 . Cf . Brichtman, POH , 358 : "The whole self 
or oerson is a total conscious process whi ch is aware o f 
its~ider,tity and wholeness ~y means of its backward-look-
ing memories ard its forward looking purposes . 11 
2 . Cf . Chap . IV , sec . ~\ , 2. 
3 . MO~r , 22 8 . 
The central activity of enjoyment and ex-
pression baa assumed a reversal in the im-
portance of its diverse functionings. The 
conceptual entertainment of unrealized pos-
sibility becomes a major factor in human 
mentality. In this way outrageous novelty 
is introduced, sometimes beatified, some-
times damned, and sometimes literally pat-
ented or protected by copyright. The defin-
ition of mankind is that in this genus of 
animals the . central activity has been de-
veloped on ihe side of its relationship 
to novelty. 
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In light of man's capability of introducing into feel-
ing significant novel ideal alternatives he is continually 
made aware of 11wba t might be and what might have been. n2 
His sense of importance is greatly increased. This 
sense exhibits itself in various species, 
such as, the sense of morality, the mystic 
sense of religion, the sense of delicacy 
for adjustment which is beauty, the sense 
of mutual connection which is understand-
ing, and the sense o~ discrimination of 
each factor which is consciousness.3 
To be sure, man's increased sense of importance and ability 
to introduce novelty is only a matter of difference in de-
gree in relation, for example, to the higher animals, but, 
Whitehead points out, "the extent of the degree makes all 
the difference."4 In light of this difference, as McEwen 
has indicated, "the person who is possessed of this state 
of mind is an active agent in the growth of ideal values 
throughout the total universe"5 to an extent of which no 
other occasion or society of occasions are capable. 
1. MOT, 36. 4. MOT, 38. 
2. MOT, 37. 5. McEwen, WMI, 195. 
3. MOT, 37. 
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One further characteristic of human personality which 
necessitates varieties of value realizations is its conscious-
ness. All values involve contrast1 and to the extent that 
significant contrast varies the types of value vary. 2 In 
Process ~ Reality Whitehead defines consciousness as "the 
feeling of the contrast of theory, as~ theory, with fact, 
as ~ fact."3 Again he says, "Consciousness is how we feel 
the affirmation-negation contrast."4 Consciousness itself, 
then, is emphasis on contrast, is comparison of the ideal 
and the actual, and accordingly, tremendously increases the 
range of the significant contrast possible. If this is the 
case, then not only is consciousness itself a value but its 
presence should increase the depth and variety of values pos-
sible. In Modes of Thought Whitehead indicates that this is 
in fact the case: 
The growth of consciousness is the uprise of 
abstractions. It is the growth of emphasis. 
The totality is characterized by a selection 
from its details. That selection claims at ·(jen-
tion, enjoyment, action, and purpose, all 
relative to itself. This concentration evokes 
an energy of self-realization ••• But this en-
hancement of energy presupposes that the ab-
straction is preserved with its adequate rele-
vance to the concrete sense of value-attainment 
from which it is derived. In this way, the 
effect of the abstraction stimulates the vivid-
ness and depth of5 the whole of experience. It stirs the depths. 
1. Cf. Chap. III, sec. B,2,d, 
also RIM, 115; SME, 43,44; 
2. Chap. III, sec. B,2,d. 
3. PR, 286. 
and Chap. IV, sec. B. Cf. 
~rt.(l927), 59; and PR, 33. 
4. PR, 372. 
5. MOT, 168-169. 
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As conscious, man becomes more fully aware of the 
contrasting and at times opposing dualities in the universal 
and in his own nature as actual. In turn he becomes more 
capable of harmoniously synthesizing these dualities into 
significant contrast. Such dualities as 
Constraint and Freedom, Survival and Destruc-
tion, Depth of Feeling and Triviality of 
Feeling, Concf=t.ptual realization and physi~al 
realization LSic7, Appearance and Reality 
are present for his understanding and harmonization in so 
far as possible in experiences of intense intrinsic value. 
We shall meet some of these pairs again later, but what man 
does with one of them, Appearance and Reality, is, Whitehead 
feels, particularly important as a condition of the higher 
types of value realizations. While the terms "Appearance" 
and "Reality" are Bradleyan, 3 Whitehead's use of them is his 
own and is derivative from his view of presentational immed-
4 iacy and caual efficacy.- Thus of the "Reality" phase of 
an occasion Whitehead says, 
The objective content of the initial phase 
of reception is the real anticedent world, 
as given for that occasion. This is the 
'reality' from which creative advance starts.5 
Appearance, however, does not correspond exactly to presen-
tational immediacy. Rather Appearance is the final phase 
of the occasion. 
·This difference between the objective content 
of the initial phase of the physical pole 
1. see Chap. III, sec. B,2,d. 4. Cf. Chap. III, sec. C,2,a. 
2. AOI, 256. 5. AOI, 269. 
3. Cf. Bradley, AAR. 
and the objective content of the final phase, 
~fter tbe integration of physical and men-
·tal poles, constitutes •appearance' for 
that occasion. In other words, 'appearance' 
is the effect of the activity of the mental 
pole, whereby the qualities of and the coor-
dinations of the given physical world under-
go transformation. It results from fhe 
fusion of the ideal with the actual. 
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In between the "Reality" and the "Appearance" phases lies 
the self-formative or intermediate phase2 which Whitehead 
describes as "a ferment of qualitative valuation"3 in 
light of the occasion's subjective aim. 
In so far as Appearance represents the final stage of 
an occasion, it is a characteristic phase of all occasions. 
Strictly speaking, however, Appearance is not the final phase 
but a phase preliminary to satisfaction--at least for higher 
actualities--in which a unity and simplification of appear-
ance has been accomplished in light of which final decision 
of self-formative activity can take place. In human beings 
it is the stage of clear perceptions and perspectives4 prior 
to final solution. It is a result of the coordinating and 
simplifying activity of the mentality of the occasion. 5 It 
is the result of and the field of the synthetic activity of 
the occasion. Thus with a strong Fichtean overtone Whitehead 
says, "It is the world in the guise of a subject matter for 
1. MOT, 270. 
2. Cf. Chap. IV, sec. A,l and sec. B. Note the description 
of this phase as "an emotional appreciation" and as 
"aesthetic supplement" (~R, 325), Also see PR, 134 and 
227 for the stages of .an actual occasion. 
3. AOI, 269-270. 5_. AOI, 273. 
4. AOI, 270. 
316 
mental activity. ul The final stage of the occasion is the 
merger of Appearance and Reality. 2 
The final value realized and its effectiveness is highly 
conditioned by the way in which the occasion forms Appearance 
and tbe conformity or lack of conformity of that Appearance 
to initial Reality. The final Reality is different because 
of the Appearance. The Appearance phase is the phase of 
sense-perception, 3 of hybrid prehensions, 4 of the dominance 
of propositional feelings5 about the relations of potential-
ities to given actualities. Since Appearance is always at 
least a "simplified edition of reality"6 it is an alteration 
which, in that the world is different as a result of the be-
coming of each occasion, effects a value change in subsequent 
reality. To draw a pa r allel with an exaggerated and yet 
penetrating insight of Nietzsche, Appearance gives the lie 
to reality in order to make the reality over into the lie. 7 
Thus on the Appearance-Reality distinction directly depends 
8 the meaning of such a value as truth, but it will also have 
a close bearing upon beauty, understanding, moral goodness, 
1. AOI, 270. Cf. Fichte, VOM, 140. 
2. AOI, 272. 
3. AOI, 278. 
4. AOI, 270. 
5. AOI, 270. Cf. PR, 391-405 and 396 in particular where 
Whitehead says, "It is more important that a proposition 
be interesting than that it be true. The importance of 
truth is that it adds to interest." 
6. AOI, 273. 
7. Nietzsche, WTP, sec. 9: "The will to appearance, to illu-
sion, to deception, to becoming, to change (to objective 
deception), is here regarded as more profound, more primeval, 
as more metaphysical than tba will to truth, to reality, to 
appearance. The latter is merely a form of the will to 
illusion." 
8. See below. 
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and many of the other values. Personality is capable of 
higher values partially at least as a result of the operation 
of the Appearance-Reality factors. Personality becomes self-
conscious of higher value distinctions more or less in pro-
portion to its awareness of the Appearance-Reality distinction 
and what it does in light of this awareness. 
The values aimed at and achieved by lower occasions are 
the solid but relatively unvaried and uninteresting values 
of survival. Man, on the other hand, engages himself with 
factors which are trivialities in relation to his own sur-
vival but yet are capable of lifting that survival, curtailed 
though it may be as compared to the stolid lower endurances, 
to new heights of richness and worthwhileness for its own 
sake. 
The soul of man ••• does not easily meditate 
upon the activities of fundamental bodily 
functions. Instead of fixing attention up-
on the bodily digestion of vegetable foods, 
it catches the gleam of sunlight as it falls 
on the foliage. It nurtures poetry. Men 
are the children of the Universe ••• A tree 
sticks to the business of mere survival; 
and so does the oyster with some minor di-
vergences. In this way the life aim at 
survival is modified into the human aim at 
survival for diversified worthwhile exper-
iences. 
But men would not be capable of such diversification 
of experience without the total society of the universe and 
in particular without the activity of the complex God2 who, 
1. MOT, 42-43. 
2. Cf. Chap. IV, sec. c. 
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acting on the basis of his primordial con ceptual valuat ion 
of all possibilities (in conjunction with his conseque n t re-
evaluation of a ctualities throug h his superjective na ture):~ 
. th "D . i T' 111 • LS e LV ne ~ros urg 1ng the active finite attai~ment 
of ideals "each in its season . n2 The perman ent possibility 
of wealth and variety of ideals for rea lization rest s back 
on the primordial na ture of God . The function of God as a 
totality in relation to tbe world 11 is t o sustain the aim at 
vivid experience . 11 3 He is "th e reservoir of pote n t ia lity 
and the co ordination of achievement 114 who makes possible 
the vivid va riety of human values and saves these values 
from mere 11 trivialities 115 by incorporating them in the wealth 
o f the unive:r•se. Whitehead thus po ints out: 
Deity •• • is t ha t factor in the universe where -
by the re is importance , va lue , a nd ideal be -
yond t h e actual . It is by refere n c e of the 
spatial immediacies to the ideals of Deity 
that the sense of worth beyond ourselves arises . 
The unity of the transcendent unive rs e, a nd 
the multiplicities of re a lized actualities, 
both enter into our experience by this sense of 
Deity . Apart from this sense of tra n scend en t 
worth , the otherness of reality would n o t e n ter 
into our consciousness . There must be value 
b eyond ourselve s . Othe rw is e every thing ex-
perienced would he a barren d~tail in our 
solipsitic mod e of ex i stence . 
According ly , man ' s increased capacit y for n ovelty a s 
a result of the wide r conceptual valuation of h is conscious-
ness and the wider range of i d eal possibilities which God 
1. AO I , 357 . 4 . MOT , 128 . 
2. AO I , 357 . 5. cf . ~~~o·r, 42 . 
3 . MOT , 128 . 6 . MOT, 140 . 
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makes available to man's conceptual feelings as also of 
God's aim at sustaining vivid value experience calls for 
variety of types of value realized. 
2. Types of value and their interrelations. 
Whi tehead's treatme r. t of types of value is neither e:x.-
haustive nor systematic. Rather , as was the case with the 
categ ories of importance, 1 his enumeration of types of value 
is made up of suggestions 11 whi ch may ••• illuminate , thoug h 
they do not exhaust, the depths of individuality. 112 That 
this is the case is evldent amon g other thing s from t he 
fact tbat no section of Adventures of Ideas or of I'ff odes of 
Thought is devoted to types of value or levels of va lue as 
such . The section in which value receives the fullest 
3 treatment occurs in the fourth part o f Adventures o f Ideas 
hut is called "Civilization" rather than types of va lue, 
a nd yet , civilization itself tends to be treated both as 
one of t h e types of value and a lso as indicative of the 
interpenetra tion of the highest types of value. 4 Furth er, 
not by any means all the types of value Whitehead considers 
are included in the discussion of civilization. Ra ther, 
such discussion as t h ere is of many of them is widely scatter-
ed throughout a ll of the b ooks of the period . 5 
1. Chap • I I I , sec • B , 2 • 
2. G. Ivi org an , Art. (19 37), 312. 
3. AOI , 307-38 1. 
4 • See be low, sec. j. 
5 . Although in g e neral AOI is t he most relevant of t hB b ooks 
of t h is period for discussion of t ype s of value ar_d the ir 
in terre lations. 
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According ly no a~solute scale or tab l e of values is t o 
be expected . However, by k eeping in mind the categ ories of 
importar.ce of the formulative period 1 and the dimensions of 
depth of Pr oc ess and Reality2 a lon g with t he p osi tive state -
ments o f va l ue types and relations of the presen t peri od , 
it is pos s i~ le to a rran <;' e the types of value rou,:;h l y in a 
tah le from minimum to maximum. depth and i mportanc e o f intr·in -
·sic va lue invo l ved in real ization , Such a tahl e can he so 
arrang ed that (rouzhl y speak i ng ) e ac h of the h i 0her types 
te nd s to presuppo se and more or less inc l ude the lower• types 
u t t h e converse does n ot necessarily f ollow . It must ~e 
k ept in mind , h owever , that our tah l e as worked out is an 
a ttemp te d reconstruction of · h itehead ' s vie w of t h e tT ne s 
o f value and relations etwee n types of va lue and not a 
litera l transcription , based though it is on rinclples 
and sug.:; estions in the works in question and in those of 
earlier periods . Aga in it must be emphasized that 1.lh i tehead 
does n ot indicate t ha t t h e types of value to which he g ives 
con s id era tion are exhaustive n or tha t the relat ions etween 
the t ypes of v a l ue are absolv.te . The latter is particularly 
eviden t in the case o.f the relations hetwee n the hi_;her 
types of value . For examp l e , in the section of Adve ntures 
of Ideas ca lled 11 Civili.zationn i!lJh i tehead d e r. ies that ::; oodn ess 
1. Chap . III , sec . B, 2 . Ha r monious individuality , endurar.ce , 
novelty , contrast , depth, intensity or vividness , and 
persona 1 it y • 
2 . Chap . IV , sec. D . The dimensions o f d ept h are width and 
narrowness combined in 11 adequate ord er . " ( ?R , 169 . ) 
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de serves its p l a ce in t he fa mous triad "Tru th, Eeaut y , and 
Goodne ss . nl He insists, on t he one hand, that b eauty and 
art are products of pu r pose2 and that ethica l i d ea ls are 
t h e supreme exampl e of the driving force l eading away f r om 
d omir:an c e of 11 sensele ss forces 11 and sheer me chan ica ! deter-
. . . 3 d ffilna "ClOn , an , on the other , that g oodress is de r i vative 
from heauty . 4 According l y it is d i fficult to d ecide whether 
g oodness s hould stand in the table '!Jelow tru t h and ma jor 
0 eau t y as con tr ibu tory or ahove as derivative from these . 
In li_; ht of t he divi sion of beaut? into mi nor beauty and 
maj or ~eaut y we have tak en the first alternative . 5 Part 
of t he re a son f or the lack of systemat ic expos i tion may 
well he hecause of t h e interpene tra tion of the t ypes of 
value wh ich tend s t.o impl y s h i fts in emphas is r ather t han 
a h s olute prog r ession . The types of va l ue ind ica te point s 
of orien tation r ather t han ste ps up a ladd er . 0 
'i'lith t :::ese qua lifications i n mind we suggest t ha t 
values a ch ieved can roughly he classified in Whitehead 's 
thought in the f ollo winG ascending order: (1) min or heauty , 
(2) surv iva l, (3 ) freedom, (4 ) mora l s oodness, ( 5 ) under-
stand i n_; , (6 ) holiness , (7) truth , (8 ) maj or 1'1eauty , (9 ) 
adventure , (10) c ivilization , (ll) peace . It will be evident 
1. AOI , 345 . 4 . AOI , 345 . 
2 . AOI , 345 . 5 . Se e below , se c. d . 
3 . 1\0I , 2 1. 
6 . Cf . :3ri~htmar.. , POB , 101- 102 . TrThe y are ce nters of organ -
izati on or points of' view for appr oa ch i ng value , rat her 
than separate and di stinct e ntit ies , each more or l es s 
va luab le than the other .n (101) 
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on first g lance t ha t with the exception of the first two 
a 11 of t hes e t ypes are fully re a l izal1le only i n human per --
soralities and ahove . 
a . Min or beauty . 
'Hhiteh ead def i nes beauty i n e;eneral as 11 t he mu tual 
adaptation of the several factors in an occasion of exoer·-
ience . nl As such, b eaut y is a wid er and more fundament a l 
noti on than truth2 or g oodness 3 or , in fact , t han any other 
type of value, f or any occasion from the simplest t o the 
most complex , to be an occa s i on at al l, mus t. rea l ize a 
mutual adaptation of the factors which constitute it . I n 
this 'ba s ic sense "the teleolos y of the Universe is directed 
to the production of' Deauty . tr 4 .out, Whitehead adds, beauty 
so d efined in its hroadest sense indicates that t h ere are 
"g radations in Beauty and t ype s of' :Oeau ty . 'r 5 From the 
star' dpoint of' the broad defin ition it could be said t ha t 
all of the other types of value are types and g r adations 
oi' beauty . 
Accordin6 ly, Whitehead disting u ishes betwe en wha t h e 
ca ll s t h e maj or and the minor fo r ms of beauty , 6 and t h is 
distin ction is h a sed upon the end aimed at . The end of the 
minor and basic form of beauty Wh itehead describes as 
t he absence of mutual inhibi t i ons amons the 
various prehensions , so t hat the inte ns ities 
of subjective form, which nat ura lly and pro-
1 . AOI , 324. 4 . AO I , 341 . 
2 . AOI, 341 . 5 . AO I , 324 . 
3 . A.O I , 345 . 6 . A.OI , 324 . 
per l y --or in one word _, c onf' ormally--arise 
from the objective co n te nt s of the various 
prehensions do no t inhibit each other . 
When this aim is secured, t h ere is the 
minor form of ll eauty , the absence of pain-
ful clas h , the abse n ce of vul~arity . l · 
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'rhe maj or f orm presup poses the minor form and stands among 
the h i ghest types of value realizahle . 2 
·rhat the minor form of !'< eauty i s t he first and basic 
type of value is indicated (1) by the fact t hat the first 
cate3 ory of i mportance o f the fonnulative peri od was har -
monious individuality3 and ( 2) hy Wh itehead ' s contention 
in Process and Realit y that subjective aim i.mposes a "pre -
estab lished harmony" on the con tent s of an occ a sion as a 
d . t' ., . t . t 4 co n 1 1011 0 1 1 s ex1s .ence . Mee t;ing the condit ion o f 
ha r mon ious individua lity under the f orm of pre - established 
harmony is the achievement of minor 1~eau ty . Vi i thou t such 
in t ernal l~ rmony, re moval of d ominant inhi~itions, and 
ac h ievement of individuality, no occasion could become . 
But mere achievement of minor beauty d oe s n ot guarantee 
any heig ht of intrin sic value . Wh ile every occasion is 
marked by min or heauty, yet an oc casion with minor e auty 
alone would be relatively uni mporta n t and trivial . 
b . Sui•vival. 
Just as the minor f orm of' heauty as a type of' value 
follows from the first cate g ory of i rr.p orta r. ce, har mon ious 
1 . !\. OI , 324 . 
2. See helow , sec . h. 
3 . Chap . III, se c. B ,2,a . 
4 . Chap . IV, sec . 0 , and PR , 3 3 8 , 3 89 . 
individuality, so the second type of value, sur vi val, 
follows from the second cate gory of importance. 1 As was 
evident in relation to endurance, so also with survival, 
strictly speaking no occasion or intrinsic value survives. 
In fact, Whitehead is so insistent on the perishing nature 
of o~casions that he comes perilously close to losing the 
temporal characteristics and nature as process of occasions 
entirely when he says, 'tAn actual occasion has no history. 
It never changes. It only becomes and perishes. 112 The 
difficulty in regard to change which we first met in the 
natural science period tends to persist. 3 The duration 
of an occasion tends to be so short as to approach non-
existence. Yet as was the case with endurance, survival 
1. Chap. III, sec. B, 2, b. 
2. AOI, 2 62. 
3. Cf. Chap. II, sec. a. Whitehead's denial of change to 
occasions stands on a somewhat different basis here than 
in the natural science period. Evidently here Whitehead 
is restricting the use of the word change to a particular 
type of change for becoming would imply change in ordinary 
usa ge. In light of Whitehead 1s descriptions of actual 
occasions in terms of becoming , concrescence--" 1 growing 
to gether• • (AOI, 303)--processes of synthesis of pPehen-
sions (AOI, 233, 239), and each process as individual fact, 
this denial of change could hardly be a denial of internal 
development in occasions. Rather he seems to be restricting 
change to change of external relations and causal inter-
action. The denial of change in this sense is based upon 
tbe doctrine of contemporary independence and its corollar,r, 
subjective immediacy. "It is the definition of contemporary 
events that they happen in causal independence of each other • 
• • • The two occasions are not in any direct relation of effi-
cient causation." (AOI, 251, sec. A, 1, above.) ~In their 
becoming they are immediate and then they vanish into the 
past." (AOI, 304.) This interpretation is indicated also 
by the following statement in FR: "The creature cannot 
have any external 11adventures, but only the internal adven-ture of becoming. (PR, 124.) It must be admitted, how-
ever, that Whitehead never entirely frees himself of the 
ghost of unchanging substance. 
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as an intrinsic value is the realization of continuity of 
exp3rience with that of previous occasions. 
The feeling of survival as intrinsic value is possible 
because of the societal nature and relations of occasions. 1 
It is conformation of feeling of the present with the feeling 
of its predecessors 2 which results from the objective immor-
tality of the predecessors in it and its reactualization of 
their dominant value in itself. Further, this feeling of 
survival as an intrinsic value includes and presupposes minor 
beauty. Dominant features survive, Whitehe ad insists, 
because, "in some broad sense they promote aes tb.eti c enjoy-
ment.113 And that survival itself is felt as intrinsic value. 
With lower type occasions aim at survival is predominant 
--"a tree sticks to its business of survival; and so does 
4 
an oyster with some minor divergences~ --and the intrinsic 
values realized by such occasions involve almost exclusively 
the coalescence of minor beauty and survival. But again, 
the feeling of belonging, while an intrinsic value, if 
achieved with minor beauty but little more would be relatively 
unimportant and trivial. 
c. Fre edom. 
Every occasion has the form of teleolog ical self-
realization, is in this sense self-creative, and thereby 
1. AOI1 263. 
2. AOI 1 235. Whitehead calls this the "Doctrine of Conformal 
Feeling.n 
3. ESP, 129. 
4. MOT, 43. 
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incurs to a greater or lesser degree responsibility. 1 Every 
occasion involves some measure of novelty in its synthesis 
and on this element of novelty depends the peculiarity of 
its ind ivid uallty. 2 But in lower types of occasions the 
novelty, the actuality of self-realization, the responsibility 
are more or less negligible. As we go up the scale of oc-
casions on the other hand these factors along with the 
presence of real a terha ti ves3 become more and more signifi·· 
cant. Accord1ngly, in the highest types of occasions 
freedom be comes not only a condition of increased value but; 
a positive intrinsic value in itself. Thus Whitehead says, 
Spontaneity, originality of decision, belong 
to the essence of each actual occasion. It 
is the supreme expression of individuality: 
its conformal subjective form is the freedom 
of enjoyment derived from the enjoyment of 
freedom. Freshness, zest, and extra keenness 
of intensity arise from it. In the personal 
succession of occasions the upward path towards 
an ideal of perfection with the end in sight 
gives a thrill keener than any prolonged halt 
in a stage of attainment wi4h the major varia-
tions completely tried out. 
The intrinsic value, freedom, corresponds to the cate-
5 gory of importance, novelty. Just as novelty without en-
durance is non-entity so freedom ceases to be an intrinsic: 
value without coalescence with survival. Freedom is the en-
joyment of the ability for si gnificant novel synthesis 
1. PR, 339. 4. AOI, 332. 
2. Chap. III, sec. B, 2, c. 5. Chap. III, sec. B, 2, c. 
3. PR, 342. 
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above and beyond survival. Whitehead stresses this by point-
ing out that effective freedom is dependent upon the 
presence and combination of two factors, routine and fore-
sigpt.1 Routine is necessary as the basis for stability 
in light of which novelty will be significant. Routine 
saves time and reduces the amount of energy needed for 
dealing with the necessary conformities. Accordingly, routine 
saves energy for sigp.ificant novelty. "Society requires 
stability, foresight itself presupposes stability. 112 The 
stability assured by routine makes possible dependability. 
"But there are limits to routine, and it is the discernment 
of these limits, and for the provision of consequent action, 
that foresight is required."3 Foresight makes possible 
wider and more intelli gent choice among alternatives and 
thus intelligent exercise of freedom with increased enjo~nent • 
.:lnd since foresi ght is proportionately increased with under-
standing,4 freedom itself and its enjoyment or intrinsic 
value is increased proportionately by 1 ts coalescence with 
tbe next hi gher value in the table, understanding. Yet, 
since understanding involves intelligent decision among 
alternatives, 5 freedom is its necessary precondition. 
Because signif~cant freedom and its enjoyment are so 
closely allied to foresi ght, intelligence, and understanding, 
it finds its higrrest exemplification in man. The two lower 
1 • .i!OI, 113-114. 4. AOI, 113. 
2. AOI, 114. 5. AOI, 59. 
3. IJOI, 114. 
values, minor beauty and survival, are present throughout 
nature and so, to a very limited extent, is the form of 
freedom, but with freedom in its full actuality we come to 
values peculiarly personal as are the others in the table 
above freedom. Thus Whitehead says, 
Manki.nd is that factor in Nature which 
exhibits in its most intense form the 
plasticity of nature. P'la.sticity is the 
introduction of novel law.l 
Further, with the coalescence of understanding and wisdom 
with the rudimentary freedom which makes them possiole 
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freedom itself becomes progressively enriched and one of the 
most precious and therefore to be carefully guarded factors 
in life. 
It issues in the soul freely conforming its 
nature to the supremacy of insight. It is 
the reconciliation of freedom with the com-
pulsion of truth. In this sense the captive 
can be free, taking as his own the supreme 
insight, the indwelling persuasion towards 
the harmony which is the height of existence.2 
This is the freedom urged and revealed to the world by the 
Platonic, Stoic, and Christian traditions. 
Neither the basic nature nor the height of freedom as 
intrinsic value includes the freedom to use force indiscrimi-
nately. In fact, freedom and force are antithetical. 
•Force is always against it. 113 The force of the past is 
always active and present but freedom implies •the victory 
of persuasion over force." 4 Sheer force destroys freedom. 
1. AOI, 99. 3. AOI, 53. 
2. AOI, 86. 4. AOI, 53. 
A free agent who uses force is usually self-destructive of 
his own freedom. On persuasion depends the rr shape of upward 
evolut i on.111 Men who violate their freedom, who fail to 
realize the intrinsic value of freedom, who cease to be 
liable to persuasion and to depend on persuasion out of respect 
for the freedom of others have lost much of the intrinsic value 
which is theirs as men, for, Whitehead insists, "the worth 
2 
of men consists in their liability to persuasion. 11 
It might be said that the two basic obligations deriva-
tive from t he potentiality for freedom and which are among 
the corrlitions for the actualization of the intrinsic value 
of hi gher freedom are persuasion on the one hand and tolerance 
on the other. 
The duty of tolerance is our fini t e homa ge 
to the abundance of inexhaustible novelty 
which is awaiting the f uture, and to the 
complexity of accomplished fagt wh ich ex-
ceeds our stretch of insight. 
The necessity of reliance on persuasion for higher values 
will beco me even more evident as we proceed. The fulfillment 
of t he obligations of tolerance and persuasion as conditions 
of int r i nsic enjoyment of freedom are ins t rumen t al values, 
but in so far as tolerance and persuasion may also be 
enjoya ble in themselves they may be considered intrinsic 
values derivative from freedom. 
1. AOI, 87. 
2. AOI, 105. 
3. AOI, 65. 
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d. Moral goodness. 
Throughout our investigation it has been evident that 
tbe concept of morality and moral good as such receive only 
1 passing notice in spite of the perfectionistic tenor of 
Whitehe ad's theory of value and its almost constant ethical 
implications. The same condition prevails in the present 
period. We have indicated Whitehead's refusal to include 
goodness as on the same level with truth and beauty. 2 Minor 
beauty is the most fundamental of values and major beauty is 
a requirement for the hi ghest reaches of value. Whereas 
truth, beauty, adventure, and peace are dealt with at some 
length, again goodness receives only incidental mention 
in any of the works of this period. Ethics and moral good-
ness would almost seem to be the step children of the 
realm of value considerations. 
However, when we consider moral goodness as a type 
of intrinsic value the reason for this seeming ly second 
place position perhaps becomes a little more evident. Morality, 
like freedom on which it depends, is perhaps more highly 
instrumental than intrins i c'ally valuable. Again, like freedom, 
it finds its fullest exemplification in t he higher f orms of 
human experience but in its rudimental forms it is at least, 
Whitehead would maintain, formally present in some lower 
occasions as well. While moral value is not present in the 
simple types of inorganic and lowe r· occasions, yet in so 
1 • Cha p . I I I , sec • B, 2; Cha p . rl, sec. B. 
2. See ab ove and AOI, 345. 
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far as nthe subject ••• is the autonomous ma ster of its own 
concre s cence into subject-super ject 111 and thus 11 is respon-
2 
sible for being wb..at it is in virtue of its own feeling sn 
it is susceptible to moral value or di s value. Accordingl y , 
Whitehead points out, "morals can be discerned in t he higher 
3 
anima ls." The concern of morality is with the instrumen-
tality of the present occasion to the realized intrinsic value 
of its successors. The responsibility of one occasion for 
becoming what it does oecome derives from the effect of what 
it does become on other becomings. Thus Whitehead says, "The 
effect of the present on the future is the business of morals. u4 
If t h is is th e case, then in light of the doctrine of the 
converse relation of instrumental and intrinsic value which 
we have discovered to be fundamental from the formulative 
period5 on, rather than sli ghtin g the importance of morality 
it would seem to be in many ways central to Whitehead's 
position. All value from one point of view is moral value. 
The specifically moral intrinsic value or moral g oodness 
as an intrinsic value is primarily a reflexive or anticipatory 
value. In so far as a high de gree of intrinsic val ue is 
achieved which w:tll correspondingly enrich successor occasions, 
intrinsic moral value is added to the present occasion by 
anticipation. Earlier, Whitehead pointed out that the 
•sens e of worth beyond itself is i nunedia tely enjoyed as 
1. P~, 347. 
2. p.rl, 339. 
4. AOI, 346. 
5. See Chap. III, sec. 
3. MOT, 39. B, 1. 
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an overpowering element in the individual self-attainment."l 
In relation to morality specifically and its interpenetration 
with b eauty Whitehead states, 11 The inevitable anticipa tion 
adds to the present a qualitative element which profoundly 
2 
affects its whole qualitative harmony.u Intrinsic moral 
value is both a precondition and a product of the attainment 
of all other higher values. 
The realization of intrinsic moral value is in turn 
dependent upon freedom to fail to realize as high a degree 
of intrinsic val'\le as one could have. In terms of the dis-
tinction between Appearance and Reality3 morality consists 
among other things in accepting the responsibility of seeing 
to it that Appearance conforms sufficiently to Reality 
so as not to cause dislocation downward of potential intrinsic 
value for successive occasi ·::ms. Whitehead adds, "If there 
were a necessary conformation of Appearance to Reality, then 
Morality would vanish. " 4 The ability to achieve moral goodness 
1. PR, 53. 
2. AOI, 346. 
3. See above, sec. B, 1. 
4. AOI, 378 . It must be admitted, however, that Whitehead 
tends to contradict himself on exactly this crucial point. 
In spite of the above stateme nt, when he rejects goodness 
from its traditional place in the truth-beauty-goodness 
triad, he offers as the reason for so do ing: "For Goodness 
is a qualification belonging to the constitution of reality, 
which in any of its individual actualizations in better or 
worse. Good and Evil lie in the depths and distances below 
and beyond appearance. They solely concern interrelations 
within the real world." And yet the next sentence is: " The 
real world is good when it is beautiful." (AOI, 345.) If 
all Whitehead means by this is that good and evil are more 
fundamental than the Appearance-Reality dis tinction charac-
teristic of higher occasions only, then there is no 
depends upon the ability to fail to achieve it and the choice 
of evil. 
Because of the variety of intrinsic values possiole and 
the developing and changing nature of reality Whitehead 
insists that there are no absolute rules of achievement of 
moral goodness, that is, no absolute unchang ing moral codes. 
Morality is a function of the societal and communal nature 
of occasions. Even natural laws, Whitehead insists, are not 
arbitrarily and absolutely imposed from without but "are 
the outcome of the character of the behaving things: they 
are the 'co mrnunal customs 1 of which Clement spoke. 111 Both 
moral and natural laws are sub ject to evolution and revision. 
Whitehead points out: 
Inter-actions within society modify the social 
laws by modifying the occasions to which these 
laws apply ••• Pro gress consists in modifying 
the laws of nature so that the Republic of 
Earth may conform to that society to2 be discerned ideally by the divinati6n of Wisdom. 
contradiction and he is merely asserting the more fundamemtal 
nature of morality. If on the other hand he means that 
morality and moral goodness do not also apply to the Appear-
~e-Rea lity distinction then it means that truth, major 
beauty, civilization and peace are exempt from morality 
and the quotation in the text above is meaningless, for tbe 
beauty he is considering here is major beauty. Further, 
the whole importance and m;taning of Appearance as 11 a subj3ct-
ma t ter for mental activity (AOI, 270.) and the merger of 
Appearance and Reality tends to be destroyed. Since such 
an interpretation is so completely contradictory s hitehead 
must surely mean that morality is more fundamental than 
but also applicable to the Appearance Reality situation. 
The seeming contradict:ton is perhaps the result of careless 
use of his own terminolo gy on the part of Whitehead. 
1. AOI, 52. 
2. A or, 52-53. 
According ly, while there are certain " general principles 
1 
underly ing a 11 such codes, 11 yet the 
Notion that there are certain regulative no-
tions, sufficiently prec i se to prescribe details 
of conduct, for all reasonable beings on earth, 
in every planet, and in every star system is at 
once to be put aside ••• All realization of the 
Good is fini~e, and necessarily excludes certain 
other types. 
But while there are no absolute moral codes it does 
not follow that for Whitehead there are no moral laws in 
t h e sense of general conditions of heightened realizations 
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of moral value approaching universality in their generality . 
Schilpp 1s insistance that for Whitehead there are nno univer-
3 
s a l moral .!~~" is only correct if by laws is meant the 
same thing as codes, for vrhitehead does insist that t here are 
certain tthi ghly general princ:tples underly ing all such 
codes"4 and he makes ratrer clear what at least four of these 
are. His gen eral insistence on t he fact that t here are 
no absolute rules can itself be cal£ d such a general 
principle. It could well be stated somewhat as follows: 
The particular situation , societal and private, ought to be 
taken into account in act ion and in the formulation of rules 
of action, and the values most rele vant to the enrichment of 
that situation and its successors should be realized. To 
borrow a phrase from E. S. Bri ghtman, this could well be 
called the Law of Specificat i on. 5 Whitehead formulates the 
1. AOI, 376. 3. Schilpp, Art.(l941), 603. 
2. AOI, 346. 4. AOI, 376. 
5. Bri ghtman, ML, 171: "All persons ~ught in any Eiven 
to develop the value or values specificaii~ relevent 
situatiOn."-------
situation 
to tha:r-
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prin ciple as follows: "Our action i s moral if we thereby 
safe guard the importance of experience so far as it depends 
1 
on that concrete instant in the world 1 s history." 
Whitehead specifically points out two additional such 
prin ciples. 
Such generalities should reflect the very 
notions of the harmonizing of harmonies, 
and of particular individual actualities 
as the sole authentic reality. These are 
the principles of the generality of har-
mony and of the importance of the individu-
al. The firs~ means 'order' and the second 
means 'love'. 
The harmonizing of harmonies calls for the realization of 
coherent or harmonious values both individually and socially 
and might be called the law of harmonious or coherent value a. 3 
The second, as the insistence that values are only realized 
b y , for, and in individuals with its further implication 
that each individual should realize the hi ghest values of 
which it is capable mi ght be ca lJe d the tt Law of Individual-
i 'lf 4 sm. But as indicating love and mutual respect for the 
individuality of each occasion it transcends individualism. 
Individuals 11 can learn to understand each other and to 
love. " 5 
1. MOT, 20. 
2. AOI, 376. 
3. Cf. Brightman, ML, 125: The Axiological Law--"All persons 
ou~ht to ~hoo~~ values which ~ self consisten~g~oniou~, 
an coherent, not values that are contradictory or incoherent 
with one anotber.n------- ------- --
4. liT-.-Brigh.tman, ML, 204: *Each person ough! to realize in his 
own experience the maximum value or-which he is capable in 
harmon;[_ withmoral la~." -----
5. AOI, 22'"0. 
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Indicating a fourth principle, Whitehead points out 
that "what all these codes do witness to ••• is the air1 at 
social perfection," 1 that is, the mutual instrumentality of 
all occasions in a society to the realiz a tion by all the 
members of that society of the highest values possible 
for them. "The Universe ach ieves its values by means of 
coordination into societies ·!'2 of occasions 11 enjoying value 
and ••• sharing value. ·~t 3 This aim at social value and its 
·achi evement through the mutual contribution of occasions to 
each other in light of their own individuality might be 
called the "Law of Altruism. 114 Without such altruism 
individual value is curtailed and social aim at perfection 
is impossiole. 
Such general principles are not specific prescriptions 
of actions nor absolute rules of action but general conditions 
of mutual enrichment of occasions and hei ghtened intrinsic 
moral value in any society. Further, Whitehead does not 
suggest that the two principles he specifically points out--
harmony and individualism--or the other two so clearly present 
during this period--specification and altruism--or the four 
1. AO I, 357. 
2. AOI, 264. 
3. MOT, 164. 
4. Brightman, ML, 22 3: "'Each person ought to respect all other 
persons as ends_i~ !hemsefves-,-and; ~-far ~~ Eossiofe, to -
cooperate w~others-In-rne-production and en~yment of 
SEared values.n-Note alsothefoiTOwing-from IM (15"8}: 
""'ur purposes extend beyond values for ourselves to value 
for others ••• Attainment of such value for others trans-
fonns itself into value for ourselves." 
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together are the only principles. We have pointed out else-
where1 that the factor of real potentiality or possibilities 
open to a particular occasi on indicates a law of the best 
possi ole whereoy an occasion can only be held responsible 
for doing the best it can under its real circums tances. 2 
Other principles could be worked out from Whitehead's 
general position regarding value. The four or five ment i oned 
do, however, seem to receive the clearest emphasis by Whitehead. 3 
Finally, it must be pointed out that it is not by accident 
that one of the two principles of increased intrinsic value 
which Whitehead specifically points out is 11 the harmonizing 
of harmonies" which 11 means 'order•.•4 Whitehead has insisted 
throughout on what he considers to be the necessary relations 
of definiteness, pattern, and order to value. In Process 
and Reali!l we discovered that the right combinat i on of 
width and narrowness for fullness of depth of value was a 
function of "adequate order."5 Further, the emphasis on 
1. Chap. III, sec. B, 1. 
2. Cf. Brightman, ML, 156. The Law of the Best Possible: 
"Al_! ;eersons ~ght to wi 11 the best ~sible values in 
~ery situation; henc~ !r ;eossible to improve every 
s i tua ti on. 11 
3. ~xth law almost as clearly indicated is what mi ght be 
called a law of consequences. Whitehead's emphasis on 
foresight (see sec. c, above) and o ojective immortality 
as the future relevance of present realized value call for 
consideration of foreseeable consequences and ap proval of 
these as opposed to other real alternatives. Cf. Brightman, 
ML, 142 : "The Law of Consequences: All _Eers ons ought to 
consider and, on the whole, approve tEe foreseeabie con-
sequen~ of ~ach or ifieir cEOICeB:'""--
4. AOI, 3ro. 
5. Chap. IV, sec. B, Cf. PR, 169. 
------
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pattern and order has been seen to be closely linked with 
Whitehead's aesthetic and mathema tical orientation. Accordingly 
it is not surprising to find Whitehead insisting that 11 there · 
is that other for.m of beauty which is rightness of conduct. n 
Moral value stands hi gher than minor beauty but lower, more 
basic, and contributory to major beauty. Moral value, as 
every other value, is a function of limitation and definite-
ness. As a defini t e form of beauty in the broadest sense of 
the term moral value cannot be divorced from coherent order. 
There is a. natural affinity between Order and 
Goodness. It is not usual to accuse people of 
'orderly conduct.' Undoubtedly there are lim-
its to the excellency of mere order. It can 
be overdone. But there can be no excellence 
except upon some basis of order. Mere dis-
order results in nonentity of achievement. 2 
1 
Without consistency and definiteness, in other words., moral:i.ty 
is impossible. It might thus be said that the basic moral 
law, more basic than any of the others mentioned, is a law 
of consistency. 3 
That consistency is the basic moral requirement for 
Whitehead would seem to be indicated by the asserted essent:lal · 
connection of the order necessary for goodness with ma.the-
matics on the one hand and methodology on the other. 
At first sight, the notion of any important 
connection between the multiplication table 
1. AOI, 190. 
2 • MOT, 10 3. 
3. Cfl. Brightman, ML, 98: "The Lo gi cal Law ••• : 'All persons 
ought to will !£gicall~; i.e., eac£ 2~rsog £Ught to !ilr--
to be free-from self-contradiction a.nd-rD be consiStent in 
his intentions •11 Whitehead 1 s concept of order is fuller-;-
however, than logical consistency. 
and the moral beauty of the ,s ermon on the 
Mount is fantastic. And yet, consideration 
of the development of human clarity of ex-
perience from its foundation of confused 
animal sa ti sfactions discloses mathematical 
understanding as the primary examp!e of in-
sight into the notion of the Good. 
In The Function £f. ~eason Whitehead points out that 11 the 
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CJ good life " is only attainable "within the scope of method."'~ 
While mere order as an abstraction is non-existent and not 
all forms of order are necessarily good, yet, Vvhitehead seems 
to be saying , morality consists in consistent ordering of 
lif'e for the maximum effectiveness and richness of value 
realization both for the individual in society and for the 
society. As such, morality is a precondition of all higher 
values. The primary emphasis on order would seem to be 
Whitehead 1s recognition of the si gnificant and notable 
features of formalism. 
It is to be no t ed however, as extremely significant 
for the following period though of minor emphasis only at 
the present time that by the terms good and goodness, 
particularly when capitalized, Whitehead does not always 
mean moral goodness. In fact in Modes ££ Thought he specifi-
cally states, "We moot remember that morals constitute only one 
aspect of the Good, as aspect often over emphasized. n3 
Further, in Adventures of Idea~, when summarizing some of 
1. MOT, 1 04 . 
2. FOR, 17~18. 
3. MOT, 106. 
the cont ributions of Greek thought in general and Plato 
in particular to value theor~ Whitehead points out with 
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a p r;arent a greement that 11 'The Good' is an ultimate qualifi-
cation not to be analysed in terms of anything more final 
than itself. ,l The increased emphasis on the relation of 
goodness even in the primarily moral sense 2 and not only 
order but mathematical order (the multiplication table and 
t he Sermon on the Mount) all tend to point towards a much 
more ri gorous Platonism in re gard to value. "The Good u so 
interpreted would tend to be the Platonic Idea of the Good 
as the apex of a realm of transcendent values. While all 
of these statements could be interpreted in terms of ideals 
or potentialities and thus of eternal objects rather than 
intrinsic values and accordingly be in harmony with Whitehead's 
insistence up to this point that all intrinsic values as 
values are actual experiences of occasions, yet that Whitehead 
may mean something quite different is indicated by the fact 
that in the succeeding period3 the Platonic interpretation 
becomes explicit. Thus, conflicting though such a view would 
appear to be with the s ti 11 major emphasis on an experiental 
definition of value, 4 the rift betwe en actuality and value 
5 first noted in Process ~nd Reali!I tends to widen and 
Whitehead's secondary train of thought about value becomes 
more predominant, even though at the same time the restriction 
1. AO J;l90. 4. See sec. A, 1, above • 
2. MOT , 104. 5. Chap. IV, sec. B. 
3. See Chap. VI. 
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of intrinsic value to the final phase of an occasion (the 
type of division introduced in Pro~~ ~nd Reali!l) becomes 
less predominant. 1 
e. Understanding. 
The obligation to exercise rationally the potential 
freedom which is ours in light of the modes of experience 
inherited from the past--termed by Whitehead rr Ins tinct" 2 __ 
and of the conceptual valuation of possibilities of the 
menta 1 pole--" Intelligence 11 3 --is 11 Wisdom. 11 Instinct and 
intelligence so defined are given modes of the occasion. 
nwe do not initiate thought by an effort of self-consciousness. 
We find ourselves thinking." 4 But the integration of the 
two as wisdom is a function of tbe occasion as a whole. 
Predominance of instinct easily sinks towards mere survival 
and blind repetition. Predominance of intellectual conceptu-
aliza tion easily sinks towards superf i cia 1 concern with 
possibilities without regard to actualities and with resulting 
loss of effectivenss and increased triviality--"intelJe ctual 
activity is apt to flourish at the expense of Wisdom. 115 
Accordingly, wtsdom is the rational and moral use of freedom 
so that "the whole determines what it wills to be, and 
thereby adjusts the relative importance of its own inherent 
flashes of spontanei ty. 1' 6 The intrinsic value which the 
1. See above, and AOI, 282; 
MOT, 184. 
2. AOI, 58. 
3. AOI, 59. 
4. AOI, 60. 
5. AOI, 59. 
6. AOI, 59. 
r-
fulfillment of tbe obli gation to be wise aims at is un-
derstanding in the fullest sense of the word. "Wisdom is 
the persistent pursuit of the dee pe r understanding. 111 
The exercise of wisdom is reason. Reason, however, 
has two aspects: t h e 11 Reason of Plato" and the "Reason of 
Ulysses" 2 or the speculative and the practical reasons. 
The Reason of Ulysses is primarily instrumental to other 
types of value than understanding as such. It is reason 
"'seeking the bnnedia te method of action, 113 reason in its 
11 short-range function ••• as pragmatic agent. 114 The Reason 
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of Plato, on the o ther hand, " is enthroned a b ove the practical 
tasks of the world. 115 It is not directly concerned with 
the mere business of keeping alive but with the attainment 
of understanding for its own sake. Its primary weapon is 
analysis; 6 its method of inte gration is cohere n ce; 7 its 
8 
reward is the enjoyment of self-evident understanding . 
Whitehead describes the value function of the Platonic 
Reaso n in lts search for understanding as an intrinsic val ue 
as follows: 
1 • A 0 I, 6 0 • 4 • FOR I 2 3 • 7 • FOR I 5 3 • 
2. FOR, 7. 5. FOR, 29. 
3. FOR, 8. 6. ESP, 13. 
B. MOT , 66-69. The aim might also be stated as rational intu-
ition. Note in particular: "Langua ge halts behind intuition • 
•.• our understanding out runs the ordinary usage of words ••• 
Understanding is self-evidence. n (MOT, 68-69.) "Understand-
ing" as used by Whitehead is a far richer concept than analy-
sis and description. It is closer to the Kantian Vernunft 
and the He gelian Begriff than the Kantian Verstand. It is 
not beyond or contrary to reason but rather is the res u lt of 
reason enriched by emotional comprehension as well. 
---
It seeks with disinterested curiosi t y an 
understanding of the world. Naught that 
ha p pens is alien to it ••• Its sole satis-
faction is that experi ence has been under-
stood. It presupposes life, a nd seeks life 
rendered good by the goodness of understand-
ing . Also so long as u nderstanding is in-
complete, it remains to tha t extent unsatis-
fied. It thus consti t u t es itself the ur ge 
from the g ood life to the better l:tfe. But 
the pro~ss which it seeks is alwayi the 
pro gress of a better understanding. 
On first g lance it mi ght seem that the Platonic Reason 
is little more than the intellectual conceptualization which 
must be synthesized with instinct if t he o bligation to 
wisdom is to be met, b u t further consi d eration indicates t ha t 
quite tbe opposite is t h e case. In the first place understand-
ing l s not a mere concept ual entertainment of possi bilities. 
On t h e contrary it involves the a pprehe ns i on of t h e relations 
of possi bilities to settled fact and t h e conformity of 
Appearance to Real i t y which is truth. 2 The only reason for 
pla eing truth higher in t he table of values than understand-
ing is that truth as an intrinsic value presupposes aim at 
unde rstanding. Until we at least try to understand, the 
conce p t of truth is unimportant. The fact t hat under-
standing both underlies and yet does not even a pproach 
completion without bringing in the conce p t of truth merely 
testifies again to the close interpenetration of t h e types 
of value. Further, the understanding which the Platoni c 
Reason seeks, while not directly concerned with kee p ing 
------- -1- FOR, 29-30. 2. AOI, 344. 
344 
alive, 1 is yet highly instrumental to enriched life and to the 
successful function of the Reason of Ulysses. The Reason 
of Ulysses is "the practical embodiment of the urge to trans-
form mere existence into the good existence and to transform 
the good existence into the better existence," 2 but the 
practical embodi.?.J.ent is not possible without the prior 
understanding of what the g ood life is. 3 Without the 
intrinsic value of understanding at least presupposed none 
of the higher values would be possible. 
Because of the nature of understanding, the Platoni c 
Reason and its achievement of understanding not only pre-
supposes but passionately demands 4 freedom of thought thereby 
i n creasing both the intrinsic and the instrumental value of 
freedom. The reason for this is demand is not difficult to 
discover. Understanding is never complete, for a complete 
understanding would be 11 a peri'e ct grasp of the universe in 
its totality ••• and such a grasp is denied to us. 115 The 
universe is always in a process of chan ge and development. 
Neitrer the universe nor our understanding of it is ever 
static. Accordingly, understanding 11 bears t he character of 
6 
a process of penetration, incomplete and p3.rtial. 11 We 
and our understanding are finite b ut our understanding 
"alway:3 involves a reference to infini tude" 7 and thus 
1. AOI, 29. 5. MOT, 58. 
2. FOR, 23. 6. MOT, 60. 
3. Cf. FOR, 23 and 30. 7. MOT, 61. 
4. FOR, 51. 
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involves a never ending progressive realization. Each 
growth in understanding is a satisfaction, a completion, and 
without such progressive feelings of achievement understanding 
would lack intrinsic value and be deficient in meaning. 1 
But any understanding which is not self-transcendent, which 
claims to be final, which is static is not Qnderstanding. 2 
Where life is stabilized, where survival has become the chief 
or only value, there is no room for reason. 3 Be cause of' the 
nature of understanding, reason "is the organ of emphasis 
upon novelty. 114 
Accordingly, the opposite of understanding, the positive 
evil which destroys it, is not lack of knowledge, for lack 
of knowledge is opportunity for reason, but certainty. 
The his tory of thought is a tragic mixture of 
vibrant disclosure and deadening closure. The 
sense of penetration is lost in the certainty 
of completed knowledge. 5This dogmatism is the anti-Christ of learning. 
~gain Whitehead points out, 
The notion of a sphere of human knowledge 
characterized by unalloyed truth is the pet 
delusion of dogmatists, whether they be 
theologia%s, scientists, or humanistic 
scholars. 
Such dogmatism is one of the worst forms of destructive and 
disruptive force. It destroys personality and lowers us to 
the level of survival-minded, sub-human existence. 
Among the causes of certainty lies another enemy of 
1. MOT, 66. 4. FOR, 15. 
2. MOT, 66. 5. MOT, 81. 
3. FOR, 15. 6. MOT, 94. 
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understanding and reason, and destroyer of value, fati gue. 
" 1 Fati g ue 1 , " Whitehead points out, "is the antithesis of 
reason.nl It defeats the upward trend and destroys the 
impulse to wa rds novelty. It may well be that we g rasp 
for self-destroying certainty because we are just too tired. 
But the results of the fati gue plus the certainty are a fatal 
11 life-tedium"2 or a lapse into "the v'ay of Blindness. n 3 
Hi gh intrinsic value requires energ7. 
Tb~t understanding has close alliances and coalesces 
with all t he higher values is evident. Understanding and 
truth intimately require each other. The 11 passiona te demand 
for freedom of though.t 114 is essentially a moral claim5 with 
reli gi ous overtones involving as it does an awareness of the 
infinitude of possib ility in t he universe. 6 As such under-
standing tends to stand as the connecting link between morality 
and relig ion. It mi ght almost be said that morality under-
stood issues into reli g ion. 
f. Holiness. 
While '~hitehead devotes li t tle space to religion as 
such in the present period, yet it is not to be assumed 
that h is interest in religion has in any way slackened, for 
the few remarv~ which are present tend to indicate the con-
tinuance both of his concern with religi on and of the major 
view s of t he nature of religion from the earlier periods. 
1. FOR, 18. 4. FOR, 50 and 30. 
2. FOR, 15. 5. FOR, 30. 
3. FOR , 18 . 6. FOR, 50-51. and MOT, 60-61 . 
347 
Religion remains primarily a concern about values in the 
1 
universe as a whole. Intrinsic moral value, we have discov-
ered, involves realization of the maximum e ffectiveness for 
the increase of value in successive occasions oy any one 
occasion through its realization of its highest potentialitiesf 
Morality implies community of value and shared value. The 
re cognition of this i m.plica t ion is lifted to clarity in 
understanding and finds expression among other ways in 
,.the passionate demand for freedom of thought. 113 In Religion 
.!.!:! th~ Maki!!B_ Whitehead pointed out that the fundamental 
reli gious experience is a dir·ect intuit i on of the unity of 
three value concepts--the value of the individual for hi!Tlself, 
of individuals for each other, and of the oojective world as 
a community of value realizing individuals mutually inter-
dependent4--which issues in a "concept of the ri ghtness of 
thing s." 5 Whitehead continues to hold essentially the 
same view of the basis of reli g ious experience, as he indicates 
by pointing out that the dogmas of ancient religions were 
attempts "to express that ultimate un ity of direction in the 
universe, upon which all order depends, and which g ives its 
meaning to importance.n 6 "'Reli gion,tt Whitehead states, "is 
concerned with our reaction of purpose and emotion due to 
our personal measure of intuition into the ultimate mystery 
of the universe."7 Further, whereas morality emphasizes the 
1. cr. Chap. III, sec. c, 1, 5. RIM, 66. 
and Chap. IV, sec. c. 6. MOT, 68 . 
2 . Sec. A, above and AOI, 346. 7. AOI, 207. 
3. FOR, 50. 
4. RIM, 59. See Chap. III, sec. c, 1. 
individual occasion and is found in occas ions lowe r in the 
scale than personality, " relig ion emphasizes the unity of 
ideal inherent in the universe~l and is present only in 
high grade occasions. 
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If religious experience invol ves cosmic value reference, 
the question still remains as to the nature of the intrinsic 
value in such experience • . To a certain extent the intrinsic 
value experience is similar to the intrinsic value exper ience 
in morality. It is parttally an anticipatory value. "Reli gi on 
has been and is now the major source of those ideals which 
add to life a sense of purpose that is worthwhile 11 2 But there 
is another side to the intrinsic religious value which g ives 
it its peculiarity and a depth beyond moral expe rience. Wit h 
the reco gnition of the unity of the rmi verse and our a ware-
ness of the rightness of things 
then our sense of details for the totality 
dawns upon our consciou sness. This is the 
intuition of hol i ness, the intuition of the 
sacred, wsich is at the foundation of all 
reli gion. 
The intrinsic value is the positive feeling of belonging , 
the positive feeling of contri bution, the positive feeling 
of 11 some eternal greatness incarnate in the passage of 
temporal fact 11 4 and thus the feeling of what might be called 
1. MOT, 39. 3. MOT, 164. 
2. ESP, 69. 
4. A OI~ 41. This might seem to violate Whitehead's earlie r 
contention that "religion is solitariness; and if you 
are never solitary you are never rel1 g ious. 11 (RIM, 17.) 
However, it does not necessarily do so if i t is rememb ered 
(1) that the solitariness is not the intrinsic value to 
be gained from rel igious experien ce but the impetus to 
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consecration to a cause g reater than oneself1 , and it is 
as derivative from this that relig ion adds 11 to li f e a sense 
of purpose that is worthwhile." 2 
In light of the comprehensive nature of holiness as an 
intrinsic · value and Whitehead's general concern with religious 
proble~s it may seem surprising that we have included 
holiness with freedom, goodness, and understanding r athe r 
than among the hi ghest types of value. 3 As will be evident, 
Whitehead's conception of holiness is i n te gral to the value 
he places highest of all, peace. In fact peace might be 
considered as an enriched realization of holiness. Fur ther, 
both truth and IJeauty are to an extent presupposed by any 
experience of holiness, and as present to a very high de gree 
in any fully adequate experience of it. It has already become 
evident that all of the types of value (with the exception of 
minor beauty and survival) to a greater or lesser extent 
4 involve each other. Such relations testify not only to 
interpenetration and coalescence of types of value but also 
to the impossibility of considering these types of value in 
a hard and fast scale. However, there is a two-fold reason 
for placing holiness . in its present position. In the first 
place, holiness does presuppose the awareness of reciprocal 
the experience which is intrinsically valuable (cf. 
Chap. III, sec. C, 2, c.) and (2 ) the feeling s of belonging, 
of con tribution, etc. are individual experiences but 
referent beyond themselves. 
1. Cf. McEwen, WMI, 201. 3. Sec. K, below. 
2. ESP, 69. 4. Note understanding and truth. 
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value relations characteristic of goodness as also the g ener-
alization involved in understanding. However, while holiness 
does involve a truth-claim and in most cases a major beauty-
claim it does not necessarily involve realization of truth 
or major beauty. Even g oo dnes s and understanding in any full 
sense of the terms may be absent in some experiences of 
holiness. The history of relig ion adequately testifies to 
this. In Reli g ion 1£ ~he Mak i n g_ Whitehead warned us a gainst 
1 
assuming "the necessary goodness" of religion. In relation 
to understanding he indicated that "dogmatism is the anti-
2 Christ of learning ." Tertullian undoubtedly experienced 
holiness, but Whitehead insists that " an attack upon system-
3 
atic thought is treason to civilization." The very sense 
of holiness may be the source of trut h-destroying and beauty-
destroying fanaticism. 4 While holiness is a precondition 
and a necessary part of the fullest value realizations, in 
itself it can oe a virulent source of evil. 
g. Truth. 
In spite of its hi gh place on the table of values,5 the 
t~~th relation is relatively simple and basic. If we re-
turn to the distinction Whitehead draws between Appearance and 
Reality6 the nature of the truth relation becomes evident. 
1. RIM, 18. 
2. MOT, 81. 
3. A OI, 208 • . 
4. Witness the Inquisition, 
holy wars, Zwingli, and 
company. 
5.Attributed to truth 
by Whitehead himself. 
Cf. AOI, 345. 
6.See above, sec. B, 1. 
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Whereas Reality is the initial g iven phase of an occasion1 in 
all its multiplicity, Appearance is the derivative stage after 
ne gative prehension and valuation have taken place in which t h e 
complex initial data have been simplified and objectified as 
datum and during which the occasion is aware of addi t i onal pos-
si bilities for actualization-- 11 the world in the guise of 
2 sub ~ect-matter for mental activity:" According ly, 11 Truth, 11 
Whit e he ad points out, 
is a qualification which applies to Appearance 
alone. Reality is j ust i t self, and it is non -
sense to as k wte ther it is true or false. 
Truth is the conforma tion of Appearance to 
Reality. This conformation may b e more or less, 
also direct or indirect. Thus truth is a gen-
eric q~ality with a variety of de grees and 
modes. 
From the standpoint of Appearance 11 t he reality of the primary 
phase i s prehended with sub j e ctive form as thou gh it parti-
cipated in the qualitative characters of ' Appeara nce. 111 4 
If the felt reality really does have the qualitative charac-
ters of the Appearance, the Appearance is to that ext ent 
to be considered true. 
Thus a felt truth relation (the intrinsic value) is 
actually the relation between the contents of two prehensions 
of the same occasi on when the same qualitative pa t t e rn "can 
5 be abs t racted from both of them." There is no necessity 
for exact conformity between the two contents but only 
1. AOI, 269. 4. A OI, 344. 
2. AO I, 270. 5. AOI, 310. 
3. A OI, 309. 
conformity in re gard to the in~ erpretative pattern. As a 
result of the common pattern each "illustrates in part 
what the other is. 1 They thus interpret each other." :In 
other words, there are no longer two prehension, but one, 
with the referential content of both referent to t wo or 
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more o ojects which, as in the truth relation, 11 stand in the 
unity of a contrast with each other." 2 The importance of 
the truth relation arises because of the presupposed attempt 
to understand in virtue of which one object is interpreted 
by means of analogy with another object in terms of common 
3 pattern. 
The two major types of experienced factors involving 
truth relations are propositions and sense perceptions. The 
nature of the truth relation is perhaps clearest in relation 
to propositions. Wh i tehead def i nes a proposition as awareness 
of • the abstract possi0ility of some specified nexus of actu-
alities realizing some eternal object, which may either be 
simple, or may be a complex pattern of simpler o b jects. 114 
The actual entities as physically felt are the log ical sub ject; 
t h e eternal objects as conceptually felt represent the predi-
cate. "A proposition is true," Whitehead points out, ;'when 
the nexus does in reality exemplify the pattern which is the 
predicate of the proposition." 5 However, from the standpo i nt 
1. AOI, 310. 
2. AOI, 311. 
3. A OI, 311. 
4. AOI, 312. 
5. AOI, 313. 
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of t he con formation of Appearance to Reality as Whi t ehe a d has 
defined Reality in this contrast relation, the truth rel a ti on 
holds when the felt objective datum conforms to the actual 
fac t ors in the initial datum. This is a function of internal 
coherence and interpretation of one set of eternal o b jects 
(those g iven as a result of t h e o o ject i ve immortality of t h e 
occasions in the nexus prehended and physically felt) in 
terms of another set of eternal o o jects (those same or 
other eternal o b jects oonsidered conceptually and predicated 
of t he same referent as tre fir s t set) all referrin g beyond 
themselves to other occasions not directly experienced. 
That this is what Whitehead means rather than, as mi ght see a 
on firs t g lance, that t he truth relation is an epistemolo gi-
cally monistic relation between the subject and other existents, 
is clearly indicated as follows : 
In all analysis there is one supreme factor 
which is apt to be omitted, namely, the mod e 
of togetherness. The nexus includes the 
eternal ob ject in the mode of realization. 
Whereas in the true proposition the to gether-
ness of the nexus and t he eternal obj e ct be-
longs to the mode of abstract possibility. 
The eternal object is then united to the nexus 
as mere 'predicate'. 'l'hus a nexus and a 
proposition belong to different categor ies of1 being ; their identification is pure no nsense. 
While the truth relations involved in sense percepti on 
are }::erhaps more susceptible to indirection and subtlety of 
variations 2 the b as i c nature o f the truth relations involved 
in perception remains the same as for propositions. The 
1. AOI, 314. 2. AOI, 321. 
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basic tyJ,:e of truth relation involved in perception, White-
head feels, is the attribution of sensa and the way in which 
they are felt (eternal objects of initial data and subjective 
form or emotional tone) to regions (complexes of eternal 
objects of nexus or societies) which both the sensa and the 
emotional tone are felt to qualify, referent to other occasions 
so qualified. 1 In other words, the truth relation is again 
in the case of perception the integration of one set of data 
in terms of another set of data unified in one prehension 
under contrast and empathically projected as referent to 
other actualities. It is felt as true in so far as coherent 
conform! ty of the two sets of data are actually achievable. 
If conformity cannot be achieved, no truth relation exists 
although the abstract possibility of that conformity may 
be conceptually entertained and mistaken for a truth relation, 
in which case error has occur red. 
The intrinsic value of truth so considered as well as 
the reason for placing it relatively so hi gh in the table 
of value lies in the enjoyment of the stability (no t neces-
sarily in the sense of survival but in the sense of real ac-
2 
complishment), elemental harmony, directness, "cleanliness," 
and efficaciousness which truth gives. Thus Whitehead says, 
After all has been said, yet the truth-
relation remains the simple, direct mode 
of reali~ing Harmony . Other ways are in-
direct, and indirectness is at the mercy 
of environment. There is a olunt force 
about Truth, which in the suo jective form 
1. AOI, 314-315. 2. AOI, 341. 
of its prehension is akin to cleanness--
namely, the removal of dir t, 1 which is un- 1 wanted irrelevance •• Falsehood is corrosive. 
Whe n the truth relation occurs in perception, Whitehead points 
out, 
we enjoy the green foliage of the spring 
greenly: we enjoy the sunset with an emo-
tional pattern including among its elements 
the colours and contrasts of the vision. 
It is this that makes Art possible: it is 
this th~t procures the g lory of perceived 
nature .... 
Such truth pre ·s upposes the interpretation of understanding 
bu t in turn enriches and makes possible the higher types of 
understanding. It presupposes awareness of influence of· ele-
mentary goodness but gives to goodness assurance. Truth is 
one of the factors whereby Appearance justifies itgtf. 3 
However, Whitehead points out, truth while one of the 
highest types of intrinsic v~ ue is s till subordina t e to other 
types of value. Truth has a hi gh intrinsic value in con-
junction with other intrinsic values but truth by itself sinks 
in importance towards neutrality. Under certain conditions 
truth may have the wrong kind of importance (ne ga tive affect 
on other intrinsic values). Partial truth is a dangerous 
thing, for "to know the truth partially is to d1.stort the 
4 Universe." It is possible for a truth as realized at the 
wrong time 1"not even to be neutral. It may oe evil." 5 
Further, to insist on a minor truth when a major truth is 
1. AOI, 342 -343. 4. AOI, 311. 
2. AOI, 321. 5. AOI, 342. 
3. AOI, 309. 
1 
at stake may be to "be get the major evil. \11 According ly, 
Whitehead points out, 11 the truth must be seasonable.•2 
Truth is a precondition of the full realizat i on of the 
next higher type of value, major beauty, but without coa-
lescence with major beauty truth tends to lose 1 ts own self-
3 just ifi cat ion. 
h. Major beauty. 
Major beauty vitalizes the entire table of values . As 
pointed out, beauty in the widest sense "is the mutual adap-
tation of the several factors in an occasion of experlence"4 
and, as such, is to a greater or lesser extent characteristic 
of every occasion. In t h is widest sense, beauty becomes 
11 the one aim which by its very nature is self-justifying ,n 5 
and all other types of value from survival to peace are 
actually t y pes of beauty. Thus in this sense it co uld be 
said that beauty is the generic term for positive intrinsic 
value. But as pointed out, in this widest sense there are 
" gradations in Beauty and types of Beauty" 6 from the simplest 
example of minor beauty characterist ic of any occasi on in the 
universe to the wealth of informed purposive beauty of the 
higher reaches of experience • Accordingly, we have 
cons 1dered 
from this standpoint six progressively 
richer and more complex 
types of beauty 
1. AOI, 311. 
2 • AOI, 311. 
3. AOI, 342, 343. 
(survival, freedom moral d 
, goo ness, understanding, 
4. AOI, 342. 
5. A OI, 342. 
6. AOI, 342. 
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holiness, truth) and now we return to the enriched concept of 
beauty itself or major beauty towards which, it might be 
said, all creation strives. 
Any part of experience can be beautiful. 
The Teleology of the Universe is directed 
to the production of Beauty. Thus any sys-
tem of things which in any wide sense is 
beautiful is t£ that extent justified in 
its existence. 
Such beauty is not a single undifferentiated type of value 
which when achieved would impose a monotonous uniformity 
of value content on all achieving occasions but is itself 
a type of value characterized by the wealth of individuality 
and detail. 
Whitehead describes the major form of beauty as follows: 
This form presupposes the first form, and 
adds to it the conditions that the conjunc-
tion in one synthesis of the various prehen-
sions introduces new contrasts of objective 
content. These contrast introduce new con-
formal intensities of feelings natural·. to 
each of them, and by doing so raises the in-
tensities of conformal feeling in the primi-
tive component feelings. Thus the parts con-
tribute to the massive feeling of the whole, 
and the whole contrib~tes to the intensity of 
feeling of the parts. 
3 Such beauty is organic unity in and through variety in which 
1. AOI, 341. 
2. AOI, 324. 
3. Cf. Parker, AOA, 232. Parker describes the organic unity 
necessary for a work of art as follows: "By this is 
meant the fact that each el,emen t in a work of art is 
necessary to its value, that it contains no elements 
which are not thus necessary, and that all that are needful 
are there." This description of organic unity closely 
approaches Whitehead's description of major beauty. 
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the unity is strengthened and made vital by the very s ig-
nif:tcant diversity of the variety, and the variety is g iven 
emphasis and meaning and val ue by the unity with resulting 
h i gh intrinsic value of the whole. Suc h beauty, Whitehead 
1 i nsists, can be defined as n the perfection of Harmony" 
wh ich in relation to occasions of experience 
is defined in terms of the per f ection of 
Subjective Form in detail and in final 
synthesis. Also the perf ection of the 
Sub j e ctive Form is defined in terms of 
Strength. 12 
The streng th, in turn, is characterized by the proper com-
bination of the two dimensions of de p th we met i n Process · 
~~ ~eality , width and narrowness,3 enriched and renamed 
" Massiveness " and n rntensity Proper.114 Massiveness Whitehead 
defines as "variety of detail with effective con t rast 115 ; 
111 Int ensi ty Proper" he defines as "comparative ma gn itude 
6 
withou t reference to qualitative variety." 
S ince major beauty is a unit of variety of effective 
details in intense harmonious contrast, the details as e s sen-
tial to the rich and differentiated unity can themselves 
7 be called " Beautiful" 11 b y reason of their conforma l con-
trib u t ion to t he perfection of the sub jective form of the 
complete occasion. 118 The un ity itself is a function of 
--------1. AOI, 324. 5. AOI, 325. 
2. AOI, 325. 6. AOI, 325. 
3. PR, 169, 251. Of. Chap. IV, 7. AOI, 328-329. 
sec. B. 8. AOI, 328. 
4. AOI, 325. 
359 l 
the realization of t he significant value of the parts and 
t h e value of the parts is a function of their partici pation 
in the si gnificant unity and differentiated indi viduality 
of tre wh ole. According ly, ma jor beauty is the true in-
divi duality which is dependent on and a function of the full 
reco gnition of t he sig n i ficant individuality of o t her. Thus 
Whitehead says, "The key to t h e exp lanation is the u n der-
standing of the prehension of individuality. This is the 
feel i ng of each objective factor as an indiv i dual 1 It 1 with 
1 its own sign ificance • 11 In other words, the hi gh in t rinsic 
value of an occasion whic h is major beauty is directly pro-
portiona l to that occasion's recognition of i ts componen t 
elements as referent to a world of truly si gnificant indi-
viduals each with its own character and each with its contri-
bu tion to make to worthwh ile experience . 
Thus major beauty is social in reference. The streng th 
of experience characteristic both of t h e perfection of ha r mony 
and its failure in discord "de pends upon the substratum of 
deta i l being composed of si gp ificant indiv iduals ' 2 referen t 
not necessarily to individual occasions, for t he detail would 
then become unmana gea ble multiplicity, out to societa l 
successions of occasions as significant enduring individuals. 
Without such recognition of significant indivi duality t h e 
necessary harmony of experience becomes "debased ••• , tame, 
va gue, deficient in outline and intent i on."3 
1. AOI, 336. 2. AOI, 338. 3. AOI, 339. 
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Major beauty is not merely a passive appreciation of si g -
nificant individualities. Rather it involves reco gnit i on of 
component factors in terms of contribution of significant 
i nd i vi duality but also t he synthesis of those con t ri butions into 
si gn ificant un i ty in li gh t of purpose to contribu t e to 
f urt her value syn t hesis and harmony . Thus Whitehead says, 
" The enjoyment of Harmony, and a factor in this enjoyment, 
is t he intuition that the future, where its objective 
i mmortality lies, i s increas i n g the grounds for Harmony. 111 Again 
he points out, 
The claim to aesthetic attent i on thus re-
presents t he indirect importance of anti-
cipation and purpose as factors in the im-
me d iate enjoyment of the immed iate perci-
pient ••• The concept of completely passi ve 
contempla t i on in abs t raction from action 
and purpose is fallacious in the extreme. 
It omits t h e final re g~la ti ve factor in 
the aes t hetic complex. 
The attainment of the synthesis of cont ri b utions i n -
volves a resolution of discordant factors, for i n proportion 
as there is positive dis cord perfect ion is lacking . On the 
way in which the occasion a t te mpts tor esolve the discord 
depends to a large de gree the measure of major beauty it 
attains, if it attains it at all. Every occasion faces and 
must resolve in some manner a greater or lesser amount of 
discord because of the very multiplicity of the world from 
wh ich it springs. This very multiplicity of the realiza-
t ions of oth er occasions assures a certain amoun t of 11basic 
1. AOI, 338 -339. 2. AOI, 340. 
1 disharmony." 
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An occasion may meet the discord by means of what Wbite-
2 head calls "anaesthesia, 11 i.e. by ne ga ti ve prehension or 
" complete inhi bition" of one of t h e discordant factors. By 
such means an occasion ma y attain a perfection defined as 
t he a bsence from sub j e ctive form of "component feelin gs which 
mut ually inhibit each other so that neither rise to the 
streng th proper to it. 113 But the danger of anaesthesia is 
the reduction of experience to tameness and, if carried far 
enough, to mere minor beauty. There are levels of perf ec tion, 
and, Whitehead insis t s, "perf ection at a low level ranks be-
low Imperfection with higher aim. " 4 
Instead of anaesthesia an occasi cn may meet discord by 
a positive feeling of the nmutual destructi veness 115 of the 
6 discordent component elements or "aesthetic destruction." 
But to do so is to feel positive pain, evil, horror, sorrow, 
or dislike. 7 Whi le such feeling s are capable under some 
circumstances of inclu sion in major beauty, yet if dominant 
and persistent they can be completely destruct i ve of the oc-
casion and the society of occasions to which it belong s. 
Discord is not without its con tributory value and at 
times necessary role in creative advance. Attained and re-
peated perfection easily sinks into monotony and tameness. 
1. A.OI, 
2. AOI, 
3. AOI, 
4. AOI, 
330: 
333. 
329. 
329. 
339. Of. also AOI, 
"Imperfection aim-
ing at a hig her t y pe stands 
a bove lower perf ections. • 
5. AOI, 330. 
6. AOI, 329. 
7. AOI, 330. 
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Without discord we easily sink into the rut of ha bitual 
established order. Discord, on the other hand, f orces us to 
novel s yn thesis and enrichment of reality. Without a certain 
amount of discord life in its higher phases would disappear, 
for n the essence of life is to be found. in the frustrati ons 
of established order • ..,l Sin ce there is no one "perfection 
which is t he infinitude of all perfect i ons, 112 hi gher 
perfection becomes a matter of continual novel achievement 
and demands a freshness which "provides the supreme intimacy 
of contras t of new with the old. 13 It is the presence of 
imperfec t ions and discords which forces us to these hi gher 
perfecti ons and new beauties. But aesthetic destruction is 
not a satisfactory way of meet i n g discords and tends to the 
triumph of discord which is non-entity. 
Accordingly, .a third way of meeting discord without the 
disruptive effect of aes thetic destruction or the diluting 
effect of anaesthesia is what Whitehead calls " reduction to 
background. ·•4 In this case the discordant elements are 
ad jus t ed in rela tion to each other by reducing one of the 
elements to background against whi ch the other element 
stands out in strik ing contrast. Strength of experience 
and full contribution of one of the elements has been saved. 
Major beauty has been attained. However, it may still be 
the case tha t the full potential richness of the experience 
1. MOT, 119. 3. ESP, 118. 
2. AOI, 330. 4. A or, 334. 
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has not be en realized, for the contribution of the element 
reduced to background may well have been curtailed. 
Thus Whitehead suggests a fourth way of meeting dis-
cord which will do full justice to the contributory factors 
of the discordant elements and introduce further significant 
novelty as well, in a to ta l and fully rich harmony. 
This fourth way is by the spontaneity of the 
occasion so directing its mental functionings 
as to introduce a third system of prehensions, 
relevant to both the inharmonious systems. 
This novel system is such as radically to al-
ter the distrubiton of intensities through-
out the two gi ven sys terns, and to change the 
importance of :o th in the fina 1 intensive ex-
perience of the occasion. This was in fact 
the introduction of Appearance, and its use 
to preserve the massive qualitative variety 
of Reality ryom simplification by ne gative 
prehensions. 
By use of t he f ourth way of meeting discord experience 
reaches a new intensity of intrinsic and instrumental 
value which is major beauty at its height. 
Ma jor b eauty presupposes, includes, synthesizes, and 
raises to new hei ghts the stability and cleanness of truth 
in season, the acute awareness of value to ta lity of holiness, 
the insi ght of understanding, and the mutuality of g oo dnes s. 
It g i ve s reason and point to freedom and is the fruition which 
minor beauty only suggests. As harmonizing, givi ng meaning 
to, enriching , and synthesizing all the other values 
major oeauty in turn takes the form of and gives rise to 
the hi ghest values of the table--adventure, ci vi lization, and 
1. AOI, 335. 
peace. 
i. Adventure. 
Major beauty like every intrinsic value perishes in 
actualization. 1 While the characteristics of an occasion 
of maj or beauty may be more or less closely approximated in 
successive occasions, yet as mere repetition is a pproached 
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the value loses its vividness and tends to sink into tedium , 
for freshness is lost. 2 Every achievement is significant 
in terms of fur ther achievement . While it mi gpt seem that the 
loss of b eauty through perishing would turn the value itself 
into a mockery, Whitehead points out that just the opposite 
can be the case. It i s true that achievement perishes. 'l'o 
think that the moment can be preserved is to commit the 
Faustian sin against value and lose everything . It is to be 
3 gu ilty of what Whitehead calls the "static fallacy." But 
the realization that the "very essence of real actuality ••• 
is process , 114 that part of the high int rinsic worth of 
beauty is due to the very fact that it does perish and 
in perishing opens up new possibi lities for fu ller beauty , 
may, if accepted as the challenge which it is, add to intrinsic 
value. And this additional intrinsic value 1 de pende n t on 
major beauty itself, may be called adventure. 
Adventure involves the realization •that every occasion 
of actuality is in its own nature finite, 11 that 11 t here is no 
totality which is the harmony of all perfections,ill5 but that 
1. AOI, 262. 
2. ESP , 118. 
3. AOI, 335-336. 
4. AOI, 354. 
·5· AOI, 356 
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the progressive society of occasions formin g a human person-
ality, or the society of human personalities, or the uni verse 
taken as a who le is in a very real sense infinitelyperfect-
i b le though never reaching static finality. Adventure in-
volves the recognition that perfect i on and beau t y in the 
fullest sense are ever retreating ideals which in every moment 
of r ealization transcend thems e lves. The mark of adventure 
as:n intrinsic value is a 'no ble discon tentrr 1 which in itself 
is rewarding, for it is the "preservation of zest112 and the 
pro gressive realization of freshness of achievement in succes-
sive occasions. Of its origin Whitehead says, 
The factor in human life provocative of a 
n oble discontent is the gradual emerg ence 
into prominence of a sense of c r iticism, 
founded upon appreciation of b eauty, o~ 
intellectual distinction, and of duty . 
The noole discontent is the refusal to be satisfied with past 
achievements. It thus involves an active recognition of 
" real contrast between what bas been and may be 114 which 
arouses renewed vi gor to further achievement and in so doing 
enriches present experience as well. 
The nature and contri ,Jution of a noble discontent inte g -
ral to the intr i nsic value of adventure has be en summed up by 
McEwen as follows: 
The intellectual, aesthetic, and reli gious 
attitudes which ••• conatitute a noble dis-
content embody emotional experieD.Ces that 
oy--tli8mselves would be perpetually perish-
ing . Accor· ding l y , a rational person 
1. AOI, 12. 3. AOI, 12. 
2. AOI, 232. 4. AOI, 360. 
possessed by a noble discon t ent is constantly 
dissatisfied. 0 ut when these-rransient ex-
periences are u nders t ood and concretely rea-
lized as an or ganic whole, then they are g iven 
an endurin g meaning in pe rsonal g rowt h .l 
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Thus man's very long i n g and s t rivi ng for t h e highest values 
i s itself one o f t he s e highes t values. 
j. Civilization. 
Whereas adventure is the intrins i c enrichment of each 
e xperie nce througp t h e individual urge to hi gher ach ieve-
ment, civilization might be defined as the intrinsic enri ch-
ment of each occas i on or nexu s of occasions (enduring i n -
dividuals) through the combination of the urge to communal 
ach ievement, communal sharing , and the sense of being an 
integral part of pro gressive communal achievement. No oc-
cas i on or nexu s of occasions can exist in isolation. All 
values d ep e nd on com.'11.u nal relations and the hig her values on 
t he act i ve, purposive, sharing of values in terms of comnunal 
aim. Major beaut-y , we have d i s covere d, involves the reco g -
nition of the significant contri :Jution and intrinsic value s 
of individuals. 2 Civilization might be said to be the int rin-
sic value of t he harmonization and coalescence of all the 
t y pes of value including peace which we have left for the 
hi ghest place. 
While civilization in t he fullest sense includes and 
requires peace yet in an even more basic sense peace, as 
the truly civilized attitude to wards reality--in Whitehe ad's 
1. McEwen, WMI, 1 8 6. 2. See a bove, sec. h. 
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sense of the term peace 1--presupposes civilization. Each 
requires the other and to gether they might be considered 
the two-fold nature of the highest type of intrinsic value 
of which individuals and societies are capable. Considering 
this value from the societal standpoint, Whitehead says, 
"I put forward as a general definition of civilization, 
that a civilized society is e x hioiting the five qualities of 
2 Truth, Beauty, Adventure, Art, and Peace.n It goes without 
saying that as involv ing these, civilization involves all 
the other types of value as well. 
Art3 as a qual:tty of society and civilization is aim 
at the production of individuality in the component details 
of its iooth art's in the narrower sense and civilization's 
in the broader sensv compositions. 114 The products of art 
are enduring individualities. 11A great Civilization inter-
fused with h rt presents the world to its members clothed 
5 in the Appearance of immortality. 11 But civilization like 
all other values is not static. It is a value which must 
be prog ressively realized. Civilization might be descr i j ed 
as "the Great harmony LWhicE7 is the harmony of enduring in-
dividualities,116 but those individualities as successive 
realizations of major beauty and in their communal harmony 
only endure by virtue of progressive enrichment in lig ht of 
1. See below, sec. k. 
2. ~-1. or, 353. 
3. We have not treated art 
individually as a type of 
intrinsic value since its 
product and :tntrinsic 
value are major beauty. 
4. AOI, 363. 
5. AOI, 363. 
6. AOI, 362. 
----~--
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of COMJlon aim and the quality of adventure as present in each 
and communally. 11 \IVithout adventure civilization is in full 
decay.n1 In other words, civilization is not an assured 
resultant of automatic prog ress. Neither societies nor in-
dividuals can stand still. "Advance or decadence are the 
only al terna ti ves open to men. 112 To be achieved, ci vi liza-
tion must be aimed at and to be kept it must be increased. 
In this sense civilization is an always retreati ng ideal 
which as actual intrinsic value is self-transcendent. Thus 
Whitehead says, 
The ideal of the good life which is ci vili-
zation ••• is the discovery, the u r:!derstand-
ing , and tbe expositj_on of the possi ble 
harmony of diverse thing s, involv ing and3 exciting every mode of human experience. 
Civilization is thus the highest form of morality4 and 
understanding.5 
Without common aim at mutual enrichment so-called 
1 civilized life ei tre r wallows in pleasure or relapses slowly 
6 into barren repetition with waning intensities of fee ling . 11 
A ccordingly, for the realization of civilization t here must 
7 be not only coordination for social welfare in light of 
1. AOI, 360. 
2. AOI, 353. 
3. ESP, 223. 
4. Note that for Whitehead as for Hegel, morality only reaches 
its fullest embodiment in civilized society. Of. He gel, 
POM, 253: "The moral life, or social ethics." Die Sittlichkeit. 
5. Of. MOT, 5: "Civilized being s are t h ose wh o survey-trle worra:--
wi th some large generality of understand ing ." MOT, 63: ·n If 
civilization is to survive, the expansion of u nderstanding 
is a prime prerequisite." 
6. AOI, 108. 
7. AOI, 108-109. 
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common aim, but that coordination must be based on the per-
1 
s ua sion which respects the individual autonomy and freedom2 
of each to make his contri j ut i on. Force is the destroyer of 
civilization. "The prog ressive societies are those tha t 
have trusted themselves to ••• the way of persuasion. 113 
Whi tehead points out four factors or activities of men 
which promote the per s uasion necessary to civilization and 
its realization: 
They are family affections aroused in sex 
relations and in the nurture of children, 
intellectual curiosity leading to enjoyment 
in the interchange of ideas, and--as s oon as 
large scale socie~es arose--the practise of 
commerce. But b ey ond these special a ctivitie s 
a greater bond of s y mpa t hy has arisen. This 
is the g rowth of reverence for that power in 
virtue of which nature harbours ideal ends, 
and produces individual beings capable of 
conscious discrimination of such ends. This 
reverence is t~e fou-,! dation of the respect 
of man as man. 
In terms of the fourth of t hese factors it can oe pointed 
out that civilization is dependent on and the f n lfillment 
of hol i ness also. 5 
But the completion in the sense of the fullest realiza-
tion of civilizati on depends on still an other factor wh ich 
in a sense transcends civilization itself, the factor 
mentioned before, peace. 
1. Cf. Understanding , sec. e, above. 
2. Cf. sees. c and d above. 
3. AOI, 109. 
4. AOI, 109. 
5. Sec. f, above. 
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k. Peace. 
The final factor without which civilization is incomplete, 
with out which it tends to lose its reliance on persuasion 
a n d verge towards its eclipse in the "ruthless, hard, and 
cruel," 1 Whitehead calls "Peace." But by peace he does not 
mean the negative factor of cessation of struggle, nor does 
h e mean a Dantean rest in the everlasting arms, nor does he 
mean life untouched by loss, suf fering , and tra gedy. Ra ther, 
Whitehe ad says, 11 I choose the term 1 Peace 1 for that Harmony 
of Hannonies which calms destructive turbulence and completes 
ci vi liz a tion. 112 
Peace is not gained through anaesthesea or elimination 
of discordant factors. "It is a positive fe e ling which 
crowns the 1 life and motion 1 of the soul. 113 It is n ot the 
peace that passeth understanding but the peace of fullest 
sy mpa the tic ur.d e rs tanding. 11 It is broadening of fee 1 i ng 
due to the emergence of some deep metaphysical insight, 
unverbalized and yet momentous in its coordination of 
values. n 4 It is the richest type of personal experience, 
but with egoistic preoccupation wit h self torn away. Its 
closest historical relative is perhaps Spinoza 1 s Amor Intel-
lectualis Dei but it is neither a pure ly intellectual value nor 
primarily passive. It is a faith out a rational faith which 
is "a trust in the efficacy of Beauty. It is a sense tha t 
1. AOI, 366. 3. AOI, 367. 
2. AOI, 367. 4. AOI, 367. 
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fineness of achievement is as it were a key unlocking treasures 
that t he narrow nature of thing s would keep remote. 111 Again 
it mi ght be compared with Plato's final vision of t he Good 2 
in the Republi~ or of the Beautiful3 in ~~sium, but 
it is not merely a contemplative vision. Rather it is t he 
recognit i_on and prog res s ive a t tainment of 11 the harmony of 
t he soul's activities with i deal aims that lie beyond personal 
sa tis faction. 114 
By "beyond any personal satisfactionn Whitehead does 
not mean either non-personal nor unattainable but rather 
satisfaction which loses the narrowness of purely personal 
refer e nce. That this is the case is indicated by the example 
he g ives of an impersonal satisfaction-- 11all strong interes t s 
easily become impersonal, the love of a g ood joo well done. 115 
Peace ~not something which can be attained by direct 
purpose to attain it. Rather, like happiness, "it comes as 
a g ift. 116 It is the finding of a higher self through the 
loss of a lower self-centered self. " The deliberate aim at 
Peace very easily passes into its bastard suostitute anaesthe-
sia. • 7 It is a wider and wider inclusion of interests rather 
than an exclusion by inhibit i on. It is the fruition of 
personality in its transcendence of its own narrowness. White-
head points out, "Thus Peace is self-control at its wisest, 
1. AOI, 367. 5. AOI, 371. 
2. Plato, Rep ., 508-509. 6. AOI, 368. 
3. Plato, S~., 211 D. 
4. A or, 371. 
7. AOI, 368. 
.· 
372 
--at the width where the 'self' has been lost, and interest 
has been transferred to coordinations wider than personality. rr l 
He goes on to add , 11 0ne of its fruits is ••• the love of mankind 
as such." 2 
The state of mind marked by the atta inment of this 
highest intrinsic value, peace, is not to be confused with 
a falsifyin g , blind, or callous optimism. The very width 
and depth of vision necessary for peace would rule out any 
such shallowness. Truth, including the truths of evil, of 
3 
suffering, of "Decay, Transition, Loss, Displacement," is 
essential to peace. Where corrosive falsehood persists 
harmony is limited. "There can be no secure efficacy in the 
Beauty which hides within itself the dislocation s of false-
hood.114 Thus rather than entertaining a brutal blindness, 
"Peace is the understan..ding of tragedy, and at the same time 
5 its preserva tion. 11 Peace is deeper than gai ty or even 
joy. Whitehead sur.~arizes the relation of tragedy and joy 
including the necessity of the reco gnition, u nderstanding, 
and appreciation of tragedy for peace as follow s : 
As soon as high consciousness is reached, the 
enjoyment of existence is entwined with pain, 
frustration, loss, trag edy . Amid the passing of 
so much Beauty, so much heroism, so much daring, 
Peace is then the intuition of permanence. It 
keeps vivid the sensitiveness to tragedy; and it 
sees the tra gedy as a living agent persuading the 
world to aim at fineness beyond the faded level of 
surrounding fact. Each tragedy is the d i sclosure 
1. AOI, 368. 4. AOI, 377. 
2. AOI, 368. 5. AOI, 368. 
3. AOI, 368. 
of an ideal;--What might have been, and 
was not; Wh~t can be. The tragedy was 
not in vain.l 
Although the awareness of tragic beauty is an element in 
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peace it does not follow tha.t an attitude of mind characterized 
by peace falls into the o pposite brutality of condoning 
tragedy for the sake of beauty. Rather, as the a bov.e passa ge 
indicates, li ke the consequent nature of God2 mind characterized 
by peace attempts to salvage from the wreckage of given fall-
ures value for enrichment of the future. 
Thus peace i s also the hi ghest holiness. It is a sharing 
with God of his fu r;ction of salvation and preservation of 
value as also the love of God for the world whereby the world 
is enriched through reintegration of possibilities and ac-
tualities.3 The }Rrallel wi th God becomes unmistakeable in 
the love characterizing peace. 
Some closeness of status, such as in tbe rela tion 
of parent to ch i ld or in the relation of marria ge, 
can produce the love of self-devotionwhere the 
potentialities of the loved o b ject are fe 1 t 
passionately as a cla im that it find it~f in 
a friendly Universe. Such love is really an 
intense fee ling as to how the harmony of the 
world should be realized in particular objects. 
It is the feelin g of what would happen if ri gpt 
could triumph in a beautiful world, with dis-
cord rout ed. It is the passionate desire for 
the beautiful res u4t in this instance ••• It is 
the sense of Eros. 
Thus the peace which completes the table of values as 
------1. AOI, 3 69. 
2. See Chap. IV, sec. c, 2 . 
3. Cf. Chap. IV, sec. c, 3, and PR, 532 . 
4. AOI, 37 3. 
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the highest intrinsic value might be described as t he " endur-
ing satisfactionlll1 which results from selfless and loving 
devoti on to the ideal aim of fullest realization of values 
on the part of all actua li t i es in light of the widest meta-
physical understanding . It is the intrinsic value oft he 
realiz a tion of "the Harmony of Harmonies" or fullest possible 
interpenetration of values now. It is the present realizat i on 
of the infinitely perfecti ble kingdom of heaven as present 
2 
now. The summum £~ is no one value but the interpenetra-
tion of all values in a civilizat i on of devotion of all oc-
casions to their mutual enrichment. 
The emergence of a table of types of intrinsic values is 
the most significant addition to Whitehead's va lue theory 
during this period of elaboration. We ha·ve discovered that 
the table does not pretend to be exhaustive but rather is sug -
gestive of types of intrinsic value and their interrelations. 
From a general stand po int these eleven types of value are 
roughly arran ged in levels of importance, that is, de gree 
of intrinsic value, from lower to higher. However, the rela-
tive position of the various values is approximate only and 
varies with the amount and type of interpenetrat ion wi th other 
types of value, so that the relative positions indi cated tend 
to hold only of the rudimentary appearance of the t ype o f 
value in question. In general each type of value, from an-
other standpoint, is so arranged as to be de pende n t on but 
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richer than those below it. but again t h is also is an approxi-
mation , for in a ver y real sense every type of value with 
the possible exceptions of the two lowest is dependent to a 
greater or lesser de gree on all the other& This became par-
ticularly evident in the relations between such values as 
freedom and understanding , understanding and truth, and 
·-· 
civilizat:l.on and peace. Fully recognizing these limitations 
and the resulting approximate nature only, we have yet been 
a b le to discover by impljcation more often than direct state-
ment what a ppears to us to be Whitehead's table of intrinsic 
values: 
A. Lower intrinsic values: 
1. Mino r beauty. 
2. Survival. 
B. Higher intrinsic values~ 
3. Freedom. 
4. Moral goodness. 
5. Understanding. 
6. Holiness. 
c. Highest intrinsic values; 
7. Truth. 
B. Ma jor beauty. 
9. Adventure. 
10. Ci vilization. 
11. Peace. 
Perhaps the most striking feature of the table is the 
relatively low position of moral goodness. However, as we 
have seen, the reason for its lower position is perhaps a 
tribute to rather than a deroga tion from moral g oodness, for 
as lower it is fundamental for all the higher types of 
value and is literally reincarnated and enriched in each of 
the hig her t ypes so that the full wealth of moral goodness 
is only attainable in its coalescence with pea ce. 
In thi s period we have found a continuing a nd, if 
pos s i bl e, heightened emphasis on the societal conditions 
o f value and on the rec i procal relations of intrinsic and 
instrumental value. Further, the concept of i~portance 
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has been broadened to mean awareness of value si gnificance, 
that is, de gree of intrinsic and/or instrUmental value or 
disvalue which awareness itself i s a constituent of realized 
intrinsic value. Matter-of-fact is an abstraction apart from 
importance. The complementary concept to i mportance as aware-
ness of value significance is expression as value effect. 
Finally, as pointed out, 1 during this period there is 
a gro wing tendency on Whitehead's part towards a more 
thoroughly F la tonic theory of value. Thus in spite of his 
rene wed and continued emphasis on the experiental nature of 
value and even in contradiction to it we find Whitehead 
elaborating a view of '"the Good" in terms of nn thema tical 
subsistent order. Three factors in this period tend to 
strengthen this secondary line of thought in relation to 
value: ( 1) The very analysis of intrinsic values into types 
easily leads to the idea that the t y pes rather than the 
exp eriences are the values. While t h is need not follow, yet 
it may very well have been a causal factor leading to White-
head's thought of the final period. (2) Even more important 
is the rather striking omission of the term "eternal objectstt 
1. Sec. d, abo ve. 
from Niodes of Though~. While eternal objects are briefly 
mentioned in the earlier Adventures of 1dea~, 1 they play 
a much less dominant role than for merly and are omitted 
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entirely from the list of terms Whitehead at this time con-
siders necessary for an adequate philosophical generaliza-
tion.2 Thus the way is open for the indentification of values 
with the potentialities that were eternal o o je cts. ( 3) While 
Whitehead in this period draws a distinction between matter~ 
of-fact and importance only to point out that the concept of 
matter-of-fact is a mythological abstraction apart from 
importance 3 yet it may be the case that concen t ration on 
this distinction led Whitehead to think of them more and more 
in terms of polar opposition. Add to these the explicit 
discussion of ~the Good" in Modes of Thought4 and it is 
not surprising to find a marked shift in emphasis in the 
Platonic direction in the short and final period of Whitehead's 
thought. To this final period we now turn. 
1. AOI, 312-314. 
2. AOI, 304: "We require 'together', 'creativity', 'concres-
cence', 'prehension', 'feeling', 'subjective form', 'data•, 
'actuality', 'becoming', 'process. 1 ~ 
3. MOT, 13-14. 
4. MOT, 103-106. bf. AOI, 190, also. 
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CHAPTER VI. 
The Fin a 1 Pb.a s e • 
The final phase of Whitehead's thought found expres-
sion in two articles: one-- 11 Mathematics and the Good"--
was delivered as a lecture at Harvard University in Decem-
ber of 1939, and the other--"Immortality"--was delivered as 
the Ingersoll Lecture for 1941. Both of these were first 
published in · the Whitehead volume of The Library of Living 
1 Philosophers in 1941. The second of the two, "Immortality," 
2 
represents the culm±nation of what we have noted as a 
gradually emerging secondary line of thought in relation 
to value theory which is much more Platonic in nature and 
in some respects quite different from and even contradictory 
t o some of the major contentions of his primary theory of 
value first developed in his formulative period and em-
phasized and elaborated in the two subsequent periods of 
his thought. 
We discovered the first indication of this secondary 
development in Process~ Reality with the restriction 
of intrinsic value to the final phase of an occasion. 3 
We have seen the basis for it growing in the subsequent 
period with the gradual eclipsing of the doctrine of 
eternal objects, the increased emphasis on "the Good," 
1. Schilpp, PANW, 666-700. Also in ESP, 77-113. 
2. Chap. IV, sec. B; Chap. v, sec. B, d and k. 
3. Chap. IV, sec. B. 
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the relation of "the Good" to order and pattern, and the 
distinction between matter-of-fact and importance. 
The first of the two articles of this last period, 
"Mathematics and the Good," in some respects bas much closer 
affiliations to Modes of Thought than to the final arti-
cle on "Immortality" in that value is still considered to 
be restricted to finite realizations. 1 However, "Mathematics 
and the Good" clearly forms the connecting link between the 
features in Modes of Thought pointing in the Platonic direc-
tion and their fruition in "Immortality" by its renewed 
emphasis on patterns as the "necessary condition for the 
realization of the Good 112 and "infinitude" as the receptacle 
3 
for the "embodiment of finite values." Accordingly, in 
spite of its closer temporal proximity to Modes 2f Thought, 
in light of its transitional nature and its later publication 
we shall consider "Mathematics and the· Good" as belonging 
to the final phase. Our procedure then will be to follow 
Whitehead in his transition from emphasis on pattern as 
the condition of value to identification of patterns with 
values. 
A· Patterned value. 
Throughout every period of his philosophical develop-
ment Whitehead has emphasized order, pattern, limitation, 
1. Art. (1941)~, 674-675, 679 
2. Art. (1941} 1 , 678 3. Art. (1941) , 675 
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and definiteness as essential to value realization. In 
the formulative period Whitehead insisted, "Value is 
the outcome of limitation. The definite finite entity 
. 1 is the selected mode which is the shaping of attainment." 
An occasion as an intrinsic value experience was asserted 
to be the actualization of an abstractive hierarchy2 or 
a complex pattern of eternal objects or possibilities or 
3 ideals. All occasions as intrinsic values were considered 
to be structured or patterned values. Again in Process and 
Reality the mark of depth of intrinsic value was asserted 
4 
to be 11adequa te order." Throughout, harmonious order has 
been the basic category of importance, and height of value 
to a greater or lesser degree has been dependent upon 
complexity, contrast, and vividness of attained order. 
5 6 Both in Adventures of Ideas and Modes 2£ Thought order 
was considered to be the basic condition of moral goodness 
and value achievement. Thus there is nothing either new 
or surprising about Whitehead's continued emphasis on the 
close relation of pattern and value in "Mathematics and the 
Good.'' The following could be considered a summarizing 
statement applicable to every period of his thought: 
"The infusion of pattern into natural occurrences, and 
the stability of such patterns, is the necessary condition 
1. SMW, !'36. 4. PR, 169. 
2. SMW, 246. 5. AOI, 376. 
3. SMN, 241. 6. MOT, 103-106. 
1 for the realization of the Good." 
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Pattern, Whitehead contends, is basic to civilized life. 
The arts which enrich civilization are "founded upon the 
2 
study of pattern." Socia tal rela tiona and stability are 
dependent upon behavior patterns. Social change and advance 
rest on "fortunate modification" of pa. ttern of social beh.a-
3 
vior. Lack of pattern is ap~oach to chaos, ineffective-
ness, and, at the extreme, non-entity. Thus without 
pattern and its definiteness there cannot be values. But 
if lack of pattern is non-entity and ineffectiveness, it 
also follows that without pattern there would not be effec-
tive evil. Accordingly, Whitehead insists, the troblems of 
4 Good and Evil are problems of patterns and their inter-
relations. Since this is the case, our ability intelligent-
ly to achieve value, to bring about actualization of the Good, 
to avoid evil, is directly proportional to our ability to 
understand pattern and structure. All realities, to be re-
alities, must achieve structure of some sort, but that attain-
ment of structure, although enjoyed, when attained may be more 
or less blind. Great and intended good and great and intend-
ed evil both require an understanding of structure. Thus i n 
Modes of Thought Whitehead pointed out: 
The animal enjoys structure ••• Man understands 
structure. He abstracts its dominative 
1 1. Art. (1941) 1, 678. 2. Art. (1941) , 677. 
1 3. Art. (1941) 1, 677. 4. Art. (1941) , 679. 
principle from the welter of detail. He 
can imagine alternative illustration. He 
constructs distant objectives. He can 
compare the variety of issues. He can aim 
at the best. But the essence of human con-
trol of purposes depends upon the under-
standing of structure in its variety of 
applications. 
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If it is the case that structure is fundamental to 
value, then the relation of mathematics to goodness in not 
difficult to see. Mathematical insight can be an effective 
tool for attainment of "the Good." Mathematics is the most 
rigerous and most general investigation and manipulation 
of structure or patterned factors. To understand mathema-
tics is to understand patterned interrelations. Thus White-
head insists: 
Mathematics is the most powerful technique 
for the understanding of pattern, and for 
the analysis of the relationships of patterns • 
•• The essence of this generalized mathema-
tics is the study of the most observable 
examples of the relevant patterns; and ap-
plied mathematics is the transference of 
this study to other examp~es of the reali-
zation of these patterns. 
In harmony with his general position Whitehead goes on 
to insist that pattern is not the whole story in relation 
to value. It "is only one f'actor in our realization of' 
experience, either as immediate value or as stimulus to 
3 
activity for future value." The other side is individuality 
4 
of feeling. The pattern must be actualized in individual 
1. MoT, 164-105. 3. Art. (194l)i,678. 
2. Art. (1941) 1 , 678 4. Art. (1941) , 679. 
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feeling to be a value or a disvalue. As abstracted from 
feeling pattern is non-existent. 
In itself pattern is neither good nor bad. 
But every pattern can only exist in virtue 
of the doom of realization, actual or con-
ceptual. And this doom consigns the pat- 1 tern to play its part in uprush of feeling. 
But it is just at this point that Whitehead intro-
duces a new emphasis. Just as pattern in itself is an ab-
straction, so is feeling. The unity of the two issues is 
2 finite values. However, the attaining of finite values, 
Whitehead says, "is the awakening of infinitude to finite 
3 
activity." Pat terns, even in abstraction, as forms of 
definiteness are finite. 4 Feeling in abstraction as 
indefinite is infinite. Accordingly, tbe imposition of 
pattern on feeling is the becoming of actuality. Or, to 
state it in the reverse manner, the embodiment of pattern 
5 by feeling is the "activity of finitude." The embodiment 
of pattern by feeling "is the awakening of infinitude to 
6 finite activity." Whitehead goes on to add: 
Such is the value of existence: it is the 
acquisition of pattern by feeling, in its 
emphasis upon a finite group of selected 
particulars which are the entities patterned. 7 
Again in the same line Whitehead says, 
All characteristics peculiar to actualities 
are modes of emphasis whereby finitude 
~--:---:---r:;- ) 1 1 1. Art. (1941 1 , 679. 5. Art. (1941) 1 , 675. 2. Art. (1941) 1 , 675. 6. Art. (1941) 1 , 679. 3. Art. (1941) 1 , 679. 7. Art. (1941) , 679. 4. Art. (1941) , 675. 
vivifies the infinite. In this way Creativity 
involves the production of value experience, 
by the inflow of tba infinite into the finite, 
deriving special character from the1details and the totality of finite pattern. 
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In other words, Whitehead is insisting that while 
either the infinitude of feeling or the finitude of pattern 
are non-existent in abstraction from the other, yet, actu-
alities may be considered as the taking on of tbe finitude 
of pattern by the infinitude of feeling or the impression 
of the finitude of pattern upon the infinitude of feeling. 
He does insist "that infinitude is mere vacancy apart from 
finite values, and that finite entities are meaningless 
apart from the relationship beyond themselves. "2 But the 
parallel between the infinitude of feeling and the Platonic 
recptacle of the Timaeus which 
assumes a form like that of any of the things 
which enter into her; she is the natural r~cip­
ient of all impressions, and is stirred and 
informed by them, and appears §ifferent from 
time to time by reason of them 
is obvious. Further, Whitehead's mathematical patterns 
correspond almost exactly to the patterns of the Timaeus 
which are "intelligible and always the 4 same." Finally, 
actualities tend to become the particularizations of in-
finitude through its participation in the "true essence"5 
of finite pattern. In fact, as pointed out, Whitehead 
4. Plato, Tim., 49 A. 
5. Plato, sophist, 248 c. 
1 1. Art. (1941) 1 , 681. 2. Art. (1941) , 675. 
3. Plato, ~., 50 C. 
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states "that infinitude is a mere vacancy apart from 
lli embodiment of finite values. rrl The further ·step of 
the identification of the patterns with the values though 
not yet consummated is already indicated. '~he Good" does 
tend to become a Platonic form and the mathematical patterns 
subordinate forms which must be actualized for its actual-
iza tion. 
While it must be indicated that the Platonic parallel 
could have been drawn as more or less applicable in any 
period of Whitehead's development, that eternal objects in 
particular have been very closely analogous to the Platonic 
Ideas, yet there would seem to be a significant difference 
in the applicability of the parallel at the present time. 
Whereas previously the primary emphasis from Science ~ ~ 
Modern World to Modes of Thought had been upon real self-
attainment of individuality and value, and, in the formu-
lative period in particular, on the equation of intrinsic 
value with reality and individuality, at the present time, 
2 
while individuality is still mentioned as important, yet 
the emphasis is placed upon a substrate infinitude and what 
might be called a superstrata of forms of finiteness. 
While Whitehead never goes so far as to assert real 
separate existence to either the substrate or the super-
strata, yet the real drama of existence tends to pass 
1. Art. (l94l}i, 675. Underlining mine. 
2. Art. (1941) , 680. 
386 
from the self-realizing achievement o f irdivid ua ls to the 
i n terplay of cosmolos ical opposites. ~ hereas fo~mer ly , 
on the .a sis of the ontolog ica l princip le 1 and the con sis-
tent a nd s t rikint; emphasis on self-realization, 2 sel f -
crea tion,3 and individual achievement p lus such explicit 
statements as "creativity is not an external a g e n c y with 
its own ulterior purposes , 4 we could irsist t hat wh ile 
some passag es were somewhat amhi guous yet Whitehead did 
n ot h old to a view of a real creativit y that was an y t h i nb 
more than or other than or different from the self realiz-
i n · act ivity of actual occa sion s, 5 in the present period 
such an ass ertion is by n o means obvious . In fact Nhitehead 
comes dange rously near to e:nbracing now the p osition he for -
merly reje cted . lhis tends to he i ndicat ed i n such a state -
ment as "Creativity involves t h e producti on of value expe rience 
by the i n flow of the infinite into the f i nite , derivin ~ special 
c ha racter fr om details and t he totality of the finite pa ttern . 11 6 
F inally, as wil l be ev i dent , in nimmortality" the l ocus 
of value itself shifts fr om the individual occasion s to a 
"World of Value , 11 and individual value becomes der ivative 
from the 11 iiforld of Value" by participation . 
1 . Chap. IV , sec . A,l and 
PR , 254 . 
2 . PR , 340 . 
3 . PH , 131-132, 22 8 - 229, 339 . 
4 . PR , 339 . 
5 . Chap . IV, sec . A,l. 
6 . Art. (1 941)1 , 681 . 
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B . The worlds of f act and value. 
1. The 1.'Vorld of Va lue. 
The un iverse , Wh itehead insists, can be descr ib ed in 
terms of two mutually relevant worlds each of wh ich requires 
the o ther . These t wo worlds are (1) the nworld of F a ct 11 
which is constituted by al l "finite activities, 111 and (2) 
t h e 11World of Value" wh ich is the 11 ti:neless coordi nation 
of the i n finitude of possibility for realization . 112 Valu e 
is unch ang ing , timeless, and i~mortal , and while it has a n 
esse n tial referen ce to fact y et it is i ndiffere n t to any 
particular fact . 
Value is in its nature ti rr.eless and i mmortal. 
Its essence is n o t rooted i n any passing cir-
cumstan ce. Th e i mmediac y of some mortal ex-: 
perie n ce is only va luah le b ecause it shares in 
the immortalit y of some value. The value in-
here nt in the Universe has an essential inde-
pe nde nce of any moment of time ••• No h e roic 
deed, and no unworthy act , de pe n ds for its 
heroism or disgust , u p on t h e e x act moment of 
time at Wi'l ic h it occurs, un le ss such cn...ang e 
o f t i me p lace s it i n a differe n t se q ue n ce of 
1 3 va ues . 
It becomes i mmedi a t e ly eviden t that value has ta k e n the 
p l a ce o f eternal o~jects in Whitehea d ' s earlier thought . 
Al most all of t h e stateme n ts about eternal objects a ppe a ring , 
f or ex a mple, in Scienc e and t h e Modern 1, orld where the con-
ce p t receives its most exha ustive a na 1ysis 4 can he tran s f erred 
intact to t h e prese n t c on cept of v a lue. Value is no l on g er 
1. Art . (1941) 2 , 695 . 
2 . Art . (1941) 2 , 696 . 
3 • Art • ( 19 41 ) 2 , 6 84 • 
4 . ShiV/ , 226 - 24 8 , a nd Chap . III , 
sec • A , 2 , a lJ ov e • 
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11 t he intrinsic reality of an event 111 or occasion; the 
actuality is ro long er• the value .2 Rather values are sub-
sistent loz; ica l identities wh ich 11 haunt time like a spirit, 11 3 
which whi le refere n t to each o ther and to actual i ty ~ enerally4 
are indifferent to any particular realization. The metaphy-
sical status o f values is to be possib ilities for actuality.5 
To carry this parallel further, Whitehead now insists 
that not eternal objects hut value tthas an essential inde-oen -
d e r ce of aJJY moment of t.ime, 116 not oh jects hut value s are 
eterna l, are i mmortal. 7 Creative acti on derives whatever 
immortality, stability, and permanence it has from the re-
actualization n ot of eternal objects but of values . 8 Further, 
"the primary basis for the 'vl'orld of' Va l ues is the coordina-
tion of' a ll poss i bi lities f or entry int o the active World 
0 
of fact . 11 v 
"Value n in the hr oade st sense of the term is n ow 1' the 
g eneral name for the infinity o f values . nlO Values as eter-
na l possibilities involve essential relationship to each 
oth er. 11 Values require each o ther . The esse n tial character 
of the 1.1orld of Values in coordinati on. 1tll But t h is coord in-
ation of possioi lity involves an essential activity within 
1 . Si\'1YV" , 136. 7 . Ar t. (1 941)2 , 686 . 
2. RI 1'1 , 100-101. 8 . Art . ( 1941)2 686 . 
3 . SI'.;~YV , 126 . 9 . Art. (1 941)2' 696 . 
4 . S l\.:il!IT 237-238 . 10 . Art . (1941 ) 2: 68 5 . J.•J. ~. , 
5. Sl'f'/ii , 229 . 11. Art. ( 1941)2, 692 . 
6. Art . (1941 )2, 684 . 
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the V'lorld of Value, for possibilities are "partly concor -
dant and partly discordant." 1 That su ch internal : coordin-
ation in tbe Wor•ld of Values is necessary becomes particu-
l ar ly evident with Wn i t ehead 1 s ins is t.ence t n_a t 11 the World 
o f Value contains within i tself Evil . a :s well as Good. 112 
Thu s in spite of his i n siste nce on the timelessness o f 
the World of Va lue \Fh it eheacl a lso rna intains t hat it is 
act ive. " ·rhe World of Values must be conce i ved a s active 
with the adjustmen t of the potentia lities f o r realization . n3 
Just h ow such acti vity is t o be harmonized with the !!t i me -
less and immortal"4 nature of the Wor l d o f Value, Whitehead 
make s no attempt to make clear . The difficulties involved 
in the assertion of the timeless nature of God in Relig i on 
in the l\'[aking 5 return with a ve ng eance . At le a st i n the 
f ormulative period the difficulties could be mitigated by 
evidence that Whitehead may have merely meant that God is 
timel ess i n the se n se of being con stan t in purpose, 6 but 
here n o such mitigati on is possible, for Whitehead is not 
talking about a con cr ete ac tua li ty but an abstract realm 
of eterna l subsistent s. Yet he is asserting tb.at t {l is realm 
itself is active . 
This activity wh ich goes on in the timeless World of 
Value Whitehead calls "Va luation. 117 When it is recalled 
1 . Art . (1941) 2 , 685 . 
2. Art. ( 1941) ~ , 692 . 
3 . Art . (1941) 2 , 685 . 4 . Art . (1 941), 684 . 
5. RIM, 90 . 
6 . Cf . Chap . I8I, sec. C,l. 
7 . Art. (1941) , 6 85. 
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t hat in Process arrl Reality valua tion meant the conceptual 
aware ness arx:l eva luation o f poss ib ilities on the part of 
t he mental poles of actual accasion s, 1 it mi ght see m t ha t 
a clue to t h e harmoniza tion of the presen t position with 
t h e major the ory of va lue in the other per iod s had b een 
found. It mi6ht seem, in oth er words, that all ~bitehead 
mea ns by the Vv' orld of Value is the conceptual realization 
on t h e part of each occasion of value p oss ibil ities as 
a b stracted from their actualization. But, unf ortunately 
for such an interpretation, Hhitehead r a t her specii'ically 
p oints out that t h is is not what he means . Valuation "for 
the purpose of t h is disc ussion," Hhitehead says, will mean 
t he "int ernal activity of tbe -~vorld of Value." 2 F'or the 
f unction for wh ic h the t erm va luation stood in Process and 
Reality:, W:O.itehead n ow sub stitutes the term "evaluation. 11 3 
Evaluation, he defines as the · conceptual awareness of possi -
b ilities for "the process of realization in ·the ""if orld of 
Activity. 114 Wh ile evaluation "involves refere n ce to valua-
tion"5 the two are n ot to be ide ntified. Evaluat ion is 
the connecting link , or rather one of them, lJ etween the 
World o f Activity a nd the World o f Value in orien tation 
from th3 orld of Activity. 
In a sen se valuati on ca n a lso he considered as a 
1. PR, 39-40, 50, 368 . 
2. Art. (194 1) 2 , 6 85. 
3. Art. (1941) 2 , 68 5. 
4. Art. (1941)~ , 685 . 
5 . Art. (1941) , 6 8 5. 
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connecting link between the two worlds in orientation from 
the World of Va lue, for it i s by the activi t y o f' valuation 
in the World of Value that va lues are coordinated in mutual 
relevance for actua liza tion.l This relevance f or actualiza -
tion , however, is n ot a relevance to any particular occasion 
ut rather is a g rading of values n ot onl y in terms of 11hetter 
and worse 112 but also a g radation of values in relation to 
each other whereby the rea liza tior of a ny one value in 
actuality involves re a lization of that value c omplex of 
compatih le values which st ar:d as its cond itions . 
Its fe'n.e ,'orld of Value '.~? activity con-
sists in the approa ch to multiplicity by 
the adjustment of its many potentialiti es 
into finite unities, each unity with a 
g roup of dominan t ideas o f value, mutual-
ly interwoven, and reducing the infinit~ 
of values into a g r adua ted perspe ctive. 
Thus like the former r ealm of' ideality or eternal objects 
the World o f Value is characterized by in~ernally ordered 
structures of p o tentia lities. 4 
In a sense Whitehead 1 s value theor•y has c omp l etely re-
versed i t self in this final phase . No lon:;er can it he said 
that for Whitehead no bifurcat ion exists b etwee n fact and 
value.5 F ot only are fact and value bifurcated, they tend 
to stand in ext re me polar opposition. It is in this final 
phase that Whitehead's similarity to Nicolai Hartmann 
1. Art. (1941)2, 685. 
2. Art. (194 1)2, 685. 
3 • Art • ( 19 41 ) 2 , 6 92 -6 9 3 • 
4. Cf . S HN , 2 32 1 and Chap . III, sec. A,2, above. 
5. Cf. Chap . I I I , sec. B,l, and G. F organ , Art .(l937 , 310. 
becomes pronounced. "Nhitehead during this final peri od 
alon g with Hartmann draws no distinction between i dea ls 
as ideas of situations which whe n realized woul d be in-
trinsic values and intrinsic values themse lves.l The 
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Vlorld of values l:a s bec ome a re alm of sulJsistent i deal ity 
which can almost be asserted t o have independent exi s ten ce . 
F or whi le Whit e head cont i nues t o insist of the iNorld of 
Va lues as f ormerly o f the realm of eternal ob jects t hat 
considered i n itself it is a n abstraction2 yet at the 
same time h e s p eci fical l y asserts that rr the 'JJorld of Value 
is n ot the World of Ac t ive Creativi ty." 3 
While 1/\Thitehead tends to indica t e by indirection t hat 
the ':Vorld o f Value bas its locus in God a nd thus to avoid 
floating surysiste n ts and sub siste n ce, eve n this is le ft 
o pen to question. As a matter of f'act Wh ite l1.ead 1 s state -
ments about God i n the article 11 Immortality" could a s easily 
be interpreted to mean that God is derivative from and in-
c luded within the 1Nor l d of Val ue as ti1.a t the WoP ld of Value 
is includ ed i n God . Thus f or example, Wh it ehead sa y s, 
The ascription of mere happiness and ar-
bit rary power to the nat u re o f God is a 
profanat ion . This nature c on ce ived as the 
uni f ication derived from the World" of Value 
1. Cf . Chap . I~I, sec. B,l. 
2 . Art . (194 1) , 693 and ts95 . Cf . m:'!.'W , 228 . 
3. Art. (1941) 2 , 694 . 
is founded on fdeals of perfe c tion , moral 
and aesthetic . 
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He speaks of 11 God in the World o f Values 1t2 and makes God t s 
func tion another of the conn ectin:; links bel~ween the World 
o f Fact and the vrorld of Value by adding t hat God 11 is 
e qually a f ac 0or in each of the man y persona l ex ist e n ces 
in the world of change . rr 3 Ace ord i ngly , 'Nh i r.ehead points 
out that rr God, whose existence is f ound ed in Value, is to 
be conce i ved as persuasive towards an ideal coordinat ion . 114 
Such statement s would seem to imp l y a priority of the World 
o f Va lue eve n to God and the reduc tion of God to a principle 
of releva nce of values to fact. 
It may si mp ly be the case that Whitehead is distinguish-
i l'1_g between the primordia l and conseque nt natures o1' God 
again although the terms primordial and consequ e nt do n ot 
appear . Howeve r, it mi ght be more accurate in relation t o 
the present period to say t hat the Wor l d of Value has a 
primordia l and cons eque n t ra ture , or even that there are 
two vVor l ds o f Va lue , primordial an d conseque n t, and t ha t 
God is the mediator between t h e two and inclusive o f t h e 
lat t er. F or n ot on ly is the World of Value the rea lm o f 
potentialities , 5 but it is also the immortal coordination of 
achievements wh ich is God's co n sequent na ture. Wh iteh ead 
1. Ar t . ( 1941) : ' 697 . 4 . Art . ( 194 1) 2 ' 694. 
2 . Art . ( 1941) 2 ' 694 . 5 . Art. (1941)2, 685, 693 . 
3. Art . ( 1941) 2 ' 694 . 
says: 
He LGo~ is the unification of the multi -
ple personalities received from the Active 
World. In this way , we ca n conceive the 
World of Value in the gu ise of the coordin-
ation of many personal indivi~ualities as 
factors in the nature of God. 
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Again , he says that t h e nature of God as derived from the 
World of Values nreceived into its unity the scattered 
effectiveness of' rea lized actualities, transformed by the 
s upremacy of its own ideals."2 
Pr obab ly the most accurate statement would be t hat the 
World of Value has re p l ac ed the primordia l nature of God 
and that the term God has become r e stricted to what wa s 
formerly ca lled his consequent and superjective natures . 3 
If this is the case, then the concept of God, like t h e con -
cept of value, h as undergone al most a complete reversal 
from its first appeara r ce and elaboration in the formulative 
period . Wherea s t h e term God was orig ina lly introduced 
pri maril y to account for eternal objects and was thus de -
veloped first in terms of his non-temporal primordial 
natu re, 4 now the term God tends to be restricted to the 
consequent (and superjective) functions of the God of 
Process and _eality. Eterna l objects , hecome values , 
now tend to account for God ("derived from the ; ~or •ld of 
Value" 5 ) whereas forme rly God was necessary to account 
1. Art. (1 94 1)2, 694 . 
2 . Art. (1941)2, 69 8 . 
3. See Chap. IV, sec. C. 
Underl i.ning mine . 
4. See Chap . I I I, sec. C,l. 
5. Art. (1941) ~ 697. 
"· 
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for eterm.l objects. 
2. The World of Fact. 
As opposed to the World of Value Whitehead distinguishes 
the ttworld of Fa ct 11 1 which is characterized by lfctivity, 2 
temporality, 3 11 Creation Now, 114 transiency,5 and "the factual-
ity of Finite Activity."6 The World of Fact re qu ires the 
vVorld of Value as the source of potent iali ties for its real-
ization,? as tbe source of its meaning, 8 it importance ,9 and 
its permanence.lO Bu t all orig ination and creation as such 
lies within the World of Fact . 11 
The World of Fact as process and crea t ion "aims at 
Value" and saves value ufrom the futility of abst raction.ul2 
Actualizatior. of the potentialities of the World of Value 
consists in realizing "sequences of types of value 11 13 and 
the realizatioE of these is what "g ives importance . 11 14 Thus 
in this las~- phas e of Whitehead's thought importance does 
take the place of what in ever y other per iod we have b een 
able to describe as intrinsic value. Enj oyment is now 
identified with i mportance. 
1. Art . 
2. Art . 
3 . Art . 
4. Art . 
5. Ar t. 
6. Art . 
7. Art. 
If you are enjoying a meal, and are con-
scious of pleasure derived from a pple-tart, 
( 1941) 2' 683 . 8 . Art. ( 1941) 2' 687 . 
(1941)2, 6 84 . 9. Art . ( 1941)2, 686 . 
(1941)2, 684 . 10. Art . (1941)2, 686. 
(1941)2, 684 . 11. Art. (1941)2, 686. 
(1941)2, 688 . 12. Art . ~1941)2, 686. 
( 1941) 2, 696. 13. Ar l! . 1941) 2, 686. 
( 1941) 2, 696 . 14. Art. (1941)2, 686. 
it is the sort of taste that you enjoy. 
Of course the tart has to come at t he 
right time. But it is not the moment 
of clock time which g ives i mportance; 
it is the sequence of types of value--
for instance, the an te cedent na tur~ of 
the meal, and your initial hunger . · 
Importance is the actualization of values in due order. 
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The vVorld. of F'act when considered in itself is a 
world of "sheer immediacy" 2 of activity, but such sheer 
immediacy is non-existent and mea n ine; less infin ity3 apart 
from its specific re~lizations of the potentialities of 
and from the World of Value. Again Vifh itehead insists 
that either World in abstraction from its refere n ce to 
the ot her is non -ex iste nt . 4 But of the two, the ,,{orld of 
Va l ue has a permaner,ce, a stab ility, and a width never 
attainable by the chang ing World of Fact. 
3. The Universe of Fact and Value. 
In the Universe, Wh itehead insists , 
the status of the World of Fact is that 
of an abstraction requiring , for the com-
pletion of its concrete reality Value 
and Purpose . Also in the Universe the 
status of the World of Value is that of 
an ab straction requiring , for the com-
pletion of its concrete reatity the fa c-
tuality of Finite Activity. 
The universe t hen is a unive r se of value-informed fact . 
We have already indicat ed that the actualities of the 
World of Fact become aware of the potentialities of the 
l. Art. (1 941)2, 686. 
2 . Art . (194 1)~, 685 . 
3. Art. (1941) , 682. 
4 . Art. (1941)2, 693. 
5. Art. (1941)2, 696 . 
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'!\forld of Value for realization by mear1s of r.tEvaluation ," 1 
as also that the World of Value b ecomes releva n t for the 
World of Pact throu,sh valua tion in the World of Va lue 
and through the activity of God. 2 The .actual fusion of 
t he two wor lds, however, or what for merly was called 11 in-
e; ression113 of the potentialities of the World of Value into 
the World of li'a ct can only b e accounted for, v'Vhiteh ead 
feels, in terms of w:b...at calls 111 Ideas, 1 which it wa s t h e 
g lory of Gree k thought to have explicitly discovered. 114 
It is n ot at all certain , however, that t he Platon ic 
parent would recognize the Wh iteh eadeem child , for the 
Ideas are not, as might be expected, the Values of the 
World of Value but r ather are the "bridge£s]"5 between the 
two worlds. Whitehead describes the situation as follows: 
This fusion involves the fact that either 
World can only be des cr i~ed in terms of 
fa ctors which are common to both of them . 
Such f actors have a dua l aspect, and each 
Vorld empha sizes one of the two aspects .6 
These factors with double aspects are what Whitehead calls 
11 Ideas. 11 
The Ideas are the means of ing ression of the values 
into actuality . They mi e;ht be described as the actual 
value cha racteristics of actuality. Whitehead characterizes 
1. See above sec. 1, and Art. (1941 )~, 685. 
2. See a hove sec . 1, and Art. ( 1941) ' 698 . 
3. E . g . , PH, 34 • 5. Art . (1941 )2, 688 . 
4 . Art. ( 1S·41) 
' 
687 . 6 . Art. (1941)2, 687. 
l 
I 
these ideas as follows: 
Eac h 'Idea' has two sides: namely, it is 
a shape of value and a shape of fact. 
When we enjoy 'rea l ized valu e' we are ex-
periencing the esse ntial conjunction of the 
two Worlds • • • The b rid ~e b etween the two 
is the ' I dea' with its~two sides.l 
Thus b oth Ideas ard Values are necessary to perform t h e 
functions of various sorts formerly performed hy eterna l 
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objects . The co nnecting function 0f Ideas is poss ible due 
to t h e fact t hat t h ey are at one and the same ti !T'e "temporal 
characterizations and immorta l types of va lue . "2 
The most strikin6 example of the 'temb odiment 113 of 
value in tbs World of Fact, oi' the opera tion of Ideas, is , 
a ccording to iiV11i tehead, rt the t ende n cy of the transitory 
occasions of fact to unite themselves into seque ~ ces of 
Personal Iden tity . "4 Through such identit y i n personal 
sequence we gain insight into the very i mmortalit y of value. 
The stable influen ce of value as evidenced in its reactuali-
zation and successive consta r cy of ideals in pers ona l se-
quences 'b ecomes chara cteristic of reality . Wi thout p ersonal-
ity the World of Fact would d isintegrate into n on-e n tity . 
1. Art . 
2 . Art . 
3 . Art . 
4. Art . 
5. Art . 
The World of Fact would dissolve into noth-
ingness of co nfusion a part from its modes 
of unity derived from its preservation of 
d ominant characters of Value . 5 
( l94lg, 688 . 
( 19411?, 693. 
( l 94Jj§, 688 . 
( 1941~ , 688 . 
( 1941~, 690 . 
399 
Thus Wh itehead concludes, nPersonality is the extreme 
example of the sustained realization of a type o f va lue. "l 
The universe is a universe of fact and value, of value-
informed fact , or fact participating in sequences of value. 
Value ar.d fact tend to stand in polar opposition, as two 
v1orlds held tenuously together by 11 Ideas" whose metaphys ica~ 
status is far from clear. The 1fiJorld of Va lue which Whitehead 
t h roughout the m~,jor portion of his metaphysical develop-
me n t asserted to b e none oth e r than the actual, factual 
world of' individual, self-realizing , self-enjoying ~ 
experiential occasions has become so separated from the 
experienced actuality that its relevan c y to actuality 
can only be preserved hy the introducion of connecting 
or bridg ir:g "Ideas". But these Ideas, rather than resem-
;ling their Plat onic prototypes, as 1jif'.n itehead seems to 
think, as the mediators between the Values (Plat o's Ideas) 
and actualities take on t h e characteristics of the ideas of 
Ideas pointed out and condemned by P lato tn the Parm.enides2 
--th e so-called t h ird man difficulty wh ich tended to cause 
Plato to a~andon the t h eory of I d eas. 
It might be said that in relation t o t h eory of value 
~'hi t ehead 1 s development reverses that of Plato . 'Nhereas 
Plato moved from the d octri ne of Ideas to a g reater emphas is 
on exper i enced a ct ua lity in his l ater developmen.t , Whit ehead 
2 1. Art . (1941) , 690. 
2. Plato, Parm ., 132 B- D. 
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in the last pha se of h is thousht moved from an experiental 
t he ory of value to a d octrine o f a world of Platon ic trans-
cer..d e r..t values. It may well b e t hat upon f inding himself 
sado led wi th the difficulties of the Platon ic view, he 
a ttempted to save the unity of his universe with hi s own 
t heory of Ideas. But it is by n o mean s evide nt t hat that 
unity has b een save d , for the sa me objections which P l a to 
brought a gainst h is own theory in the Parmenides could 1-,e 
broug ht a gainst the Wh itehead ea n couterpart. I f 11 Ideas 11 
are ne cess a r y to co nne ct va lue and fact, then it could 
we ll he asked what connects the Ideas with value and with 
fact , ard t h e i nf'i_nite re g ress is in sig ht. 
At least it must he p o inted out that t he most cha rac ter -
istic doctrir.e s of' Wh itehead 1 s primary theory of value have 
disappeared in this final period. The unity of fact and 
value, the mutua lit y of intrinsic and i ns trume n t a l value, 
the i ndividuality and community of actual value relation s, 
t h e transiency of va lue, the affective ch aracter of value, 
and the prog ressive enrichment of reality through real 
incr ease of value all seem to have lJeen more or less sacri-
ficed for a su sistent, unchang ir-c:; , eternal, static objectiv-
ity of values. The cult of the eternal would see m to have 
won, fo r the t h i rlb s t ha t matter are timelessly i mmortal. 
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CHAP'rER VII. 
Developmental Summary and Critical 3 stimate of Whitehead's 
Theory of Value. 
A. The Developmental picture. 
Contrary to the opinion of some of Whitehead 's critics 
and interpreters, 1 we have discovered and traced a continu-
ing line of development in Whitehead's thought about the 
nature and place of value in the universe from his first 
philosophic brush with the problem of value in his natural 
science period to his last published articles. In light 
of our investigation, it seems to us, it would hardly be 
an exaggeration to assert that the connecting link be t ween 
the various phases of Whitehead's thought, the focal prob-
lem around which all other prohlems gravitate, the problem 
which led INhitehead from. philosophy of science to metaphysics, 
was the problem of value. To draw the strands together we 
shall summarize that development. 
The particular task Whitehead set for• himself in the 
natural science period was that of searching for the uni-
fying concepts of 11 the sciences whose subject matter is 
nature.n2 While value forms 11 part of the motive of its 
production, 113 science itself abstracts from value consid-
erations. Accordingly, Whitehead felt, the formulation of 
a philosophy of scie nce in terms of a unifying concept 
1. E.g., Stebhing , Art . (1928) 2 , 372. 
2. CON, 2. Cf. Chap. II, above. 
3. AOE, 228. 
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of nature, derivative from, applicable to, and presupposed 
by the natural sciences, calls for a methodolog ical res tric -
tion of value considerat ions from the task at hand. Thus 
Whitehead began his investigation with the methodolog ical 
stricture that he would consider nature as closed to mind 
and as closed to value. 1 However, at the same time White-
head went on to add, ttThe values of nature are perhaps the 
k ey to the metaphysical synthesis of existence. 112 The 
significant feature of this period from the standpoint 
of the continuing development of his thought would seem to 
be that, in spite of the me thodolog ical stricture, White-
head found his concept of nature con tinually pointing in 
the dire ction of such a metaphysica l value s ynthesis. 
The fundamental characteristics of nature on the level 
of preme taphysical synthesis are creative advance, temporal-
ity, process, 3 and by implication from "advance", progressive 
achievement. The further analysis of nature's crea tive 
advance in terms of the categories of the natural sc ience 
period--events, ohjects, sign ificance, and rhythm--involves 
the introduction of most of the factors necessary for the 
"metaphysical synthesis of existenceu in terms of the 
values of na ture 4 which became t he centra l theme of White-
head's thought in Science and ~he Modern World. 
Events were d iscovered to be5 units of process involving 
1. CON, 4. 4. CON, 5. 
2. CON , 5. 5. Cf. Chap. II, sec. a. 
3. PNK , 14. 
403 
synthesis of relations. Each event has its own intrinsic 
quallty or peculiar character and contrib ution to make to 
the totality of ev ents which is nature. The events are 
selective of the relations included in or excluded from 
synthesis in a manner strong ly sugg estive of choice in 
accordance with purpose. 
'rhe concept of ideality and permanence t:b..rough chang e 
was introduced hy the categ ory of ob jects. 1 Objects, on 
the one hand, are the qualifying g iven contents of events 
in terms of which events can b e identified. On the other 
hand, the objects, con sidered in themselves are the poten-
tialities for actualization by events. An event's reality 
is experienced in terms of the particular way lt selects 
from a mong poten tialities those it will realize. Permanence 
amid chan6 e is assured by the subsistent log ical identit y of 
objects in diverse and succesive events--a continuit y of 
potentialities and contribution of conte n t and poten tialities 
for future events. 
The doctrine of significance of events approaches a 
doctrine of intrinsic and instrumental value in all except 
name. 2 Analysis of experien ce indicates that it is mean-
ingful only throug h its significance of and for someth ing 
beyond itself. The relation of events to each other is in 
terms of their mutual signification of each other. As a 
1. Chap. I I, sec. b . 
2. Chap. II, sec. c. 
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result, every factor in nature is a synthesis of the 
whole of nature from its point of view or perspective, 
and each factor or event maintains its individuality in 
light of i t s peculiar synthesis due to selective exclusi on 
and inclusion. Two central concepts for Vv'hitehead's theory 
of value in all of the phases of his metaphysical i nvestiga-
tion are developed in the concept of significance: F irst, 
the si gnificance o f ob jects and events is conveyed not 
primarily by judgment, but by feeling--the felt signifi-
canoe of one event for another event.l Second, the intrin-
s i c significance of an event in itself is reciprocally re-
~ lated to its significance for other events.~ In the doctrine 
of significance the necessity for metaphysical value synthesis 
hecomes evident in Whitehead's recognition that events indi-
vidually and the totality of events are significant of an 
idealit y which transcends nature considere.d as the object of 
scientific investiga tion. 3 
With the categ ory of rhythm characterizing life, White-
head introduces value considerations as such. Such rhy thm 
is ne ither sheer repetition nor sheer novelty4 but rather 
a progressive enrichment, development, and realization 
through an or ganic complex of events related in significant 
and persistent pattern. 5 At least in the higher phases of 
1. PNK, 88-89· , Art . (1919), 54; cf. Chap. II, sec. c, above. 
2. POR, 18-19 in particular; cf. Chap. II, sec. c, above. 
3. POR, 20-21. 
4. PJ'.TK, 198. 
5. Hm: , 198; cf. Chap. II, sec. d , a1Jove. 
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life the rhythmic process is a dialectical growth motivated 
by and aimed at value and consummating in achievement of 
value. 1 The connecting links between this conce pt of rhythm 
and a value centered metaphysics of all levels of reali'ty 
are pres ent (1) in the recognition of rhythmi c progress as 
characteristic of all levels of life, and (2) the extension 
of rhythm to physical objects considePed as avera g es of 
rhythms. 2 
In the period of metaphysical formulation \~itehead 
proceeded to develop a value centered metaphysics, the key 
concepts to which are: 11 'Value' is the word I use for the 
intrinsic reality of an event, 113 and 11 The organism is a unit 
of emerg ing value.'t 4 Whitehead indicates that the nature 
and conditions of the existence of or ganisms are also the 
conditions of value realization . The first of these con-
ditions is prehensions, 5 the affective condition of organ-
isms and value. The con cepts of relation and sign ificance 
are expanded and synthesized in that of prehension. Every 
event or occasion is a 11 prehen sive unification, 116 an affect-
ive, aesthetic synthesis of relat t ons to the rest of reality. 7 
Reality is sentient through and through. Every occasion as 
a unit process of feeling synthesis is temporal and transi-
tory. Realit y as a society of such occasions is a continuing 
1. AOE, 63. 5. Chap. III, sec. A, 1 . 
2. PNK, 197. 6. SMW, 102. 
3. S1'DN, 136. 7. SMW , 245-246. 
4. SM:N, 156. 
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process of pro3 ressive feeling syntheses. 
The second of the conditions of organisms is idea lity, 
the subsistent cond ition of value. Reality as a who le a nd 
realities individually are on l y conce ivable as rea lizations 
of ideal possibilities or eternal objects. As in the case 
of the objects of the natural science period, eternal ob jects 
perform the d ouhle role of a cting as content of occas ion s 
and as "potentialities which are t h ere for synthes i s. 111 
Unless there is s iven and potential, thus realizab le, con-
tent t here can h e no s ynthetic activity. Whitehead is care-
ful to point out that such eternal ob jects are real only a s 
exemplified or a ctualized in particular occas i ons. 2 Real it y 
is a progressive actualization of potentialities in which 
the real potentialities a t any time are set by the preceeding 
a ctualizations. Complex groups of pos s i~i~ities act as the 
con crete aims or g oals or p l an s o f action of actualizing 
occasions. As actualized, eternal objects form t h e z iven 
contents of actual occasions wh ich ma k e feelin g structure 
and feeling s yn t he sis possihle. 
'rhe third or effective condition of or ganisms a nd 
value realization is pur p ose. The a gency whereb y feeling 
synthesis is brought ahout in any occasion is the internal 
a g e n c y of the occasion itself in light of the conceptua l 
realization of an end aimed at. 3 Mechanism is an a'!:ls tra ction 
from the conc r ete, experienced, i nternal causality of t h e 
1. SIVJ:liV, 254. 
2. SM:W , 82-83, 225-229, Ab ove, Chap. III, sec. A, 2. 
3. Chap. III, sec. A, 3. 
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organism itself. Every occasion is a n attainment, an ach ieve-
ment, a realization. 1 This d oes not mean , however , that 
antecedent causality is not also present. The real potenti-
alities and g iven con te n t for an occasion are set by its 
predecessors a nd as such are antece'de n t f or a ny pax'ticular 
occasion, b ut the antecedent factors of the prese n t occasion 
i n turn are the results of the purposive realizations of 
those predecessors . It is the factor of purposive a g e n cy 
which ma kes necessar y the distinction between the physical 
and me n tal poles of an actual occasion. 'rhe physical pole 
is the receptor of the inheritan ce from the past whereas the 
me n tal pole is the awareness of possib ilities for the future.2 
Every concrete occasi on is dipolar a nd on its dipo larity rests 
its a g ency, novelty, and preh ensive unification . 
The doctrine of prehension attributes feelin g and affec-
tive s yn thesis to a ll occasions. The d octrine of eterna l 
obj ects opens up a realm of ide a ls from which the feeling 
occasion can select f or realization. The doctrine o f purpose 
attributes the casual a g ency for such realization to the 
organism itself. The conditions of valu e rea lization are 
established. 1:Vhitehead proceeds to identify ex is t ent reality, 
actuality, a nd value. "An actual thing is an e licited feeling 
valu e. 113 Value is the achieveme nt of feeling synthesis or 
l. S!1fiN , 103, 136, 228 . 
2. RI M, 117-119. 
3. RI M, 151. 
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the actual enjoyment whi c h is the unit of experience as 
having 11ecome. 1 There is no value in the abstract but 
only concrete experienced values. Value is the intrinsic 
self-enjoyment of an occasion. The realm of eternal objects 
has no intrinsic value in itself apart from actualization in 
concrete occasions. Such value is no abstract pleasure or 
happiness but the concrete outcome of limitation. 2 No 
bifurcation exist.s between fact and value. Intrinsic value 
is private, individual, and irreducible experience. Ob-
jectivity pertains only to ideals, not to intrinsic values. 
Anything con trihu ting to the becoming of an actual 
occas i on is an instrumental value. The realm of ideality 
a nd all other events are instrumental to the hecoming of any 
one event . Since every event is a synthesis of pre h en sions 
which are feeling awarenesses of other events and of eternal 
obj e cts, then every other event as s iving rise to a pre-
hension is instrumental to the becoming of an y one event . 
An event's int. rinsic value is a function of the instrumental 
value of other events f or i~, and i~s o~m intrinsic value is 
to b e judg ed as h i t; her or lower in terms or it.s instrumental-
it y to other. events . 3 In its completion as an intrin sic 
value every occasion ceases to be and g ives rise to its 
successors. Process itself can be described as the successive 
achievement and transcendence of in t rinsic values, or as the 
l. Chap. III, sec. B , 1. 
2. SNflil , 136. 
3. RIM, 100, 113; Cf. Chap. III, sec. B, 1. 
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rhythmic alternation o f intrinsic and instrumental values. 
The nature of disvalue and evil follow from the mutual 
instrumental ity of intrinsically valuable occasi ons. The 
failure to realize the fullest potentiality on the part of 
any one occasion reduces the real potentialities for its 
successors, and, by reflection, lowers the intrinsic value 
of the occasion for itself. Evil indicates failure of ad-
equate purpose , realization of lesser purpose than was 
possihle, fra gmentary purpose. The recognition of evil 
depends upon its co mparison with the "might have l;een. 111 
Ahsolute evil or complet e failure is extinction. 
While e very actual occ asion considered intrinsica lly 
is a value for Whitehead , it d oes n ot f ollow that all in-
trinsic values ar e o f equal worth . Values very in i mportance 
or r elative d egree of intrinsic and inst rumenta l va l ue . 
~itehead proposes a progressive series of standards of 
importan ce ba sed upon the nature and adequacy of val ue as 
aesthetic fact -- i . e ., on relative r i chn ess of prehensive 
un if i cat ion of d ivergent ele ments: The ha s i c and min i mum 
categ ory o f i mportance with out which no occas i on could ex ist 
is harrr:. onious ind i vidua lity. 2 In an ascendiDg order t h e 
fo llowing categ ories can he listed: Endur ance, Novelty, 
Significant Contrast, Depth, Vividness or Inten sity, and 
Personality . Wh ile vVhitehead does not conte nd tha t all 
l. RIH , 97 . 
2. RIM, 104; SMlN , 41. 
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reality is made up of human or higher personalities yet he 
does tend to i ndicate that personal occas i ons rank as pecu-
liarly hig h instances of value . Each l eve l of importa n ce 
(with the possible exceptions of enduran ce and n ovelty) 
tends to involve the presupposit i on of each of the lower as 
already in operati on be fore it comes i nt o effect. 
Va lue is not onl y the individualizing factor of reality 
f 1 but the unifying a ctor as well. Attain ment of value is 
the attainment of individuali ty . But the attainment of 
ind ividuality is only p os sib le be cause the corr!ln.unity or 
totality of intrinsic values is instrumental to individual 
attainme nt. The community is a community be ca u se of the 
instrumental va lue of all i ntrinsic values to ea c h other. 
:Further, be cause the community is a commun ity of interre la ted 
i ntrinsic values, the comrnunity itself is intrin sical l y 
valuable. Over and a h ove the aim at value o f each occasion 
there is positive aim at value r eal ization o f the who le with-
out which individual intrinsic val ue would be meaning l e s s . 
This aim at and constant realization of value by community 
as a whole constitutes re al ity an organism, but an or6ani s m 
which does not suppress or ne gate the individua lit y o f 
its componen t occas i ons. Ra t her the totality its~lf is a 
function of the dive rse component i ndividua li tie s as continu-
ousl y pre h ended into the unity of total i ntrinsi c value by 
another entity among them, God, who through his total vision 
1. Chap. III, sec. C, 2 and 3. 
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as prehended by other entities is the necessary condition 
of their individual value realizations. 
The concept of God is called for by the necessity of 
a principle of limitation, of order, of relevance. 1 There 
must he an actual reason, which is itself an entity, for 
the imposition of g eneral limitations on actuality and pot -
entiality. Furt her, our realizations of intrinsic value, 
of our mutual instrume ntal value, and of comrnunity of value 
in the ohjective world g ive rise to a n intuition of the 
"ri~htness of things" 2 from which the existence of God is 
a leg itimate inference. The power of God is the power of 
the ideal. The purpose of God is the progressive "attain-
ment of value in the actual world. 113 
Process and Realitx4 in most respects is a further 
elaboration of the position in regard to value already de-
veloped in the formative period. The perfectionistic em-
pha sis upon self realization he comes, if anyt h ing , more 
predominant with the fuller development of the concept of 
subjective aim. Whitehead's basic aestheticism receives 
fuller ela~oration in the concept of satisfact i on. Intrinsic 
value can be defined as self-realized aesthBtic satisfaction. 
The subjective nature of intrinsic value and the objective 
nature o f ideals as eternal ohjects continues to be emphasized. 
However, in Process and Reality the first rift between 
fact and value beg ins to make its appearance. 'Whereas in 
1. SMW , 225-226. 3. RIM, 156. 
2. RIM, 66. 4. Chap. IV. 
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the form.ulative period actuality and intrinsic value are 
reg arded as synonymous, in Process and Reality intrir-sic 
value is g iven a more restricted meaning as applicahle prim-
arily to the final pl:1ase of completed satisfaction of an 
actual occasion rather than to the whole process of an 
occasion's be coming . Actuality is cons idered a wider term 
than intrinsic value. In a derivat ive sense Whitehead still 
recognizes the intrin sic v a lue content of the earlier phases 
of an occasion in terms of anticipatory enjoyment of sub-
jective aim. 
In general the same cates ories of importance are recog -
nized and applied in Process and Reality as in the earlier 
period~ However, they no long er stand. in quit e the same 
relation to each other. One of them, depth, with its two 
sub-categ ories, narrowness and width , tends to usurp by 
inclusion most of the others . Four of the earlier ca te~ories-­
harmonious individuality, endurance, novelty, and vividness--
be ca us e of their basic nature as conditions for any occasion 
are absorb ed in the Categoreal Oblig ations . 1 Contrast is felt 
by Whitehead to be so ba s i c tha t he lists it as the eighth 
cats ory of existence. 2 
The most significant addition to Wnitehead 1 s theor y of 
value in Process and Reality lies in his more careful analysis 
of the concept of God as source and conserver of values. The 
development and expa n sion of the three-fold nature of God--
1. PR , 39-41. 2. PR, 33. 
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Primordial, Consequent, and Superjective--in the unity of one 
developing entity provides for God's temporality and yet 
eternity of envisagement of ideal ends or potentialities. God 
• 
is both a source and realizer of values. The reciprocity 
between God and all actual occasions is a recognition that 
while for actual occasions God .is the source and conserver of 
values, for God's value realization in his consequent nature 
actual occasions are the sources of the values to be con-
served and transformed. The world needs God and God needs tbe 
world. Reality is a community of needs and values. 
In the period following Proc~ ~nd ~ealitl1 Whitehead's 
major contribution to his earlier theory of value lies in the 
addition of a table of values. Whitehead's table is in many 
respects more suggestive of types of value and their inter-
relations than exhaustive. The eleven types of value con-
sidered can be arranged roughly in accordance with the levels 
of i mportance or degrees of intrinsic value from lower to 
higher. The relative positions of the values is approxi-
mate only and varies with types and amount of interpretation 
with otrer types of values. As a table, the relative positions 
tend to hold only in relation to the rudimentary appearance 
of the t ypes in question. The higher in each case is dependent 
upon but richer than those preceding. But again this is an 
approximation, for with the possible exception of the two 
lowest types of value every type is to a greater or lesser 
1. Chap. v. 
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degree dependent upon all the other types for its fruition. 
With E. s. Brightman's contention that nno value has sover-
eignty in its own national territory; only the league of values 
is sovereign~1 Whitehead would be in essential agreement. 
With these factors in mind Whitehead's table of values would 
appear somewhat as follows: 2 
A. Lower Intrinsic Values: 
1. Minor beauty. 
2. Survival. · 
B. Higher Intrinsic Values: 
3. Freedom. 
4. Moral goodness. 
5. Understanding. 
6. Holiness. 
c. Highest Intrinsic Values: 
7. Truth. 
8. Major beauty. 
9. Adventure. 
10. Civilization. 
11. Peace. 
The full wealth of any one of the lower values is only attained 
in its coalescence with the higher types. 
The concept of importance receives much further attention 
in this period.3 It is broadened to mean awareness of value 
significance in the widest sense, that is, awareness of degree 
of instrumental and/or intrinsic value or disvalue. This 
awareness itself is a constant factor in realized intrinsic 
value. Matter-of-fact is an abstraction apart from importance, 
an abstraction made in light of judgment of importance. The 
complement ary concept to importance as awareness of value is 
expression as value effect. 
1. Brightman, POR, 101. 
2. Chap. v, sec. B, 2. 
3. Chap. v. sec. A, 2. 
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However, in spite of the above, the rift between value 
and actuality first noted in Process and Realitl grows 
wider in this peri od. There is a growing tendency of White-
head's :p:~.rt towards a more thoroughly Pla ton is tic value theory. 
Thus we find Whitehead elaborating a view of the "Good" in 
terms of a mathematical subsistent order. 1 This secondary 
line of thought tends to be strengthened by three factors: 
(1) The very analysis of intrinsic values into types easily 
leads to the idea that the types rather than the experiences 
are the val u.e s. (2) The term "eternal obje cts 11 disappears 
entirely in Modes of Thought and receives only passing mention 
in Adventures of Ideas. The way is at least open for the 
identification of values wi th the potentialities formerly 
considered eternal objects and instrumental values only. 
(3) While importance and matter-of-fact are considered in-
separable during this period, yet a polar opposition between 
the two tends to appear. 
In the final period of Whitehead's thought, 2 the Platonic 
conception of a subsistent realm of value tends to win the 
field. Whitehead still insists that the universe is a uni-
verse of fact and value. But the fact is value-informed or 
participates in sequences of values which as values are sub-
sis tent apart from tre ir realizat1on in fact. Fact and value 
tend to stand i n polar opposition--two worlds held tenuously 
1. Chap • V. s e c. B, 2 , d. 
2. Chap. VI. 
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together by nrdeas" whose metaphysical status is far from 
clear. No longer is the world of value the actual, factual 
world of individual, self-realizing, self-enjoying, experiential 
occasions. Values themselves have become objectively, eter-
nally, unchangeably real. The bifurcation against which 
Whitehead so convincingly fought throughout most of his phil-
osophic career would seem to have triumphed in his final phase. 
B. Difficulties. 
The wealth of suggestion, of positive formulation, and 
of contribut i on in Whitehead's theory of value have become 
evident at every turn. Part of its very wealth is due to 
the fact that it never attained a flnal, embalmed, or stat i c 
formulation. Growth, expansion, re-consideration, and re-
evaluation are characteristic of Whitehead's thought up to 
the very end. The process, development, and creativity 
Whitehead stressed as basic to reality are nowhere better 
exemplified than in the Faustian temper of his own searching 
mind. His thought was always expanding and never sys t ematic-
1 
ally complete. Like the thought of Plato he so admired 
Whitehead's major contribution may not lie so much in specific 
answers to the problems of the universe as in the awakening and 
stating of problems, in the germinal effect of his thought. 
The process of following Whitehead's philosophic writings 
1. Cf. PR, 63: "The safest· characterization of the European 
philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series 
of footnotes to Plato." 
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chronolo gically from the natural science period to the final 
phase is an exciting adventure from which one catches the 
spirit which must have pervaded his lectures, judging by 
the memorial note of the Perry committee appear i ng in the 
Proceedi~~ and a ddresses of !he American Philosophical Associa-
tion: 
The listeners had the experience of being 
taken behind the scenes and witnessing the 
very process of creative thinking, with its 
doubts and queries, its problems genuinlly 
felt, in an unfinished but living form. 
Because of the growing nature of Whitehead's thought it 
should not be surprizing to find somewhat conflicting strands 
p.Pesent within it, nor to find certain concepts not fully 
rounded out and elaborated. In a sense, criticism of White-
head on this basis is somewhat specious in that it mi ght seem 
to presuppose a desire for finality foreign to the spirit and 
intent of Whitehead himself. However, Whitehead would probably 
be the first to object to a wholesale or uncritical acceptance 
of any phase of his thought and to stress the importance of 
critical examination. With this in mind we shall attempt to 
point out wherein some of the major difficulties in Whitehead's 
value theory lie bef'ore proceedi.ng to a consideration of wba t 
appear to us to be some of its major contributions. 
1. The ghost of eternalism. 
In spite of Whitehead's fundamental emphasis on process, 
crea ti vi ty, development, self-realization, and passage, we 
1. Perry, Art.(l949), 469. 
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have had occasion to note again and again the presence of a 
strand of a quite different nature. From An Enqui~ Concer£-
!~ ~he Principles of Natural Knowledge 1 to the article 
~Immortalit~~ 2 Whitehead would seem to have a propensity for 
the eternalism or non-temporalism which the major emphasis 
of his general metaphysical position should have caused him 
to reject. In the last phase of his thought, as we have in-
dicated,3 the entire realm of value is transferred from 
changing, becoming actualities to a "timeless and immortal" 
status. 4 As opposed to such a pos :i. tion Whitehead's dominant 
temporalism can be represented by the conjunction of three 
characteristic statements: (1) "The actualities of the uni-
verse are processes of experience, each process an individual 
fact. The whole universe is the advancing assemblage of these 
5 processes • 11 (2) t:t 'Value' is the word I use for the intrin-
sic reality of an event." 6 (3, "Apart from the experience of 
subjects there is nothing , nothing , nothing, bare nothingness.•7 
That there tends to be a contradiction between the two po-
sitions hardly needs elaboration. 
Vlhile it migpt be pointed out that the articles rMathema-
tics and t he Good" and "Immortality" represent a new departure 
1. PNK, 52. 
2. Mt.{l941) 2, 684. 
3. Chap. VI, ~ec. B, 1. 
4. Art.(1941) , 684. 
5. AOI, 253. 
6. SMN, -136. 
7. PR, 254. 
4 19 
in the general direction of Whitehead' s thought and are thus 
unjustly compared with the major tenets of his earlier po-
sition, the difficulty is not so easily solved. Not only 
have we indicated factors from Process ~nd Realitl on point-
ing in the direction of this new departure, but, while the 
ghost of eternalism has taken different forms, it seems to 
have been at least faintly present in some form in every 
period of Whitehead's thought as a potential internal con-
tradiction. Further, we are inclined to believe that it was 
this desire for the timelessly eternal which may have been 
a major motivating factor leading to the thought of the final 
phase. 
The first intimation of a non-temporalism occurred in 
the assertion "events never changelf1 in An Enquirl Concerning 
the Principles of Natural I\howledge. In considering this 
statement in cont ext we were able to point out that White-
head was probably merely emphasizing the irrevocable nature 
of an event as complete and thus past. In this manner we 
were able to harmonize the denial of change with the 
. 2 
assertion that events are "elements of becomingness" and that 
an event has 11 its very being in the formation of its natural 
relations. " 3 
The non-temporalistic aspect reappeared in Whitehead's 
description of God as " that non-temporal entity which has to 
1. PNK, 62. Cf. Chap. II, sec. a. 
2. BNK, 61. 
3. PNK, 14. 
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be taken into account in every creative phase•1 in Religion 
in !he Making. The basis for the assertion of God's non-
temporal! ty at that t i n,,e was seen to lie in Whitehead's con-
ception of God as "the one systematic, complete fact." 2 God 
with his purposes, unlike actual occasions, does not perish. 
His steadf ast purpose cannot pass. It became evident, how-
ever, that the conception of a non-temporal God was either 
not consistent with new gradations in the realm of poten-
tiality or else not consistent with the asserted freedom of 
occasions, 3 nor was i t consistent with God's active purpose 
or his specific relevance for each occasion. It was suggested 
that Whitehead tended to overl ook the fact that constance and 
consistency of purpose and temporality are not contradictory 
but complementary. 
Whitehead corrected this difficulty in relation to 
God's temporality in Process ~nd Reality through his careful 
analysis of God's threefold natures : Primordial, Consequent, 
and Superjective. While God as non-perishing would have 
to be described as an actual entity rather than an actual 
occasion4 yet his consequent and superjective natures assure 
his temporality. Yet even here when talking about the 
pri mordial nature of God, Whitehead descr i bes it as "a non-
temporal actuality. 115 Although the difficulty is mitigated 
4. Of. Chap. IV, sec. C. 
5. PR, 48. 
1. RIM, 94. 
2. RIM, 154. 
3. Chap. III, sec. C, 1. 
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by the fact that the primordial nature is non-existent in 
abstraction from the totality of God, yet it is not complete-
ly vanquished if, even when considered abstractly, the pri-
mordial nature is really non-temporal, for, as pointed out, 
Whitehead does attribute a kind of activity to the primor-
dial nature as such. 1 
In Adventures of Ideas the earlier f orm of the denial 
of chan ge in actual occasions rea ppears. Whitehead a gain 
asserts: • An actual occasion ••• never changes ." 2 Yet he goes 
on to add, "It only becomes and perishes. 113 We have pointed 
4 out, that at least the denial of chan ge in this case has a 
much more specific and int elligible meaning than in some 
other contexts. The statement in Adventures of Ideas must 
be considered in conjunction with two other statement s from 
Process !nd Reality: "The doctrine of internal relations 
makes it impossible to attribute 'change' to any actual en-
tity.115 "This is a theory of monads, but it differs from Leib-
niz's in that his monads chan ge. ~ 6 In all three cases the 
meaning is fairly clear. Whitehead is using chan ge in the 
restricted sense of change of external relations and contempo-
rary causal interaction. The occas i on is a process, but a 
process independent of its contemporaries. "The creature 
cannot have any external adventures but only the internal 
1. PR, 522, and a bove, Chap. IV, sec. C, 1. 
2. AOI, 262. 
3. AOI, 262. 
4. Chap. V, sec. B, b. 
5. PR, 92. 
6. PR, 124. 
1 
adventure of becoming." 
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But even so, the douot tends to linger on, for ~vhite­
head is not consistent in his use of the term change. At 
times he tends to equate change and process. The most strik-
ing instance of this occure in Modes of Thought where, 
having said tbB.t process is "an inexorable fact" in the uni-
verse, he indicates that some persons would ask: 
Why should there be process? One answer 
to this question embodies a denial of 
process ••• This solution seems to me very 
inadequate. How can the unchanging unit2 
of fact generate the delusion of change? 
Again and again Whitehead tends to link process and change 
together as inseparable. 3 If change and process are insep-
arable then the denial of change to events would be the denial 
of process and Whitehead would be giving the answer he re-
jects as inadequate, i.e., denying process ·and change. The 
suspicion that Whitehead has not entirely clarified the con-
cept of change in his own thinking and is occasionally lean-
ing towards the Parmenidean One persists. 
This tendency towards eternalism would seem to have 
two rather different roots: First, in the case of An Inquiry 
Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge and of !~­
~ntures ~f Ideas, Whitehead would seem to be concerned with 
denying (1) the possibility of altering or changing completed 
1. PR, 124. 
2. MOT, 73. 
3. E.g., PNK, 7-8; Slffl, 153, 185: Art.(l9~7), 61; PR, 37~. 
MOT, 139-140. 
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or past event s and (2} the mutual cau sative influence of 
contemporary events on each other. But the rather strange 
effect of the denial of change on this basis is that in 
order to ass ure the ongoing of process and the organic 
prehensive relatedness of all occasions or events the dura-
tion of an occasion must be reduced to a minimum. As a result 
occasions become so transitory that they almost never are. 
If change is not applicable to occasions, then t h e occasion 
must be identified with its completion which is its cessation. 
We have indicated Whitehead's recognition and assertion of 
t h is1 in relation to intrinsic value. The coming into being 
of the intrinsic value is its cessat i on. The intrinsic 
value is the superject2 which is ac h ieved and then is not 
exce pt as decision3 for successive occasions in the form 
of objective immortality. 4 There is a danger of making the 
intrinsic value and the occasion so transitory that it is 
never existent. Whitehead hi~self points out, *This is the 
sense in which the philosophy of organism interprets Plato's 
I 11 i fill5 phrase and never rea y s. 
Second, in the case of the denial of temporality to God 
in Reli gion in the Ma k ing and to the primordial nature of God 
in Pro_ce~ ~nd Re~li tr_ Whitehead is concerned with the 
seemingly different problem of constancy and preservation of 
1. Chap. v. sec. B. 
2. PR, 129. 
3. PR, 129. 
4. PR, 22'7. 
5. PR, 129. 
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ideal aims, order, and potentiality for rightness in the 
universe through all process or change. Admitti ng the 
desirability and perhaps necessity of eternal purposes, prin-
ciples of order, po t entialities, and norms throughout all 
time , Whi tehead seems to recur to the idea that the only way 
tre se eternal factors can be maintained is by asserting 
that they are beyond or outside of all time. He tends to 
overlook the fact that if they are truly non-temporal they 
tend to lose their relevancy to temporality. 
Among the factors leading to t he final phase of 
Whitehead's thought , seemingly so in contradiction to his 
major theory of value, may well be the convergence of the 
two roots of his tendencies towards eternalism. We have 
pointed out the restric.tion in Process and Realitl of intrin-
sic value to the final or completed phase of the occasion. 1 
We have just indicated the highly transitory nature of the 
occasion so considered--i' and never really is. " 2 Now if 
preservation of value is central to Whitehead's whole 
position, as we have maintained, then it may well be the case 
t.hs.t he felt that the only way to preserve the reality of 
value was to lift it also to the realm of unchanging and 
eternal order. Whitehead's acceptance of the Platonic Idea 
of the Good in Adventur~ .£!:. Ideas3 and his emphasis on 
the relation of goodness and mathematical order in ~odes of 
1. Chap. IV, sec. B, and above. 
2. PR, 129. 
3. AOI, 190. 
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Thought1 both point in the same direction. In "Mathematics 
and the Good; 11 that which was the minor strain shifts like 
the lines in an optical illusion and emerges as the major 
theme. The two strands of eternalism meet in the eternal 
patterns which, as the title indicates, are the Good. The 
eternal patterns were always there as the eternal objects 
or potentialities for realization but realization by individu-
al occasions in their individual and independent actuality 
as intrinsic values. Now, however, it is not the self-
realization of actual occasions but the inflow of the infini-
tude of feeling (the receptacle) into the finitude of pattern 
(the Ideas). 2 Time has be come for Whitehead as for :P'la to 
the moving image of eternity. 3 
Finally, in "Immortality," the identification of values 
and eternity is complete. Values are •timeless and immortal."4 
The eternal has won. Value has been preserved but at the 
cost of the intrinsic value and significance of individuality. 
Fact and value have been b ifurcated. No real distinction 
exists between ideals and values. The world of fact is at 
best a series of transitory conformations of the flux of 
feeling to the unchanging forms of the impersonal and imper-
ishable World of Value. Bravery is not this bravery in these 
trying circQ~tances and therefore worthy of respect and a 
real achievement of a struggling individual but an instance 
1. MOT, 104. l 
2. Art.(l941) , 681. 
3. Plato, Tim~, 37C. 
4. Art. (1941) , 684. 
in the flux of infinitude of feeling that conforms in 
appearance to the timeless, eternal 11 value 11 --Bravery.•1 
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The Faustian conception of value as dep endent on continual 
process and growth through successive occasions, the com-
munal concept of mutual interdependence and responsibility 
for continuance and increase of value, the rich and rewarding 
affective characteristics of value--all of which characterize 
Whitehead's dominant value theory--are gone. The icy finger 
of subsistent eternity has chilled the "tender care tha t 
nothin g be lost. 112 
The rest of our remarks will be primarily confined to 
the dominant theory of value throughout the major portion 
of Whitehead's metaphysical period. It is our contention, 
however, that the failure to recognize the two divergent 
theories of value in Whitehead's thought and the presence 
of the roots of the secondary theory even in his major 
metaphysical works can only lead to a failure to comprehend 
either of tbese points of view and the failure to recognize 
the full import of either. The difficulty would seem to be 
that of a basic polarity in Whitehead's own thought. 
2. The secondary position of morality. 
The implications of Whitehead's dominant value theory 
for morality are legion. We have noted, for example, its 
highly perfectionistic tenor, 3 its continual emphasis on 
1. Art.(l94l) 2 , 684: •No heroic deed ••• depends for its heroism 
on the exact moment of time at which it occurs.u 
2. PR, 525. 3. Chap. · IV, sec. B. 
.. 

instance-~are also as 'gpod without quali-
fication' as is a good will.l 
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This seeming restriction on Whitehead 's part of mo ra l 
values-- goodness--to the anticipatory values of int ention 
or subjective aim may be called into question as misleading . 
As has been indicated from our discussion of the categ ories 
of i mportance 2 and the table of values, 3 the richest and ful-
lest self-realization both individually and socially (and 
the two are inseparable because of the interrelation between 
intrinsic and instrumental values) involve the harmonious 
interpenetration of the whole table of values. Civilization 
and Peace include within t hemselves and are the f ruition 
4 
and transformation of all the lower types of values. 
Surely these are hi g hly moral concepts and their realization 
would be highly moral values. 
Had Whitehead reserved the term moral values and 
5 
morality for '"the experience of the whole table of values, 11 
as Br i ghtman suggests, the perfectionistic nature of his 
value t h eory would have been much clearer. Whitehead's 
failure to do so does tend to make relevant to his overt 
statement s about morality if not to his real intent such 
criticisms as the following: 
It would seem that the foundin g of real 
1. Brightman, POR, 98. 
2. Chap. III, sec. B, 2. 
3. Chap. V, sec. B, 2. 
4. Cf. Chap. v, sec. B, 
5. Brigh tman, POR, 97. 
values " for the more 
2, j and k. 
Brightman suggests the term n character 
restricted values of intention. 
morality upon the quicksand of largely 
emotional reactions provides a treacherously 
thin foundation for morals. It would hardly 
seem possible that Mr. Whitehead could be 
satisfied with sue£ a flimsy and all too 
shifty fo undation. 
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Whitehead's restriction of morality and moral value or 
goodness may well have been another one of the sources of 
his movement towards the Platonic eternalism of value in 
the last phase of his thought. If morality is so restricted, 
then it does follow that moral value constitutes only 
"one aspect of the Good, often everemphasized. 1r 2 The pri-
mary intrinsic value--that which is good in itself--is the 
satisfaction or completion of becoming . The moral value of 
intent and striving may be said to be intrinsically valuable 
only by virtue of its anticipatory part i cipation of and in 
the end to be realized. But the end as realized is unchange-
ably and eternally that end which was realized. 3 Since the 
realization of the Good is its cessation as intrinsically 
and experientially existent, it 11never really is. 114 The 
Platonic realm of subsistent values is at hand to save the 
Good from extinction, to preserve it for anticipatory moral 
participation by intentional processes. · Had Whitehead not 
restricted the meaning of moral value to the anticipatory 
intentional values, but rather recognized morality in terms 
of experience of the whole table of values, he might have 
1. Schilpp, Art.(l941), 611. 
2. MOT, 106. 
3. Cf. Sec. 1 above, and PNK, 62; AOI, 262; PR, ]29. 
4. PR, 129. 
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been much less tempted to have bifurcated the organic 
unity of intent and realization so characteristic of his 
dominant theory of value in the formulative and systematic 
periods. In light of this 1 1Vhitehead's failure to give more 
direct consideration to the central ethical implicat i ons of 
his dominant theory of value tends to give his thought an 
unnecessary instability and perhaps to present a major 
weakness. 
3. The dangers of aestheticism. 
While Whitehead's recognition of the unity of types 
of value experience in terms of teleolo gical intrinsic 
feeling synthesis may well be one of his major contributions 
to axiology, yet his insistence on what might almost be cal~d 
the absolute primacy of the aesthetic contains certain poten-
tial and real difficulties. It is one thing to recognize 
that all intrinsic value by its very nature as intrinsic 
must be enjoyed immediately in and for itself and thus in 
a real sense, aesthetically. It is quite a different thing 
to assert that the only ultimate categories of value are 
aesthetic categories--that the moral and rational orders "are 
1 
merely aspects of the aesthetic ordern , that the principles 
of morality "are rre rely the expression, in specialized form 
of the requisites of depth of experience. 112 
It may even be the case that that which is morally 
1. RIM, 105. 
2. PR, 483. 
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commendable is also aesthetically satisfying and that which 
is aesthetically adequate is morally commendable. But it 
does not follow that moral categories are reducible to aes-
thetic cate gories nor vice versa. The same relationship 
may hold between the rational and the aesthetic. The same 
occas i on may be rationally, morally, and aesthetically 
ade quate, but it neither follows that truth, beauty, and 
goodness are one nor tha t any of the two are derivative 
from the third. While the cate gories of the rat i onal, the 
moral and the aesthetic may be analogous, yet when I make a 
moral judgment it does not follow pri ma facie that I am 
making an aes thetic judgment or a truth judgment. There 
would seem to be a real and perhaps an irreducible difference 
i n intent and perspective. 
To insist, as Whitehead does, that aesthetic order is 
basic and that rational and moral order are derivative as-
pects would seem to be a somewhat dangerous oversimplification. 
While perhaps no one stresses as more fundamental in one sense 
the necessity of community, of sharing , of mutual enrichment 
than does Whitehead through h i s doctr ine of the mutuality 
of all value realizations as both intr i nsic and instrumental, 1 
yet if the basic cate gories of importance are primarily aes-
thetic, then t he sharing and the mutuality are i mportant not 
as themselves intrinsically valuable but as cont ri butory to 
aesthetic success. Further, if under any set of circumstances 
1. Chap. III, sec. B, 1; Chap. IV, sec. G; Chap. V, sec. A, 1. 
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a higher aesthetic success is to be gained by unjust exclu-
sion or by retaining or encoura ging pain, suffering , and loss 
for the sake of significant contrast, then, since the moral 
is derivative from the aesthetic, such proceedure wou ld gain 
the status of an ought. But morality of such a nature woulc 
be its opposite. The possibili ~y of brutality and insensi-
tivi ty would tend to lie in morality itself as long as such 
bru tality and insensitivity were conducive to contrast or 
aesthetic sat i sfaction. 
We defended1 Whitehead against Ely's charge that in 
li gh t of his consequent nature Whitehead's God is not a moral 
God2 on the basis that Ely had overlooked {1) the function of 
God 's superjective nature and (2) t h e destructive nature of 
evil for God as well as for actual occasions. As indicated, 
Whi~ehead d oes not say that evil is necessary for con t rast nor 
does he say that God is unconcerned with evil. However, 
Ely 's charge is not so easily downed when rephrased. Since 
morality is deriviative from the aesthetic, then it would 
seem that anything cont ributory to aesthetic success -is moral. 
Now since God 1 s consequent nature is the "perfected ac t uali ty11 3 
of the kingdom of heaven which, oy means of his superj e ctive 
nature, enriches real potentiality for aesthetic self-realiza-
tion in future occasions, 4 God by defi nition is contributory 
to further aesthetic success and thus is moral. But in so far 
1. Chap. IV, sec. C, 2 . 
2. Ely, RAWG, 50. 
3. PR, 531. 
4. PR, 135 and 523. 
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as the preservation of discord and tragedy1 is basic to en-
riched aesthetic success it also becomes moral. The question 
then becomes not whether or not Whitehead's God is moral but 
whether Whitehead's conception of morality as derivative 
from the aesthetic is adequate. 
It would seem to us that, in spite of the high moral 
tone of much of Whitehead's theory of value, the answer 
to this question would have to be negative. If morality 
is derivative from the aesthetic then, logically as least, 
even the extremes of cruelty, brutality, and bestiality 
could not be excluded from morality if heightened aesthetic 
experience resulted. The aesthetically adequate may be con-
sidered morally commendable and the morally commendable may 
be considered aesthetically adequate only so long as the aes-
thetic and the moral perspectives are recognized as comple-
mentary and counterbalancing . The reduction of either to the 
other at least opens the way to distortion--to a barren 
puritanism on the one hand or to a callous aestheticism on 
the other. The fact that the general tone of Whitehead's 
thought does not succumb to such a callous type of aestheti-
cism is perhaps due more to the breadth of Whitehead's humanity 
than to strict lo gical implication. 
Analogous objections could be raised to Nhitehead's 
reduction of rational order to aesthetic order. 2 Whi le it 
1. AOI, 368. 
2. RIM, 105. 
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undoubtedly is the case from thestandpoint of effective-
ness that 11 it is more i mportant that a proposition be i n-
teresting than that it be true ~1 and that truth which does 
not coalesce with other intrinsic values sinks towards neu-
trality and even evil, 2 yet the very dangerousness and des-
tructiveness of interesting falsehood would tend to indicate 
the equally basic and complementary nature of truth with and 
to beauty and goodness. Whitehead tends to reco gnize this 
when he points out that 11 in the absence of Truth, Beauty 
is on a low level, with a defect of Il13.ssiveness.n 3 However, 
at the same time he asserts, "Truth derives •• self- j ustifying 
4 power in its services in the promotion of Beauty." 
If all he means is that truth and beauty are mutually enrich-
ing and necessary to each other for the fullest realization 
of value, no objection can be raised. But the evidence would 
seem to indicate that he means to assert that truth is only 
justified in the service of beauty, and, if and when t he t wo 
are in conflict truth should be sacrificed to beauty. To 
make such a contenti on, however, is to open oneself to the 
possibilities of a shallow, escapist type of aestheticism, on 
the one hand, and a vicious dema gogery and cruel distortion-
ism, on the other. 
Truth is not always conformal to beauty. Whitehead's 
5 
recognition of the fundamental nature of discord is a point 
1. PR, 395-396. 
2. ~or, 342. 
3. AOI, 344 • . 
4. AOI, 343-344. 
5. Chap. V, sec. B, 2, h; 
AOI, 329-333. 
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in evidence. Truth may have a hardness, a difficulty, even 
a frustrating and destructive force which must be met if 
contact with ~eality is to be maintained. Whitehead recog-
nizes this in his discussion of the ways in which discord can 
be met. 1 He further indicates the undesirability of meeting 
the aesthetic demand in such a manner as to violate the truth 
relation through suppression or distortion of undesirable 
factors--anaesthesia and aesthetic destruction. 2 And yet, 
it may well be asked whether, if the truth relation is only 
justified by its aesthetic usefulness, and if obligation to 
truth and rational order is derivative from obligation to 
aesthetic order, there is ever adequate justification for 
rejection of easier aesthetic synthesis for the more diffi-
cult recognition of truth. 
While it may be admitted that deeper experiences of 
beauty may only be attainable when difficult truth is an in-
eluded factor in aesthetic synthesis, it does not necessarily 
follow that this is always the case. Further it would often 
seem to be the case that the pursuit of truth contrary either 
to generally accepted opinion or to our cherished beliefs 
about ourselves may lead to more immediate disvalue than 
value regardless of the long run, and for some persons it 
may even mean permanent destruction. Persecution of the pro-
ponants of unwelcome truth as also the disillusionment that 
1. Cf. Chap. V, sec. B, 2, V• Anaesthesia, aesthetic destruc-
tion, reduction to background, introduction of synthesizing 
novel system. 
2. AOI, 329, 330. 339. 
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comes with some realizat i ons of truth in regard to ourselves 
and others make this all to evident. If the aesthetic order 
supplies the only j ustification ultimately for truth, then 
it would seem that our obligation would lie in supression of 
such unwelcome and emot i onally disruptive truth. Escapism 
would seem not only to be justified but in some cases to be 
obli gatory. And yet it is in just such cases that knowledge 
of the truth may be most important for the long run and most 
needs justification. Without such justification and 
reco gnition of the equally basic nature of rational order and 
truth with aesthetic order and beauty, metaphysical aestheti-
cism runs the danger of becoming cosmic dilettantism. 
Of equal danger, however, are t he possible implications 
of the statement nit ts more important that a proposition 
be interesting than that it be true " 1 if it is taken in a 
normative rather than a purely descr i ptive sense. The most 
violent distortion of truth and outri ght lying would seem 
to be justified as long as it created startling aesthe t ic 
contrast. There is a sublime element in the Nazi myth of 
the German super-race. No one could deny its interest to 
Germans and to non-Germans alike. The Promethean attempt 
of the Austrian paperhanger to change the hu_man race and the 
map of the world to conform to this myt h con t ains elements 
of grandeur, pathos, tragedy. The very falseness of his 
appeal added a note of breath taking and thrilling horror 
1. PR, 395-396. 
to the dramatic spectacle of a nat i on chanting 11 Ein Volk, 
e i n Reich, ein E&hr~£1 Der ~hrer 1st Deutschland und 
Deutschland ist der Ffihrer. wir durch 
ihn." 1 While it would be a complete distortion of intent 
to attribute to Whitehead a sympathy with or j ustification 
of any such procedure, yet in so far as truth and rational 
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order are subordinate to interest and receive their justifi-
cation from their contribution to aesthetic contra st, if 
greater aesthetic effect is produced by such distortion, 
demogogery, and inhumanity, then the possibility of its 
justification on a Whiteheadean b ase can not be log ically 
ruled out. 
Whitehead's failure to reco gnize the coordinate nature 
of moral, rational, and aesthetic orders is perhaps the 
weakest point in his predominant theory of value. 
c. Contributions. 
The contributions of Whitehead 1 s dominant theory of 
value are perhaps more difficult to indicate than its 
inherent difficulties, but for quite the opposite reason. 
Wh i tehead's theory of value is so pre gnant with s ugges t ion, 
so rich in positive content, that to enumerate all its 
contributions would be to recapitulate our entire investi-
gation. The problem is one of more or less arb itrary decision 
as to whichare the most outstanding contri butions. With 
1. Zie gler, SS , 43. 
f'ull reco gnit i on of' the arbitrarines s of' s u ch procedure we 
submit as perhaps the most significant areas of contr i bu-
t i on of Whitehead's theory of value the following : (l) 
Whitehe ad's analysis of value, its conditions a nd relation 
to fact, (2) his suggestion of a basis f'or axiolo gical 
uni t y , and (3) his assertion of the ax iocentr i c nature of' 
t he universe. 
1. Value, its conditions and relation to fact. 
Whitehead's primary analysis of the nature of concr ete 
value experience is perhaps as thorough, as free f'rom dis-
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torti:r:-g abstract i ons, and as f'ruitf'ul for f urther axiolo gical 
investi gations as that of any contempor a ry investigator. 
His s t ateme nt, tt 'Value 1 is the word I use for the intri nsic 
1 
reality of an event", does not mean an extension of t he word 
value to meaninglessness, but rather a recognition of the 
essential meaningfulness of' existence itself'. To become 
actual is to realize value. To say that "the organism is a 
2 
unity of emergent value, n t hat "actual occasions are t h e 
emergence of values, \ll 3 t ha t the "actuality is ••• the exper i ence 
of va lue, • 4 is to reco gniz e the intrinsically affec t ive, 
teleolo gical, ideally oriented nature of all occas i ons of 
actuality . 
Whitehe ad's major theory of value is thoroughly em-
pirical. Value is to be analyzed and considered from the 
1. SMW, 13 6. 3. SMW, 256. 
2. SMW, 157. 4. RTII1, 100. 
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standpoint of its actual experienced attainment. Value is 
the final issue of concrescence, is 11 the satisfaction of the 
completed subject, 111 the realized "individual self-attain-
ment,~2 the positive •enjoyment"3 of the self-attained ideal. 
It is the actual self-enjoyment of the unit of experience as 
become. Any and every value realizat i on as value involves 
and is dependent upon, but not reducible to, as sole consti-
tuent, three conditions. 
The first condition of value is the affective condition. 
Intrinsic value is a meaningless term apart from felt synthe-
tic awareness. There can be no non-experienced value nor 
can there be value which makes no felt difference to the 
experient. Every experience of value involves a positive 
feeling awareness referent beyond itself. This condition 
of value is met by the prehensive nature of all occasions. 
Every occasion is a prehensive unification, 4 is a unit of 
awareness, is an "experience of feelin g . " 5 Every occasion is 
a complex unity of felt relations to the rest of the uni-
verse.6 The transitory nature of feeling testifies to 
the temporality and transitory nature of actual value ex-
perience. 
7 But value is not "mere value" or mere feeling . It 
is no abstract enjoyment, happiness, or feeling of accomplish-
1. PR, 2 9. 5. RD-1:, 115. 
2. PR, 53. 6. PR, 225. 
3. PR, 130. 7. SM1V,l36. 
4. SNfW, 102. 
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ment. Rather "value is the outcome of limitation. tt l It is 
this particu lar entity, this particular realization, this par-
ticular achievement, a realizat i on of these particular possi-
bilities. Its constitution as value is structured. White-
head rejects any hedonistic identification of pleasurable 
feelin g per~ with value. Every value is a "patterned 
value •112 Thus the second condition of value is a subsistent 
condition, that is, a structured realm of ideal possibili-
ties or patterns to be realized--the eternal obj e cts. Nature, 
actual accasions, values are "significant of ideality. 113 
The definiteness of feeling necessary for value requires 
both specific (real) and general po t entiality for actualiza-
tion which when actualized becomes specific value content. 
The realm of possibility, the potentialities it includes, 
are not to be confused with actual value experiences. There 
is no realm of value existing in abstracto. The only sense 
in which t he realm of ideality can be said to be existent 
prior to specific actualization in feeling synthesis of 
actual occas i ons is as conceptually envisaged in the pri-
mordial nature of God. As such, the eternal objects exist 
as potentialities for value and not as values themselves. 
Neither abstract possioilities nor abstract feeling constitutes 
value. Both Platonic realism and hedonism involve 
1. SMW, 136. 
2. SMVv , 174. 
3. POR, 20. 
hypostatization or the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. 1 
• 
But without feeling and ideality value expe rience would be 
i mpossible. 
An effect i ve condition is also necessary for value 
experience. This effective condition is the subj ective 
aim or purpose present in every actual occasion. Every 
occasion is a self-realization, is the self-attained 
actualization of potentialities in positive feeling syn-
thesis. "Self-realization is the ultimate fact of facts ••• 
Whatever is self-realizing is an actuality.•2 In li ght 
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of its subjective aim every occasion as a value realization 
"is causi sui. 113 While in one sense the ultimate cause of 
value is C~d in that it is he who initiates s ubjective aim, 4 
yet the actual efficient cause of value realization, capable 
at least in higher occasions of modifying the original 
subjective aim, is th e occasion itself. Without purpose, 
value would be non-existent. Each occasion as an internally 
teleological concrescence into structured feeling synthesis 
is an occasion of intrinsic value. 
The highlyAristotelean character of Whitehead's theory 
of value is evident. The initiator of value realization 
both for Aristotle and for Whitehead is God. For Aristotle, 
God as ~ the object of desire 115 initiates value process. For 
Whitehead "the power by which God sustains the world is the 
1. SMW , 75. 
2. PR, 340. 
3. PR, 131-132, 228-22 9, 339. 
4. PR, 164. 
5. Aristotle, Meta. 
1072a26. 
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the power of himself as t he ideal. 11 For Aristotle as for 
Whitehead reality and value realizat i on are a process of 
teleolo g ical actualization of potentiality. 2 For neither 
Aristotle nor for ~ihi tehead can potentiality or actuali ty3 
exist in abstraction from the other. For both Aristotle and 
Whitehead the teleological attainment of actuality or realized 
value involves compl e tion and the becoming of potentiality 
for further actualization. Thus for both 11 actuality is 
prior to potency. 114 Finally, for both--for Aristotle by 
implication5 and for Whitehead explicitly6--intrinsic value 
is t he entelechy, and "complete reality,•7 the " individual 
self- attainment. n8 
One of the major contributions of Whitehead's value theory, 
it seems to us, lies in his synthesis of fact and value 
withou t loss eitl::e r of the richness and complexity of tre 
nature of value or the pers i stence, givenness, and irreducible-
ness of fact. Rather than reducing the term value to meaning-
lessness, Whithead raises fact to the level of value by 
showing the value basis of the occurrence of fact, on t he one 
1. RIM, 156. 
2. Aristotle, Met., 1069b. 
3. With the exce ption of Aris t o t le's God (Met., 1072b). 
Whitehead's assertion of the non-temporaifty of God in 
RIM (formulative period), if taken as characteristic, would 
complete the paralle 1, for Whitehead asserts God 1 s non-
temporality on the basis tha t God is " the one, systematic 
complete fact." (RIM~99.) 
4. Aristotle, Met., 1049 , 5. 
5. Aristotle, Met., 1072a, 26. • t he attai nment of " the object 
of desire .u·--
6. SMW, 136t • the intrinsic reality of an event"; PR , 29: ·• t.h. e 
satisfact i on of t he completed subject." 
7. Aristotle, Met., 105oa, 23. 
8. PR, 53. ---
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hand, and the value constitution of fact on the other. 
Every fact as actuality is intrinsically affective in na t ure, 
is a teleolog ical actualization of structured potentiality, 
and is a real, though limited, self-achievement. 
2. Basis for axiolo gical unity. 
Although we have criticized Whitehead's attempt to 
derive all other types of value from aesthetic value and 
its i mplication of the primacy of an aesthetic imperative 
as more basic t han either a moral or a rational imperative, 1 
yet with Whitehead's search for a u n ity of the axiolog ical 
sciences in t erms of generic value structure we would 
be in basic agreement. It may well be that Whitehead has 
discovered such a unifying concept in the affective, teleo-
logical, synthetic, structured nature of value realizat i on. 
It may even b e the case that the basic nature of intrinsic 
value is always analo gous, at least, to the aesthetic. Our 
point of difference was not with the coordination and comple-
mentation of aesthetic vaiue with other types of value nor 
even with the recognition of the aesthetic element (using 
aesthetic in the wider sense of affective) in all value 
experience, but rather with the exclusive pr i macy of the 
aesthetic cate gories as a bas i s of jud~t of adequacy of 
value a nd the reduction of other cate gories to the aesthetic. 
Whitehead's insistence that every intrinsic value as 
1. See sec. B, 3, above. 
,. 
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a value has a primary positive feeling component, "an 
emotional tone, 31 is borne out not only by aesthetic experi-
ence but by such other and varied values as friendship, 
worship, eating an ice cream cone, solving a mathematical 
problem, and the miser running his fingers through his 
pile of gold. It is the factor recognized as central in 
Bri ghtman 1 s definition of value as 11 wha tever is actually 
liked, prized, esteemed, desired, approved, or enjoyed 
by any one at any time. 112 Again, it would seem to be one 
of the primary factors in Perry's definition of value as 
rrany object of any interest.•3 But whereas Perry's defini-
tion would tend to make the o oject a value whether present 
or not, both . Whitehead and Brightman insist on the necessarily 
present, affectively experiental nature of value as such. 
Thus, as we have indicated,4 in contrast to Perry, Whitehead 
would insist that value is the realiza t ion of any interest 
in any ob ject as present experience. This is the important 
truth which hedonism has seized upon. Enjoyment is vital 
to value. ~The actuality is the enjoyment, and this enjoy-
rre nt is the experiencing of value. n 5 
But enjoyment P9!:, ~or in abstract i on is not the basic 
value experience. It is rather enjoyment in real, purposed, 
and structured feeling synthesis. 6 Value is neither an 
1. RIM, 100. 
2. Bri ghtman, POR, 88. 
4. Chap. III, sec. B, 1. 
5. RIM, 100. 
3. Perry, GVT, 115. 6. Cf. SMW, 174. 
experience of undifferentiated unity nor is it an experi-
ence of unmitigated plurality. Further, there is no value 
in §9neral any more than there is happiness in general, ex-
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perience in general, or love in general. Every value expe~ 
ence is a particular and individual attainment, "Apart from 
shaping into individual matter of fact there is no attain-
1 
ment." 
To recognize the achieved particula. ri ty of intrinsic 
value is not to say that values are not communally conditioned 
and, in this sense, shared, nor is it to say that value ex-
periences do not have universal reference. As a prehensive 
unification, every value experience for Whitehead in some 
sense involves reference to the totality of reality. Rather, 
it is to insist that every value experience is the experience 
of a "universalizing pa.rticular," 2 a particular experience 
with universal feeling reference. The universals in particu-
lar values are themselves particular meaningful feelings or 
prehensions which through their grasp of eternal objects or 
hierarchies of eternal objects are referent beyond them-
selves.3 The intrinsic value is the concrete particular 
meaning of this particular experiental achievement. Every 
intrinsic value is an affective Hegelian concrete universal. 4 
1. SMW, 136-137. 2. Brightman, ITP, 136. 
3. ·Cf. Brtgh t man, ITP, 134: "Universals apart from particu-
lars are, we admit, nonsense. The nonsense can be avoided 
only by regarding the universal as a kind of particular." 
4. Note in particular Hegel, SOL, II, 479-480: 11 The beginning 
was the universal; the result is the individual, the con-
crete, the subject; what the former is!~ itself, the 
It must be further emphasized that intrinsic value 
experience is not something which happens to an occasion or 
is passively given. Rather value contains an essentially 
active element. It is attained, achieved, the result of the 
process of concrescence. Even in the case of the aesthetic 
values as such, e.g., Major Beauty, the value is not charac-
terized by a passive acce ptance or repose 1 in the sense of 
cessation of activity. To the contrary, such beauty is the 
attainment of organic unity in and through variety in which 
the unity is strengthened and made vital by the very sig-
nificant diversity of the variety. While the attainment of 
major beauty does involve the loss of an exclusive self-
centeredness and emphasis on the means function alone of 
present action, yet far from involving a cessation of self-
attainment and activity, the attainment of major beauty is 
the attainment of t~1e individuality which is dependent on 
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and a function of the recognition of the significant individu-
ality of others. 2 The experience of beauty either of the 
latter now is equally for !tself; the universal is pohited 
in the sub ject ••• For us the Notion /Begriff7 is (1) t e 
universal which is in itself, (2) tfie:negative which is for 
itself, and (3) the third term, which is in and for itself, 
the universal which runs through all the moments of the 
syllogism." If Hegel's passage is interpreted in terms of 
feeling, it becomes an almost exact descri~ion of the con-
crescence of an actual occasion and thus of the becoming 
and nature of intrinsic value for Whitehead. 
1. Cf. Puffer, POB, 78-70. While there is ambiguity in Miss 
Puffer 1s concept of "Aesthet i c repose, 11 yet even for her 
such repose contains active elements. 
2. Cf. Chap. v. sec. B, 2, h, and AOI, 328, 336, 338. 
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artist or appreciator is an experience of active creat i on. 
The Peace wbich stands highest in Whitehead's table of values 
is not a cessat i on of activity but "self-control at its 
widest," 1 "a sense of that fineness of achievement is as it 
were a key unlocking treasures that the narrow nature of things 
would keep remote."2 
Thus Whitehead proposes as the unifying concept of all 
types of value experience, of the axiological sciences, and 
of value with existence a generic concept of value as meaning-
ful, structured, active, teleolog ical feeling synthesis. 
The concept is unifying not in the sense of being reduction-
i:stic, that is, Whitehead is not saying that there is a basic 
type of value experience to which all others can be reduced, 
but rather unifying in the sense of relational and explana-
tory of the wide variety of vivid values possible. He is 
not necessarily saying that experiences of truth, beauty, 
gpodness, holiness, survival, and sexual satisfaction are 
one but that all types of value realization as intrinsic have 
a similarity of structure which accounts for (1) the possi-
bility and richness of result of interpenetration of value 
types, (2) the complementary yet discrete nature of individuaL 
value experiences, and (3) the appearance of novel values and 
value types through evolutionary development. 
By the very nature of value experience no two value 
1. AOI, 368. 
2. AOI, 367. 
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experiences are ever exactly alike. The wealth of potential-
ity for value realization in the universe is unlimited. 
Since every value is a teleolo gical synthesis a.nd actuali-
zation of real po t entiality, and since real potentiality1 
for further occasions is altered by the becoming of each 
occasion, even though successive occasions may realize similar 
types of value no two occasions will have the same prehensive 
factors for synthesis, and thus no two occasions will experi-
en ce the same intrinsic value. Evolutionary advance is 
advance in possibility of newer, richer, and higher types 
of value experiences. The appearance of animal life and the 
later appearance of man are major cases in point. It is from 
:bhe evolutionary nature of progressive value realizations, 
the possibilities for hi gher types of value, t hat our moral 
responsibility sterns. 11 The universe achieves its values by 
reason of its coordination into societies of societies. 112 
Value realization and existence, While incurably particula r, 
is a cooperative endeavor. Evolution, increasing d i versity, 
and appearance of new types of value are not automatic but 
depend upon the realization on the part of all occas i ons 
of the richest values possible for them. 
That Whitehead's gene ric concept of value does f ulfill 
its function is indicated not only by its ability to inte-
grate in terms of interpenetration and pro gre s sive enrich-
1. Cf. Chap. III, sec. A, 2; Chap. IV, sec. A, 2. 
2. MOT, 264. 
ment his table of values, 1 but also by its emp:trical appli-
cabili ty to an analysis of the universe in terms of,_ ·process, 
creativity, fluidity, _and yet coordination, direction, rela-
.·· 
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tive permanences, and ' even seemingly disteleolo gical factors. 
Finally, the generic concept's :~ruitfulness is indicated by 
its applicability to all ac t ual entities regardless of com-
plexity from the simplest inorganic occasion to the extremely 
complex value realization of God through the interact i on of 
his primordial and consequent natures into the oneness of 
his superjective nature. 2 
In relation to the simplest inorganic occasions, we 
noted Whitehead's original difficulty3 with the concept of 
non-cognitive awareness and the resultant impossibility of 
the awareness of eternal objects as potentialities for reali-
zation by such simple occasions. However, with Whitehead's 
recognition of the necessity of an internal teleology even 
for the near reproduction characteristic of such simple oc-
casions, this difficulty was overcome by the attribution of 
4 
mental and physical poles to all occasions. Thus while the 
heavy hand of the past allows a minimum of novelty in such 
occasions because of the predominance of physical feeling and 
the reduction to negli gibility of selection and of the 
mental phase, 5 yet the mental phase must be at least minimally 
1. Cf. Chap. V, sec. B. 
2. Cf. Chap. IV, sec. c. 
3. Chap. III, sec. A, 1; SMW , 104-105. 
4. RIM, 118. 
5. PR, 269. 
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present, otherwise dispersion and cessation would result. 
In li ght of this, the generic concept of value as meaningful, 
active, teleological, structured feeling synthesis applies 
as directly to such simple occasions as to the most complex. 
Since for Whitehead value is the intrinsic reality of 
an occasion or event, and since the universe is a society 
of occasions or events, the generic concept of value is in 
1 
a sense a further statement of his ontolo gical principle. 
If to be is to realize value, and to realize value is to be 
an active, purposive, structured fee ling synthesis--" self-
2 
realization is the ultimate fact of facts" --then the 
highly indealistic nature of Whitehead's metaphysics is evi-
dent. While Whitehead's definition of consciousness as "the 
feeling of contrast of theory, a~ mere theory, with f act, as 
3 
mere fact" makes necessary his restriction of consciou sness 
to the hi ghest types of actual entities only, every occasion 
as a purpos i ve feeling synthesis, as an intrinsic value 
experience, is a unit of experience and a self. In this 
se nse the basis for axiological unity can be expressed as 
t he nature of all values as self-realizations. 
1. PR, 254: "Apart from the experiences of subjects there is 
nothing , nothing , nothing, hare nothingness. 11 Cf. also 
PR, 95-96, 113, 22 3-224, 234-235. 
2. PR, 340. 
3. PR, 286. 
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3. The axio-centric universe. 
In spite of the o b jections we have raised to Whitehead's 
allocation of morality to a secondary role, 1 probably few 
writers in value theory have stressed more clearly and per-
sistently the concept of mutual social responsibility 
as essential not only to an occasion's own intrinsic value 
realization but to the progress and improvement of the universe 
as a whole than has Whitehead. Essential to Whitehead's value 
theory is the doctrine of the relation of intrinsic and 
instrumental value to each other on which to a very large 
extent the unity and creative process of the universe depend. 
But equally on this doctrine depends the irreducible indivi-
duality of each occasion in the society which is the universe. 
Every realization of intrinsic value as a feeling s yn-
thesis is the attainment of individuality, is a private, 
irreducible, and individual experience. 2 For Whitehead there 
are no public experiences of intrinsic value. I never 
experience any one else's intrinsic value experience as he 
experiences it intrinsically. Intrinsic values are always the 
actual subjective experiences of occasions. However, t hat 
does not mean value isolationism in the universe. The only 
intrinsic values I can realize are my own experiences of value, 
but the condition of my realization of value is the double 
instrumentality of the realizations of intrinsic values by 
1. See above, sec. B, 2. 
2. SMW, 137. 
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others for me and of my realization of intrinsic value for 
others. 
As early as the natural science period Whitehead stressed 
this mutuality of instrumentality and intrinsicality in the 
doctrine of significance by his distinction between cognizance 
by relation and cognizance by adjective. 1 In the formub tive 
period the doctrine becomes explicit. Every event is a pre-
hensive unificat i on of the universe. As such every event as 
g iving rise to a prehension in the particular event is 
instrumental to that event's becoming , and, in turn, that 
2 
event i s instrumental to the becoming of other events. 
My realization of intrinsic value is a function of the intrin-
s:tc value of others as instrumental to my becoming and of 
my instrumentality to the becoming of others. There is no 
intrinsic val ue withou t instrumental value and no instru-
mental value without intr i nsic value. 3 As pointed out, it 
is on the basis of mutua l instrumen t ality of i ntr i nsic values 
as existents to each other that a large part of t he dis t inction 
between value and disvalue rests, for every occasion as an 
achievement is to that extent a value. Yet in light of the 
reflective nature of the occasion's instrumentality for 
o t hers its failure t o realize the "might have been" is not 
only instrumentally a disvalue for ot hers but an intrinsic 
disvalue for itself. 
1. POR, 18-19. 
2. SMW, 1 3 7, 151. 
3. Chap. III, sec. B, 1. 
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The universe is community and its community rests on 
the necessity of instrumental value to intrinsic value and 
the converse. The universe is an organism, not in the sense 
of being existentially one, but in the sense of the organic 
relatedness of all occas i ons to the becoming of each other. 
iiiActuality is through and through togetherness. 111 God, among 
other things, is the principle of concretion and order in the 
sense that 
He is the element in virtue of which our 
purposes extend beyond values for ourselves 
to values for others. He is that element 
in virtue of which the attainment of such 
value for others tran~forms itself into 
values for ourselves. 
The universe is made up of individuality in and through 
community in which there is "elbow-room"3 to allow the 
novelty and freedom necessary for individual satisfaction 
and contribution. The responsi bility of eve~~ occasion for 
the preservation and increase of value in the universe 
as a whole is real and direct. "To God's question men gave 
the answer of Cain--'Am I my brother's keeper?'; and they 
incurred Cain's guilt. • 4 
Whitehead is not only asserting that man is a social 
animal out that all actualities in the universe are necessari-
ly social. The basis and necessity of that society is the 
mutuality of instrumental and intrinsic value. Process 
1. SMW, 251. 
2. RIM, 158 • . 
3. AOI, 251. 
4. SMW, 292. 
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itself can be described as the rhythmic alternation of intrin-
sic and i nstrumental value whose conditi on is society ana 
individuality. Whitehead also calls this fact of mutual 
instrumentality of all occasions to each other the doctrine 
of mutual immanence. Of this he says, "The key to metaphysics 
is the doctrine of mutual immanence, each side lending to the 
1 
other a factor of necessity for its reality." Reallty is 
a democracy the basis of which lies 11 in the common fact of' 
value experience'.rr 2 In_!:~~ and Reality Whitehead points 
out: "Each t~$of creation is a social effort, employing 
the whole universe. Each novel actuality is a new partner 
adding a new conc+ition." 3 Thus an actual occasion is ful-
filling its highest social obligation, its function in the 
universe, when it realizes the fullest, richest, deepest 
satisfaction possible for it, for in doing so it enriches 
instrumentally all values and thus all realities to come 
and is fulfilling the potentialities set for it by its 
pr>edecessors and God. 
This doctrine of the mutuality of intrinsic and 
instrumental value also applies to the relation of actual 
occasions to God. God and the world need each other for the 
fulfillment of God's purpo ::J e. God's primordial nature is 
4 the ultimate source of the ideals for value realization. 
In his consequent nature he is the conserver of values, 
1. ESP, 118. 
2. MOT, 151. 
3. PR, 340-341. 
4. PR, 48. 
but the immediate source of values for h i s ever-growing 
consequent intrinsic value experience is the world of 
actual occasions in their objective immortality as instru-
1 
mental to the intrinsic value experience of God. In turn 
the major i~mediate source of values for becoming actual 
occasions is the superjective nature of God as setting the 
initial subjective aim for each occasion. 2 But since the 
superjective nature of God is a function of the totality of 
God as forming real potentiality in subjective aim for 
each occasion, it is also the instrumentality of God's 
consequent nature or intrinsic value experience for the 
attaining of int~insic value in each occasion. Together 
God and the world form a community of mutually enriching 
intrinsic value experiences. 
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Whitehead has, in other words, performed a metaphysical 
synthesis of reality without sacrificing the individuality 
necessary for plurality of mutually enriching intrinsic 
values. Whitehead's axiological hypothesis (not including 
the last phase of his thought), whatever its shortcomings in 
other respects, does adequately account for the experienced 
subjective nature of value, the objective reference of idea ls, 
the social interdependence of all actualities, the transitory 
nature of all value experiences, the permanence of value in 
the universe, the order of the universe and yet its disorderly 
1 • Chap. IV, s e c • C, 2. 
2. Chap. IV, sec. C, 3. 
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factors as well, and gives to every occasion of experience 
a religious quality of cosmic reaponsibility. The summum 
bon~, the kingdom of God, is no realization of one static 
type of value but the progressive realization and inter-
penetration of all types of values in a cosmic civilization 
of devotion of all occasions to their mutual enrichment. 
Whitehead's universe is melioristic. It is a universe with 
infinite potentialities, but a universe in which the future 
rests not with God alone but with the total society of indi-
vidual occasions and what they do with it. 
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this dissertation is the investi gation 
of the development of Whitehead's conception of value and its 
basic cate gories and the fUnction of value as an integrating 
factor for his general metaphysical position. 
Whitehead's interests and abilities led him from mathe-
matics to philosophy of the natural sciences to metaphysics. 
His interest in the problem of value first appeared in his 
investigations of philosophy of natural sciences and became 
in many ways the predominant interest of his metaphysical 
period. As early as 1920 Whitehead indicated that the values 
of nature are perhaps the key to the metaphysical synthesis 
of existence. His analysis of nature in terms of events 1 
objects 1 significance 1 and rhythm pointed directly to such 
a metaphysical synthesis. The category of events stressed 
the selective achievement and contribution of each unit of 
natural process. The category of objects stressed the charac-
teristics of these events as actualizations of potentiali-
ties and as patterned 1 ordered 1 or structured in their 
synthetic completion. The category of significance stressed 
the mutual meaningfulness 1 conveyed by feeling 1 of .events 
for each other and the resulting intrinsic meaningfulness 
of each event for itself. Through significance each event 
is related to the totality of events and all events are 
significant of an ideality that transcends nature considered 
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as the object of scientific investigation. The category of 
rhythm characteristic of life indicates the nature of life 
as dialectical process motivated by, aimed at, and consum-
mating in value. The way for the extension of value motiva-
tion and consummation to all realities is prepared by the recog-
nition of physical entities as averages of rhythms. 
In the formulative period of his metaphysical investi-
gations extending from Science and !he Mode~ World to Process 
a~ Reality Whitehead developed an axio-centric metaphysical 
synthesis of existence. Value is to be identified with the 
intrinsic reality of an event. The condi tiona of value and 
the conditions of the existence of an event or occasion are 
the same. For Whitehead these conditions are: (1) prehension, 
the affective condition, (2) ideality, the subsistent condi-
tion, and (3) purpose, the effective condition. Every occasion 
as an intrinsic value realization is an affective, selective, 
synthetic actualization of ideal potentialities effected by 
its internal self-determination within the limits of real 
potentiality for it set by its predecessors and the actual 
principle of concretion, relevance, and order in the universe, 
God. Intrinsic value is meaningful, active, teleological, 
self-enjoyed, structured feeling synthesis. As such, intrinsic 
value experience is individual and private. Fact is raised 
to the level of value. 
The principle of individuation is the attainment of pri-
vate, irreducible, and individual intrinsic value. The 
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principle of unity is the instrumentality of all intrinsic 
values to each otber. The int rinsic value of any one occasion 
is proportionate to the instrumental value of other occasions 
to its becoming and its own instrumentality to the becoming 
of other occasions. Thus reality is made up of individualities 
in community. Process can be described in terms of the rhythmic 
alternation of intrinsic and instrumental values. The totality 
of value community is coordinated by the purpose of God that 
there shall be progressive attainment of value in the actual 
world, a purpose effected not by coercion but by the persua-
sive power of the ideal. 
While every occasion as a positive achievement is an 
intrinsic value, disteleology and evil are to be explained 
in terms of failure of adequate purpose and negative instru-
mentality. The relative degree of intrinsic value attained 
or importance of an occasion is to be judged in terr~ of (1) 
harmonious individuality, (2) endurance, (3) novelty, (4) 
contrast, (5) depth, (6) vividness, and (7) personality. 
In Process and Reality the perfectionistic and aesthetic 
character of Whitehead's theory of value is fUrther developed 
in the concepm of subjective aim and satisfaction. The na-
ture and role of God in value process is made explicit. God's 
primordial nature as the locus of general potentiality or 
ideality is the ultimate source of values in the universe. 
In his growing consequent nature God is the conserver of values, 
the preserver and redeemer in his own intrinsic satisfaction 
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of the contributions of all occasions which are thus instru-
mental to value realization in God. By his superjective 
nature God initiates the subjective aims of all occasions 
and thus returns instrumentally to the world the richness 
of his own intrinsic satisfaction or value. The three natures 
of God, however, are to be understood as three fQDCtions of 
the one God and as non-existent in abstraction. 
In Proc~ ~nd Reality also appears the first rift between 
fact and value. Intrinsic value is restricted to the final 
phase or completion of the occasion, the attainme nt of which 
is t he occasion's cessation. Intrinsic value, except for 
God, is made transitory to the point where it "never really 
is." The opening wedge for a secondary theory of value is 
present. 
The major addition to Whitehead's predominant theory 
of value in the period from £!£~ ~nd Real!!l through 
Modes of Thought is a table of values roughly arranged in 
accordance with the categories of importance and on the prin-
ciple that the higher is dependent on but richer than the 
lower. However, the fulJe st realization of any one type of 
value depends upon its interpenetration with all the others. 
The table can be constructed somewhat as follows~ 
A. Lower intrinsic values: 
1. Minor beauty. 
2. Sur vi val. 
B. Higher intrinsic value: 
3. Freedom. 
4. Moral goodness. 
5. Understanding. 
6. Holiness. 
c. Highest intrinsic values: 
7. Truth. 
B. Major beauty. 
9. Adventure. 
10. Civilization. 
11. Peace. 
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In this period the rift between fact and value widens • 
• 
While in Modes of Thought Whiteh~ad insists that matter-of-
fact and importance cannot be separated, he yet recognizes 
a dipolarity between them. The Platonic concept of the nGood" 
is introduced and with it the suggestion of a subsistent 
realm, not of ideals, but of values. The term eternal objects 
all but disappears. 
In the final period of Whitehead's thou&ht as present in 
the articles "Ma thema tics and the Good" and 11 Immortali ty 11 
(1941), the secondary theory of value becomes explicit. 
Tbe Platonic conception of a subsistent realm of values tends 
to win the field. Although Whitehead still insists that the 
universe is a universe of fact and value, the fact is value-
informed or participates in sequences of values which as 
values are subsistent apart from their realization in fact. 
Fact and value stand in polar opposition--two worlds tenuously 
held together by "Ideas" whose metaphysical status is far 
from clear. No longer is the vvo rld of value the factual world 
of individual, self-realizing, self-enjoying, experiental 
occasions. Values themselves are ob jectively, eternally, 
unchangeably real. The bifurcation against which Whitehead 
so convincingly fought throughout most of his philosophic 
career would seem to have triumphed. 
Conclusions: 
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1. For \l.fui tehead value is the key concept for a meta-
physical synthesis of existence. The universe is axio-centric. 
2. Vfuitehead's thought a b out value follows a clear line 
of development and change from his first methodologica 
restriction of value considerations from philosophy of the 
natural sciences (1919} through his last important philoso-
phic writings (1941). 
3. It is inaccurate to speak of Whitehead as holding to 
a sing le theory of value. Rather he tends to move from a con-
ception of intrinsic value as individual, experiential, mean-
ingful, teleological, active, structured, feeling synthesis--
the concept dominant throughout his major works--to a concep-
tion of a realm of objective, subsistent, eternal and unchang-
i ng Platonic values in which the infinite flux of feeling of 
the world of fact merely partic i pates--the concept dominant 
in his last published works. 
4. Whitehead's secondary theory of value would seem to 
have its roots in: 
(1) the presence throughout his thought of a strand of eter-
nalism as evidenced by: a. the denial of change to events and 
occasions predicated on (a) the impossibility of altering or 
changing a completed occasion and (b) the den i al of mutual 
causative influence of contemporary occasions on each other, 
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and b. the assertion of the non-temporality of God in Reli g-
ion in the Making and of the primordial nature of God in 
Process and Realitz in order to insure the constancy and 
preservation of ideal aims, order, and potentiality in the 
universe; 
(2) the desire to compensate for the restriction of intrin-
sic value to the final phase of an occasion in Process and 
Realit;r with the resultant reduction of intrinsic value to 
a status of "never really is"; 
(3) the setting up of a polarity between matter-of-fact and 
importance in Modes of Thought; 
(4) the decreasing emphasis on eternal objects and the in-
creased emphasis on the relation of mathematics and value in 
his later works. 
5. In his dominant theory of value Whitehead offers an 
axiological hypothesis which adequately accounts for the 
experienced subjective nature of intrinsic values, the ob jec-
tive reference of ideals, the social interdependence of all 
actualities, the transitory nature of value experience, the 
permanence of value in the universe, the order in the universe 
and disorderly factors as well, and that gives to every occa-
sion of experience a religious quality of cosmic responsibility. 
This hypothesis can be expressed in three propositions: 
(1) Every actual occasion is an intrinsic value experience, 
i.e., an individual, experiential, active, self-realizing, 
structured feeling synthesis. 
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(2) All intrinsic values, thus all actual occasions, are 
instrumental to other intrinsic values, and their instrumen-
tality increases their intrinsic self-enjoyment. 
(3) Reality is a society of progressive intrinsic value 
realizations (actual entities)--individualities in community 
--the potentialities of which are provided for and the contri-
butions of which are preserved by the primordial and consequent 
envisagements and the superjective non-coercive persuasion 
of one actual entity among them, God. 
6. Since every occasion as an intrinsic value is a pur-
posive feeling synthesis, a unit of experience, a self-reali-
zation, the highly ideal is tic character of Whitehead's meta-
physics be comes e vi.dent in his theory of va 1 ue. 
7. Perhaps the major weakness in Whitehead's dominant 
theory of value lies in his insistence on the primacy of 
aesthetic value over all other types of value, the attempt 
to derive moral order and rational order from aesthetic order, 
and, thus, the primacy of an aesthetic imperative which opens 
the way for a possible Whiteheadean justification of escapism 
on the one hand or of a brutality towards suffering, pain, 
and evil on the other. The paucity of discussion and refer-
ence to morality and moral goodness is in harmony with White-
head's aestheticism but inconsistent with his emphasis on 
self-realization and the mutual instru~entality of intrinsically 
valuable occasions. 
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